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This dissertation examines the personal ties between elite Athenians and 
Thrace from the mid sixth century to the mid fourth century BCE in four case studies 
– the Philaids and the Thracian Chersonese, Dieitrephes and the massacre at 
Mycalessus, the northern campaigns of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, and the fourth 
century mercenary general Iphicrates.  In order to highlight further the particular 
qualities of those elites who were drawn to Thrace, the final chapter examines figures 
that shared several traits with Athenian Thracophiles but did not make extensive use of 
Thracian ties.  The relationship between Athens and Thrace is explored in terms of 
three broad categories – political, military, and cultural.   
Given that there continued to be ambitious elites in Athens even after Solon‟s 
reforms and the subsequent climate of increasing political equality between male 
citizens, Thrace served as a political safety valve.  Thrace was a place to which elites 
could remove themselves should they be unwilling or unable to engage in the 
prevailing ideological system and should mechanisms like ostracism fail to achieve 
the desired result, such as the removal of their more powerful competition.   
Experience with Thracians was often the catalyst for military innovation.  
Several Athenians were pioneers in adopting Thracian methods of warfare.  Thrace 
was a forum for experimentation as it was a long way from the pitched hoplite battles 
 that were the norm between mainland Greek poleis, and Thracophiles were frequently 
the sorts of leaders that were unconstrained by the hoplite ethos.  
Finally, some elements of Thracian culture and society were powerfully 
attractive for ambitious Athenians.  In the Athenian imagination Thrace was a 
throwback to the primitive societies of the Greeks‟ own past, specifically the world of 
epic.  For the Athenians, Thracian culture and society were defined by aselgeia 
(licentiousness) and poluteleia (extravagance).  While these traits were disdained by 
many, they proved enticing to others, those whom Aristophanes would dub 
Thraikophoitai, or Thrace-haunters. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THRACE-HAUNTERS 
 
Introduction 
 In the first half of the fourth century, Iphicrates of Athens, a talented and justly 
famous military leader, forged a connection with Cotys, ruler of the Odrysian kingdom 
of Thrace.
1
  Though he had risen to prominence at the head of Athenian expeditions – 
achieving a stunning victory with mercenary peltasts over Spartan hoplites near 
Corinth in 390 – Iphicrates took up service with his Thracian patron.  Not only did 
Iphicrates take Cotys‟ daughter as his wife, he even fought a naval action on behalf of 
his father-in-law against the forces of Athens itself.  Though Iphicrates‟ career with its 
focus on Thrace has been treated as a unique curiosity in the history of Greek warfare, 
his actions were prefigured by a continuous line of illustrious Athenians stretching 
back nearly two centuries to Pisistratus.   
Thrace featured prominently in Athenian history from the late Archaic and 
throughout the Classical periods.  Its place in the overseas ventures and the strategic 
considerations of Athens as a polis has been widely acknowledged.  But Thrace played 
an essential role in the careers of individual Athenians as well.  In this capacity it was 
of great importance as a destination for political and military leaders frustrated by a 
lack of success and opportunity at home.  This phenomenon was so pronounced that 
Aristophanes coined a unique term for the individuals involved: θρᾳκοφοῖται, or 
Thrace-haunters (F 156 K-A).  Starting well before Iphicrates, the connection between 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are BCE. 
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Athens and Thrace also had an underappreciated importance in the introduction and 
adoption of novel, non-hoplite military tactics throughout Greece.       
While Athens and individual Athenians had ties with various foreign peoples, 
Thrace was uniquely important in several ways.  To a greater degree than other 
locales, Thrace was attractive because of the richness of its resources in terms of 
metals, timber, arable land, and access to grain-producing areas further afield; its 
geographic proximity to seafaring Athens; the relative power vacuum throughout its 
vast territory; and various cultural and social elements that appealed to members of an 
elite stifled by the political system of post-Solonian Athens.  As Athens became ever 
more egalitarian, certain of its citizens still aimed at political dominance.  Though this 
sometimes led to civil strife and violent attacks against democratic institutions, Thrace 
provided sufficient opportunities for disaffected elites so as to spare Athens from 
considerable political turmoil.  It also served as a means for ambitious figures to 
consolidate their power within the system at home.  Beyond politics, some Athenians 
might have found in Thrace an environment more conducive to aristocratic cultural 
affinities, from ostentatious display to heroic feasting.  The elites who turned to 
Thrace tended to be open to military innovation just as they were ready to employ 
unorthodox measures in circumventing regular Athenian politics.  Thus, these Thrace-
haunters combined experience with Thracian tactics with a willingness to use them.   
This study will examine how the relationship between Thrace and the Athenian 
elite was manifested in terms of three broad categories: Political – that is, the ways in 
which Thrace factored into politics at Athens by advancing Athenians at home and 
providing a political outlet and refuge abroad; Military – the impact the special 
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relationship between Athens and Thrace had on Greek military practices and the 
central role played by Thrace-haunters; and Cultural – the “soft,” or non-political and 
non-material ways in which Thrace might have appealed to certain Athenians.
2
 
 
Ambitious Elites in an Egalitarian State: Political Considerations 
In the fourth century many Athenian generals abandoned Athens in favor of 
their own private operations abroad, which Demosthenes attempts to explain in the 
Second Olynthiac, delivered in 349:  
If I am to say something factual about the generals, then why do you think, 
men of Athens, all the generals you send out flee this war only to pursue their 
own private wars?  Because this war is fought for prizes that are yours 
collectively (for if Amphipolis were taken, you would be immediately 
advantaged), but the commanders bear the danger themselves and yet receive 
no pay.  In private wars, the danger is small and the rewards go to the 
commanders and the soldiers – Lampsacus, Sigeum, and the things plundered 
from ships, for example.  Therefore each one turns to that which pays best 
(2.28).
3
    
 
In urging the Athenians to commit the requisite resources to check Philip‟s growing 
power, Demosthenes gives a straightforward, sensible reason why commanders have 
taken to pursuing their own “private wars.”  Fighting on behalf of Athens carried great 
                                                 
2
 I use the expression “soft” in the sense championed by Joseph Nye, Jr. in his 1990 book Bound to 
Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, and more recently in 2004‟s Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics.  Nye employs the idea of “soft power” in the sphere of international 
relations, whereby one nation affects the behavior of another by means of attraction – employing things 
such as culture, values and institutions – rather than coercion – achieved through more traditional 
military and economic means.  Various regions of Thrace had definite “hard” advantages, such as 
strategic location and economic opportunity, but it also had less tangible cultural and social attractions.  
3 “τίνος γὰρ εἵνεκ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζετε τοῦτον μὲν φεύγειν τὸν πόλεμον πάντας 
ὅσους ἅν ἐκπέμψητε στρατηγούς, ἰδίους δ’ εὑρίσκειν πολέμους, εἰ δεῖ τι τῶν ὄντων καὶ 
περὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν εἰπεῖν; ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μέν ἐστι τἆθλ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐστιν ὁ πόλεμος ὑμέτερα 
(Ἀμφίπολίς γ’ ἅν ληφθῇ, παραχρῆμ’ ὑμεῖς κομιεῖσθε), οἱ δὲ κίνδυνοι τῶν ἐφεστηκότων 
ἴδιοι, μισθὸς δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖ δὲ κίνδυνοι μὲν ἐλάττους, τὰ δὲ λήμματα τῶν ἐφεστηκότων 
καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, Λάμψακος, ΢ίγειον, τὰ πλοῖ’ ἃ συλῶσιν. ἐπ’ οὖν τὸ λυσιτελοῦν 
αὑτοῖς ἕκαστοι χωροῦσιν.”  Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.    
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risk for a commander in the case of defeat, and very little reward in the case of 
victory.
4
  Demosthenes was addressing the situation in his own day, but the Athenian 
generalship had always been a hazardous occupation.  Capable of bringing great glory 
to a victor, such as for Miltiades after the Battle of Marathon, it virtually guaranteed 
harsh and immediate consequences after defeat, as for the very same Miltiades 
following his failure at Paros.  Such were the consequences of popular control over the 
state‟s leaders. 
In his 352/1 speech Against Aristocrates, Demosthenes characterizes those 
generals who were attracted to Thrace as desirous of exousia, or license and authority 
(23.57).
5
  Throughout the speech Demosthenes deals with Charidemus of Oreus, one 
of the more notorious military leaders of the mid fourth century.  Charidemus was 
originally from Euboea, but as a mercenary light-infantryman in the 360‟s he served 
under Iphicrates and accompanied him on a mission to Amphipolis.  When Iphicrates 
failed to take the city and decided to remain in Thrace, Charidemus did likewise and 
would spend the rest of his career oscillating between service to the Athenians and to 
Thracian kings.  To Demosthenes‟ mind, Charidemus was loyal only to his own 
advancement.  Demosthenes carefully contrasts the civilizing and constraining laws of 
                                                 
4
 While many scholars have followed the scholiast to this speech in suggesting that Demosthenes means 
to single out Chares in particular as the general who pursued his own interests instead of bringing aid to 
Olynthus, I agree with Ellis (1967: 109) who argues that Demosthenes is alluding to all Athenian 
generals. 
5 “ἀπαλλαγῇ μὲν ἐκ Θρᾴκης, ἐλθὼν δ’ εἰς πόλιν οἰκῇ που, τῆς μὲν ἐξουσίας μηκέτι κύριος 
ὢν δι’ ἧς πολλὰ ποιεῖ τῶν ἀπειρημένων ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων… (Suppose [Charidemus] should leave 
Thrace, coming to live in some civilized city, no longer enjoying the license through which he now 
commits innumerable violations of the law…)”  Demosthenes supplements the sections of historical 
narrative in this speech with many pieces of documentary evidence.  As Sealey (1993: 131) notes, 
Demosthenes acquired the copious knowledge of Thrace demonstrated in the speech from his service as 
a trierarch in the region in 360/59.  Sealey also suggests that, though a Hellenistic scholar listed 
Euthycles as the actual litigant who delivered the speech, perhaps Demosthenes prosecuted Aristocrates 
himself. 
 5 
 
the Athenian polis – particularly the legal safeguards and recourse available to 
aggrieved citizens against the more powerful – with the exousia available in Thrace to 
the unscrupulous.  Like his protégé, Iphicrates seems to have been attracted to the 
exousia of Thrace when denied what he deemed to be suitable power in Athens.   
For a long time scholars maintained that the generals in the fourth century were 
tied less and less to the demos and behaved largely as condottieri, the mercenary 
generals of late medieval and Renaissance Italian city-states.  Some have likened them 
as well to the professional generals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who 
rose to prominence in the armies of foreign powers.
6
  Also, mercenary soldiers came 
increasingly to replace the traditional citizen hoplite as the mainstay of Greek armies, 
or so was the communis opinio.
7
  Iphicrates, with his storied leadership of Thracian 
mercenaries and perfidious actions in the service of Thracian kings, would appear to 
be the very paradigm of these trends in Greek warfare.  But, the observations of 
Demosthenes are also apt with respect to many prominent Athenians in the fifth and 
even the sixth century.  In the context of post-Solonian Athens, Thrace had long 
beckoned leading political and military figures with the promise of ever greater 
exousia. 
It is a truism that there will always be elites in any given society, regardless of 
the particular political, social, and cultural framework by which the society is defined.  
In the case of ancient Athens, though by the end of the sixth century a new form of 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of the problems with labels such as condottieri, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 59-
116.  Pritchett argues that these generals remained loyal in the service of their polis.  He seems to 
overstate his case at certain points, however, as many of the Athenian leaders did at times forsake 
Athens in favor of their own campaigns.  
7
 For a study of this phenomenon, see Burckhardt 1996: 76-153.  Pritchett (1974-1991: vol. 2, 104) 
thinks the sources, especially Demosthenes and Isocrates, exaggerate the dependence on mercenaries. 
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government took hold which in theory afforded ever greater numbers of adult male 
citizens a full share in the running of the state and the benefits derived therefrom, there 
remained individuals who strove for a disproportionately great share of power.  While 
sometimes these figures were able to achieve such power, often they were left 
disappointed.  Scholars have long wrestled with how democratic Athens reconciled the 
opposing interests of mass and elite, as well as the fierce competition within the elite 
itself.  
Ober argues in his seminal Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens that the elite 
communicated with the masses in the public sphere by means of a complex set of 
symbols.  The meaning and ideology behind these symbols were assigned by the 
masses themselves, thereby constraining the elite.
8
  More recently, he has explored 
further the ways in which the Athenian democracy met the challenges posed by what 
was in reality a socially diverse citizen body.  He calls democracy “diversity 
management,” and acknowledges that such a system inevitably left some disappointed.  
Ideally, though, the political and social “ledger” would be balanced over time.9 
In an important study, Forsdyke maintains that through the institution of 
ostracism the democracy took ownership of the “weapon of exile.”  Prior to 
democracy, members of the elite throughout Greece had employed exile as a means of 
removing their competitors.  This rendered the political situation in many poleis 
inherently violent and unstable.  Ostracism, with its ten-year limit, was an ingeniously 
mild form of exile which showcased the democracy‟s restraint while still preventing 
dangerously ambitious and influential individuals from posing a threat to the balance 
                                                 
8
 See Ober 1989, esp. 339. 
9
 Ober 2005: 1-26. 
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of power.
10
    
Recently, Moreno has argued that, by contrast to the system outlined by Ober, 
the elite were in fact able to maintain power over the masses in Athens.  This was 
achieved principally through control of the grain trade.  For Moreno, foreign 
connections with the Aegean clerouchies and allies in the fifth century and with the 
kingdoms in the grain-producing Crimea in the fourth were crucial to elite control of 
Athens.  These elites were cynical enough to call themselves democrats while 
fostering despotic rule in the northern Black Sea in order to cement their position 
within the democracy.
11
    
To add to the models advanced by Ober and Forsdyke, Thrace was a place to 
which the elite could remove themselves should they be unwilling or unable to engage 
in the prevailing ideological system and should ostracism fail to achieve for them the 
desired result, such as the removal of their more powerful competition.  Not every 
ambitious Athenian was willing to suffer political and social disappointment in the 
hopes that the situation would even out in the end.  In this way, removal of oneself to 
Thrace served as a type of voluntary ostracism.  Furthermore, it would seem that 
Athens was not always as susceptible to elite capture as Moreno contends.  Even if it 
were, not a few notable Athenians would still be largely excluded from power.  
Instead of using foreign ties to maintain their influence at Athens, many elites turned 
abroad when the desired level of influence proved unattainable, either because the 
democracy would not countenance elite capture, or because rival elites held the reins 
of power.  For this reason, Thrace proved a vital alternative to Athens, providing a 
                                                 
10
 See S. Forsdyke 2005, esp. 1-3. 
11
 See Moreno 2007, esp. 204, 322-323. 
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power base and an outlet for elites unable to achieve their goals at home.  The 
ambitions of the elder Miltiades, for example, were stifled because of Pisistratus‟ firm 
grip on power in the second half of the sixth century, so he turned to the Thracian 
Chersonese.  Connections to Thrace also frequently allowed elites to achieve greater 
influence at Athens itself.  Pisistratus overcame rival aristocrats once and for all and 
was established as tyrant largely because of the mercenaries and money he was able to 
amass from the region around Mt. Pangaeum in the northern Aegean.   
The extent and nature of the role Thrace played in the contest for political 
power among Athens‟ elites has gone unnoticed by modern scholarship.  More than 
three and a half decades ago, Pritchett, in discussing Iphicrates, commented that “we 
are in need of a study of nuptial ties of mercenary chieftains with Macedonian and 
Thracian princesses.”12  Little has been done to remedy this situation.  As this study 
will show, for Athens such ties went far beyond the nuptial and involved many more 
leading figures than those traditionally seen as mercenary chieftains.  In his invaluable 
reference work for Aegean Thrace, Isaac identifies some of the personal ties 
established between Athenians and Thrace.  For instance, in discussing the ties of 
Thucydides and the Philaids to the region opposite Thasos, Isaac stresses the 
longstanding relationship forged by one of Athens‟ most elite families with Thrace, 
based largely on cooperation rather than enmity with local Thracians.
13
  But Isaac is 
interested in such connections only insofar as they pertain to the local history of 
certain sites.  Only a very cursory account is therefore provided.  
Archibald‟s 1998 The Odyrsian Kingdom of Thrace: Orpheus Unmasked 
                                                 
12
 Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 66, n. 33. 
13
 Isaac 1986: 34. 
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provides the most comprehensive survey to date of the region of Thrace most directly 
connected to the Athenians.  In discussing Athenian activities in Thrace during the 
Pentacontaetia, she says that “the relationship between official civil and military 
activities and unofficial, private ones is occasionally perceptible in our sources but is 
otherwise an unexplored dimension of these developments.”  While Archibald does 
recognize that the personal interests of elite Athenians were central to Athens‟ 
foothold in Thrace, she stresses that Athens‟ principal aims in the north were 
economic and strategic.
14
  There is no in depth exploration of how pervasive these 
personal ties actually were, nor the full range of factors which led to elite Athenian 
interest in Thrace irrespective of the wider aims of the polis.  Also, Archibald 
distinguishes between the personal ties made by Pisistratus and the Philaids, especially 
Cimon, with what appear to have been official “civic” ventures from the mid fifth 
century on.
15
  Even in the later fifth century, though, the personal connections of the 
elite continued to play a pivotal role, and there was not so much of a shift in Athenian 
diplomatic machinery as scholars such as Archibald contend. 
For the Greeks, the Persian Empire too was often perceived as a source of 
personal enrichment and prestige, and a channel to greater political power.  The main 
difference, though, between Thrace and the other lands to which an Athenian might 
turn was the potential for acquiring autonomous power and territory.  Whereas the 
nations ruled by the Persians were under the thumb of the Great King, and any Greek 
who was given influence over a territory served at the pleasure of his Persian masters, 
Thrace was under no such central control.  In describing Thrace, Herodotus evokes a 
                                                 
14
 Archibald 1998: 115-116. 
15
 Archibald 1998: 112. 
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land of limitless but unrealized potential.  He says that the population of Thrace is 
second only to that of India, and that if all the Thracian tribes united under a single 
leader and common goal, no nation on earth could defeat them.  Herodotus then adds, 
however, that such a unification could never happen, so the Thracians remain weak 
and divided (5.3).  The Odrysian kingdom provides the only exception to a Thrace that 
was fragmented, and even under the Odrysians enterprising Greeks could enjoy a great 
degree of individual power and autonomy.  While Herodotus himself lived to see the 
rise of the Odrysian kingdom and knew of the powerful king Sitalces (Hdt. 4.80, 
7.137), he maintained his conception of Thrace as largely ungoverned.  It was in this 
expansive territory in the northern Aegean that ambitious men could establish 
hereditary dynasties, secure wealth and resources, and acquire private armies of 
mercenary soldiers.  In short, Thrace-haunters could obtain the exousia they desired.   
 
Inspiration from Abroad: The Military Impact of the Thracian Connection 
Many scholars have recognized that Thracian soldiers were instrumental to 
Greek military developments.  The indispensible volume is Best‟s dissertation, 
published in 1969 as Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare.
16
  Best 
emphasizes that peltasts – the light-armed Thracian soldier characterized by his small 
crescent-shaped shield, the pelte – played a role in Greek armies far earlier than most 
previous scholars had assumed.  He also argues that the famous fourth century reforms 
of Iphicrates as related by Diodorus and Nepos, by which peltasts were supposedly 
regularized and integrated into Greek armies, never actually took place.  Best 
                                                 
16
 Best 1969. 
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concludes that any major changes to Greek warfare were essentially effected by the 
end of the fifth century and that in the fourth, that era of supposedly revolutionary 
developments in Greek infantry tactics, “the situation in the army remained exactly as 
before.  The hoplites formed the core of both the Greek citizen and mercenary armies; 
peltasts played a secondary role, albeit one of considerable importance.”17  Best goes a 
little too far.  Nepos and Diodorus might have misconstrued some of the details 
transmitted by their sources, but Iphicrates was a capable innovator.  Greek poleis 
might have failed to incorporate Iphicrates‟ innovations effectively, but it does not 
follow that he made no such innovations or that they did not have an impact on 
military practice. 
Best and others largely neglect the special connection between Athens and 
Thrace, which was a central element in the introduction and integration of Thracian 
tactics.  Iphicrates was clearly working within an already established military 
paradigm for the use of light-armed auxiliaries.  But beyond this, by turning to Thrace, 
he behaved much as previous generations of elite Athenians had in the political sphere 
as well.  He was a cunning tactician who made good use of Thracian-style mercenary 
soldiers due mainly to the extended periods of time he spent with them.  Those 
inhabiting the Greek settlements in the Thraceward region were among the first to 
recognize the effectiveness of Thracian styles of warfare and adopt Thracian tactics 
themselves, perhaps the inevitable result of proximity to the Thracians.  In the same 
way, Athens played a decisive role in pioneering the use of Thracian soldiers precisely 
because so many elite Athenians had personal ties with Thrace.  Athens itself was also 
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a geographic neighbor to the Thracians if we consider the Thracian Chersonese to be 
Athenian territory.  It was at any rate controlled and inhabited by Athenians through 
much of the period covered by this study.  Places in the north Aegean such as Thasos 
were under Athenian suzerainty at various times as well.  This connection was 
important for the introduction to mainland Greece of the peltast and possibly several 
other military practices that have gone unnoticed by previous scholars. 
It is unlikely that proximity to and experience with Thracians was the only 
factor that led to such significant military change.  The peltast was an important new 
technology for the Greeks, but scholars debate to what extent new technologies 
provide an impetus for reform.  Politics, society, and culture clearly play important 
roles too, both in the adoption of new ways of fighting and the retention of old.  Many 
Athenian Thrace-haunters were innovators that were unconstrained by traditional 
military norms.  In their hands, the new technology learned from the Thracians could 
be put to optimum use.  This vital characteristic of those who spearheaded key Greek 
military developments has received insufficient scholarly comment.  
Many scholars, though, have addressed non-technological aspects of Greek 
warfare, especially how Greek tactics were intertwined with the nature of the polis.  In 
an influential article, Vidal-Naquet insisted that the Classical hoplite phalanx, 
especially that of Athens, was an artificial reflection of the polis itself.  Even the 
organizational structure of the Athenian phalanx was based on the political division of 
Attica wrought by Cleisthenes‟ reforms.18  More recently, Hanson has shown that 
citizen hoplites, who were primarily middling farmers, dictated the predominance of 
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the decisive phalanx battle until at least the Peloponnesian War.  For Hanson, it was in 
the interest of the land-owning hoplites to settle disputes as quickly as possible in 
order both to defend their property and to ensure that lengthy campaigns did not keep 
them from their crops.  Once military power was in the hands of these middling 
farmers, they demanded their fair share of political power, which led to the community 
of citizens that was the Classical polis.
19
  Strauss has provided similar analyses with 
respect to the Athenian navy, the predominance of which in the fifth century led to a 
more broadly-based democracy with full participation of the thetic class of rowers.
20
  
As Strauss succinctly states, “military tactics are rarely simply a matter of military 
efficiency; they reflect politics, society, and culture.”21  
Recently, Lendon has focused on the cultural dimension of ancient military 
practices, arguing that both the Greeks and Romans found military inspiration in 
looking to the past, especially the mythological and epic past.
22
  The Greeks were 
most of all concerned with emulating Homeric precedent and tailored their infantry 
tactics accordingly.  Lendon suggests that the increasing presence of the peltast in the 
fourth century, along with Iphicrates‟ reforms, was made possible not so much 
because the peltast mode of fighting – by charging out and hurling javelins – was 
tactically effective, but because it resembled Homeric warfare more than did the 
hoplite phalanx.
23
  In the end, Iphicrates probably did not care whether his troops had 
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epic legitimacy, and the peltast still did not replace the hoplite as the primary element 
of Greek armies.  But Lendon‟s suggestion that culture plays an important part in 
tactics is a good one.  Certainly something had to overcome the cultural and social 
stigma attached to non-hoplite troops. 
Ferrill addresses this issue in his general survey of ancient warfare.  He argues 
that there were two distinct strains of military development in antiquity, that of the 
Greeks, and that of the Near East.
24
  By Ferrill‟s model, change gradually came about 
in Greece because large numbers of Greek mercenaries served in the east in the late 
fifth and throughout the fourth centuries and brought back their experience with light-
armed troops and other supposedly eastern elements.  The Greek ideological 
commitment to hoplite battle, however, ensured a slow rate of change.   Since the 
Macedonians had never been fully part of the hoplite culture, Philip was finally able to 
merge the two strains of development in creating his invincible war machine.  As a 
Macedonian, Philip enjoyed a relatively free hand to innovate.
25
  Ferrill pays too little 
attention to the importance of cavalry in the Macedonian army, and he overstates his 
case in insisting that virtually all Greek military innovation was due to Persian 
influence.
26
  He rightly, though, emphasizes the conservatism of the Greek hoplite as 
compared to the innovative genius of Philip.   
Like Philip, Thrace-haunters seem to have been less tied to the hoplite ethos.  
They were thus open to military experimentation inspired by their contact with 
Thracians.  Figures such as Dieitrephes and Iphicrates were all too happy to work 
                                                 
24
 Ferrill 1997: 149-186. 
25
 Ferrill 1997: 150. 
26
 Ferrill 1997: 180. 
 15 
 
beyond the bounds of the phalanx.  They were placed in charge of foreign and 
irregular troops and received their commands by special appointment, circumventing 
the regular channels such as popular election to the strategia.  They were uninterested 
in the supposedly ritualized conventions of hoplite warfare, and were instead willing 
to employ any and every devise to achieve victory, to the point of unleashing bands of 
soldiers on defenseless towns.  Xenophon, by contrast, was unimpressed with the 
Thracian Seuthes‟ willingness to slaughter and plunder even his defeated enemies in 
order to teach them a lesson.  Many of those attracted to Thrace were also wealthy 
aristocrats, expert horsemen who probably felt little loyalty to the hoplite phalanx in 
either an ethical or political sense.  The Philaids, for example, were famous horse-
breeders in Attica, and many members of the family, including the elder and younger 
Miltiades, were victors in the Olympic chariot race.  Why should wealthy, talented, 
and ambitious descendents of the eupatridae adhere to the phalanx and its attendant 
values of military and political equality?  This freedom to experiment beyond the 
regular forms of warfare was a major factor in effecting military change in Greece. 
A central theme in the various modern histories of Greek warfare is the 
increasing dependence of poleis on mercenary troops in the fourth century and the 
growing professionalization of the military concomitant with a separation between 
political and military leadership.
27
  The ties between Athens and Thrace have largely 
been ignored in such analysis.  Common scholarly opinion is well encapsulated by 
Lengauer.  He argues that starting in the last decades of the fifth century, and 
increasingly in the first half of the fourth, military commanders, who had once been 
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conceived of as citizens leading groups of citizens in military activities at the behest of 
the polis, grew to become military commanders-in-chief.  In many cases, Military 
strength came to be the prime determiner of political power.
28
  As Lengauer contends, 
this trend was made possible by the growing professionalization of generals, of which 
Iphicrates was a prime example.  Such commanders were first and foremost military 
men whose success depended solely on military skill.  Their ties to any polis were 
largely immaterial, hence Iphicrates‟ service for Cotys in Thrace.29  But as this study 
will show, the phenomenon of the military leader more concerned with his own 
advantage than with the aims of the polis was nothing new in the late fifth and early 
fourth centuries.  It was to Thrace that many such figures turned as early as the mid 
sixth century.       
 
The Greek Discourse of Thrace: Cultural Attractions   
 The historian Theopompus of Chios, writing in the fourth century, offers his 
own take on the reasons behind prominent Athenians turning abroad.  As he alleges 
concerning Chabrias and others: 
[Chabrias] was unable to live in Athens, partly because of his profligacy 
(aselgeia) and extravagant way of life (poluteleia), and partly because of the 
Athenians.  As the Athenians are difficult for all prosperous men to bear, 
virtually all of the most renowned figures elect to live abroad: Iphicrates in 
Thrace, Conon in Cyprus, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares in Sigeum, and 
Chabrias himself in Egypt (FGrHist 115 F 105).
30
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As is implied, the great men of Athens almost invariably left the city because their 
very lifestyle was out of keeping with the Athenian democracy.  Chabrias was too 
prone to aselgeia and poluteleia to live in Athens, where such traits were discouraged 
and even reviled.  As Flower argues, Theopompus does have a tendency to over-
moralize, and he is not always consistent.  While he is aghast at the apparent moral 
depravity exhibited by individuals in his day, he is also harshly critical of the Athenian 
democracy, which he sees as itself decadent and morally bankrupt.
31
  Lamentation 
over moral decay was a common theme for elite writers, especially in the fourth 
century.  A general‟s extravagance, then, is ultimately insufficient as an explanation 
for the choice to leave Athens and take up with foreign powers, but it cannot be utterly 
discounted as a factor. 
Throughout the two centuries of Atheno-Thracian relations, aselgeia and 
poluteleia were central ideas along with a desire for exousia.  These concepts 
informed the Athenian discourse of Thrace and characterized the Athenians who 
cemented ties in the region – from the tyrant Pisistratus in the 550‟s to Iphcrates and 
his successors in the mid fourth century.  Many if not all of these figures at one point 
or another embraced certain Thracian cultural practices.  They seem to have been 
more prone to aselgeia and poluteleia than was acceptable at home.   
To determine what attraction, if any, Thrace held for such Athenians, we must 
                                                                                                                                            
Sigeum, a city in the Troad, was usually considered part of Thrace as well, along with the other cities in 
the region such as Abydos and Lampsacus.  Chares had led many campaigns in the vicinity of the 
Hellespont, so he too should be considered a Thrace-haunter. 
31
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could be just as extravagant as Chabrias in his personal life.  See also Flower‟s comments on FGrHist 
115 F 62 in which Theopompus renders a damning indictment of the decadence of fourth century 
democracy (78-79). 
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examine in some detail how the Greeks conceived of the Thracians.  The evidence 
indicates that some saw in Thrace not only a political, but also a cultural alternative to 
Athens that suited their particular tastes.  Davies outlines some of the problems faced 
by the traditional elite under the democracy: 
A traditional society could be governed by people whose claim on public 
recognition lay in their wealth, or athletic prowess, or descent from a god or 
hero.  A complicated, Assembly-based, political society such as Athens had 
rapidly become needed men to run it who could compile a set of accounts and 
check that they were right, who had enough sense of logic to put a case 
persuasively, and who could cope on their feet with malicious opponents and a 
bloody-minded Assembly.
32
    
 
A democratic system rendered much of conventional aristocratic training and talent 
obsolete.  Davies continues by quoting a passage from Plato‟s Laches (179c-d) in 
which the speaker addresses the inappropriateness of elite education – that is, training 
in horsemanship, wrestling, gymnastics and the like – for achieving power in the 
Athenian democracy.
33
  Prior to the reforms of Cleisthenes, the tyranny of Pisistratus 
also placed a check on the ambitions of rival aristocrats.  In the Athenian imagination, 
Thrace represented the type of traditional society in which aristocratic skills still 
carried the appropriate weight. 
To be sure, many elite writers of the Classical period portray Thrace and the 
Thracians in a negative light.  Euripides‟ Hecuba renders perhaps the most vivid 
image of Thracian savagery, greed, and perfidy.  We are told at the beginning of the 
play that Polymestor, king of the horse-loving Thracians in the Chersonese, was given 
Priam‟s son Polydorus to safeguard during the course of the Trojan War.  In short 
order, Polymestor killed the son of his ally and guest-friend (ξένος) in order to steal 
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his gold, thus violating every rule of guest-friendship (ξενία).  Later, he maltreats 
Polydorus‟ mother Hecuba, and the daughter of Priam and Hecuba, Polyxena, is 
sacrificed by the Greeks on a Thracian altar.  In the end, Hecuba blinds Polymestor, 
who in turn seethes with rage and wants to tear Hecuba limb from limb and devour 
her: “Where can I spring on them and devour their flesh and bones, making for myself 
a savage beast‟s meal, inflicting mutilation in payback for their outrage against me?”34  
There are few characters so evil in all of Greek literature as this Thracian king who 
violates every diplomatic convention, lusts insatiably after treasure, and raves about 
his desire to butcher and consume his enemy.   
As scholars have remarked, there might be a warning inherent in the play.  In 
the early years of the Peloponnesian War, when the Hecuba was first produced, 
Athens was entering into close diplomatic relations with the Thracians, especially the 
Odrysian king Sitalces.  As a gesture of goodwill, the Athenians had even made 
Sitalces‟ son an Athenian citizen (Thuc. 2.29).  Euripides might have intended this 
play as an admonition against relying on a Thracian as an ally in the war, as the 
Thracians were proverbially greedy and untrustworthy.  Like Polymestor who had 
agreed to protect Priam‟s son during a war only to murder him for material gain, 
Sitalces could be expected to pursue his own interests regardless of any perks offered 
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by the Athenians.
35
  Polyxena, whose very name means “many guest-friends,” seems 
to represent, by her sacrifice at the hands of the Greeks in Thrace, the terrible 
consequences of entering into alliances with Thracian dynasts.  As Hecuba declares: 
“The barbarian race has never been a friend to the Greeks, nor could it be (οὔποτ’ ἅν 
φίλον / τὸ βάρβαρον γένοιτ’ ἅν Ἕλλησιν γένος / οὐδ’ ἅν δύναιτο, 1199-
1201).” 
Another Thracian character of stereotypical brutality is Tereus, popularized by 
his depiction in Ovid‟s Metamorphoses.  The earliest versions of the Tereus myth can 
be traced back to Homer (Od. 19.518-23), Hesiod (F 312 M-W) and Pherecydes 
(FGrHist 3 F 124).  Sophocles wrote a tragedy called the Tereus sometime before 414, 
which now survives only in fragments.  It has been argued that Sophocles‟ version of 
the story probably had a great deal of influence on Ovid‟s.36  The essence of the story 
is that the Athenian king Pandion married his daughter Procne to his military ally, the 
Thracian king Tereus.  In due course, Tereus fell in love with Procne‟s sister 
Philomela and so kidnapped her, raped her, and cut out her tongue to prevent her from 
revealing his crime.  Once Procne learned of her husband‟s deeds, she conspired with 
her sister to kill her own son by Tereus, and serve his remains to Tereus as a meal.  
When the awful truth was revealed, Tereus was transformed into a hoopoe in full 
armor, Procne into a nightingale, and Philomela into a swallow.  While the myth 
existed before Sophocles‟ play, it seems that Sophocles innovated by setting the action 
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in Thrace.
37
  It is likely, though, that Sophocles made use of a pre-existing tradition in 
which Thrace had rendered military aid to Athens at some point in the epic past.
38
 
The myth of Tereus was popular in Athens during the time of the 
Peloponnesian War.  Tereus is a central character in Aristophanes‟ Birds.  He is also 
mentioned by Thucydides in connection to the Athenians‟ Thracian ally Sitalces 
(2.29).  Sitalces‟ father was a man named Teres, and clearly some Athenians had 
connected Teres with the mythological Tereus, a notion which Thucydides attempts to 
disprove.  In the early fourth century, the Thracian dynast Seuthes II appears to make 
use of the same mythological kinship in dealing with Xenophon, as recounted in the 
Anabasis (7.2.31, 3.39).
39
  While the Thracians tried to use the myth to their advantage 
by highlighting a history of military alliance between Athens and Thrace, writers such 
as Sophocles possibly employed the myth as a cautionary tale.  Like Polymestor, 
Tereus was a cruel and untrustworthy ally.  Thus, Athens should think twice before 
working with his descendants.
40
   
The Thracians were noted for their propensity for warfare.  Euripides describes 
the fearsome god of war, Ares, as the lord of Thrace of the golden pelte, that is, the 
crescent shield wielded by peltasts (Ἄρεος, ζαχρύσου Θρηικίας πέλτης ἄναξ, 
Alc. 498).  Herodotus claims that Ares, along with Dionysus and Artemis, was one of 
the only gods worshipped by the Thracians (5.7).  Herodotus also says that the 
Thracians considered a life of working the land the least worthy of honor 
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(ἀτιμότατον), but reckoned that warfare and plunder provided the finest mode of 
living (τὸ ζῆν . . . κάλλιστον, 5.6).  Herodotus rounds out his description of 
Thracian bellicosity by stating that the most valuable prizes in Thracian athletic 
competitions were awarded to the victors in single combat (μονομαχία, 5.8).  
Thucydides paints a terrifying picture of Thracian mercenaries setting upon the 
unwalled Boeotian town of Mycalessus, which they utterly destroyed before turning to 
plunder.  These Thracians were so intent on despoiling the town (ἁρπαγή) that many 
of them were killed by the Theban cavalry while still in the act of gathering up booty 
(7.29-30).  In the fourth century, Isocrates equated sea-borne pirates 
(καταποντισταί) with peltasts (4.115).  Even into the Roman period the Thracians 
continued to be famous for fighting.  Vergil calls Thrace the land of Mars (Mavortia 
Terra, Aen. 3.13), and Horace describes it as a country mad with war (bello furiosa 
Thrace, Carm. 2.16.5). 
Thracians, as other barbarians, were purported to be drunkards.  Aristophanes, 
in his Acharnians, ridicules the Athenian envoys to Sitalces by suggesting that they 
were held up so long in Thrace by continuous drinking parties (141).  While the 
Persians are similarly mocked in the play (73-78), the Thracians seem to have had 
more of a flair for rowdy drunkenness.  Plato lists the Thracians along with the 
Scythians as the quintessential drinkers, taking their wine neat and letting it crudely 
drip all over their clothes.  Even the women partake in such activities.  In this way, the 
Thracians and Scythians reckon that they are following a noble and prestigious custom 
(καλὸν καὶ εὔδαιμον ἐπιτήδευμα).  While the Persians also drink great quantities, 
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they do so with considerably more decorum (ἐν τάξει δὲ μ᾵λλον τούτων, Leg. 
1.637d-e).  Xenophon describes Seuthes II as able to drink several horns of neat wine 
and then carry on as if the alcohol had not the slightest effect (An. 7.3.35).  The fourth 
century king Cotys is reviled by Demosthenes as directing a drunken rage (μεθύων 
ἐπαρῴνει) against his foes, Athens included (23.114).  In a private legal speech of 
Demosthenes, a group of rowdy, drunken, and utterly sacrilegious Athenian youths is 
described.  This group dubbed itself the Triballoi after a famously uncouth Thracian 
tribe (54.39).   
As is evident, in much of Greek, and specifically Athenian, discourse Thrace 
was reviled, mocked, and even feared as a primitive and backward society of fierce 
fighters.  Belligerence was matched only by rapacity, perfidy, and drunkenness.  What 
could possibly recommend such a society to members of the Athenian elite?   
Some Greeks might have thought of the Thracians not only as barbaric and 
savage, but also as quaintly old-fashioned.  In the second book of the Politics, 
Aristotle discusses how and when changes should be introduced into the laws of any 
given state.  While this task should never be undertaken lightly, sometimes it is 
important to bring in modifications and improvements to a body of law.  As an 
example of why such measures might be necessary, Aristotle says that the customs of 
old are exceedingly simple and barbaric (τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν 
ἁπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς).  For instance, the Greeks used to carry arms at all 
times and purchase their wives (ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ τὰς 
γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο παρ’ ἀλλήλων, 1268b39-41).  The Thracians were famous 
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for purchasing their wives at great expense, as Herodotus relates (5.6), and there are 
references to Thracians carrying weapons in a way that was no longer fashionable 
among the Greeks (Hdt. 6.36; Thuc. 1.5.3-6.2).
41
  Some Greeks, then, might not have 
considered the customs of the Thracians, even the most savage ones, to be utterly alien 
and divorced from “Greekness.”  Instead, the Thracians lived as the Greeks 
themselves once had.   
 Near the beginning of his Archaeology, Thucydides says that in former times 
Greeks and barbarians alike routinely engaged in piracy (λῃστεία), in particular 
descending upon weak and unprotected settlements in sea-borne raids in order to seize 
plunder.  More than that, they considered this lifestyle to be perfectly honorable (τι 
καὶ δόξης).  In those days of banditry, everyone carried weapons at all times, which 
the more primitive Greeks continued to do.  Thucydides then discusses the way in 
which many Greek states turned to a more luxurious and relaxed way of life, as is also 
common among certain barbarous peoples, and it was the Athenians themselves who 
led the charge.  He ends the passage by remarking that the former mores of the Greek 
world are very much the same as those of the barbarians of his own day (τὸ παλαιὸν 
Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τ῵ νῦν βαρβαρικ῵ διαιτώμενον, 1.5-6).  We see some 
evidence of this in epic poetry.   For example, the first act of Odysseus and his men 
after leaving Troy was to attack the Thracian city of Ismarus and kill all of the male 
Cicones who dwelt there.  The women of the settlement were taken along with the rest 
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of the plunder.  To his Phaeacian hosts Odysseus freely admits his role in this 
merciless act of killing and pillaging (Hom. Od. 9.39-42).
42
 
Unlike the hoplite-dominated Athens of the late Archaic and Classical periods, 
Thrace was a land of skilled horsemen.
43
  Even in the Iliad, The Thracian king Rhesus 
is noteworthy for his resplendent chariot and team of brilliant white horses (10.435-
440).  Elsewhere, Homer describes the Thracians as horse-herders and horse-warriors 
(Il. 13.4; 14.227; 16.287).  During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides says that the 
Thracian king Sitalces had at his disposal around 50 000 cavalry (2.98.3).  Regardless 
of any exaggeration on the part of the historian, Thrace certainly had vast numbers of 
horsemen.  Arrian attributes the origin of the wedge formation so effectively utilized 
by Alexander‟s cavalry to the Scythians and Thracians (Tact. 16.6).  The image of the 
Thracians as able riders was so prevalent in art and literature that members of the 
Athens‟ own cavalry were often depicted in Thracian apparel.44  Skill in mounted 
warfare was matched by a fondness for horse-racing and chariot-racing (Hdt. 6.38; 
Xen. Hell. 3.2.5), a fondness shared by Athenian aristocrats. 
The literary accounts of Thrace indicate a society that enjoyed more than its 
fair share of wealth and royal pomp, not unlike the Persian Empire.  Xenophon‟s 
firsthand description in the Anabasis of life at the court of a Thracian ruler recalls 
lavish banquets, ornate furniture and treasures, the exchange of valuable gifts, and all 
the pomp and circumstance of the best royal entourages (7.3.26-35).  This picture is 
corroborated in several other sources, and the material finds from Thracian lands lend 
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further credibility to Xenophon‟s witness.45  The wedding banquet of Iphicrates in 
Thrace is parodied in middle comedy as the very picture of excess (Anaxandrides, F 
42 K-A).  Even Homer‟s accounts of Thracians are colored by images of incredible 
wealth and fabulous objects, such as the elaborate cup given to Priam when he was an 
ambassador to Thracians (Il. 24.234-235).
46
  Such wealthy figures could give valuable 
gifts to their friends.  While women were often exchanged, fortresses and large tracts 
of territory were also bestowed upon foreign allies.  Xenophon was offered several 
properties in addition to Seuthes‟ daughter in marriage, and two of these properties 
had previously been given to Alcibiades, another Athenian friend of the Thracians 
(Xen. An. 7.2.38; 5.8). 
Post-Solonian Athens was no longer a place in which aristocrats could hope to 
obtain power solely by virtue of their lineage, nor even their wealth and athletic and 
equestrian prowess.  As the democracy evolved and became ever more broadly based, 
a new skill set became necessary for swaying the assembly and obtaining political 
influence, and certain aspects of aristocratic culture became suspect to the demos.  A 
typical note of resentment is sounded by the chorus of aristocratic horsemen in 
Aristophanes‟ Knights, performed in 424.  Bemoaning the lack of innate courage in 
the mass of Athenians, as well as the public subsidies offered to the people by 
demagogues, the horsemen insist that they only wish to fight nobly for the city and its 
gods, and should peace ever be restored, to be allowed the luxury of their long hair 
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and personal adornment (565-580).
47
   
Throughout the period of the democracy other signs of elite disdain for the 
demos can be found.  The Dexileos monument, a relief from the Ceramicus depicting a 
young aristocratic horseman killed in 394-393 during the Corinthian War, is perhaps 
one example.
48
  As Ober points out in his stimulating discussion of the piece, the 
iconography suggests that the mounted Dexileos is delivering the death blow to a 
hoplite lying on the ground who assumes the distinctive posture of the Tyrannicides.  
That a vase depicting the Tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogiton was found in the 
same burial plot suggests that those who commissioned the monument were well 
aware of Tyrannicide iconography, specifically the image of a nude warrior raising a 
sword above his head with his arm bent at a right angle.  Dexileos, therefore, a noble 
cavalryman, is portrayed as vanquishing a hoplite representative not only of the 
democracy, but even of the very champions of democracy.
49
  On a more fundamental 
level, the size and splendor of the relief suggest that Dexileos‟ family was not satisfied 
with honoring their dead simply as another democratic citizen killed in battle, equal 
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and indistinct from the others who were honored by the demos collectively.
50
   
Pleas to be allowed certain elements of aristocratic pretention, along with the 
commissioning of subversive monuments, were some of the ways in which the elite 
could assert their superiority in Athens.  But in the end, the polis was still a 
constraining environment for those eager for more pomp and power.  In Thrace, it 
seems as though the ruler was expected to be ostentatious, to lavish presents on his 
allies as he received status gifts from his subjects.  Thracian dynasts lived a life that 
was vaguely reminiscent of epic heroes – racing horses, entertaining guests with 
feasts, and leading raiding parties of hardy warriors.  If Athenian elites could no 
longer live this way in Athens, at least not without censure, then perhaps they could in 
Thrace.         
Clever political actors are aware of the very practical importance of employing 
the customs of the people they hope to influence.  White, in the context of the relations 
between Europeans and Native Americans in the Great Lakes region from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth century, stresses what he dubs the “middle ground,” that 
is, the mutually comprehensible region created by disparate cultures that perceive each 
other as alien: 
On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences through what 
amounts to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings.  
People try to persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing 
to what they perceive to be the values and the practices of those they deal with, 
but from these misunderstandings arise new meanings and through them new 
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practices – the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground.51         
 
By such a model, the Greeks operating among the Thracians would have attempted to 
employ Thracian cultural practices to appeal to Thracian sensibilities and achieve their 
practical aims.  Quite likely the Greeks misread various Thracian cultural practices 
with the result that new meanings and practices emerged.  In any case, a major goal of 
adopting Thracian practices seems clear: to solidify one‟s position among a foreign 
people and secure every possible material and political advantage.  But this does not 
preclude that some Greeks also had an affinity for the cultural forms they took on in 
Thrace.     
T. E. Lawrence, immortalized by his own writings and by Peter O‟Toole‟s 
performance in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia, is the most famous example of a 
Western European who fell in love with a foreign people and culture.  In his 
autobiographical Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence details his experiences as a 
British officer aiding the Arab revolt from the Ottoman Empire during the First World 
War.  He also offers a portrait of Arab culture and the steps he took to assimilate to it.  
Lawrence had spent a great deal of time in the Middle East on archaeological digs and 
other projects, was fluent in Arabic, and was as well placed as any Briton could be to 
blend in with the Arabs.  While living with and fighting alongside the Arabs, 
Lawrence himself admits that he kept a cool paternalistic distance from them while at 
the same time striving to blend in culturally.  Throughout Seven Pillars, he presents 
the Arabs as strange and foreign, prone to base physical excesses yet possessing an 
innate nobility of mind and character.  The many portraits and photographs of 
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Lawrence in full Arab dress are the perfect caricature of the strange oriental, down to 
the ornate curved dagger.  Whatever degree of reality is represented by Lawrence‟s 
literary and artistic portrayals of himself, he wished to convince others that he truly 
lived and appeared as an Arab.  He himself also seems to have believed that he “could 
see things through the veils at once of two customs, two educations, two 
environments.”52  
As the enduring picture of a modern cross-cultural actor, Lawrence might shed 
light on the Athenians who were able to thrive in Thrace.  He was an agent of the 
British Empire in a strategically important yet peripheral part of the world.  He worked 
to advance the interests of Britain by embroiling a key ally of the Axis in a theatre far 
from the European fronts of the Great War and also, it would turn out, by establishing 
a foothold in a resource-rich corner of the globe.  At the same time, there was a deeply 
personal element in Lawrence‟s activities in Arabia.  He cemented his own ties with 
key Arab leaders, attempted to live as an Arab himself, and felt saddened and betrayed 
by the cynical exploitation of the region by the British in their own national interests 
and the failure to grant the Arabs full sovereignty after the War.
53
  Not only was 
Lawrence able to achieve remarkable fame and influence by his activities in Arabia, 
he was also either genuinely attracted to the area‟s cultural and social milieu or he 
appreciated the usefulness of adopting Arab customs while in the Middle East.  The 
promise of a life of adventure also played its part.  In Lawrence‟s own words: “We 
were fond together, because of the sweep of open places, the taste of wide winds, the 
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sunlight, and the hopes in which we worked.  The morning freshness of the world-to-
be intoxicated us.  We were wrought up with ideas inexpressible and vaporous, but to 
be fought for.”54  This combination of real political and material advantages, 
compelling cultural and social draws, and the prospect of unencumbered adventure 
could have been just as potent in ancient Athens as it was for Lawrence in the early 
twentieth century. 
We can only speculate as to the importance of these cultural factors in drawing 
Athenian elites to Thrace.  In Thrace ambitious individuals were able to grow rich and 
powerful – to obtain a great level of exousia – beyond what they could hope for at 
home.  It just so happens that the very traits which characterized the old aristocracy at 
Athens, those outlined by Davies as out of place within a democratic society, were 
exhibited by Thracian dynasts and many of those Athenians who turned to Thrace and 
obtained the power of dynasts in their own right. 
   
Thracians at Athens 
An examination of the situation of the Thracians living in Athens itself 
provides a useful illustration of the ways in which political, military, and cultural 
considerations coalesced in the Athenian connection to Thrace.  Thracians living in the 
polis held an ambiguous place, just as they did in the Athenian imagination.  While 
they were denied full participation in the polis and subject to certain humiliations such 
as slavery, in many respects they enjoyed a privileged status, especially in the sphere 
of religion.   
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In the second half of the fifth century, worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis 
was instituted in Attica.
55
  At some point before 429/8, the Thracians, alone of all 
peoples, were granted the right of owning property (enktesis) in Attica and 
constructing a shrine to this goddess (IG ii² 1283, 4-7).  Closely linked with the 
huntress Artemis, Bendis is usually depicted as a young woman clad in the apparel of 
light-armed Thracian fighters – with a throwing spear; special boots, or embades; the 
cloak known as the zeira; and the distinctive fox-skin cap – and sometimes 
accompanied by a hunting dog.  The center of her worship was in the Piraeus, 
specifically in the vicinity of the Munichia hill, perhaps due to the presence there of a 
shrine to Artemis Munichia.  More importantly, the Piraeus, as a port and emporion, 
was a center for foreign residents of Athens, including Thracians, making it the natural 
place in which to found a cult of a Thracian deity.
56
      
While the worship of Bendis in Attica on the part of the Thracians living in the 
Piraeus probably stretched back to the 430‟s or earlier, The Athenians as a whole 
eventually celebrated a lavish public Bendideia.  The date of the inauguration of this 
festival is variously given between 431-411, but the earlier date seems more likely.
57
  
The opening lines of Plato‟s Republic give us the fullest description of what this 
festival entailed, including separate processions of Thracians and Athenians, a 
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horseback torch-race, and an all night celebration (327a-328a).  Inscriptional evidence 
tells us that there was also a massive sacrifice, probably a hecatomb, on the part of the 
state (IG ii² 1496).
58
   
In addition to grants of enktesis and the right to construct a shrine, the Thracian 
worshippers of Bendis were allowed to form their own groups of orgeones.
59
  While it 
is difficult to translate this word directly, the closest we can get is something along the 
lines of “sacrificing associates.”  Orgeones were an important element in the civic 
structure of Athens, along with phratries and gene, having an elevated status with a 
great deal of economic and political autonomy.  Prior to the privileges given to 
Thracians, only Athenian citizens could be orgeones.  An early, most likely Solonian 
law states that the phratries must admit orgeones as well as gennetai.  Ferguson takes 
this to mean that in Solon‟s time orgeones were Athenians of the middle classes, now 
to be admitted to a central institution of the citizenship as Athens transitioned from an 
aristocracy of birth to a timocracy.
60
  More recently, Ustinova has suggested that the 
private cultic associations of orgeones were incorporated into civic life in order to 
include a greater number of Attic residents in civic affairs, fostering the growth of 
common consent, or homonoia.
61
  In any case, for Thracian foreigners to be called 
orgeones and to acquire all the rights inherent – barring citizenship – is noteworthy.  
We know of no other corporate bodies of non-citizens that were allowed to be 
orgeones.  We must ask why the Athenians granted the Thracians these very special 
privileges, and also why the Athenian state held such a prominent and expensive 
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festival for a foreign deity. 
Some scholars argue that the Athenians were eager to secure the alliance of the 
Odrysian king Sitalces as war with Sparta loomed on the horizon.
62
  Sitalces was 
granted sundry honors at Athens in order to secure his cooperation.  A public festival 
to his native goddess would have sweetened the deal.  As Garland says, “the 
incorporation of a foreign deity into another state's pantheon was, in effect, the 
ultimate diplomatic compliment one state could pay to another."
63
  Others take this 
line further.  In addition to gaining a powerful ally in the north Aegean, the Athenians 
wished to ensure the loyalty of those many Thracians already living in Athens, to 
protect against any possible unrest in the city and also to make use of the foreigners on 
campaign.  In 431, Athens made the first of many invasions into the Megarid.  
Thucydides tells us that in addition to the many thousands of citizen hoplites, the 
Athenians also had with them not less than 3000 metic hoplites and a sizeable mob of 
light-armed fighters (ὅμιλος ψιλῶν, 2.31).  A large number of these metics, 
especially the light-armed troops – a specialty of the Thracians – were probably 
Thracians from the Piraeus, as argued by Simms and Peek.
64
  Ferguson suggests that 
the army (stratos) of the Piraeus, which would eventually be an official unit of the 
Athenian military, had a key role to play in the public Bendideia.
65
  Thracian metics, 
therefore, could have been a strong presence in this force.   
Some attribute the inauguration of the Bendideia to what they call “plague 
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psychology.”66  In light of the destruction wrought by the Plague in the first years of 
the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians desperately sought divine help.  It is perhaps 
then that they received instructions from the oracle at Dodona, mentioned in IG ii² 
1283, to honor the goddess Bendis.  Furthermore, Bendis is linked to the Thracian 
hero Deloptes (IG ii² 1324) who may have been a Thracian Asclepius.  The 
propitiation of this healing figure by means of a public festival in his honor and that of 
his associate Bendis would make sense.
67
   
 A combination of these factors most likely explains why the Athenians paid 
special attention to a Thracian goddess.  The Thracians were important allies abroad 
and probably also in the polis itself.  The Athenians could have given the Thracians 
special privileges in order to secure their loyalty and their foreign alliance, and the 
public worship of Bendis would have provided the perfect forum for the Athenians to 
“liaise” with their Thracian neighbors, as Garland has argued.68   Also, the effect of 
the Plague on the Athenians cannot be overestimated, and the probable timing of the 
introduction of the Bendideia suggests that the Plague may have played a role.  
Finally, the Athenians seemed uniquely fascinated by Thracian, or what was perceived 
to be Thracian, religion.  In addition to Bendis, cults of Sabazius, a Thraco-Phrygian 
god, and Cotytto, a Thracian mother-goddess, were introduced at some point into 
Attica.
69
  Even Dionysus and Orpheus, with their stereotypically wild and barbaric 
worship, were conceived of as Thracian figures.  
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 For the Thracians to have been granted special privileges, including enktesis, 
an official decree had to be passed by the Athenians.  Garland regrets that we know 
nothing of those who championed the cause of Bendis in the boule and ecclesia, but he 
suggests that foreign policy weighed heavily on the decision and would have been 
employed in the arguments in favor of the cult.
70
  Gauthier points out that only 
extremely rarely were grants of enktesis made for Athenians abroad before the 
Hellenistic period.
71
  Some Athenians in the fifth century, though, notably Alcibiades 
and his associates, clearly had these rights in the Thraceward region.
72
  As the 
Thracians alone of all foreigners were given such privileges in Athens, it is plausible 
that Athenians with interests in Thrace proposed such a decree, probably to cement 
their own claims to property abroad.  Thus, the interests of individual Athenian 
Thrace-haunters might have been partly behind the embracing of Bendis‟ cult.  
 The Thracians were not always so well off in Athens.  Rosivach argues that 
they were the first true chattel slaves in Athens, beginning in the sixth century when 
Pisistratus, the Philaids, and others became active in the north Aegean.  Thracians 
continued to be the predominant group of slaves at Athens and came to represent in 
drama the very stereotype of the foreign slave.
73
  Even on those rare occasions when 
Greeks were actually taken as slaves, it was usually from places on the periphery of 
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the Greek world, overwhelmingly in Thrace.
74
  The situation is made more 
complicated by a comment made by Xenophon in his Poroi.  He tells us that the 
general Nicias leased 1000 of his mine-working slaves at Laurium to a Thracian 
epistates named Sosias (Por. 4.14).
75
  Scholars have surmised that Sosias was chosen 
because of his familiarity with mining, perhaps because he came from the region of 
Mt. Pangaeum.
76
  Throughout this passage Xenophon argues that business deals 
involving metics, Thracians included, for the exploitation of Attica‟s mines would 
benefit the state immeasurably.  For his part, Sosias could have grown very wealthy by 
this deal, if the mines were sufficiently productive, and the control of 1000 slaves, 
many of whom were probably Thracians themselves, evinces no small amount of 
power.   
The paradox of the Thracians in Athens is apparent.  At one moment they were 
slaves working the mines, hardly an enviable position.  At another they were involved 
in important and lucrative business arrangements with prominent Athenians.  And, 
while throughout Greek literature Thracians are stereotyped as backward and savage, 
the worship of their goddess was embraced at Athens and celebrated at public 
expense.  In her survey of Thracian imagery, Tsiafakis concludes that while they were 
frequently reviled and despised by the Athenians, the Thracians still had a powerful 
allure.  They were not necessarily enemies to be feared, but simply “others” that were 
fascinating to the Athenians.
77
  An aesthetic interest in foreign cults, practices, and 
                                                 
74
 As noted by Rosivach (1999: 131-135) who provides a useful table of the instances in which Greek 
slaves seem to have been taken, particularly in war.  
75
 We learn from Xenophon that Sosias was an epistates of Nicias in Mem. 2.5.2. 
76
 See Gauthier 1976: 138-142. 
77
 Tsiafakis 2000. 
 38 
 
imagery, though, is not the whole picture.  As the polis profited from slave labor and 
benefitted civically and military by keeping the Thracian metics happy, many elites 
derived real advantages abroad by championing the Thracian cause at Athens.       
 
Defining “Thrace” 
 Before turning to the careers of several Athenian Thrace-haunters, the 
geographic and ethnic parameters of this study should be outlined.  Thrace, that is, the 
territory inhabited in the main by “Thracians,” represents a very broad category.78  The 
geographical boundaries of what the Greeks and Romans called Thrace varied over 
time.  The Danube might be considered its northern extent, but from antiquity on, 
many have conceived of territory far to the north of this line as Thracian.
79
  To the 
southwest, prior to the Persian Wars the area west of the Axius River surrounding the 
Thermaic gulf was inhabited by Thracians, though this region came increasingly under 
the Macedonian sphere of interest after Xerxes‟ invasion in 480-479.80  Virtually all 
the northern Aegean coast was inhabited by Thracians at some point, including islands 
such as Thasos, though over time Greek settlements were found increasingly 
throughout the area.
81
  The edge of the Black Sea formed the eastern border, but there 
were Thracian elements in the Spartocid dynasty as far east as the Crimea in the fourth 
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century.
82
  To the southeast, Thracians inhabited the Chersonese – the modern 
Gallipoli Peninsula – and the northern shore of the Propontis, today‟s Sea of Marmara.  
The Greeks considered the lands immediately south of the Hellespont – the strait now 
called the Dardanelles – and Propontis, including the Troad, to be part of Thrace.  
Herodotus tells us that the Thracians who had migrated to Asia, namely to the 
southern shore of the Black Sea, continued to live exactly as their European brethren, 
becoming known as Bithynians (7.75).  Other writers, including Xenophon, call the 
Thracians in Asia simply Bithynian Thracians (Hell. 1.3.2).
83
   
What will be considered Thrace, or at least a “Thracian context” for the 
purposes of this study, includes the following: all of modern Bulgaria, especially the 
Haeumus – the modern Balkan – and Rhodope mountain ranges and the plain lying in 
between, known as the “Thracian Plain”; northeastern Greece east of the Axius, 
including the Chalcidice and all of the northern Aegean coastline; all of European 
Turkey; a sizeable section of northwestern Anatolia, including the northern Troad, the 
territory abutting the Propontis, and the southwestern shore of the Black Sea; and the 
northern Aegean islands lying between the Athos peninsula and the Chersonese.  It 
should be noted that many cities in Asia, such as Lampsacus, Cyzicus, and Sigeum, 
which today are not normally considered to be part of Thrace, were considered so by 
the ancients and will be treated as such in the following analysis.  
 In discussing groups of Thracians, the word “tribe” is used for the sake of 
consistency.  Those scholars such as Archibald and Theodossiev who write about 
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Thrace all use “tribe” to refer to the different groups living in Thrace.  Greek writers 
such as Herodotus and Thucydides variously refer to different divisions of Thracians 
by ἔθνος and γένος, and even the Thracians as a whole are labeled an ἔθνος.  It 
seems that γένος usually denotes a subgroup within an ἔθνος, but the ancient writers 
show little consistency in the use of these terms in relation to the Thracians.
84
  “Tribe” 
is used to refer various non-state groups as opposed to, say, the Odyrsian kingdom 
which incorporated many tribes into a larger federation led by a king.
85
  It is uncertain 
what exactly differentiated Thracian tribes, whether territory, language, origins, or the 
like.  It surely varied from case to case.
86
   
It is unclear how many distinct tribes comprised Thrace.  Strabo, for one, 
counts twenty-two in the comprehensive treatment of Thrace in his seventh book 
(7a.48), whereas the elder Pliny describes Thrace as divided into fifty strategiae, a 
Roman administrative unit that might reflect some sort of ethnic or tribal division  
(Nat. Hist. 4.11.40).  The problem is compounded by our inability to ascertain to 
which chronological period each tribe mentioned in the sources belongs, as Strabo and 
Pliny wrote centuries after Iphicrates and the other Athenian Thrace-haunters.  Some 
tribes were larger and more powerful than others, and are consequently better known 
to us, such as the Triballoi and Getai in northwestern and northeastern Bulgaria 
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respectively, and the Odrysai who for a period in the fifth and fourth centuries 
controlled a federation of tribes spread over most of southeastern Bulgaria and 
European Turkey.
87
  There were numerous smaller tribes that were at different points 
incorporated into larger units such as the Odrysian kingdom, while others seem to 
have remained independent.  For his part, Herodotus judged who should be considered 
Thracian by a set of criteria including physical appearance, dress, customs, and 
common origin traditions.  He was probably influenced by the definition of Thracian 
then current at Athens.
88
  While we do not have to accept Greek or Roman notions of 
tribal and ethnic groups, as with so much of Classical Antiquity we are at the mercy of 
their terminology.  Thracian tribes are thus referred to by the names given to them by 
Greek literary sources.  
 The Athenians – like most Greek powers – dealt primarily with the Thracians 
inhabiting the Aegean littoral.  That being said, some of the tribes with whom the 
Athenians interacted were from regions further inland, such as the Dioi who inhabited 
the Rhodope Mountains.  Also, Sitalces, the Odrysian king that was an Athenian ally 
in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, ruled tribes quite distant from the 
Aegean, as did some of his successors.  The Odrysian kingdom, however, even at its 
greatest extent was confined to the southeast corner of Thrace.  It should be borne in 
mind that an Athenian Thrace-haunter usually had a relationship with only one of the 
many Thracian tribes, centered on a specific region.  Dieitrephes, for instance, seems 
to have had ties to the Dioi.  Likewise, the elder Miltiades was invited to the 
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Chersonese by the tribe of the Dolonci with the express purpose of defending them 
from the Apsinthii, a rival group of Thracians.  At the same time, because of his 
connections Dieitrephes was given a special command by the oligarchy of 411 over 
the entire Thraceward region, and the elder Miltiades married the daughter of Olorus, 
a Thracian king most likely from the area opposite Thasos.  Thus, while we should not 
assume that an individual‟s connections to Thrace entailed a special position among 
all Thracians in all regions, Thrace was often conceived of as a unit by the Athenians.  
Where possible, the specific Thracians involved in a given case will be defined.   
 
A Note on Sources 
 A study of the more than two centuries of connection between Athens and 
Thrace incorporates a wide array of sources.  The nature of the surviving evidence 
necessitates an Atheno-centric approach as the Thracians left us no writing of their 
own by which we might discern their motives and views concerning the Athenians.  
An acute problem for modern scholars is in separating the reality of Thrace from the 
often ideological perception of Thrace found in literary sources.  Several recent 
archaeologically based studies have made strides towards illuminating Thracian 
society on its own terms.
89
  For their part, the Greeks had much to say about the 
Thracians which, though biased and skewed by the incomplete perspective of the 
foreign observer, can at the very least reveal how the Greeks thought about the 
Thracians.  In addition to literary accounts, epigraphic and artistic evidence are used 
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where appropriate.  Due attention is also given to the material from archaeological 
excavation.  What follows is a survey of the sources most frequently used and the 
methods employed in approaching them.   
 
Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon 
Herodotus is our most important and often only source for the late sixth and 
early fifth century.  Born in Halicarnassus in Caria around 485-480 BCE – a city with 
a mixed population of Greeks and non-Greeks – it is generally accepted that he 
travelled widely in the process of compiling material for his history.  The bibliography 
on Herodotus as a historian, especially his reliability and use of knowledgeable 
sources, is vast.
90
  The extremes of opinion are best exemplified by Fehling and 
Pritchett.  Fehling argued in his 1989 Herodotus and his Sources: Citation, Invention 
and Narrative Art that Herodotus employed the principle of citing the most obvious 
source when addressing a given topic.  For example, in dealing with Egyptian matters, 
Herodotus cites “the Egyptians” as his source, and so on.  For Fehling, Herodotus 
largely invents such sources as part of his literary program, and his historical veracity 
is accordingly impugned.
91
  Pritchett, in his 1993 The Liar School of Herodotos, 
vigorously refutes Fehling and others, arguing that Herodotus, a faithful recorder of 
his sources, should be trusted.  A vast array of evidence is brought to bear to 
demonstrate that even the most implausible of Herodotus‟ stories could have happened 
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just as he narrates them.
92
  Scott seems to be correct in insisting that the real issue is 
not whether we can trust Herodotus when he names a certain source, but how reliable 
each source is and whether Herodotus was willing or able to check his sources‟ 
information.  For Scott, Herodotus is essentially honest, arguing that “for the later 
books, including book 6, there is no reason to see him as other than a conscientious 
enquirer, within the limits of his world, and then writing up the results.”93  Because 
Herodotus wrote about events that occurred over a huge expanse of the ancient world 
usually a generation or more prior to his own researches, we should approach his 
material with a critical eye, evaluating how he could have learned about a particular 
event and whether the event as he describes it is plausible and fits in with what other 
evidence we have.  
 Herodotus famously was as much an ethnographer as historian.  The Thracians 
are treated in an excursus at the beginning of his fifth book.  As Asheri argues, we are 
given a valuable yet selective and incomplete portrait of the Thracians which is 
centered on θῶματα, or marvelous things.94  Thus, we should bear in mind that the 
aspects of the Thracians Herodotus chooses to present are those most alien to the 
Greeks.
95
  Many scholars have dealt with Herodotus‟ treatment of non-Greeks.96  In 
1980, Hartog in Le miroir d’Hérodote: essai sur la representation de l’autre studied in 
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depth the excursus on the Scythians in book 4, concluding that Herodotus employed 
the Scythians – a people representative of the “other,” or non-Greeks – as a means of 
revealing and exploring Greek customs.  The strange customs of the Scythians were 
used by Herodotus to convey a wealth of information about the Greeks themselves.
97
  
This would apply as well to his treatment of the Thracians.  Herodotus, though, does 
not necessarily imply the inferiority of non-Greeks by emphasizing their differences.  
Rather, he seems to admire many non-Greek practices while at the same time showing 
that the boundary between Greek and non-Greek is often permeable.
98
 
 For Thracian affairs, especially those pertaining to the Aegean coastline and 
the Chersonese, Herodotus seems to rely on Athenian sources.  While in Athens, he 
could have consulted members of the large population of ethnic Thracians living in the 
city.  He also visited a number of sites in the north Aegean, including Thasos and the 
Hellespont, where he would have encountered both Greeks and Thracians privy to 
happenings in Thrace and knowledgeable about Thracian nomoi.
99
  Scott, however, 
urges caution with respect to Herodotus‟ Athenian sources.  For example, while there 
would have been many Athenians who remembered hearing of the exploits of the 
Philaids in Thrace, the tradition might have been tainted by the arguments made in 
Miltiades‟ tyranny trial of 493.  The prosecution would have emphasized the 
tyrannical bent of Miltiades, including his association with the hated Pisistratids.  The 
defense, on the other hand, would have denied such a connection and stressed his 
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democratic credentials.  Both strains subsequently entered the tradition.  Thus, when 
Herodotus narrates the departure of the elder Miltiades for Thrace, he makes use of a 
pro-Philaid source which removes all mention of Pisistratus‟ involvement.  Later, the 
departure of the younger Miltiades is depicted as at the behest of the Pisistratids, 
which indicates an anti-Philaid source.
100
  Despite Scott‟s arguments, it is odd that at 
one part of the Philaid account Herodotus accepts what amounts to pro-Philaid 
propaganda, while at another he repeats the accusations of the Philaids‟ political 
enemies.  Why would the historian have been so inconsistent?  All told, Herodotus had 
access to a wealth of reasonably informed sources on Thrace.  We should hesitate 
before challenging the accuracy of his account of Thracian nomoi and Thracian events, 
including the experience of the controversial Philaids. 
Thucydides is a crucial source for this study not only due to his incomparable 
history of the Peloponnesian War and much of the fifth century, but because he was 
tied to Thrace in his own right.  He tells us that he had many connections in Thrace, 
due largely to his control of gold mines on the mainland opposite Thasos (4.105.1).  
The biographical tradition of Thucydides, attributed largely to one Marcellinus, adds 
that the historian also owned estates in the region (Marc. Vit. Thuc. 14).
101
  Plutarch 
says that Thucydides inherited these mines from Cimon, who was probably a kinsman, 
and from his own father Olorus (Cim. 4).  It is nearly certain that Thucydides was 
related to Cimon and the Philaid family.  There is ancient testimony of a monument or 
tomb of Thucydides at Athens located among those of the other members of the 
Philaid family, though scholars are divided as to the historicity and nature of the 
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monument.
102
  That aside, Thucydides‟ father was a man named Olorus, which was 
the name of the Thracian king who married his daughter Hegesipyle to the younger 
Miltiades.  Some sources attribute the name Hegesipyle also to Thucydides‟ mother.  
It is possible, then, that Thucydides was a grandson of the elder Miltiades.  At any 
rate, there existed some sort of familial relationship.
103
    
Because of his ties in the north, Thucydides was one of the Athenian generals 
specially charged with affairs in Thrace (στρατηγὸς επὶ Θρᾴκης) for 424/3 (Thuc. 
4.104.4).  Other figures in this study, namely Dieitrephes and probably Thrasybulus, 
were given similar postings during the Peloponnesian War.  Following the loss of 
Amphipolis to Brasidas – due in part to Thucydides‟ failure to arrive from Thasos in 
time to prevent the city from defecting – Thucydides withdrew to his possessions in 
Thrace, at Skaptesyle across from Thasos.  According to both Plutarch and 
Marcellinus, there he completed the writing of his history (Plut. Cim. 4; Mor. 205c; 
Marc. Vit. Thuc. 46-47).  Marcellinus adds that Thucydides married a woman from 
Skaptesyle and remained very rich and in possession of mines (19).  In light of his role 
in the loss of Amphipolis, which was psychologically devastating for the Athenians, it 
seems as though Thucydides opted for voluntary exile.
104
  He resembles many of the 
                                                 
102
 Marcellinus Vit. Thuc. 17.  For a discussion of the problems relating to the monument, and for 
Thucydides‟ biography in general, see Canfora 2006. 
103
 It has also been argued that Thucydides the historian was related to Thucydides son of Melesias, also 
a kinsman of Cimon.  For a proposed stemma of the family, see Wade-Gery 1932: 210-211.  See also 
Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 3: 578; Davies 1971: 233-234.  
104
 Canfora (2006: 16-17) argues that Thucydides‟ exile was voluntary, and that he may have returned 
to Athens for a brief period after the exiles were recalled in 413; after 411, he left Athens again, perhaps 
due to his connections with the oligarchy of that year.  Canfora‟s arguments, however, are not without 
critics.  In Thucydides‟ own account we are told that he was an exile for a period of twenty years after 
Amphipolis, though the language is ambiguous as to whether voluntary or forced exile is meant 
(5.26.5).  This passage is a vexed one.  Canfora has argued that it was in fact penned by Xenophon, and 
others have suggested various emendations.  Dover, though, accepts the text as it appears (Gomme et 
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figures examined in this study: he gained a prestigious command because of his ties to 
Thrace, and once out of favor in Athens he relied on those same connections to 
provide refuge. 
It is difficult to assess how Thucydides‟ personal ties affect the presentation of 
Thrace in his history.  He demonstrates a deep knowledge of the region and allows 
himself a handful of lengthy digressions on Thrace, especially on the Odrysian 
kingdom of Sitacles (2.95-101).
105
  As opposed to Herodotus, Thucydides‟ work 
contains few such excurses.  His aside in 2.29 in which he censures the common 
association between Sitalces‟ father Teres and the mythical Tereus is curious.  The 
historian is vehement in his systematic refutation of any connection between the 
Odrysians and the savage Tereus who is most famous in mythology for raping and 
mutilating the daughter of an Athenian king.  Is Thucydides here defending the 
reputation of the Thracians who were his associates if not his kinsman?  Or is he 
pedantically drawing upon his knowledge of the region to correct a common 
misconception at Athens?  It is a strange and nearly unique insertion into his otherwise 
detached narrative.
106
  At 7.29.4, while describing the sack of Mycalessus at the hands 
of Thracian mercenaries in the service Athens – one of the most chilling episodes in 
the war – Thucydides says that the Thracians, like other barbarians, are most 
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bloodthirsty when confident.
107
  While this appears to be a condemnation of the 
Thracians, Kallet thinks Thucydides is employing a gnomic statement rather than 
giving his own opinion.  She argues that the Mycalessus episode is intended more to 
demonstrate the depravity to which the Athenians had descended because of the 
financial ruin wrought by the Spartan presence at Decelea.
108
  In the end, there is no 
mistaking the pity Thucydides felt for the people of Mycalessus.  It seems he had a 
complex range of opinions regarding the Thracians. 
Gomme sensibly argues that when Thucydides is contradicted in a later source 
such as Ephorus or Diodorus, we are to prefer Thucydides unless some new evidence 
appears in support of the latter.
109
  I might add that regarding actual events, as opposed 
to attestations of motive and the like, Thucydides appears quite reliable.
110
  In 
Thucydides we are fortunate to have a well informed source regarding many things, 
but especially in the case of Thrace.  And as a figure connected to Thrace himself, he 
might offer special insight into the characters of other such men, though perhaps with 
a level of bias of which we should be wary.  His feelings for the post-Periclean 
democracy at Athens, for instance, are fairly negative and might bear on his 
presentation of the democracy‟s treatment of the elite.111 
 Like Thucydides, Xenophon was a historian as well as an actor in some of the 
most significant events he records.  Also, like Thucydides, he had extensive 
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experience in Thrace.  The last two books of his Anabasis, an account of the journey 
in 401-399 of the Ten Thousand Greeks commissioned by the Persian pretender 
Cyrus, give a firsthand account of Xenophon‟s experiences in Thrace at the head of his 
troops.
112
  The remnants of the Ten Thousand took up service with the Odrysian 
dynast Seuthes II and campaigned on his behalf through much of southeastern Thrace.  
Xenophon also recounts his personal dealings with Seuthes, including a banquet 
attended by all the Thracian nobles in the region.  The Anabasis, completed after 
362/1, offers one of the fullest accounts we have of the military interaction between 
Greek hoplites and Thracian peltasts, and of the life and ritual at a Thracian court.  
Xenophon‟s Hellenica too, an account written in the mid 350‟s of Greek history from 
411 to the Battle of Mantinea in 362, tells us much about Thracian affairs, especially 
those Greeks involved in the north.
113
   
   Prior to his campaigns in Thrace at the head of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon 
was familiar with Thracians, especially their fighting methods.  He gives a vivid 
account of Thrasybulus‟ use of light-armed troops in the Battle of Munichia against 
the Thirty Tyrants in 403 – a battle in which Xenophon himself might have 
participated.
114
  Thrasybulus‟ troops likely consisted largely of Thracians, both 
mercenaries and those dwelling in the Piraeus.
115
  As a young man, not much more 
than eighteen years of age, Xenophon seems to have taken part in Thrasyllus‟ 
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expedition to the Aegean coast of Asia Minor in 409.
116
  Thrasyllus eventually wound 
up on the Hellespont where he joined his forces with those of Alcibiades as they 
raided the territory of Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell. 1.2.13).  Xenophon tells us that 
Thrasyllus equipped 5000 of his sailors as peltasts before he set out from Athens, and 
other mercenary peltasts seem to have been part of this force as well (Xen. Hell. 
1.2.1).
117
  Thracian mercenaries were also part of Cyrus‟ expedition of 401, fighting in 
the battle of Cunaxa (Xen. An. 1.10.6). 
 While undoubtedly a well informed source, Xenophon had clear biases from 
which his history seems to suffer at certain points.  In a seminal introduction to the 
Hellenica, Cawkwell renders a damning verdict of Xenophon as a historian, 
highlighting many inexplicable omissions and apparent distortions in his history.
118
  
Because Xenophon was exiled from Athens and took up service and residence with the 
Spartans, he has also been accused of harboring an elitist prejudice against Athenian 
democracy.
119
  Likewise, his portrayal of the Thracians, especially Seuthes, appears to 
                                                 
116
 The account of this campaign seems to be given from an eyewitness perspective.  See Stronk 1995: 
4. 
117
 The OCT text of this passage shows that one editor has deleted the next line, “ὡς ἅμα καὶ 
πελτασταῖς ἐσομένοις,” which implies that these peltast-sailors would serve together with the peltast 
troops that were already to be part of the expedition.  Presumably, the editor felt this line to be 
redundant, though I would argue it implies there were Thracian mercenary peltasts along with the newly 
equipped sailors.  At 1.2.2-3, Xenophon seems to distinguish between the Athenian light troops – 
ψιλοί, a term Xenophon often uses interchangeably with peltasts – and other peltasts.  In my opinion, 
the former designates the improvised peltast-sailors, while the latter denotes Thracian mercenaries.   
118
 Cawkwell and Warner 1978: 7-46. 
119
 The date and cause of the exile is one of the most contentious issues in the life of Xenophon, with 
even our ancient sources varying in explanation from participation with the Cyreans to philo-Laconism.  
To my mind, Rahn (1981) offers the most convincing arguments, proposing that Xenophon was exiled 
in 394 after anti-Spartan sentiment became more openly expressed in Athens.  For his anti-Athenian 
bias, see, however, Badian (2004), who argues that Xenophon remained a loyal Athenian all his life, 
even as an exile.  Whether his anti-Athenian feelings, like his pro-Spartan ones, were as extreme as 
many scholars have contended, Xenophon certainly harbored some negative sentiment toward his native 
city for a considerable span of time.  After all, there were good reasons for the works of the so-called 
Old Oligarch to be attributed to Xenophon, however incorrectly.  The democracy that had executed 
 52 
 
be a hostile one.  Xenophon was offered considerable rewards by Seuthes, but he 
chose to leave Thrace and join the Spartans in Asia Minor.  What he tells about 
Seuthes‟ court, however, is in line with other sources concerning the Thracian nobility, 
including material remains.  Because he was in a position to become a Thrace-haunter 
should he have wished yet opted instead for Sparta, he is especially valuable for this 
study as a counter to Athenian Thracophiles.
120
  For the period covered by Xenophon 
we have recourse to other contemporary accounts, in various states of preservation, 
which can offer useful corroboration or corrective as the case may be.  Biases and 
flaws aside, Xenophon tells us many useful things about Thrace and Thrace-haunters, 
often from a firsthand perspective.
121
 
 
Drama 
 A great portion of fifth century Attic literature is represented by drama, both 
tragedy and comedy.  Many of the plays of the great tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, 
and Euripides, though ostensibly dealing with mythological themes, comment on 
current events.
122
  For instance, Euripides‟ Hecuba, staged in 425, is set in the 
aftermath of the Trojan War, but the villainy of the Thracian character Polymestor was 
possibly meant as a warning to the Athenians against allying with the Thracians.
123
  
Likewise, Sophocles‟ Tereus, surviving only in fragments, told in gruesome detail of 
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the rape and mutilation committed by the Thracian king Tereus against Philomela, a 
daughter of a king of Athens.  This, too, might have been meant as a comment on the 
Thracian allies of Athens.
124
  While tragedy offers little by way of factual detail, the 
attitude of the playwrights towards the relationship between Athens and Thrace was 
probably shared by at least some other Athenians.  By extension, that such comments 
were made concerning the Thracians implies that the playwrights believed a 
significant segment of Athens needed to be corrected in their opinion.  Obviously we 
should be cautious in using tragedy as evidence, as the writers were pursuing a 
dramatic rather than historiographical agenda.  In her influential 1989 book, Inventing 
the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy, E. Hall explores how the 
Athenians sought to understand themselves in comparison to a barbarian other as 
represented in Attic tragedy.  Plays such as Aeschylus‟ Persae served to paint a 
portrait of the barbarian which acted as a foil in developing the audience‟s conception 
of what it meant to be Greek.  Such works, therefore, are invaluable in helping us 
determine how the Greeks conceived of barbarians, including Thracians.
125
   
 Comedy has often been used as a mine for historians of Athenian political 
history.  The plays of Old Comedy in particular dealt overtly with contemporary 
events and personalities, especially leading politicians such as Cleon.  As Rusten 
argues, Old Comic plays survived throughout antiquity, despite their arcane references 
that would hardly have resonated with later audiences, because the ancients used the 
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plays as sources for Athenian history.
126
  The Thracians and Athens‟ ties to Thrace are 
mentioned in many places, especially Aristophanes‟ Acharnians.  But, as with tragedy, 
we must be cautious in using comedy as evidence.  Facts were routinely twisted and 
exaggerated to fit comic plots.   Also, it is not always clear what the relationship was 
between the respective attitudes of comic playwright and audience.  Sommerstein 
argues that the playwrights were a “conservative” lot, as were the majority of those 
who attended the plays.  Thus, the treatment of “radical democrats” was 
disproportionately harsh.
127
  Carey, on the other hand, insists that the lampooning of 
leading politicians was a means for the mass of citizens to assert authority over their 
leaders through ridicule.  In this way, the comic playwright voiced concerns and 
attitudes held by the population at large.
128
  Henderson calls the Old Comic poets the 
“constituent intellectuals of the demos” whose role in influencing and shaping the 
city‟s ideology was “an organic feature of the sovereignty of the demos.”  It was no 
coincidence that the heyday of Old Comedy was exactly the period of greatest popular 
sovereignty, between Ephialtes‟ reforms of 462/1 and the reforms enacted after 
404/3.
129
  Like tragedy, comedy can inform us of various Athenian stereotypes of 
foreigners such as the Thracians, though perhaps distorted to an even greater extent.
130
  
In the end, as playwrights were concerned with taking the first prize in dramatic 
competitions, they would have written plays that pleased the audience, or at least the 
judges.  If a joke was made concerning the Thracians or an Athenian Thrace-haunter, 
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it probably resonated with the audience.
131
    
 
Other Fourth Century Literature 
Theopompus of Chios, likely born in the first quarter of the fourth century, 
wrote two major histories, a twelve book Hellenica detailing events from 411-394, and 
the fifty-eight book Philippica which covered not only the career of Philip II of 
Macedon but also much of the fourth century through lengthy digressions.  His work 
survives only in fragments, marking a great loss for scholars of late Classical 
Greece.
132
  From what we can gather from ancient testimony and the contents of the 
fragments themselves, Theopompus was widely traveled and acquainted with many of 
the leading figures of his day, including Philip of Macedon at whose court he spent 
some time.  He also seems to have participated in politics on his native Chios late in 
his career.  Though scholars have differed in their assessments of Theopompus‟ 
political and moral leanings, as well his reliability as a historian, the evidence suggests 
that he was an honest writer who perhaps focused too much and too uncritically on 
questions of morality and motivation.  Above all, he seems to have been preoccupied 
with the moral failings of his time, primarily licentiousness and extravagance.  The 
rise of Philip, according to Theopompus, can best be explained by the vices of his 
opponents.  Theopompus‟ evidence, though, should be given serious consideration 
given that he was a contemporary with many of the events he narrates and that he had 
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so much contact with important political actors.  And, as Flower stresses, 
Theopompus‟ obsession with moral failings may be exaggerated because he is quoted, 
chiefly by Athenaeus, in order to provide anecdotes of extravagance and the 
unusual.
133
  Theopompus provides an important contemporary perspective on the 
times in which Iphicrates, Chabrias, Charidemus and others operated, and in several 
passages he comments directly on such figures.     
 Another important but no longer extant historian of the fourth century is 
Ephorus of Cumae, who lived around 400-330 and wrote a universal history in twenty-
nine books.  The first century BCE epitomator Diodorus Siculus remains our best 
means of accessing Ephorus‟ writings, as Diodorus relied heavily on Ephorus in his 
treatment of the fourth century in his own universal history.  Unfortunately, Diodorus 
is a problematic source since it is generally acknowledged that he was a compiler of 
second-rate skill who accepted his sources uncritically and often represented them 
inaccurately.
134
  That being said, Ephorus provided a fuller picture of the Greek world 
of the fourth century than did Xenophon, and were it not for Diodorus, we would be in 
the dark about many important issues such as the Second Athenian Confederacy.
135
  
Ephorus seems particularly well informed concerning the campaigns of Greek 
mercenaries abroad, perhaps hearing from the mercenaries themselves in Athens.  His 
account of Iphicrates‟ activities in Egypt in 374/3, for example, is given from the 
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perspective of Iphicrates who may have been Ephorus‟ source either directly or 
indirectly.
136
  But, in examining the foreign exploits of various Athenians in Thrace 
and elsewhere, we must keep in mind that Ephorus seems to disparage barbarians 
unfairly and implies in many passages that they were helpless without the guidance of 
Greek mercenaries.
137
   
 Early in the twentieth century, a papyrus was discovered in Oxyrhynchus 
containing part of a history of Greece from 411-394, with the early years of the fourth 
century best represented in the surviving fragments.  Various candidates have been 
suggested for the authorship of this Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, including Ephorus, 
Theopompus, and one Cratippus of Athens, but no clear solution to the problems of 
identification has been found.
138
  The Oxyrhrynchus historian, writing likely in the 
early to mid fourth century, a source for Ephorus and indirectly for Diodorus, provides 
an important alternative account to Xenophon at many points.  It is unclear whether 
Xenophon or the Oxyrhynchus historian should be preferred in cases of disagreement.  
Each case should be judged on its merits.
139
  The Oxyrhynchus historian is useful for 
deciphering the political situation in Athens following the Peloponnesian War, 
particularly the climate in which important Thracophiles such as Thrasybulus 
operated.  Also, since this historian is widely acknowledged to have been a serious 
practitioner of history, the account preserved in Diodorus of the years 411-394 should 
be given due consideration alongside Xenophon.          
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 For the end of the fifth and much of the fourth century, the Attic orators – 
principally Lysias, Aeschines and Demosthenes – are often the richest sources we 
have for Athenian history.  This is in many ways unfortunate, not least because the 
nature of their works necessitates extreme caution on the part of the modern historian.  
Speeches were composed to persuade the audience, whether in the political arena or in 
the law courts, and the stakes were enormous.  As E. Harris points out, “nothing aside 
from the knowledge of the men sitting in judgment and the limits of plausibility 
restrained the litigant from inventing falsehoods and distorting the truth.”140  A further 
wrinkle is added by the often substantial revision of speeches after their oral 
delivery.
141
  Can we then trust oratorical evidence at all?  In some instances, the claims 
made by an orator can be substantiated at least in part by other evidence.  For 
example, Aeschines mentions a decree proposed by Archinus of Coele, part of which 
has been found in an inscription.
142
  In this case, the two independent pieces of 
evidence can be used in conjunction to flesh out the particulars of the decree in detail 
greater than would have been afforded by just one or the other.  Harris argues that 
references to public events, particularly recent ones, can more or less be trusted given 
that the audience would not have accepted blatant falsehoods concerning matters of 
common knowledge.
143
  Statements about matters of a less public nature should be 
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accepted only if reasonable supporting evidence is produced by the speaker.
144
   
Even if facts and events are unsure, oratory can help us discern Athenian 
attitudes and conceptions if used cautiously and with an appreciation of context.  For 
instance, Lysias might be engaged in wholesale fabrication by alleging that 
Thrasybulus contemplated defecting from Athens in order to establish his own power 
base in Thrace (28.5-6).  Such an allegation, however, implies that the Athenians 
would have appreciated the plausibility of this sort of defection.  Ober stresses the 
importance of oratorical evidence for our understanding of Athenian mass ideology.  
Though the orators themselves were members of the elite, they composed speeches 
designed to sway the opinions of jurors or voters.  Thus, they were compelled to speak 
well of what the audience thought was good, and ill of what the audience thought was 
evil.  In this respect, oratory is virtually unique.  Other elite writers, by contrast, wrote 
for elite readers.
145
  
 The use made by orators of historical material, involving both the distant and 
recent past, is a complex issue.
146
  At the very least, a speaker would be discriminating 
and even misleading in the selection, exclusion, and interpretation of historical events.  
Concerning recent events, orators usually proceeded with the assumption that their 
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audience knew the details, though it is difficult to determine to what extent this was 
actually true.  It is reasonable to assume that recent history could not be treated too 
cavalierly.
147
  As a relevant note on the treatment of historical events in Thrace, 
Aeschines chides Demosthenes for wearying the Athenians with excessive detail about 
obscure Thracian matters and places, but he does not impugn the accuracy of these 
statements.
148
  In using oratorical evidence, the context and the intention of the 
speaker should always be borne in mind; statements about private matters without 
corroborating evidence should not be trusted; and the speaker‟s interpretation of even 
securely attested matters should never be taken at face value, though the speaker‟s 
arguments can shed light on what the audience might have been expected to believe.  
 The Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, rediscovered on papyri in the late 
nineteenth century, was written probably in the late 330‟s and revised in the 320‟s 
while Aristotle was in Athens.  It is disputed whether Aristotle himself wrote the 
treatise, or whether it was compiled by members of his school.  In any case, we do 
know that Aristotle and his pupils compiled a corpus of “constitutions” of numerous 
Greek states, on which the Politics was based.
149
  The Athenaion Politeia consists of 
two sections, the first being a history of the development of the Athenian constitution 
from its beginnings to the supposedly final reforms of 403.  The second gives a 
detailed account of the workings of the fourth century Athenian democracy.  This 
study primarily makes use of the first half, as the author in narrating the history of 
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figures such as Pisistratus and events such as the struggle against the Thirty Tyrants 
make use of traditions different than those used by Herodotus and Xenophon.  While it 
is not always clear which tradition the modern historian should prefer, and while many 
principles of fourth century political theory are applied anachronistically to earlier 
periods, each case will be judged on its merits.
150
    
 Other fourth century writers provide important details, from scattered 
references to historical events to an elaboration of various political views that bear on 
the Thrace-haunter phenomenon.  The works of Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and his 
school, and others will be used throughout with an attempt to maintain an 
appropriately critical approach and an appreciation for context.  
 
Later Literature 
 Cornelius Nepos, a Latin writer of the first century BCE, penned a collection 
of brief biographies of famous men, the De viris illustribus, which included a section 
on Greek generals.  Though much maligned by modern scholars for his apparent lack 
of original research and his hackneyed prose, he does have his defenders.
151
  It seems 
as though Nepos consulted primary sources more than previously thought, and the 
nature of his work, that is biography, means that he preserves many details left out of 
historiography.
152
  As a repository of anecdotal material, such as certain traits of 
character and the attitudes held by the contemporaries of important figures, Nepos is 
often the only source we have.  When we can compare his work with other sources, it 
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becomes clear that he often represents various traditions faithfully.  He does present 
some factual inaccuracies, however, such as a conflation of the elder and younger 
Miltiades.  This particular error might stem from a popular strain of thought in fifth 
century Athens that was followed by Ephorus, implying that Nepos accurately 
preserved the historical tradition rather than blundered through carelessness.
153
 
 Plutarch of Chaeronea wrote his famous series of parallel biographies of Greek 
and Roman figures between 96-120 CE.  Like Nepos, by whom he was influenced, 
Plutarch‟s reputation has suffered at the hands of scholars.154  During the nineteenth 
century and the early part of the twentieth, Plutarch was primarily used as a mine for 
historical information.  It was assumed that he used only a single source for each of his 
biographies, and that this source was often an earlier Hellenistic biography.  Plutarch‟s 
only direct contact with primary sources, so it was thought, was via this earlier 
biographical material.  Accordingly, as good practitioners of Quellenforschung, 
scholars were at pains to identify the various lost primary sources that were indirectly, 
and uncritically, preserved by Plutarch.  Recently, however, Plutarch has been 
rehabilitated as not only a critical user of primary material, but also an important 
literary figure in his own right.
155
   
As for Plutarch‟s historical accuracy and access to reliable source material, 
Frost presents a convincing image of the biographer able to consult seminal works 
while being steeped in an intangible yet vital intellectual and cultural milieu that we 
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moderns can scarcely hope to appreciate.  Though Plutarch‟s prodigious memory 
might slip from time to time, he demonstrates a vast learning and familiarity with the 
Greek past.
156
  This study does tend to use Plutarch primarily as a source of historical 
material otherwise lost to us; but the context and purpose of his writing is taken into 
account.  As a biographer, Plutarch was a dedicated moralist.  He records the deeds of 
his subjects, both major public actions and intimate private utterances, in order to 
present a comprehensive portrait of their respective characters.
157
  In so doing, 
Plutarch hoped to edify his readers.  This particular ethic of biographical writing 
ensures that Plutarch, like Nepos, records many things overlooked or downplayed by 
historiographical sources.  For the careers – and personal traits – of Cimon, 
Alcibiades, and others, he is invaluable.  If the motives he assigns to his subjects are 
incorrect or inferred from dubious evidence, we can at least gain insight into the 
reputation and reception of these characters as preserved in the traditions used by 
Plutarch. 
 
Inscriptions 
 The so-called Greek “epigraphic habit,” whereby all manner of decrees, laws, 
dedications, and economic transactions were recorded for posterity on stone, has 
provided ancient historians with a massive corpus of evidence.  The Athenians were 
especially fond of inscriptions.  In addition to filling in the gaps left in literature 
concerning political history, inscriptions are invaluable for legal and social history.  
They provide often the only source for local history outside of the main foci of ancient 
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literary sources.
158
  In many cases, inscriptions are the soundest pieces of 
contemporary evidence we have.  First of all, they were often inscribed very shortly 
after the event or decision they record.  Also, they have not been subjected to the 
manuscript tradition which at certain points might have led to distortions in literary 
texts.  Ideally, the inscription as we have it today is exactly as it was when it was first 
inscribed.  Finally, inscriptions have often corroborated and elaborated upon the 
version of events preserved in literature.  For instance, Plutarch tells us that Alcibiades 
managed to capture the rebellious city of Selymbria largely through treachery and 
bring it back into alliance with Athens (Alc. 30).  The inscription preserved as IG i
3
 
118 details the exact arrangements made between Selymbria and the Athenian 
generals, and Alcibiades himself is listed as the proposer for honors to be granted to 
Apollodorus, a Selymbrian citizen and probable associate of Alcibiades.  We thus 
have a much fuller picture of events than Plutarch alone provides, including a glimpse 
into the personal arrangements that were behind Alcibiades‟ successful campaigns in 
the north.   
 Inscriptions, though, are often poorly preserved, missing large sections of the 
text and having other sections damaged by erosion and other factors.  While the 
formulaic language and stoichidon lettering of many inscriptions allows epigraphers to 
make educated restorations to missing lines, Badian has urged caution in 
reconstructing ancient history from “square brackets.”159  Inscriptions can also be very 
difficult to date and situate in their proper context.  Often a clear date presents itself, 
such as the preservation of an archon‟s name.  In other cases, epigraphers apply 
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various criteria, from letter forms to grammatical idiom and spelling conventions.  
But, these criteria are necessarily subjective and open to various interpretations.  
Letter forms especially have proven notoriously unreliable for dating purposes.
160
  A 
base for a stature of a certain Dieitrephes, one the Thrace-haunters covered in this 
study, has been preserved on the Acropolis.  The lettering had originally been used to 
date the inscription to the 440‟s, which would be too early for our Dieitrephes, but 
more recently a date closer to the end of the century has been plausibly suggested.
161
  
Certainty in this case is elusive.  We should always remember that the inscriptions we 
do have form far from a complete record and only survive by chance.  More than that, 
there is no guarantee that what is preserved on inscriptions in accurate.  Even in the 
fourth century, Theopompus accused the Athenians of exaggerating their role at 
Plataea in the inscription supposedly preserving the oath made before the battle.
162
  
And finally, the physical placement of the inscription, often on a large and elaborately 
decorated stele, carried meaning far beyond the written text itself.
163
  This meaning is 
often lost to us, in no small part because the original situation of the inscription cannot 
be ascertained.         
 
Material and Artistic Evidence 
The Thracians left no written sources in any quantity by which we might hope 
to gauge their own views of themselves and also of the Greeks, but we are fortunate 
enough to have recourse to a substantial body of archaeological and material evidence 
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from Thracian lands.  The first major comprehensive work to deal with Thracian 
material culture was Danov‟s 1976 Altthrakien, based largely on an earlier work 
published in Bulgarian in 1968.  Danov follows a survey of scholarship on Thrace and 
an account of the relevant literary sources with a look at what he calls “primary 
sources,” that is, inscriptions, numismatics, and other material and archaeological 
evidence.
164
  Archibald takes into account the massive amount of archaeological 
material from Bulgaria in the decades following Danov‟s work and offers a rich and 
full survey of a specific area of Thrace from the Early Iron Age to the early Hellenistic 
period.
165
  Archibald urges scholars to move beyond the skewed accounts of Thrace 
offered in Greek literature, and instead to investigate the Odrysians on their own 
terms.  Utilizing material remains, she traces changes in such areas as the symbols 
used to express wealth and social stratification.  From a material perspective, she also 
explores the interaction between the Odrysians and their neighbors, especially Greeks 
and Persians.   
While a scholar must treat with caution material finds that have no native 
literary context with which they might be interpreted, such finds can be used to 
corroborate what the Greeks wrote about the Thracians.  For example, it is difficult to 
determine what meaning the ornate drinking vessels found among the Rogozen and 
Panagyurishte treasures had for the Thracians who possessed them.
166
  But we can 
understand how a Greek such as Xenophon or Iphicrates would have seen in the use of 
these objects the type of ritualized ostentation of epic heroes.  Likewise, we do not 
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know exactly what significance horse-burials, for which we have many surviving 
examples, had for the inhabitants of Thracian lands; but for the Greeks they might 
have reaffirmed their view of Thrace as a land of heroic horsemen.
167
  By careful use 
of material evidence, the tension between Greek imagery and Thracian reality can be 
addressed.
168
 
Art objects represent a complex and difficult category of evidence for the 
historian.  Though we have a large body of vase-painting and sculpture, particularly of 
Attic origin, that depicts Thracians and figures with Thracian attributes, the precise 
intent and meaning behind such imagery can be elusive.  In employing this evidence, 
the proper context for each object – usually sympotic in the case of vase-painting – 
must be kept in mind, along with the careful work of art historians.  As this study is 
concerned with Athenian attitudes toward Thrace and the Thracians, artistic material 
cannot be overlooked.  Though images of, say, Thracian peltasts might represent their 
subjects inaccurately, that they were depicted at all says something about those who 
consumed such material.  There appears to be an acute fascination on the part of the 
Athenian elite, the primary consumers of art objects, with foreigners in general and 
Thracians in particular.  In many cases, elite Athenians are themselves represented 
with Thracian attributes such as distinctive clothing and equipment.
169
  In 
corroboration with literary and other forms of evidence, artistic material can flesh out 
our understanding of Athens‟ relationship with Thrace. 
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Case Studies 
 The following chapters consist of case studies examining the careers of many 
whom Aristophanes would have called Thrace-haunters.  As will become evident, 
there was a range of factors that led to the exploitation of the “Thracian option,” as 
there was a range of outcomes that resulted.   
  The study begins in chapter 2 with the careers of Pisistratus and the Philaids 
from the mid sixth century to the early fifth.  After two initial attempts at tyranny 
which proved short-lived due to the efforts of his aristocratic rivals, Pisistratus found 
wealth and soldiers in the region of Mt. Pangaeum in Thrace.  These new resources 
tipped the balance decisively in his favor, and he and his family were able to rule 
Athens unchallenged for decades.  Faced with Pisistratus‟ firm grip on power, the 
ambitious Miltiades son of Cypselus left Athens to lead a group of Athenians to the 
Thracian Chersonese.  Driven from Athens by the lack of political opportunity, in 
Thrace he became a tyrant in his own right, and he passed on his authority to several 
succeeding generations of the Philaid family.  For Pisistratus, Thrace proved to be a 
kingmaker in Athens.  The Philaids were able to achieve royal authority abroad, being 
in effect exiles living as tyrants.  Once back in Athens, later generations of the 
Philaids, from the younger Miltiades to his son Cimon, would use the resources and 
prestige they acquired in Thrace to gain positions of influence within the Athenian 
democracy.   
 During the Peloponnesian War the Athenians made extensive use of Thracian 
mercenaries, especially light-armed peltasts.  The victory of Demosthenes and Cleon 
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at Sphacteria in 425 was achieved largely through this type of soldier and set the stage 
for increasing use of peltasts by Greek states from the end of the fifth and throughout 
the fourth century.  While Demosthenes learned the utility of light-armed fighters in 
large part because he had suffered a crushing defeat at their hands in Aetolia, several 
Athenians before him learned this lesson in Thrace.  Most notable of these was 
Hagnon, who founded Amphipolis in 437 and had led the armies of the Thracian 
Sitalces in 429/8.  In 413, a group of 1300 Thracian mercenaries arrived in Athens to 
serve with Demosthenes in Sicily.  These soldiers arrived too late and were too 
expensive for a beleaguered Athens to maintain, so they were sent home under the 
command of an Athenian named Dieitrephes, the subject of chapter 3.  En route, this 
force massacred the entire population of Mycalessus, a defenseless Boeotian town.  It 
turns out that Dieitrephes had a pre-existing family connection to Thrace, which 
explains his appointment to this command.  In 411 he was commissioned by the 
Athenian oligarchs to be the overall commander in the Thraceward region, achieving 
yet another post through his Thracian connections.  The career of Dieitrephes 
highlights some of the tensions in the Atheno-Thracian relationship.  He exploited his 
ties to Thrace, even to a group of particularly murderous and unsavory mercenaries, to 
gain advancement in Athens.  There is evidence that many Athenians did not approve 
of the use of such soldiers, nor Dieitrephes‟ command over them.        
 Chapter 4 explores the careers of two other Thrace-haunters active during the 
Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus.  After falling out with the Athenians 
due to his arrogance, fleeing Sparta because of an alleged affair with the Spartan 
Queen, and being arrested by the Persians, Alcibiades resorted to Thrace.  The relative 
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power vacuum in Thrace allowed Alcibiades to carve out his own niche, complete 
with a private army of Thracian soldiers with which he conducted lucrative campaigns 
and rendered valuable services to several Thracian dynasts.  His associate Thrasybulus 
made his own connections in the north in 411-407.  These connections proved 
invaluable in 404-403 when he overthrew the Thirty Tyrants and restored democracy 
largely through the use of Thracian soldiers.  Thrasybulus thus became the hero of 
Athenian democracy and enjoyed unparalleled prestige, at least for a while.  In 390/89, 
he returned to Thrace and secured the alliance of two Thracian rulers whom he 
managed to reconcile to one another.  His career was so intertwined with Thrace that 
his political rivals accused him of planning to abandon Athens and take up with the 
Thracians, after marrying a Thracian princess of course.  For Alcibiades, Thrace 
proved the one and only suitable place of refuge, where he could freely exercise his 
ambitions.  Thrasybulus owed much of his political success at Athens to his Thracian 
ties, and at the end of his career, some worried that he would follow in Alcibiades‟ 
footsteps.     
 Iphicrates, the brilliant leader of the mercenary peltasts that humbled Spartan 
hoplites at Corinth in 390, is studied in chapter 5.  In the 380‟s, after losing control of 
the Hellespont to the Spartans, Iphicrates found refuge at the court of the Odrysian 
Cotys where he served as a guarantor of Cotys‟ throne and an advisor on military 
matters.  He married Cotys‟ daughter, who bore him a son, and was adopted by 
Amyntas, king of Macedon.  After returning to Athens for a time and serving as a 
mercenary leader in Egypt, Iphicrates again fled to Thrace in the 360‟s, having failed 
in his campaign to take Amphipolis.  During this period he fought a naval action 
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against the Athenians on Cotys‟ behalf.  Only the exigencies of the Social War led 
Athens once again to call on Iphicrates to serve as a general, indispensable 
commander that he was.  Though Iphicrates has usually been seen as the harbinger of 
a new type of military leader for the fourth century, a mercenary general loyal more to 
his own gain than to his polis, he acted perfectly in line with previous generations of 
Thrace-haunters.  He used his command of Thracian troops to gain prestige in Athens, 
and he turned to Thrace as a refuge when prosecution and loss of influence loomed at 
home.  And, like other Athenians who turned to Thrace, Iphicrates seemed to enjoy the 
cultural and social milieu of the north, being treated to lavish feasts and rewarded with 
valuable gifts.  
 Athens‟ ties to Thrace did not long survive Iphicrates.  Philip began to extend 
Macedonian control over the region in 357 when he took Amphipolis, succeeding 
where the Athenians had failed so many times.  This was followed soon after by most 
of western Thrace between the Strymon and Nestus rivers.  By 340, after a series of 
campaigns, Philip controlled all of Thrace, the native kings being reduced to subject 
rulers.  Athens, though, did have its agents in the north.  Charidemus of Oreus (in 
Euboea), who had served with Iphicrates at Amphipolis and followed him to Thrace, 
worked as a general for Cotys and then his son Cersobleptes.  Thanks to Demosthenes, 
Charidemus‟ reputation is one of a greedy mercenary exploiting the fragmented power 
structure of Thrace for his own advantage.  Despite this, he did render valuable service 
to Athens and was awarded Athenian citizenship and made a general several times.  
Another commander active in the north in the mid fourth century, especially against 
Philip in the Chersonese, was Chares.  He too had the reputation, perhaps 
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unwarranted, of an unscrupulous bandit who looted and pillaged in order to keep his 
troops well-paid.  In the end, regardless of the negative portrayal given by our sources, 
both Charidemus and Chares acted well within the paradigm established by previous 
Athenian generals who campaigned in Thrace.  Despite Athens‟ best efforts, control of 
the Chersonese, the last remaining foothold in Thrace, was lost to Philip.  After 
Chaeronea in 338, there was little hope it would ever be regained.
170
        
 As there were other places to which Athenians could and did turn, chapter 6 
examines several individuals who did not find their outlet or secure a power base in 
Thrace.  Though his family had ties to Thrace, Pisistratus‟ son Hippias trusted in 
Persia to return him to power in Athens.  Considering that Persia at the time sponsored 
many Greek tyrants in Ionia, this was a reasonable goal.  After the Persian Wars, and 
the stigma that became attached to “Medism,” Hippias‟ attempt was never repeated.  
Themistocles famously found a refuge in Persia, but he did so only as a last resort 
when Athenian naval power prevented him from settling in any place within reach of 
Athens‟ ships.  Xenophon was offered a Thracian bride, valuable estates, and a 
position of influence by the dynast Seuthes II, but he had no love for the Thracians.  
He opted instead to serve with the Spartans and his personal friend Agesilaus, who 
duly rewarded him with an estate at Scillus.  After fleeing the Battle of Aegospotami, 
Conon took refuge on Cyprus at the court of Evagoras, and eventually came to lead 
Persia‟s fleet against Sparta.  Immediately following the Peloponnesian War, Spartan 
control of the Aegean, especially the Hellespont and Chersonese, ensured that Thrace 
                                                 
170
 Nilsson (1942: 180-181) suggests that Thracian cults were once again given prominence in Athens in 
the late fourth century as part of Lycurgus‟ plan to court the Thracians as potential allies against Philip 
and Alexander. 
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was not an option for Conon.  While his son Timotheus served the Persians abroad for 
a time, he was above all dedicated to Athens and its fourth century maritime league.  
The general Chabrias found service with the Egyptians.  It seems that he and 
Iphicrates were rivals, and while the latter was influential with Cotys in Thrace, 
Chabrias was shut out of the region.  Finally, Alcibiades is once again examined to 
contrast his experiences in Persia and Thrace.      
In the end, Thrace offered limitless resources coupled with a lack of a central 
governing authority that few other regions could match.  Thus, for the Athenians 
Thrace held a unique place.  Throughout much of Athenian history, Thrace was vital 
to the needs of the Athenian polis and instrumental in the careers of its elite.  By turns, 
ties to Thrace led to power and influence at Athens – even within the democracy – and 
a source of refuge and authority abroad.  This special relationship also had a great 
impact on Greek military developments.  By winning influence and renown at Athens 
through novel tactics employed at the head of Thracian troops, and by turning to the 
court of a Thracian king when his fortunes at Athens were on the wane, Iphicrates 
acted just as a long line of Athenians had before him. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PISISTRATUS AND THE PHILAIDS 
 
Introduction 
The paradigm for Athenian involvement in Thrace was established by 
Pisistratus and the Philaid family from the mid sixth to the early fifth century.  
Pisistratus discovered that the resources of Thrace could be harnessed by an ambitious 
and unscrupulous politician to furnish a decisive advantage over aristocratic rivals.  
For Pisistratus Thrace served as a kingmaker in Athens which, for a period, ended the 
volatile shifting of power between competing aristocratic factions.  Once Pisistratus 
was firmly entrenched as tyrant, the Philaids, starting with the elder Miltiades, found 
in the Thracian Chersonese a political refuge and a place where they could exercise 
tyrannical authority abroad.  They deftly exploited the conflicts endemic among the 
Thracian tribes to establish their own power base in a land lying just across the 
Aegean.  Aside from political and material advantage, there are also several 
indications that the Philaids found much that was attractive in Thracian culture.  In 
this period, Thracian military practices were introduced to the Athenians, through the 
mercenaries hired by Pisistratus and by the experiences of the Philaids in dealing with 
threats to their territory in the Chersonese.  The Philaids developed various military 
techniques that would influence Greek fortification and perhaps even the outcome of 
the Battle of Marathon.  They were but the first of many Athenians who would derive 
tactical inspiration from the Thracians, outside the bounds of the traditional Athenian 
military ethos.      
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To begin with, however, we should turn first to an episode of the late seventh 
century.  A group of Athenians set out from home and captured the site of Sigeum in 
the Troad from the Mytileneans, thereby gaining a foothold on the Asiatic shore of the 
Hellespont.
1
  The leader of this early Athenian expedition was a man named Phrynon, 
an Olympic victor in the pankration described as a massive man of great strength 
(Plut. Mor. 858b).
2
  Phrynon the pankratiast, skilled at hand-to-hand combat, relished 
any chance to engage in a duel of champions (μονομαχῆσαι) and win glory for 
himself.  Accordingly, in a subsequent dispute with Mytilene over control of the 
territory, he issued a challenge to anyone willing to fight him.  In spite of the 
Athenian‟s intimidating stature and renowned proficiency, a famous figure by the 
name of Pittacus, one of the so-called seven sages of Greece, rose to the challenge.  
During the duel, Pittacus ensnared Phrynon with a net he had concealed under his 
shield and ran him through.  Thus killing his opponent, Pittacus took back control of 
Sigeum for Mytilene (Plut. Mor. 858a-b; Diod. 9.12.1; Diog. Laert. 1.74).  In 
recognition of this feat he became sole ruler (αἰσυμνήτης) of the Mytileneans (Diog. 
Laert. 1.74-81).
3
                                     
Diogenes tells us that Pittacus‟ father was a Thracian (1.74), and indeed the 
name is shared by a king of the Edonian Thracians mentioned by Thucydides (Thuc. 
                                                 
1
 See Hdt 5.94-95 for the ongoing disputes between Athens and Mytilene over possession of this site.  
See also the attendant commentary in How and Wells (1912: vol. 2, 56) for the chronological problems 
in Herodotus‟ account.  For the history of settlement of Sigeum, see Diog. Laert. 1.74; Str. 13.1.38.  
Isaac (1986: 162-166) offers a comprehensive account of Athenian activities in the region.  For Sigeum 
as part of Thrace, see above, ch. 1. 
2
 Eusebius‟ list of Olympic victors places Phrynon in 636/5 (1.199). 
3
 Though Herodotus makes no mention of this story, it had a strong tradition in antiquity.  For the 
ancient sources, see Isaac 1986: 162.  See Bowen (1992: 112-113) for a discussion of Plutarch‟s 
treatment of the story.  As Bowen argues, Plutarch probably visited Sigeum himself, and he may have 
use Hellanicus of Lesbos as his source.  For Diogenes Laertius‟ use of earlier sources, see Mejer (1978: 
7-59), who aims to show that, however flawed, Diogenes was an honest compiler of material (14). 
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4.107).
4
  As Herodotus says in his ethnological account of the Thracians at the 
beginning of his fifth book, the Thracians considered warfare to be the most honorable 
way of life, and in the lavish funeral games which they held for their dead, they 
awarded the highest prize to the victor in single-combat (κατὰ λόγον μονομαχίης, 
5.8).  Even in the Late Roman Republic, the Thracian was a type of gladiator 
(μονομάχος in Greek), and the most famous gladiator of all, Spartacus, was from 
Thrace.
5
  Indicative of the popular Greek perception of the inhabitants of Thrace, the 
most notorious fighter in Greek mythology, Amycus, was the king of the Bebrycians 
who dwelt on the southern shore of the Black Sea and in the northern parts of the 
Troad, not far from Sigeum.
6
  As told by Apollonius of Rhodes and Theocritus, the 
towering and arrogant Amycus demanded that every foreigner who came to his land 
fight him in hand-to-hand combat.  Polydeuces finally silenced this bully by defeating 
him in a vicious boxing match (Ap. Rhod. Argon. 2.1-98; Theoc. Id. 22).  Among such 
a people, Phrynon, who had received the highest known accolade among the Greeks in 
the sport of no-holds-barred fighting, would have felt right at home.  That Pittacus was 
himself of Thracian stock and that he was able to defeat Phrynon with a cunning trick 
implies that he too was experienced in such combat.   
 A half century after the Athenians first took Sigeum, the elder Miltiades led an 
expedition to the opposite shore of the Hellespont.  The Thracian Chersonese – the 
modern Gallipoli peninsula – abounded in fertile land for crops and pasturage, a thing 
                                                 
4
 For the name, see Dechev 1957: 371.  The Edonians lived mainly in the Strymon valley. 
5
 See Strauss 2009: 13-28.  Spartacus, though, was a murmillo-type gladiator. 
6
 The scholiast for Apollonius (2.2) places the Bebrycians specifically near Lampsacus on the southern 
shore of the Hellespont.  
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decidedly lacking in Attica.  Also, the straits provided access to Black Sea trade.  It 
would have been in any state‟s interest to control important ports along this trade route 
in order to impose duties and attract the business of traveling mariners.  The Black Sea 
eventually became crucially important as a source of imported grain, though likely not 
before the late fifth century.
7
  Miltiades had been invited there by the local inhabitants, 
the Thracian Dolonci, in order to offer protection against a rival group of Thracians, 
the Apsinthii.  Having been established as tyrant, he came to possess a swathe of 
territory that his family would control for several generations.   
In deciding to leave Athens, the elder Miltiades seized an opportunity to carve 
out a niche in greener pastures.  As it turned out, the fringes of the Greek world proved 
just the place for the horse-loving Philaids, as it might have for the ill-fated Phrynon.  
The extent to which sheer necessity lay behind such overseas ventures and 
colonization efforts is hotly debated by scholars.  A consensus is emerging that 
emphasizes adventurism over pragmatism.
8
  Moreno calls the younger Miltiades an 
“aristocratic buccaneer.”9  Beyond this, Thrace served as a social safety valve whereby 
elite Athenians could achieve their full aristocratic potential without the constraints of 
Athens‟ political system, be it democracy or Pisistratid tyranny.  Moreno contends that 
                                                 
7
 For the vigorous scholarly debate surrounding the settlement of this region, see Isaac 1986: 159-166.  
For the grain supply, see Moreno 2007. 
8
 De Angelis (1994) argues that problems of overpopulation and other traditional explanations for 
colonization played less of a role in the settlement of Selinous in Sicily than did the thrill of new 
opportunities.  The role of the Hellespont in the Athenian grain trade is disputed.  Garnsey (1985; 1988) 
argued that Athens was more self-sufficient in terms of grain than previously thought, so the 
colonization of the Hellespont was driven by adventurism.  Keen (2000), conversely, attempts to show 
that Athens did use Black Sea grain before the Peloponnesian War.  More recently, Moreno (2007: 140-
143) has shown that Athens used Aegean clerouchies to provide the city with grain throughout most of 
the fifth century, and did not turn to the Black Sea until the fourth.  In his model, the missions of 
Phrynon, the Philaids, and others were aimed at securing land for the elite.  
9
 Moreno 2007: 142. 
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achieving power in Athens was always the ultimate goal of the Philaids and those like 
them.
10
  The elder Miltiades, though, accepted that the door to advancement in Athens 
was closed.  He was not simply an old fashioned aristocrat opposed to a populist 
tyrant.  As we shall see, there is good evidence that he wanted to be a tyrant.   
Later generations of Philaids would distill an additional advantage from their 
Thracian power base, namely the ability to court the Athenian populace and bolster 
their position within the new democracy.  But, even for talented leaders enjoying 
privileged access to the resources of Thrace, the politics of the democracy proved too 
volatile.  While Pisistratus had largely kept rivals to his power at bay, the Philaids 
struggled with maintaining lasting influence once back in Athens. 
 
Pisistratus and Thrace 
Sometime in the mid sixth century, Pisistratus seized power in Athens.  Taking 
advantage of the factional strife that plagued the post-Solonian polis – namely that 
between the people of the coast led by the Alcmeonid Megacles and the people of the 
plain under Lycurgus – he championed the cause of a new third faction, the people of 
the hills.
11
  Shrewdly drawing upon the fame he acquired in a war against Megara, and 
                                                 
10
 Moreno 2007: 140-141. 
11
 The fullest accounts of Pisistratus‟ tyranny are given by Herodotus (1.59-64) and the Aristotelian 
Athenaion Politeia (14-19).  For the chronological problems involved, see Rhodes 1981: 191-199.  How 
and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 81) see these factions as the natural consequence of Solon‟s reforms, which 
eroded the traditional rule of the eupatridae.  They argue that the real division was between the old 
landed aristocracy and the rising mercantile class.  For recent scholarly treatments of Solon‟s reforms 
and the political situation in Athens at the time, see the collection of essays in Block and Lardinois 
2006, especially the offerings of Raaflaub and van Wees.  Raaflaub argues that there were basically 
two, rather than four, classes in Solon‟s time, the cavalry leaders (hippeis) and hoplite followers 
(zeugitai); whereas van Wees posits that Solon merely reinforced the pre-existing agrarian class 
divisions.  See also Rhodes 1981: 183-187.  For the general importance of intra-elite conflict in this 
period, see Stahl 1987: 60-105; Forsdyke 2005: 103-107.   
 79 
 
addressing the grievances of a large underprivileged segment of the Athenian 
population, Pisistratus managed to be voted a bodyguard with which he occupied the 
Acropolis and became master of the polis (Hdt. 1.59; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 14.1-4).
12
  
Soon, however, his aristocratic rivals joined forces and drove him from Athens.  How 
was Pisistratus to overcome the traditional elite weapon of exile?
13
  
In order regain the tyranny, Pisistratus devised a scheme in conjunction with 
his former rival Megacles whereby he was escorted into Athens by an exceptionally 
tall woman in full panoply on a chariot.  The Athenians were told that this was Athena 
herself brining Pisistratus home.  The ruse worked (Hdt.60.4).
14
  The fourth century 
Athenian Atthidographer Clidemus says that this woman, named Phye the daughter of 
Socrates, became Hipparchus‟ wife (FGrHist 323 F 15).  In the Aristotelian Athenaion 
Polteia we are told of a tradition that this woman was a Thracian flowergirl 
(σετφανόπωλις), or hetaira, living in the deme Collytus (14.4).  In introducing the 
passage from Clidemus, Athenaeus preserves her designation as a flowergirl, which 
was unknown to Herodotus and Clidemus.  Jacoby thinks that her label as a Thracian 
was an insertion, perhaps originally a marginal note on the Athenaion Politeia.  As he 
argues, it would not be surprising for a tradition to take root that made Hipparchus‟ 
wife a nameless Thracian, as appears to have happened in the case of Themistocles‟ 
                                                 
12
 The Athenaion Politeia labels Pisistratus as δημοτικώτατος, as opposed to Megacles and Lycurgus.  
Rhodes (1981: 186) thinks that this account of the rivalries between aristocrats is broadly correct.   
13
 See Forsdyke (2005: 101-133) for a study of the role of exile during the Pisistratid period.   
14
 How and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 83) believe this story.  The sons and grandsons of those who had seen 
this peculiar procession would still have been alive at Athens.   
 80 
 
mother (Plut. Them. 1.1-2).
15
  It seems that this was a stock slander in Athenian 
political history.   
For Themistocles, however, there is strong evidence that his mother actually 
was a Thracian woman from the Chersonese, or at the very least a Greek living in this 
Thracian territory.
16
  The Pisistratids hedged their bets with far-flung alliances.  
Clidemus says that Pisistratus chose for his son Hippas the daughter of the polemarch 
Charmus, which would have secured the loyalty of a powerful Athenian.  Herodotus 
tells us that Pisistratus installed his own illegitimate son Hegesistratus, also called 
Thessalus, as tyrant in Sigeum after driving out the Mytileneans by force.
17
  It was to 
Sigeum that the Pisistratids fled after their expulsion from Athens (Hdt. 5.94; Thuc. 
6.59.4).  After the death of Hipparchus, Hippias made an alliance with Hippocles the 
tyrant of Lampsacus by marrying his daughter to the tyrant‟s son Aeantides (Thuc. 
6.59.3).
18
  Others too contracted such alliances, even with foreigners.  The younger 
Miltiades married the daughter of a Thracian king, probably to strengthen his position 
in the Chersonese.   
Moreover, if the ethnic designation of Thracian was meant to slander Hippas, 
why does the author of the Athenaion Politeia (or the person writing the marginal 
note) preserve only part of the slanderous tradition without mentioning that this 
woman was married to Hippias?  It seems that there were two traditions about the wife 
of Hippias: one that she was the daughter of a prominent Athenian; the other that she 
was a nameless Thracian.  Perhaps the slander lay in the allegation that she was an 
                                                 
15
 See Jacoby‟s discussion in FGrHist (3T, b, vol. 1, 70-72; vol. 2, 73-74). 
16
 See Bicknell 1982; Lewis 1983.  See also below, ch. 6. 
17
 See How and Wells 1912: vol. 2, 55-56. 
18
 See further below, ch. 6. 
 81 
 
unknown flowergirl rather than the daughter of an important figure in the Thraceward 
region where Pisistratus would soon demonstrate extensive ties.  We cannot safely 
disregard either version of the story.
19
  
Pisistratus‟ second period of tyranny did not last either as he again fell afoul of 
Megacles.  Pisistratus was soon forced abroad where he set about marshaling the 
support of his friends.  Herodotus says that the he spent ten years gathering a force 
from Thebes, Argos, Naxos, and other places while based in Eretria on Euboea.  
Finally, he landed at Marathon, defeated his Athenian enemies, and took control of the 
city, this time for good.  He maintained power by means of many mercenaries 
(ἐπικούροι) and the great deal of money he derived from Athens and the area around 
the Strymon River in Thrace (Hdt. 1.61-64).   
The account preserved by the Athenaion Politeia explains this reference to the 
Strymon.  During his decade-long exile, Pisistratus had first ventured to the Thermaic 
gulf – near modern Thessaloniki – where he established a settlement (συνῴκισε) at a 
place called Rhaecelus.
20
  At this time, the area was very prosperous and still inhabited 
by Thracians, as the presence of wealthy Thracian burials attests.
21
  Cole conjectures 
that the verb συνῴκισε implies a joint colonization venture, perhaps with supporters 
                                                 
19
 Interestingly enough, the Thracians were often characterized as unusually tall.  Valerius Flaccus, for 
example, refers to the immanes Bessi (2.229).  The Bessoi were a Thracian tribe inhabiting the western 
Rhodope range, not far from the northern stretches of the Strymon.  See the map in Archibald 1998: 
108. 
20
 For the location, see Edson 1947: 89-91. 
21
 For this material, see Baba (1990), who discusses the material from several sites, including Sindos.  
Many of the grave goods consist of luxury items including gold funerary masks reminiscent of those 
from Grave Circle A in Mycenae.  For the masks see also Theodossiev 1998; and the catalogue of the 
Sindos finds, Vokotopoulou 1985.  The region fell within the Macedonian sphere of influence after the 
Persian Wars, as implied by Thuc. 2.99-100.  See Hammond et al. 1972-1991: vol. 1, 435-440; Cole 
1975: 42, n. 1. 
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from Athens, or more likely a group from Eretria.
22
  Soon Pisistratus went to the 
region of Mt. Pangaeum, adjacent to the Strymon and famous for its mines.  Here he 
grew wealthy and hired soldiers.  Cole suggests that Pisistratus may have introduced 
the large-scale worship of Dionysus in Athens as part of an arrangement with the 
Edonian Thracians dwelling near Mt. Pangaeum, analogous to the later introduction of 
the Thracian goddess Bendis in Attica.  These Thracians did famously worship 
Dionysus.
23
  After a decade in the north Pisistratus moved to Eretria to gather his 
Greek allies ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2).  Best offers compelling additional evidence that 
his mercenary force in Athens was based on Thracian solders: at precisely this period, 
Thracians began to appear in Attic vase-painting.
24
 
Forsdyke argues that it was by involving a larger portion of the population that 
Pisistratus mollified the traditional aristocratic rivalries that often led to expulsion.  
She also argues that he allowed his rivals to have a suitable level of power in Athens 
rather than resorting to the weapon of exile.  Yet, the elder Miltiades went into de 
facto exile.  In order to explain this away, as well as the attested exile of the 
Alcmeonids during the Pisistratid period, Forsdyke resorts to faulting Herodotus‟ 
grasp of the situation.  She attributes the account as preserved to Philaid and 
Alcmeonid propaganda in the oral tradition.
25
  This explanation is unsatisfactory.  
Why would Herodotus uncritically accept such propaganda, aimed at dissociating 
these families from the Athenian tyrants, while at the same time expressly labeling, as 
we shall see, Philaid rule in the Chersonese as tyranny?   
                                                 
22
 Cole 1975. 
23
 Cole 1975.  For Bendis, see above, ch.1. 
24
 Best 1969: 1-15. 
25
 Forsdyke 2005: 121-124. 
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Forsdyke and many others pay too little attention to the role Thrace played in 
cementing Pisistratus‟ third and lasting tyranny.  Lavelle, followed by Forsdyke, 
thinks that Pisistratus relied on trade and temporary exploitation of Thracian resources 
by force in order to acquire resources during his exile, but any sort of permanent 
control of the mines of Pangaeum would have been unfeasible in light of the strength 
of the local Thracians.
26
  Such reasoning, however, ignores Herodotus‟ comment that 
Pisistratus continued to rely on money from the Strymon in maintaining power at 
Athens, as is indicated by the use of the present participle συνιόντων (1.64.1).  Also, 
Hippias once expelled was offered Anthemus on the Thermaic gulf by Amyntas of 
Macedon, which suggests that lasting ties had been established by the Pisistratids in 
the region (Hdt. 5.94).
27
  While Pisistratus enjoyed a level of popular support in 
Athens, and many Athenians joined his side in the Battle of Pallene in which he 
defeated his rivals (Hdt. 1.61.3-4; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.3), the Thracian mercenaries 
constituted the backbone of his military resources.
28
  Regardless of any change in the 
political mood, these soldiers would have remained loyal to their paymaster.   
As far as we can tell, Pisistratus was the first Athenian to discover that Thrace 
could be a kingmaker.  Unfortunately we are not told why he chose to go north during 
his second exile, or how he learned of the region‟s advantages.  If during his second 
period as tyrant he did indeed choose a Thracian wife for his son, a prior connection to 
Thrace would be implied.  The moves he made to acquire influence in the northern 
                                                 
26
 Lavelle 1992; Forsdyke 2005: 118-119. 
27
 Baba (1990: 16-17) suggests that Pisistratus gave aid to the Thracians in the Sindos region against 
their northern enemies and thus secured their friendship. 
28
 Forsdyke (2005: 119-121) mentions these mercenaries, but only in passing.  For her, the support of 
the Athenians was the linchpin of Pisistratus‟ success.  
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Troad demonstrate that he was well aware of the strategic importance of that part of 
Thrace.  His ability to found a colony at – or at least settle –  Rhaecelus and to secure 
mining rights around Mt. Pangaeum attests to his skill in dealing with the indigenous 
inhabitants of the Thermaic Gulf and Strymon valley.  The forging of inroads in the 
north paid off for Pisistratus by allowing him to seize lasting power in Athens, and his 
successors benefitted from a suitable place of refuge after they were exiled.  Scholars 
such as Cole have appreciated that Pisistratus set off a long lasting Athenian interest in 
the Pangaeum region, and that he demonstrated an especial diplomatic talent in doing 
so.
29
  No one, though, has fully recognized that Pisistratus initiated a clear and 
pervasive pattern that would be followed by elite Athenians for the next two centuries.  
The aristocratic rivalries at Athens had made Pisistratus‟ position unstable.  At one 
moment he was an ally of the powerful Megacles; at another he was driven from the 
city.  The money and soldiers of Thrace proved to be an advantage that Pisistratus‟ 
rivals could not overcome.   
  
Regal Power and Royal Connections 
The Dolonci, an otherwise obscure Thracian tribe that inhabited the 
Chersonese, were continually under threat from their neighbors the Apsinthii, also 
Thracians.  Rivalries between tribal groups were the norm for the region which lacked 
a dominant governing power.  Around 545/4, the Dolonci set out for Delphi to inquire 
of the god as to how their situation might be remedied.  The oracle replied that they 
should take as a founder (οἰκιστής) for their land the first person who should offer 
                                                 
29
 See also Isaac 1986: 14-15. 
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them the traditional tokens of guest-friendship (ξείνια).  The first person to do so was 
Miltiades, who noticed the foreigners from the porch of his country house as they 
walked by (Hdt. 6.34-35).
30
  Herodotus‟ account of the Athenian foray into the 
Chersonese in the mid sixth century gives the distinct impression that the elder 
Miltiades desired more personal power than he was able to exercise in Pisistratid 
Athens.  As such, he jumped at the chance to leave Athens and rule over a foreign land 
and people.  For the next five decades, his family lived like kings in the north Aegean. 
In introducing Miltiades, Herodotus outlines the political situation then current 
in Athens, namely, that Pisistratus held all the power (εἶχε μὲν τὸ π᾵ν κράτος), but 
Miltiades was still a man of influence (ἀτὰρ ἐδυνάστευε καὶ Μιλτιάδης).31  To 
clarify Miltiades‟ station, he is said to have had a household wealthy enough to race 
four-horse chariots (ἐὼν οἰκίης τεθριππιτρόφου), an indicator of vast resources.  
Furthermore, his illustrious ancestry, tracing back to Aeacus of Aegina and connected 
to Athens via Philaeus the son of Ajax, is outlined in detail.
32
  Miltiades‟ father 
Cypselus was most likely the grandson of the Corinthian tyrant of the same name and 
had been eponymous archon in 596/5.  Thus, the Philaid family was among the 
aristocratic eupatridae who had monopolized political power at Athens before Solon‟s 
reforms.
33
 
                                                 
30
 As Scott (2005: 165) says, there is no a priori reason to reject this story of Thracians consulting the 
Delphic oracle.  Many other non-Greeks did as well. 
31
 Scholars dispute the chronology of much of the Philaid colonization of the Chersonese.  The most 
comprehensive general treatment is given by Kinzl 1968.  This passage, coupled with Miltiades‟ 
connection to Croesus, suggests that Miltiades set out during Pisistratus‟ third and lasting period of 
tyranny, probably in 545/4.  Some scholars argue that one of the earlier tyrannies is indicated.  For a 
concise account of this debate, see Scott 2005: 166. 
32
 For family claims of descent from gods or heroes, see Scott 2005: 167-168. 
33
 Bradeen 1963: 193-196. 
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Miltiades offered the Dolonci shelter (καταγωγή) and hospitality (ξείνια) 
once he had noticed their foreign clothing and the spears they were carrying (ἐσθῆτα 
ἔχοντας οὐκ ἐγχωρίην καὶ αἰχμὰς).  Thucydides remarks that by his time only 
barbarians and some of the less civilized Greeks still regularly carried weapons due to 
their fear of bandits (1.5.3-6.2).  The spear-brandishing Dolonci would have been 
readily identifiable as foreigners.  Because of Pisistratus‟ use of Thracian mercenaries 
at Athens, it is possible that Miltiades was familiar with their specific style of clothing 
and weapons and recognized them as Thracian.   
Miltiades was amenable to the request of the Dolonci that he accompany them 
to the Chersonese.  He was unhappy (ἀχθόμενον) with Pisistratus‟ reign and wished 
to remove himself from the way (βουλόμενον ἐκποδών εἶναι).  Many scholars 
think that Pisistratus himself sent Miltiades as part of a comprehensive foreign policy 
which included the Hellespont, and that Herodotus is offering a sanitized, pro-Philaid, 
version of events with Pisistratus‟ involvement removed.  Even if this were true, 
Miltiades probably did resent the tyrant‟s grip on power and was eager for a way to 
advance his own interests.  In that case, both men would have something to gain from 
the venture: Miltiades by finding an outlet from Athens; Pisistratus in removing a 
powerful rival.  One can, however, reasonably trust Herodotus‟ version of events.34  
                                                 
34
 For Herodotus relying on a pro-Philaid source, see Scott 2005: 163, 169-170.  But Scott also argues 
(366-367, 526-527, 531, 643) that for the younger Miltiades Herodotus made use of an anti-Philaid 
tradition, namely that derived from the prosecution‟s arguments at Miltiades‟ tyranny trial which 
emphasized the link between his family and the Pisistratids.  Why the inconsistency on the part of 
Herodotus?  Herodotus seems to have been aware of both traditions, those for and against the Philaids, 
and for some reason felt the version he chose to be the more likely. The most vigorous argument in 
favor of the private nature of Miltiades‟ expedition (and also Pisistratus‟ activities at Sigeum) is given 
by Berve 1937: 26-28; 1967: 62, 80. 
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Seeing the Dolonci in their Thracian clothes, and having in mind the precedent set by 
Pisistratus, Miltiades eagerly embraced the opportunity to establish personal ties with 
the foreigners.  The ξείνια so willingly offered the Dolonci might have been a 
deliberate first step in forging a formal ξενία relationship.35  
Before setting out for the Chersonese, Miltiades assembled all of the Athenians 
willing to take part in such an expedition, offering them a chance to join him (Hdt. 
6.36.1).  A large number of Athenians probably went along, perhaps as many as 400-
600, if we are to judge by the several settlements that were founded.
36
  This group 
most likely included other ambitious Athenians dissatisfied with their prospects for 
advancement under the tyranny, possibly including the father of Themistocles.
37
  If 
Pisistratus had brought some Athenian supporters along with him to settle Rhaecelus 
during his second exile, Miltiades would have had a ready precedent.   
This entire episode bespeaks a Miltiades jealous of Pisistratus‟ ἀρχή and 
searching for an outlet for his own ambitions.  The advent of the Dolonci seeking help 
against their rivals, the chance to be a prestigious οἰκιστής, and the legitimacy of 
power that could only be conferred by the Delphic oracle, furnished the ambitious 
aristocrat with the means of creating his own ἀρχή only a few days‟ sail from 
Athens.
38
  He was evidently satisfied enough with his position in the Chersonese: he 
                                                 
35
 Herodotus mentions ξείνια in the context of formal diplomatic relations in 2.115.4.  
36
 As conjectured by Scott (2005: 170). 
37
 Bicknell 1982: 168-173.  For more on Themistocles relationship with the Philaids, which seems to 
have soured by the late 490‟s, see below, ch. 6. 
38
 Herodotus indeed calls the Philaid principality in the Chersonese an ἀρχή (6.34.1), a term which 
would have had strong resonances in the time he wrote his history.  For the complexity of Herodotus‟ 
views on the Athenian ἀρχή of the mid-late fifth century, see Fornara 1971b: 37-58.   
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died there between 525-516, having ruled for at least two decades.
39
  Unlike 
Pisistratus, he never ventured to return to Athens and make a bid for power, in spite of 
being able to call upon significant numbers of both Thracians and Greeks living in his 
domain.    
As holders of power in the Chersonese, the Philaids exercised what was 
tantamount to regal authority, treating the region as their personal property.  
Herodotus calls them tyrants, applying the verb τυραννεύω and the nouns 
τύραννος and τυραννίς to their rule, explicitly equating it to the power wielded by 
Pisistratus in Athens (6.34.1, 36.1).  The elder Miltiades was superior to many of the 
Thracian rulers in the area, as the kings (βασιλεῖς) of the Dolonci willingly 
surrendered their power to him.  Accordingly, he “took possession of the land (ἔσχε 
τὴν χώρην)” once he arrived in the Chersonese.  He ruled the Dolonci by virtue of 
their invitation and because he fought on their behalf and offered them security by 
building a wall across the Chersonese to keep out their Thracian enemies.  After 
Miltiades‟ death, possession of the land remained within the Philaid family.  Many 
Athenians evidently disapproved of the exercise of such authority, even in a foreign 
land.  Once the younger Miltiades, heir to the family dynasty, returned to Athens in 
493 he was tried by his political enemies on a formal charge of tyranny (τυραννίς), 
though he was acquitted and elected general shortly afterwards (Hdt. 6.104.2).     
The elder Miltiades‟ nephew, Stesagoras son of Cimon, succeeded him as 
tyrant.  When Stesagoras was assassinated by an enemy during a war with Lampsacus, 
                                                 
39
 For the date of his death, see Scott 2005: 174. 
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the younger Miltiades, another son of Cimon, was sent out by the Pisistratids to 
succeed him around 515/14 (Hdt. 6.38.2-39.1).
40
  This Miltiades was more heavy-
handed than his uncle and his brother had been.  He seized total control of the area by 
tricking the regional chieftains (οἱ δυναστεύοντες) and having them all imprisoned 
(ἐδέθησαν).  It seems that the various indigenous leaders were unable to unite in 
order to pose a challenge to Miltiades‟ power.  Miltiades then maintained a force of 
500 mercenaries in order to avoid his brother‟s fate, and held (ἴσχει) the Chersonese 
as his possession (6.39.2).  It is unclear whether these mercenaries were Greeks or 
Thracians.  It is likely that Pisistratus had shown the Philaids how useful Thracian 
mercenaries could be.  Even in the fourth century, Iphicrates intimidated the Athenian 
law courts and secured an acquittal by surrounding himself with an armed band of 
retainers, who were possibly Thracian soldiers acquired during a long sojourn at the 
court of the Thracian king Cotys (Polyaen. 3.9.5, 29; Sen. Rhet. Cont. 6.5).     
According to Nepos, Miltiades carried himself among the inhabitants of the 
Chersonese with a regal demeanor (erat enim inter eos dignitate regia) and secured for 
himself lifelong rule (perpetuum imperium obtineret).  It should be noted that Nepos 
seems to conflate the careers of the elder and younger Miltiades, so the exercise of 
regal and perpetual authority might therefore apply to the elder.
41
  Nepos says that 
Miltiades obtained such power largely through his justice and magnanimity, and that 
he had the full support of the Athenians, both those who had sent him on the mission 
                                                 
40
 For the date, see Scott 2005: 178-179. 
41
 Hammond (1956: 122-127), against the opinion of most scholars, argues that Nepos actually fills in 
some of the gaps concerning the younger Miltiades‟ career and does not in fact confuse the two men.  
Scott (2005: 164) argues that already in the fifth century there was a confusion of the elder and younger 
Miltiades, which was picked up by Ephorus and in turn Nepos. 
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and those that had accompanied him (Milt. 2.3).  This support was the natural result of 
the great benefits he conferred, such as granting those Athenians that were with him 
tracts of land and enriching them through frequent raids (crebris excursionibus) into 
adjacent territories (Nep. Milt. 2.1).  To be sure, the legitimacy of Philaid rule had 
been founded upon, and was increased by, the continued support of the Dolonci.  
Although the younger Miltiades seems to have had a more authoritarian style of rule 
than his predecessors, once he had fled the Chersonese because of a threat of Scythian 
invasion the Dolonci of their own volition asked him to return and reinstated him in 
power (Hdt. 6.40).
42
                                 
During the course of the campaigns to secure his position on the Hellespont, 
the elder Miltiades was captured by his rivals from Lampsacus.  According to 
Herodotus, Miltiades was then very much in the thoughts of Croesus (ἐν γνώμῃ 
γεγονώς), which suggests the two were political allies.  Croesus threatened the 
Lampsacenes with total destruction should they fail to release their prisoner, and 
Miltiades was accordingly set free (Hdt. 6.37).  The war with Lampsacus, a city on the 
Asiatic side of the Hellespont, indicates that Miltiades aimed at complete control of 
the straights.  Croesus, under threat from the growing power of Persia, doubtlessly 
desired to cultivate an alliance with the ruler of a territory as strategic as the 
Chersonese.
43
  Perhaps, also, Croesus sought to increase his standing in the Greek 
cities of Asia Minor and to acquire influence with the Thracians, a potential target for 
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 Scott (2005: 181-182) discusses the chronological and other problems with this Scythian invasion.  In 
any case, Herodotus‟ text implies the esteem the Dolonkoi had for Miltiades. 
43
 Isaac 1986: 171; McQueen 2000: 114; Scott 2005: 173. 
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future conquest, through Miltiades.
44
  In any case, there was a personal connection 
between Miltiades and the Lydian king that benefitted both parties. 
 Once in the Chersonese, the younger Miltiades, though previously wedded to 
an Athenian woman, married Hegesipyle, daughter of a Thracian king named Olorus 
(Hdt. 6.39.2).  Emphasizing its importance for Miltiades‟ position of authority, 
Herodotus lists the marriage along with the other measures Miltiades took to seize 
power, namely imprisoning all potential rivals and maintaining a private mercenary 
force.  It was Hegesipyle, rather than Miltiades‟ Athenian wife, that would become the 
mother of the famous Cimon.  The historian Thucydides‟ father was a man named 
Olorus, and Thucydides himself controlled mines in Thrace and wielded considerable 
influence among the local inhabitants (Thuc. 4.105.1).  There was certainly a 
relationship between Thucydides and the Philaids, centered on Thrace.
45
  It stands to 
reason that Miltiades‟ father-in-law Olorus was a king in the region near Mt. 
Pangaeum or on the mainland opposite Thasos where Thucydides would later have 
connections via his father of the same name.  In addition to strengthening his position 
in the Chersonese, perhaps Miltiades also had an eye to securing some of the resources 
of Olorus‟ territory.46    
Marriage alliances among the aristocracy of Greek states were common in the 
Archaic period, and in the northern kingdoms of Macedon and Thrace the custom 
would be the norm throughout much of antiquity.  Hammond argues that many 
Archaic Greek aristocrats and tyrants often resorted to polygamy in order to cement 
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 Danov 1976: 246. 
45
 For Thucydides‟ family and Thracian ties, see above, ch. 1. 
46
 Scott 2005: 180-181.  How and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 343) suggest that Miltiades had rendered Olorus 
some military service, though there is no direct evidence of this. 
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marriage alliances.  Thus, they were essentially a “law unto themselves,” paralleled 
most closely by the Macedonian royals.
47
  There is some evidence that Miltiades‟ first 
wife was a relation, or even the daughter, of Hippias.
48
  Sometime after the marriage 
alliance between Olorus and Miltiades, Hippias seems to have withdrawn his support 
for the venture in the Chersonese, instead throwing in his lot in with Lampsacus.  
Perhaps this was in response to Miltiades‟ actions during Darius‟ Scythian campaign 
of 513, when Miltiades had attempted to betray the Persians by having their bridge 
across the Danube destroyed, leaving them at the mercy of the Scythians (Hdt. 
4.137).
49
  After this episode, it has been argued that Hippias attempted to ingratiate 
himself with Darius and thus abandoned Miltiades and the territory on the European 
side of the Hellespont.
50
  Other scholars have suggested that Hippias might also have 
been motivated by family pride to break ties with the Philaids after Miltiades took a 
Thracian wife.
51
  Perhaps, then, Miltiades‟ first wife, a relative of Hippias, was still 
alive when the marriage to Hegesipyle took place.
52
   
Herodotus portrays the Thracians as polygamous (5.5).  If Miltiades was still 
married to his first wife when he took Hegesipyle as a bride, in all probability Olorus 
would have had no qualms with the arrangement.  In this way, members of the Archaic 
aristocracy might have been more at home among the Thracians than with their fellow 
Greeks.  By marrying the daughter of a powerful local dynast, Miltiades prefigures 
Greeks such as Iphicrates and Charidemus who married Thracian princesses in the 
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 Hammond 1956: 120, n. 3. 
48
 Davies 1971: 302.   
49
 The historicity of this story was long ago called into question.  See the discussion in How and Wells 
(1912: vol. 1, 343-344), who accept the essentials of Herodotus‟ narrative. 
50
 Wade-Gery 1951: 218-219.  
51
 Davies 1971: 302; Scott 2005: 180-181. 
52
 For more on the break between Hippias and Miltiades, see below, ch. 6. 
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fourth century in order to cement their own political influence in the north.  The 
historian Xenophon too was offered the daughter of the Thracian Seuthes in an 
exchange for military services but declined.  As tyrant, Miltiades was adept at 
employing local customs in consolidating his position.  It would seem that many of 
these particular customs fit in well with his aristocratic predispositions.       
 At the end of his tenure in the Chersonese, Miltiades filled five triremes with 
his personal possessions in the area and fled the region under threat from the 
Phoenicians who were engaged in the Persian annexation of territory after the Ionian 
revolt (Hdt. 6.41.1).  This bespeaks the vast amount of wealth the Philaids were able 
to acquire during the course of their rule.
53
  The crews of these ships were probably 
men of Athenian descent who were brought back into Athenian society upon their 
return to Athens.  Scott estimates that those accompanying Miltiades in his flight from 
the Chersonese numbered between 500 and 900 men, along with their families and 
Miltiades‟ personal fortune.  That Miltiades owned this many triremes is not out of the 
question since even at this time triremes were sometimes owned by wealthy families 
and rulers as an emblem of their power and status.
54
  These ships of war would have 
added greatly to his ability to control the Hellespont.   
The Phoenicians managed to catch up with part of Miltiades‟ fleet and to 
capture his son Metiochus, the offspring of his first marriage.  The Phoenicians 
thought they had a great prize to present to Darius because of Miltiades‟ treachery 
during the Scythian campaign.  In spite of this, Darius did not harm Metiochus.  
                                                 
53
 As Scott (2005: 183) argues, though the typical Greek trireme would not afford much room for 
baggage, if Miltiades‟ ships were closer to the Phoenician design, fewer rowers would be needed.  This 
might have allowed more space for material wealth. 
54
 Scott 2005: 183. 
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Rather, he gave him a house and a Persian wife, by whom Metiochus had children.  As 
far as we can tell, Metiochus never returned to Athens.  We are told that his children 
lived as Persians (ἐς Πέρσας κεκοσμέαται, Hdt. 6.41.2-4).  Scott interprets this 
passage as an example of the trope of Persian magnanimity towards prisoners.
55
  But, 
as McQueen suggests, it is likely that Xerxes would have had uses for Metiochus had 
the invasion of 480 been successful.
56
  The Persians surely saw the potential benefit of 
securing the services of a Greek of such high standing, and for his part Metiochus was 
schooled in dealing with foreign monarchs.  His great uncle had enjoyed advantageous 
ties with Croesus, and his father had married into a Thracian royal house.  That 
Miltiades was part of the Darius‟ Scythian campaign suggests that the Philaids may 
have had prior experience at the Persian court itself.   
For half a century, the Philaid family enjoyed great power in Thrace.  
Pisistratus, who had achieved his own position through his Thracian connections, left 
no room for rival ambitions.  Instead of seeing a return of the seesaw of competing 
aristocratic factions, as plagued Pisistratus‟ two first attempts at tyranny, Miltiades left 
on his own accord.  Athens then remained stable for decades.   Miltiades became a 
tyrant abroad, in a land within easy reach for any Athenian with a ship, abounding in 
resources yet populated by weak and divided tribes.  The ancillary benefits of power in 
Thrace – from dynastic ties with other monarchs, to lordly authority made possible by 
armed retainers – suited the Philaids well.  Let us explore further some of the “soft” 
factors that drew the Philaids to Thrace.    
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Miltiades Kalos 
Some pieces of evidence suggest that the Philaids adopted Thracian habits.  
Foremost among these is a red-figure plate now in Oxford‟s Ashmolean Museum, 
dated to 520-510 BC and attributed to the Cerberus Painter.  The inscription 
ΜΙΛΣΙΑΔΗ΢ ΚΑΛΟ΢, or “Miltiades is Beautiful,” frames an image of a beardless 
mounted archer clad in what seems to be Scythian clothing.
57
  Scholars are divided as 
to whether the image represents the younger Miltiades himself, but given his family‟s 
presence in the north and the date of composition, it is attractive to think that the artist 
intended to link Miltiades with northern barbarians.  We are told that Miltiades dealt 
with Scythians in addition to Thracians, both on the Danube in 513, and when the 
Chersonese was threatened by Scythian invasion at an unknown date.  There is also a 
possibility that the artist simply made use of stock barbarian imagery on this plate, 
thereby conflating Thracians and Scythians.
58
  The figure of the mounted archer may 
indicate some degree of assimilation to barbarian practices on the part of Miltiades and 
his men, such as adopting foreign styles of dress and military equipment.  At any rate, 
a familiarity with mounted archers, either as enemies or allies, is implied.     
The artist of this plate, possibly commissioned by the Philaids themselves, 
might have intended to celebrate and publicize the younger Miltiades‟ departure for 
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 Oxford 310; ARV² 163 no. 8; Wade-Gery 1951: 212-221; Vos 1963: 52-60.  
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 The distinction between Thracians and Scythians is often unclear, and was so even in antiquity.  For 
example, as Hoddinott argues (1981: 97), the so-called “Scythian” slaves provided to the Greeks by the 
Scythians were most likely Thracians from territories under Scythian control. 
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the Chersonese.
59
  On the other hand, several Athenians closely connected to Thrace 
were censured for their adoption of foreign habits.  Figures such as Alcibiades, 
Dieitrephes, and Iphicrates were mocked and even at times faced prosecution because 
of their affinity for Thracian ways.
60
  The Oxford plate, therefore, could also represent 
some sort of criticism or mockery of the Philaids and their dynasty in the north.  In 
this vein, the plate could be understood to mean “Miltiades the barbarian pretty-
boy.”61  Whether positive or negative, foreign habits and affiliations on the part of 
Miltiades are indicated.   
Kalos inscriptions in general were common on Attic pottery.  Occasionally, 
they seem to refer to an individual portrayed on the vase.   There are many cases, 
however, in which no direct correlation between the inscription and any depicted 
figure appears possible.  Additionally, the precise significance of the inscription – 
whether it plays some role in pederastic courtship, is meant to advertise the beauty and 
nobility of a particular person or family, or intended as some form of mockery – is 
often unclear and likely differs from case to case.  In the end, kalos vases allow of no 
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 Wade-Gery 1951: 220.  Miltiades‟ Thracian activities might be commemorated on another vase as 
well, on which Hephaestus or Dionysus is depicted wearing a Thracian cloak.  Sometime after Darius‟ 
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61
 For the role of kalos vases in Old Comedy-style mockery, see Shapiro (2004) who argues that 
depictions of a certain Leagros as kalos were sometimes meant to invoke Leagros‟ infamous hard-
drinking and hyper-sexuality. 
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single interpretation.
62
  
There are several kalos vases depicting persons with Thracian and Scythian 
attributes.  For instance, Leagros, a youth of legendary beauty who is commemorated 
in dozens of images, is named as kalos on a red figure vase showing a beardless youth 
riding a horse and clad in a Thracian cloak and boots.
63
  Two other red-figure Leagros 
kalos vases should be mentioned here.  One depicts several military scenes with 
warriors clad in Thracian cloaks leading horses, while a Greek hoplite fights in 
conjunction with a Scythian archer.
64
  The other shows a Thracian leading a horse by 
the reins and preparing to hurl a javelin.
65
  This Leagros was probably the general who 
in 465 led an Athenian expedition up the Strymon River to establish a colony and 
secure control of the region‟s gold mines and timber.  The Athenians were ultimately 
defeated at Drabescus by a force of local Thracians, and Leagros was killed in the 
battle (Hdt. 9.75; Paus. 1.29.4-5).
66
  That he was selected to lead the first of many 
attempts to establish a colony in the region implies that he had a connection to Thrace, 
an idea that is given weight by the several vases commemorating him as kalos which 
depict Thracian figures.    
Aside from Miltiades, other members of the Philaid family are commemorated 
as kalos in vase-painting.   A distant relative, one Epilycus, is inscribed as kalos on 
several vases dated to about 510, including at least one depicting warriors in foreign 
                                                 
62
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costume with Thracian spears and shields.
67
  Aside from a comment on Epilycus‟ 
beauty, this may indicate that he accompanied Miltiades to the Chersonese.  A 
Stesagoras is labeled kalos on two red-figure vases dating to around the same time as 
the Miltiades plate. Scholars disagree as to whether this is the brother of Miltiades 
who preceded him as tyrant in the Chersonese or a younger member of the same 
family.
68
  One of the vases shows a young warrior in traditional Greek armor, the other 
a running satyr.
69
  Though tenuous, a connection to Thrace may be implied in the 
image of a satyr given the conventional artistic connection between satyrs – and 
Dionysiac imagery in general – and Thracian attributes.70 
Lissarrague comments extensively on the large number of Attic vases, ranging 
in date from 510-460 BC, that depict horsemen in Thracian, and to a lesser extent 
Scythian, apparel.  This Thracian dress usually includes a patterned cloak (zeira), a 
fox-skin cap (alopekis), and distinctive boots (embades).
71
  Lissarrague argues that 
these images often represent Athenians rather than foreigners, which can usually be 
determined by the presence or absence of barbarian attributes such as blond hair and 
short pointy beards.  Costume alone is insufficient for determining ethnic identity.  
The horsemen are almost always young beardless youths displaying an idealized 
beauty.  In several scenes, they are depicted before what looks to be an official 
scrutinizing their mounts, evocative of the dokimasia of the Athenian cavalry as 
described in the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (49.1-2).  The preponderance of 
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Thracian costume in images of horsemen, argues Lissarrague, becomes a key element 
in recognizing members of the Athenian cavalry or citizens of the social and economic 
class of hippeis.  He concludes that this specific costume is worn to mark out the 
Athenian cavalry as distinct from the majority of Athenians, both in terms of technical 
training and social class.
72
  
If Lissarrague is right – and his analysis is convincing – idealized aristocratic 
beauty, epitomized by young members of the hippeis, is often enhanced by Thracian 
and Scythian clothing.  Certainly for Athenian horsemen to emulate the Thracians on a 
tactical level makes sense, as Thrace was famous for its horse-breeding and the skill of 
its mounted warriors.  If the Athenians desired a model of horsemanship, the 
Thracians were an obvious choice, and the adoption of Thracian apparel may reflect 
this.  But Lissarrague compellingly argues that the splendor of Thracian vestments is 
also used by the artists as a tool to convey the idealized beauty of the young noble 
horsemen of Athens.  As Thracians and Scythians are thus paradigmatically kaloi, 
kalos vases depicting warriors with these foreign attributes may further emphasize the 
elite status and worth of particular Athenians.
73
     
This situation appears to be reflected in the Parthenon frieze on which several 
of the Athenian hippeis involved in the Panathenaic procession are wearing Thracian 
clothing.
74
  Indeed, the frieze grossly over-represents the role of cavalry in the 
                                                 
72
 Lissarrague 1990a: 227.  Vos (1963: 52-60) argues that figures of archers in barbarian dress, 
including the mounted archer on the Miltiades cup, are almost invariably foreigners rather than 
Athenians, regardless of the presence or absence of barbarian facial features.  Vos‟s arguments, 
however, are far from conclusive, and as her own discussion demonstrates, many scholars maintain the 
view that Greeks are often represented in barbarian dress.  Moreover, no mention is made of images of 
similarly clad hippeis, which surely represent Athenian horsemen in many cases.   
73
 Lissarrague 1990a: 217, 240. 
74
 Neils 2001: 135-136, 265 n.25. 
 100 
 
Athenian military, and thus, as Osborne argues, “presents the very aristocratic image 
of Athenian democracy at its most elitist, where all citizens are not just soldiers but the 
quintessential soldier, the young man in the cavalry whom public inspection requires 
to be a model of physical fitness.”75  In Lissarrague‟s formulation, the addition of 
Thracian accoutrements would increase the aristocratic splendor of the horsemen 
depicted on this most public of monuments.
76
  
Some comment should be made on the context of such imagery.  Scholars 
agree that the shapes and uses of vases play an important role in interpreting the 
images portrayed.  Peltasts, whether Thracian or otherwise, according to Osborne, are 
often depicted on cheap mugs intended for private personal use and even on alabastra, 
typically used as perfume jars by women.  Only rarely do they appear on the public 
display vessels of the symposium, such as amphorae and hydriae.  As such, peltasts 
were supposedly eschewed as models for the aristocratic Athenian men who attended 
the symposium, where scenes such as departing hoplites were much more prevalent.
77
  
Yet, Osborne himself concedes that peltasts do appear on sympotic vessels, but 
primarily on cups used by individual participants instead of on communal pots.
78
  
Even these cups were surely meant to be seen by fellow symposiasts, and either 
Osborne is mistaken in his assertion that only imagery designed to showcase the ideal 
of Athenian manhood was used in such a public context, or peltasts were not so 
completely disdained.  
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 In contrast to peltasts, images of Athenian horsemen in Thracian apparel were 
often painted on amphorae, kraters, and the like, in addition to drinking cups used by 
individuals.
79
  If Thracian apparel actually served to increase the aristocratic appeal of 
the figure portrayed, such images would make for the perfect display at the 
symposium, as indeed they were on the Parthenon frieze.  If Miltiades or a member of 
his family owned the Oxford plate displaying the barbarian rider and advertising 
Miltiades‟ beauty, it could have been an evocative status symbol meant to be seen by 
fellow aristocrats.  Conversely, if the figure was meant to mock the Philaids, the 
atmosphere of drunken revelry of the symposium would have facilitated such a joke.  
In the same vein, perhaps the very nature of the symposium as a drinking party 
encouraged the display of Thracians, famous as prodigious drinkers.  In the end, we 
need not interpret all images displayed in public contexts, including the aristocratic 
symposium, as meant to inspire civic virtue.  Moreover, Thracian attributes need not 
be in conflict with such an ideal.
80
   
A comment in Aristophanes‟ Acharnians might be relevant to Thracian 
imagery on pottery.  Sitalces, king of the Odrysian Thracians, is portrayed in the play 
as a true lover (ἐραστής) of Athens, to the point that he inscribes on his own walls 
“Ἀθηναῖοι καλοί” (142-144).  Commentators on this passage have been quick to 
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point out its pederastic connotations, as Sitalces appears to play the part of the erastes 
attempting to woo the Athenians as prospective eromenoi.  This notion is apparently 
strengthened by Sitalces‟ amatory graffiti, as many see kalos inscriptions as part of 
pederastic courtship.
81
  In Aristophanes‟ plays, demagogues are often portrayed as 
ἐρασταί of the Athenian demos, trying to secure its favors.82  Just a few years prior to 
the production of the Acharnians Pericles, at least in the Thucydidean Funeral Oration, 
had exhorted Athenians to be erastai of their city (Thuc. 2.43.1).  Aristophanes may 
be presenting a comic take on Pericles‟ words.  As for Sitalces‟ kalos graffiti, 
Aristophanes‟ joke might very well extend beyond notions of pederasty.  It has been 
shown that the Athenians often equated their beautiful equestrian youth with 
Thracians, and there are several artistic depictions of young men in Thracian and 
Scythian apparel inscribed with the names of specific Athenians as being kalos.  That 
a Thracian king should declare the Athenians to be kaloi would turn a popular artistic 
theme on its head, adding a further dimension to Aristophanes‟ joke. 
We will never know the precise meaning behind the Oxford plate in question.  
That the mounted archer is beardless implies that he is a Greek – if not Miltiades 
himself – rather than a barbarian.83  What is increasingly evident is the use of Scythian 
and Thracian imagery, sometimes accompanied by kalos inscriptions, as a comment 
on social class.  It is significant that the Athenian elite, perhaps beginning with the 
Philaids, advertised their nobility by highlighting their connection to Thrace.  As 
Archibald demonstrates, many of the Thracian kingdoms had a military elite similar to 
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that of the Scythians, characterized by warfare, hunting, feasts, and horsemanship.
84
  
To the educated Greek, Thrace was the land of the legendary horseman Rhesus, a 
society in which horse-racing and chariots, along with all the glory and prestige that 
such activities entail, continued to have a central place.  What better source of 
emulation could there be for an ambitious elite constrained by the rule of the 
Pisistratids and later by the egalitarian ethos of the Athenian democracy?  
 
Competition and Olympic Victors 
In a famous speech given before the launching of the Sicilian expedition, 
Thucydides‟ Alcibiades conveys, albeit rather baldly, an attitude that had once been 
pervasive among upper-class Athenians.  Rather than skirting the issue of his wealth 
and extravagance, because of which he had aroused the suspicion of the Athenian 
populace, he tries to turn it to his advantage.  His ostentation, or so he argues, is a 
credit (δόξαν) to his ancestors and a benefit (ὠφελίαν) to his city.  As his prime 
example, he cites a celebrated victory at the Olympic Games in which he personally 
entered seven chariot teams – more than any private individual had ever done – and 
secured the first, second and fourth prizes.  In such a way, the wider Greek world, 
expecting Athens to be thoroughly wrecked by the long war (καταπεπολεμῆσθαι), 
was shown a clear example of Athens‟ continued power and greatness.  Alcibiades 
insists he should not be censured because of such qualities but, rather, he has every 
right and privilege to assume a haughty demeanor.  Thus Alcibiades justifies his 
manner of living, his arrogance, and also his fitness to lead (Thuc. 6.16).  There is no 
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greater testament to the agonistic ethos of Greek aristocrats than the importance they 
placed on athletic accomplishment, especially in the Archaic period.
85
 
The centrality of Olympic victories to the early Athenian colonizing efforts on 
the Hellespont is striking.  The elder Miltiades was an Olympic victor.  His preferred 
event was the four-horse chariot race (Hdt. 36.1), as it was for his half brother Cimon, 
father of the younger Miltiades (103.2).
86
  As Herodotus relates, Cimon won his first 
Olympic victory after he had been expelled from Athens by Pisistratus.  Cimon won 
again at the next games with the same team of horses, but this time relinquished his 
victory in favor of Pisistratus.  Thus he was allowed by the tyrant to return to Athens, 
a fact that highlights the political importance of such prestigious athletic 
accomplishments.  Cimon later won an astonishing third victory with these horses, a 
feat previously achieved only once, but this time he was soon murdered at the 
instigation of the sons of Pisistratus (Hdt. 6.103.3).  As this story implies, his third 
Olympic triumph made him dangerously popular at Athens and therefore a threat to 
the tyrants.
87
  Pseudo-Andocides (4.33) says that the younger Miltiades and his son 
Cimon also won Olympic victories, presumably in the chariot competition, and an 
aside by Pausanias (6.10.8) indicates that Miltiades subsequently dedicated sculptures 
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of horses and chariots at Delphi.
88
  A black-figure pyxis found near Brauron and 
dating to about 540 depicts a series of grooms leading horses, along with a slave 
pulling a chariot.  A youth draped in a himation and holding a branch leads the 
procession.  The artist has identified the youth as Stesagoras, probably the son of 
Cimon who would succeed the elder Miltiades as tyrant in the Chersonese.  The 
prominence of horses and the chariot in the scene would fit in well with the family‟s 
propensity for chariot-racing.
89
                         
It is well known that a large part of the prestige associated with chariot-racing 
was the sheer expense required to raise horses.
90
  As a comic take on this idea, 
Aristophanes begins his Clouds with Strepsiades lamenting the debt he has 
accumulated because of his son‟s passion for horses (12-24).  It is therefore 
unsurprising that many of Athens‟ most eminent men were victors in the chariot race, 
as few others could afford even to enter such a competition.  As the son of Alcibiades 
says, the raising of horses is only for the most fortunate (οἱ εὐδαιμονεστάτοι, Isoc. 
16.33).  Alcibiades‟ horse-breeding and chariot victories were legendary, as is attested 
in several sources.  The fame he won from his Olympic victories was unmatched given 
that he accomplished a more spectacular victory than any private individual or even 
king (ἰδιώτης οὐδὲ βασιλεύς) had before him (Plut. Alc. 11).  The elite nature of the 
sport is brought out by Alcibiades‟ son who says that his father, though inferior to no 
one in terms of physical ability, chose to spurn the gymnastic competitions because 
many of the athletes in such sports were from insignificant cities and were of low birth 
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(κακῶς γεγονότας, Isoc. 16.33).   
In the late fifth century Alcibiades thought that a peerless victory at the 
Olympic Games in the quintessentially noble sport entitled him to political power even 
in a broadly based democracy.  As the fate of the elder Cimon illustrates, Olympic 
victories were often crucial to one wishing to attain power in the Archaic period.  If an 
aristocrat could afford to raise horses, the prestige and influence that could be acquired 
ensured that the expense was a worthwhile investment.
91
  Herodotus seems to connect 
political power closely with the ability to raise horses, indicated by his introduction to 
the elder Miltiades: “Miltiades the son of Cypselus was also powerful in Athens, 
having a household that raced four-horse chariots.”92  The younger Miltiades, who 
would eventually assume leadership over the Chersonese, evidently wanted to exploit 
his family‟s prestigious victories.  Herodotus says that along with Cimon were buried 
the four horses which had won him the victories (6.103.3), and Aelian says Miltiades 
himself saw to the burial of the horses in a prestigious plot in the Ceramicus (Hist. An. 
12.40).  The ostentatious burial of the horses which had won Cimon three Olympic 
victories, and caused him to run afoul of the Pisistratids, made an unmistakable 
political statement.  Miltiades would avoid his father‟s fate despite such a public 
affront to the rulers of Athens.  He was made eponymous archon in 524/3 by the 
Pisistratids, which suggests that they wished to avoid alienating the powerful Philaid 
family any further.  
From the time of Homer, the Thracians were legendary for their horsemanship.  
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In the Iliad the Thracians are called “horse-herders (ἱπποπόλοι, 13.4; 14.227)” and 
“horse-warriors (ἱπποκορυσταί, 16.287).”  Dolon describes the horses of Rhesus as 
the largest and most splendid he had ever seen, snow white and pulling a chariot 
adorned with gold and silver, fitting spoils for Odysseus and Diomedes (10.435-440).  
Euripides describes the villainous Polymestor as king of the horse-loving people that 
sows crops in the fertile Chersonese (Hec. 7-9).  The material evidence suggests that 
such descriptions are not without merit.
93
  There are also several references to 
Thracian horse-racing.  Xenophon describes the defeat of a force of Odrysian 
Thracians from the area near the Hellespont at the hands of their Bithynian rivals.  
After the battle the Odrysians buried their dead, drank a large amount of wine in their 
honor, and then held horse-racing competitions (Hell. 3.2.5).  The elder Miltiades was 
honored after his death by the inhabitants of the Chersonese with gymnastic 
competitions and horse-races (Hdt. 6.38.2).  The famous fourth century tomb of a 
Thracian noble at Kazanlak in central Bulgaria depicts lavish four-horse chariots and 
chariot races.
94
  From the Early Iron Age horses became an important part of elite 
Thracian burials as a way to emphasize the martial prowess and wealth of their 
owner.
95
  This practice resembles, and might have provided the inspiration for, the 
elder Cimon‟s burial with his prize-winning chariot team.   
Is it mere coincidence that the horse-loving Philaids were drawn to Thrace?  
Alcibiades grew weary of the many Olympic contests which included increasing 
numbers of competitors of low birth and dubious social status.  He then focused 
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entirely on horse-racing because of its exclusive nature.  While horse-racing remained 
prestigious in Greece well into the Classical period and beyond, it seems that 
Alcibiades was unable to gain the political power to which he felt his victories entitled 
him.  Once he fell out with the Athenians for the final time, he opted to go to Thrace.
96
  
Under Pisistratus, the elder Miltiades was forced to play a subordinate role in spite of 
his standing as an aristocrat and Olympic victor.  Cimon‟s Olympic victories may 
have actually led to his political murder.  While the younger Miltiades flaunted his 
father‟s Olympic triumph in Athens and managed to secure the archonship, he 
achieved his greatest political power when he went to Thrace to assume leadership of 
the family dynasty.  There is every indication that the type of nobility epitomized by 
horse-breeding and chariot-racing held much more sway in Thrace than it did in an 
Athens controlled by the Pisistratids or under a democratic constitution.   
 
Heroic Honors 
When the elder Miltiades died he received special honors from the inhabitants 
of the Chersonese, including sacrifices and athletic competitions, both gymnastic and 
equestrian.  Due to his conflict with Lampsacus, no one from that city was allowed to 
take part, implying that athletes from several cities in the area competed in these 
games (Hdt. 38.1).  This passage has been held by many scholars to portray an 
archetype for founder-cults that existed in poleis throughout the Greek world, for 
which evidence is otherwise sparse.  Key to this idea is the standard interpretation of 
Herodotus‟ comment that such is the usual custom for city-founders (ὡς νόμος 
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οἰκιστῇ).  However, Malkin, who has written the definitive monograph on Greek 
colonization and religion and believes that this passage implies the universality of the 
ancient founder-cult, can only provide a very few additional examples of such cult 
being celebrated in honor of historical persons.  Two of these are from Thrace.
97
  It is 
possible, then, that the type of founder-cult exemplified by that celebrated in honor of 
Miltiades was far from a universal phenomenon.  Furthermore, such cult appears to be 
linked to Thrace.  Accordingly, the precise meaning of Herodotus‟ comment must be 
reevaluated.    
Malkin begins his survey of founder-cults by discussing the special oracular 
tomb associated with king Battus at Cyrene, followed by the supposed cult of 
Phalanthus, founder of Taras (Tarentum), who was of dubious historicity and seems to 
have been overshadowed by the legendary hero Taras himself.  A few late Classical 
and Hellenistic cases are mentioned, as well as the honors bestowed upon some of the 
Sicilian tyrants as recorded in Diodorus.  The remaining historical figures who 
received known cultic honors were Timesius, who was honored at Abdera; Hagnon 
and later Brasidas at Amphipolis; and Themistocles, who may have been treated as a 
founder in Magnesia.  In all of these examples, the “heroic honors” are not specified as 
they are for Miltiades, save for Brasidas who was honored with annual sacrifices and 
games, and the exceptional case of the Sicilian Timoleon who received a yearly 
festival complete with athletic as well as musical competitions after his death in 336. 
Timesius, as it is related by Herodotus (1.168), was given heroic honors by the 
Teian colonists of Abdera, though Timesius himself was a Clazomenian.  He had 
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attempted to found the site a hundred years prior to the Teian colony but was driven 
out by the local Thracians.  Why should the Teians have honored Timesius with such a 
cult?  While Timesius had attempted to establish a colony, he was neither Teian nor 
was he a successful founder.  Malkin rejects the possibility that there was a preexisting 
cult to Timesius that the Teians simply adopted for themselves.
98
  Yet, as Owen 
demonstrates, it was a regular practice of Greeks in the north Aegean to make use of 
and adapt preexisting Thracian cult centers.  These were often linked to monumental 
structures such as tombs.
99
  Perhaps the Teians were confronted with the local cult of a 
legendary Thracian and its accompanying structures and adapted it to include 
Timesius, a well known Greek that had strong connections with the site.  The activities 
of Timesius and his status as an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός are mentioned in several later sources, 
attesting to his renown in antiquity.
100
  This famous figure would have been ideally 
suited for incorporation as a hero into a preexisting Thracian cult center.   
Thucydides tells us that after the final defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis at 
the hands of Brasidas, the residents of the polis destroyed the monuments or buildings 
of the Athenian Hagnon (τὰ Ἁγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα) and made Brasidas the new 
οἰκιστής, honoring him as a hero with annual sacrifices and games (Thuc. 5.11.1).101  
This looks very much like the cult granted to Miltiades.  Yet, it seems Hagnon had 
been afforded these honors while he was still alive.  The transfer of the cult occurred 
in 422 and Hagnon lived long enough to be chosen as a proboulos at Athens in 413 
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(Lys. 12.65; Xen. Hell. 2.3.30).  To be sure, the text of Thucydides does not say 
explicitly that the new honors granted to the dead Brasidas had been previously 
bestowed upon Hagnon.  Rather, it merely states that structures connected to Hagnon 
were torn down and the title of οἰκιστής was transferred.  Malkin, however, is right in 
asserting that Thucydides‟ text does imply equivalence between the new honors 
granted to Brasidas and those now denied Hagnon.
102
  That Hagnon enjoyed an active 
cult while still living is not out of the question, though it would seem to be unique 
among the Greeks until the honors granted to the Spartan Lysander two decades later. 
It is generally agreed that the Greek settlers in Amphipolis incorporated 
elements from local Thracian cults into their own religious practices.  For example, 
coinage and several inscriptions from the area demonstrate the worship of Artemis 
Tauropolos, who is to be identified with the Thracian goddess Bendis.  Additionally, 
the cult of Rhesus which was practiced at Amphipolis was most likely a Greek 
adaptation of the worship of a Thracian god or hero.  The Greeks probably made use 
of this particular cult to demonstrate an affinity with the indigenous population.
103
  
The Greeks who settled nearby Thasos made use of preexisting Thracian religious 
structures, and likely also Thracian deities, in the practice of their own rites.  The 
evidence suggests that the Cave of Pan on the acropolis of Thasos was originally a 
Thracian rock-cut tomb, associated with ritual feasting and connected to Thracian 
hero- or ancestor-cult.  The worship of Pan at this site by Greek settlers in the 
Classical period indicates that not only was the structure itself respected and utilized, 
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but perhaps also the earlier Thracian cult practices themselves were adapted to fit into 
Greek ritual.
104
  We can reasonably conclude that, rather than abandoning local non-
Greek religion, Greek newcomers to the north Aegean regularly respected and adopted 
Thracian cult.  The unique honors granted to Hagnon and later to Brasidas can perhaps 
be best explained in the context of Thracian religious practices.   
Another historical figure to whom Malkin attributes a proper founder-cult is 
Themistocles.  He was given power by the Persians over several cities in Asia Minor 
after his expulsion from Athens.  These cities included Magnesia and Myous, which 
were both in southern Ionia near Miletus, and Lampsacus on the Hellespont (Thuc. 
1.138.5).  While Malkin argues that Themistocles received heroic worship specifically 
at Magnesia, he admits that there is no direct evidence of this.
105
  The only indication 
that Themistocles received honors akin to those given Miltiades comes from a decree, 
dated to around 200 BCE from Lampsacus, which affords an unknown recipient the 
same honors that were given to Themistocles‟ son, namely the good things (ἀγαθά) 
associated with a festival.
106
  Presumably this festival would have included athletic 
contests and the like.  While this decree proves little, it is interesting that the only hint 
of heroic honors granted to Themistocles is connected to a city in Thrace rather than 
any of the other areas over which the great Athenian was given dominion. 
The universality of the founder-cult is far from certain.  That nearly all of the 
unambiguous references to such a cult in our sources can be situated within a Thracian 
milieu is striking.  The Φερσονησῖται who celebrated the rites in honor of Miltiades 
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surely included both Thracian inhabitants of the Chersonese, as they were the ones 
who had initially invited Miltiades and benefitted from the security he was able to 
provide, and the Greeks who had been settled in the region.  Yet, rather than this being 
a noteworthy case of foreigners participating in Greek rites, as most scholars have 
assumed, perhaps it was the Greeks who were taking part in local Thracian cult 
practices.
107
  Thus, Herodotus‟ statement that the sacrifices, and by extension the other 
rites, were carried out in accordance with the customary honors due a city-founder (ὡς 
νόμος οἰκιστῇ) might imply a Thracian, rather than Greek, νόμος.   
In his discussion of Thracian customs at the beginning of his fifth book, 
Herodotus outlines the funeral rites held after the death of prominent Thracians.  
These rites include feasting after the ritual slaughter and sacrifice of many different 
victims (παντοῖα σφάξαντες ἱρήια εὐωχέονται), and every sort of athletic 
competition (ἀγῶνα…παντοῖον, Hdt. 5.8).  That such rites were uniquely Thracian 
is evinced by their inclusion in a Herodotean passage meant to highlight the strange 
customs of the Thracians.
108
  Moreover, the feasting held in honor of the dead might 
be connected to the ritual feasting archaeologists have associated with Thracian tombs 
in southern Thrace including the Thasian Cave of Pan.
109
  Xenophon partially 
corroborates this image, as he describes Odrysian Thracians from the northern shore of 
the Hellespont burying their war dead and then honoring them with copious drinking 
and horse-racing competitions (Hell. 3.2.5).  The literary evidence, therefore, suggests 
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that the Thracians, quite independently of the Greeks, celebrated their prominent dead 
much as the inhabitants of the Chersonese did for Miltiades.  
Herodotus‟ language may also indicate the non-Greek nature of the sacrifices 
for Miltiades.  The verb θύειν is used in the context of Miltiades‟ honors, implying 
sacrifices in honor of a god instead of a hero, which would not be in accordance with 
the Greek νόμος for hero-cults.  Earlier in his work, Herodotus uses the example of 
the divine versus heroic Heracles to clearly distinguish between the sacrifices made 
for an Olympian (θύειν) and those made for a hero (ἐναγίζειν, 2.44.5).  Though 
there are exceptions to this rule, as has been noted by several scholars, Herodotus has 
chosen to comment on the distinction.
110
  The other notable οἰκιστής to be given 
sacrifices in this manner (θυσίαι) was none other than Brasidas, and perhaps by 
analogy Hagnon (Thuc. 5.11.1).  This naturally has been offered as proof of the 
connection between θυσίαι and Greek founder-cult.111  Yet, it might reflect the non-
Greek elements of Brasidas‟ cult.  
Malkin remarks on the lack of musical contests in the games held for 
Miltiades, which he argues are a central element in typical Greek hero-cults.  
Otherwise, Miltiades‟ festival would seem to be completely regular.112  Habicht, cited 
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by Malkin, enumerates the types of agones held in conjunction with hero worship, 
which include gymnastic, equestrian, and musical competitions.  Yet, the examples 
Habicht furnishes are all connected with Hellenistic ruler cult, such as that held in the 
Ptolemeia in Alexandria.  The only exception is the festival for Timoleon, which is, 
strictly speaking, late Classical.
113
  The lack of musical competition in the case of 
Miltiades, and also Brasidas, possibly reflects the non-Greek aspect of these honors.  
The sacrifices performed and the gymnastic and equestrian contests held are perfectly 
in line with the particularly Thracian practices as described by Herodotus and 
Xenophon.           
If this new interpretation of the founder-cult of the elder Miltiades is correct, 
we must reexamine the nature of Greek founder-cults in general.  Malkin himself 
concludes: “The cults of founders of cities which in later periods also served as a basis 
for the ruler-cults in the Hellenistic and Roman periods – seem to have been the 
creation of Greek colonies.”114  If such practices stemmed from Thracian rites, even a 
Greek reinterpretation and adaptation of Thracian cult, the Thracians thus had a 
profound influence on Greek religion.  Furthermore, if mortal men such as Miltiades 
could expect to receive even the semblance of divine honors, the appeal of Thrace for 
ambitious Athenian aristocrats is made even more apparent.  Hagnon, for example, 
might have preceded Lysander by decades in the receipt of heroic honors while he was 
yet alive.   
Cimon too, son of the younger Miltiades, and great-nephew of the elder, was 
the recipient of cultic honors, but at the hands of the residents of Citium on Cyprus.  
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His tomb was revered and he was worshipped and honored as a great being (ὡς 
κρείττονα σέβεσθαι καὶ γεραίρειν, Plut. Cim. 19.4).  It is a reasonable 
assumption that Cimon, who might have desired distinction such as his great-uncle 
enjoyed, exploited the divine honors paid to Miltiades by the inhabitants of the 
Chersonese.  That he would receive a cult in Cyprus attests to his success in fostering 
an image of himself as worthy of these honors throughout the course of his wide-
ranging campaigns.  Though purely speculative, let me conclude by suggesting that 
Cimon, the descendent of the tyrants of the Chersonese and himself a major player in 
the Thraceward area, implanted Thracian notions of hero-worship throughout many of 
the areas in which he had influence.
115
  His cult among the Citians would thus 
represent the realization of a deeply held ambition of Cimon, one which he inherited 
from his family and its connection to Thrace.                    
 
Military Influences 
A central theme of Best‟s seminal 1969 book Thracian Peltasts and their 
Influence on Greek Warfare is that Thracian warriors were important fixtures in Greek 
armies well before the supposed reforms of Iphicrates in the first quarter of the fourth 
century.
116
  In his first chapter, Best remarks upon the presence of Pisistratus‟ 
Thracians at Athens in the sixth century and the possibility that Greek settlers of the 
northern Aegean littoral adopted Thracian tactics relatively early.
117
  The first Greek 
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strategist, though, cited by Best as employing Thracian-style light armed tactics in any 
great measure is the Athenian general Demosthenes during the Peloponnesian War.
118
  
The genius of Demosthenes is presented as a bolt from the blue, with no mention of 
Greek and Thracian military cooperation during the more than a century that passed 
between Pisistratus‟ seizure of power and Demosthenes‟ victory at Pylos in 425.119   
While Best‟s analysis is correct in the essentials, and his work provides a 
needed corrective to the outsized importance placed on Iphicrates, he overlooks a 
crucial point: the special role of Athens in developing the role of Thracian soldiers in 
Greek armies.  It was not that Athens produced men of exceptional strategic and 
tactical acumen, but that Athenians from the time of Pisistratus had a special 
connection with the Thracians and therefore appreciated the usefulness of Thracian 
tactics in ways other Greeks could not.  As a case in point, during their long tenure in 
the Chersonese, the Philaids fought alongside – and learned from – the local 
inhabitants. 
It was for military assistance that the Dolonci sought the advice of Delphi, and 
the elder Miltiades was evidently successful in defending them from their enemies.  
His first act upon arriving in the Chersonese and being made tyrant was to wall off 
(ἀπετείχισε) the entire peninsula at its isthmus in order to prevent the destructive 
plundering raids (δηλέεσθαι ἐσβάλλοντες) of the Apsinthii.  This wall, according 
to Herodotus, was some thirty-six stades, or just over seven kilometers, in length 
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(6.36.2).
120
  Apparently Miltiades was able to end the raids in this way (τοὺς 
Ἀψινθίους τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ ὠσάμενος), at least to the point where he felt able to 
initiate a war with Lampsacus (Hdt. 6.37.1).  The settlement of his Athenians seems to 
have been part of Miltiades‟ overall fortification strategy, as he established them at 
sites near the wall such as Cardia, Agora and Pactye.  This would have effectively 
controlled access to the Chersonese.
121
  Nepos corroborates this picture, saying that 
Miltiades – though it is difficult to tell whether the elder or younger is meant – 
scattered his enemies, barricaded the Chersonese with fortifications 
(castellis…communiit), settled his fellow Athenians and enriched them by leading 
frequent raids into enemy territory (Milt. 2.1).  That the wall was rebuilt several times 
throughout antiquity demonstrates that this strategy of fortification was effective.
122
   
While Miltiades was brought in to lend his military mettle to the Dolonci, it 
seems that he himself learned from the experience.  In particular, he was forced to 
contend with a type of enemy much different from that typically faced by Late 
Archaic Athenians.  How does one defend territory from hostile neighbors prone to 
raiding and pillaging rather than any sort of “regular” warfare as epitomized by 
pitched battle?
123
  Miltiades‟ answer was his fortification wall, presumably manned by 
inhabitants of the adjacent poleis.  Later in antiquity, such a wall would be dubbed a 
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διατείχισμα, the technical term applied to a barrier intended to close off an entire 
region.  The strategy of fortifying an area by means of a barrier wall was employed 
several times in antiquity.  Examples include the wall across the Dema Gap in Attica, 
Hadrian‟s Wall in Britain, Constantine‟s long wall in Thrace, Justinian‟s long wall at 
Thermopylae, and of course the wall across the Isthmus of Corinth which was 
attempted at several periods beginning with Xerxes‟ invasion of 480-479.124  The wall 
across the Chersonese is the first such fortification employed by the Greeks that is 
mentioned in our sources.
125
  Was this the direct inspiration for the wall the Greek 
allies would attempt to utilize at the Isthmus of Corinth a few decades later?
126
   
Miltiades also recognized that in order for a fortification wall, no matter how 
imposing, to be effective, it needed to be adequately manned.  Thus, he settled his 
Athenians in its vicinity.  In this vein, later barrier walls would be built with forts 
interspersed along the entire length.
127
  As for offensive operations, the raids into 
Thracian territory which Nepos describes would have fulfilled a function beyond 
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enriching Miltiades‟ men.  Essentially, such raids would have harried and weakened 
the Apsinthii and rendered them less able to attack the Chersonese.  It is unlikely that 
the Apsinthii would have faced hundreds of Athenian hoplites, supplemented by 
Doloncian allies, in pitched battle.  Thus, in order to take the offensive, the Philaids 
adopted the tactics of the enemy for themselves.
128
  While many scholars have 
commented on the Greeks‟ inability to fight in a non-hoplite fashion and their general 
ineffectiveness against light-armed troops, Miltiades and his men seem to have fared 
quite well against Thracian fighters by pioneering the use of a barrier wall and 
employing local tactics.
129
  That the Athenian settlers and the Dolonci learned from 
each other and found ways to fight in conjunction is only a reasonable result of their 
coexistence.    
If the Oxford plate discussed above does in fact depict the younger Miltiades 
or even one of the Athenians that accompanied him to the Chersonese, some sort of 
military assimilation is implied.  We can never know whether or not Greeks actually 
fought in the manner of Scythian or Thracian mounted-archers, but that Athenian 
hippeis are so often depicted with Thracian equipment indicates that they esteemed the 
skill of the Thracian horseman.  Best and Isaac both remark on the strength of the 
cavalry units in Greek cities in the Thraceward region, which is attested by several 
ancient sources.
130
  Isaac notes especially Pindar‟s second Paean, which describes the 
pivotal role of the cavalry in protecting the Greek settlement of Abdera from the local 
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Thracians.  Such cavalry units, a rarity in southern Greece, would have been a 
necessity for Greeks struggling to secure their position amongst horse-loving 
Thracians.
131
  Miltiades, the scion of a family filled with avid horse-breeders, would 
perhaps have relished the chance to fight on horseback along with the native 
inhabitants of his territory.  Even if no Greeks in the Chersonese fought in this way, 
they would have been familiar with this style of warfare through constant contact with 
their barbarian neighbors, and they presumably would have found a way to fight 
alongside and against mounted-archers and other light mobile troops.  More than a 
century later, Xenophon would demonstrate the value of his experience with different 
types of troops by devising a method by which his hoplites avoided being separated 
during a night march from the Thracian cavalry and peltasts of his ally Seuthes.
132
                         
A cup fragment by Onesimus, now in the Getty Museum, displays an image so 
far unique in vase-painting.
133
  What remains of the interior of the cup depicts the 
upper torso and head of a lone hoplite, holding a shield and engaged in combat with an 
unseen enemy.  The warrior‟s helmet is topped with a scalp still wearing a laurel 
wreath.  The Scythians were famous for scalping their enemies, as Herodotus 
demonstrates (4.64-65), and the Greek verb for scalping was aptly ἀποσκυθίζειν, or 
“to act like a Scythian.”  As one scholar suggests, this cup, which can be dated to the 
later 490‟s, might be a reflection of the upsurge in knowledge about Scythians 
following the return of Miltiades to Athens in 493.  Perhaps Miltiades and his men not 
only learned of this Scythian practice but even adopted it to a certain extent 
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themselves, much like the Europeans who encountered scalping among the Native 
Americans.
134
  We do not know whether the Thracians living more in the immediate 
vicinity of the Chersonese engaged in such activities, but the Apsinthii were 
particularly savage and sacrificed the Persian Oeobazus to one of their gods in 
accordance with their custom (τρόπῳ τ῵ σφετέρῳ, Hdt. 9.119.1).    
Perhaps the famous charge of the Greeks at Marathon was due to Miltiades‟ 
influence (Hdt. 6.112.1).  While most scholars do not think that the Greek hoplites 
could have covered the entire distance of around 1500 meters at a full run, it is clear 
by Herodotus‟ emphatic repetition of δρόμῳ that they did run for at least the final part 
of the advance.
135
  The best explanation for this charge is that the heavily armed Greek 
infantrymen, unsupported by regular contingents of cavalry or archers, needed to 
reduce the effectiveness of the Persian arrows by quickly closing the gap between the 
two forces.
136
  That the Persians had and employed archers in the battle is proven by 
the presence of many Persian arrowheads in and around the Soros, or Athenian burial 
mound, which has been excavated on the Marathon plain.
137
  Miltiades had spent 
many years in the Chersonese among peoples that made extensive use of archers.  He 
served in Darius‟ force during the Persian invasion of Scythia, which would have 
                                                 
134
 As argued by Williams 1991: 47. 
135
 For the charge, see Hammond (1968: 28-29), who argues that the facts as stated by Herodotus are 
unimpeachable, including the supposed charge of the Greek hoplites.  How and Wells (1912: vol. 2, 
112) and others had previously argued that no hoplite army could have performed such a charge.    
136
 Scott (2006: 624) cites several tests which have shown that few could have run the entire distance, 
but that a run for the last portion of the advance would have been perfectly feasible. 
137
 Hammond (1968: 28-29) brings to bear the evidence of many Persian arrows found at the site which 
indicate that the Persian barrage was intense for the last 150 meters or so of the Greek advance.   Most 
recently, Storch (2001) has argued that the Persians did not shoot their arrows at Marathon, since no 
arrows are depicted on the Stoa Poikile, nor are arrows mentioned in the literary sources.  He has, 
however, no adequate explanation for why so many Persian arrow heads were found in situ on the 
Marathon plain.  For the arrow heads being of distinctly eastern types, see E. Forsdyke 1919.  
 123 
 
brought him into contact with Scythians and Persians (Hdt. 4.137.1).  And of course 
he fought with the Thracian inhabitants of the Chersonese against their enemies which 
included other Thracians from the adjoining regions.  While the extent to which he 
was actually in control of troop movements at Marathon in unclear at best, the 
tradition does give Miltiades a key role in masterminding the battle and urging his 
fellow generals to fight.
138
  Faced with commanding an army of heavy infantrymen 
with little in the way of cavalry or archer support, he may well have applied his 
experiences in the north in advising the Greeks to close ranks quickly with the 
Persians.
139
  Herodotus does say that the Athenians at Marathon were the first Greeks, 
“so far as we know,” to charge at a run.140  For their part, the Persians thought the 
Athenians were mad in attacking without adequate light-armed and mounted support 
(Hdt. 6.112.2-3). 
There was supposedly another first at Marathon, one that Herodotus fails to 
mention.
141
  In his description of the Marathon plain, Pausanias identifies two different 
burial mounds, one for the Athenian dead, which has been identified as the Soros in 
the middle of the plain, and another for the Plataeans and the slaves, about two 
kilometers to the west (1.32.3).
142
  Pausanias says that the Battle of Marathon was the 
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first time slaves fought beside their masters.  Elsewhere, he attributes this innovation 
to Miltiades who had passed a decree (βούλευμα) freeing the slaves before the battle 
(7.15.7).  The evidence suggests that, at least by the late fifth century, hoplites were 
regularly attended on campaign by a personal slave, though the duties of these slaves 
did not usually involve fighting.
143
  Why the innovation to involve slaves in the battle?  
A shortage of Athenian manpower in the face of a large Persian army does not suffice 
as an explanation.  As Hunt observes, the thousands of Athenians of the thetic class 
were not mobilized, perhaps due to fears that they would derive too much political 
power from participation in the army.
144
  But if the Athenians really were desperately 
outnumbered, facing a threat to their very survival as a polis, it seems that they would 
have called upon the thetes regardless of potential political repercussions.   
What role did the slaves play in the fighting?  Usually, it has been assumed 
that they would have fought as hoplites, just as their masters.
145
  Some, though, have 
speculated that they would have served as light troops, possibly to cover the Athenian 
flanks.
146
  The latter seems much more likely as such inexperienced and probably ill-
equipped troops would have been a liability within the closely packed phalanx itself.  
The Athenians were clearly afraid of being outflanked, hence the thinning of the 
center in order to lengthen the line.  To place light troops on the flanks would have 
added further insurance against a longer Persian line.  Even newly freed slaves 
inexperienced in combat would have been better than nothing, and they could have 
made good use of the terrain as the ground rose sharply on either side of the Athenian 
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phalanx.
147
  If the slaves were used as light troops, this would be a very early example 
of a combined-arms force, however ad hoc, which would prefigure the tactics of later 
influential generals from Demosthenes to Iphicrates.  After Marathon, the Athenians 
seemed to gain an appreciation for light troops, as there was a corps of citizen archers 
at Plataea in 479 that played no small part in the battle (Hdt. 9.22, 60).
148
  
Spending so much time in the Chersonese and facing threats from local 
Thracians and Greeks alike, the Philaids would have been forced to apply innovative 
ways of fighting.  They would have had considerable latitude to work outside the 
confines of the phalanx while leading the Dolonci along with Athenian settlers.  
Necessity would have played a considerable role in encouraging changes in tactics.  
Miltiades might well have applied the military lessons he learned in Thrace to the 
Battle of Marathon, making the unprecedented decision to free a number of Athenian 
slaves in order to complement the citizen hoplite.  Many of these Attic slaves might 
have been Thracians themselves, or at least from other lands familiar with light-armed 
warfare.
149
  Their military value in the battle might have been minimal, but the 
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Athenians had to make the most of what they had on hand.  Herodotus neglects their 
presence because Marathon had come to represent the glory of the Athenian hoplite 
class.  But at the time, in 490, the slaves who had fought along with their hoplite 
masters were accorded a singular honor: burial on the battlefield itself.
150
 
 
Cimon: Continuing the Family Legacy 
 After returning to Athens, although Miltiades successfully defended himself 
against a charge of tyranny and gained renown from his role at Marathon, he never 
reacquired his family‟s territory in Thrace.  Instead, he died in disgrace after being 
fined fifty talents for the failure of an expedition to Paros in 489.  It was left to his son 
Cimon to pay the fine, and as a result, the family was reduced to poverty and relative 
political insignificance for some time (Hdt. 6.132-136; Plut. Cim. 4.3).  Isaac, 
following Perdrizet and Ehrenberg, argues that Miltiades‟ expedition to Paros was 
merely a prelude to a concerted effort to acquire the gold mines opposite Thasos and 
thus enrich Athens substantially.  Paros, after all, was the mother city of Thasos, and 
its reduction would have been a fitting first step in challenging Thasian interests in 
Thrace.  Also, Olorus, Miltiades‟ father-in-law, was probably a king in the vicinity of 
the Thasian-controlled gold mines, a connection the Athenian leader surely hoped to 
exploit.  Finally, the Parians set up a grave monument to a certain Tokes on the 
                                                                                                                                            
following Plassart).  More recently, several scholars have argued that these scenes should be seen in a 
mythological context.  The Scythians, for example, might have originated as attendants of Achilles, but 
came to denote a generic heroic attendant (Pinney 1983: 130-131).  Miller (1991) argues that as 
Athenians dressed as Thracians, so too did they dress as Scythians, probably to denote an upper-class 
affinity for the exotic.  In the end, there is no scholarly consensus as to the meaning of these images, but 
we cannot rule out that foreign archers, perhaps slaves, were introduced to Athens at this time.  
150
 Thucydides (2.34.5) says that the Athenian war dead were traditionally buried in the same spot on 
the outskirts of Athens, except for the warriors of Marathon who were buried where they fell. 
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mainland opposite Thasos between around 525-490, which shows continued Parian 
interest in the region shortly before the time of Miltiades‟ expedition.151  But, with 
Miltiades‟ disgrace and death, and the consequent penury of his surviving family, 
Philaid influence in Thrace seemed at an end. 
 Cimon, as is well known, would eventually attain prestige and political power 
at Athens, largely through his wealth and acts of philanthropy.  He regularly 
entertained and feasted the citizens of his deme Laciadae, and he let any who wished 
pick fruit from his extensive estates.  All this was in addition to his liberal execution 
of liturgies.  To combat such wealth and the public favor it fostered, Pericles, Cimon‟s 
rival, was forced to offer the citizens of Athens jury pay ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 27.3; Plut. 
Cim. 10.1-3).  The financial straits in which Miltiades had left the family had been 
remedied and more, largely through Cimon‟s own campaigns in Thrace.  As scholars 
point out, in Thrace Cimon was careful to appear as Athens‟ champion while 
enlarging his own personal fortune through conquest.
152
  He had learned from his 
father that vast wealth and territory were up for grabs in the northern Aegean, and 
though Miltiades failed in his final attempt to expand his own power as well as that of 
Athens in the region, Cimon would enjoy tremendous success.  
 In 476, Cimon led a force of Athenians to Thrace.  For this first campaign he 
concentrated on the region opposite Thasos and along the Strymon, fulfilling his 
father‟s thwarted ambitions.  After a destructive siege of Eion, a city on the Strymon 
under the control of the Persian governor Boges, Cimon expelled the Persians from the 
city and also ravaged the local Thracians who had been bringing the Persians supplies 
                                                 
151
 Isaac 1986: 5-7, 18-19. 
152
 Isaac 1986: 34; Archibald 1998: 114. 
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(Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1; Plut. Cim. 7-8.2).  Though Eion itself had been destroyed 
by the Persians at the end of the siege, Plutarch tells us that the surrounding 
countryside was beautiful and fertile and Cimon turned it over to the Athenians for 
settlement (Cim. 7.3).
153
  Plutarch additionally remarks that by this feat Cimon 
achieved greater fame in Athens than either Themistocles or Miltiades had.  At 
Cimon‟s insistence, stone herms were dedicated in Athens celebrating his victory, 
though Miltiades and Themistocles had received not so much as a laurel crown.  
Plutarch guesses that the Athenians were so enthralled with Cimon‟s achievement 
because, whereas the other great generals of Athens were primarily engaged in 
defending their city from external enemies, Cimon had brought the offensive to the 
enemies themselves and had in the process acquired new territories for the Athenians 
to settle (Cim. 7.3-8.2).  Isaac suggests that Cimon‟s success on the Strymon brought 
such great excitement because of the possibility of the untold riches of Thrace falling 
into Athens‟ hands.154  
 In 466, following the Battle of Eurymedon, the Chersonese was brought back 
under Athenian influence by another expedition of Cimon.  The Persians in the area 
had enlisted the help of Thracians to the north, perhaps tribesmen connected to the 
very Thracians whom the elder Miltiades had driven from the Chersonese, in order to 
fight against Cimon.  With but a few ships and vastly inferior numbers, according to 
Plutarch, Cimon defeated the combined forces of the Persians and Thracians, both on 
                                                 
153
 See Isaac (1986: 19-20) for the extent of the Athenian settlement on the Strymon organized by 
Cimon, which may have included an expedition to Ennea Hodoi and the first attempts to found a city at 
the future location of Amphipolis, as indicated by Nepos (Cim. 2).  For the date of the campaign, see 
Archibald 1998: 114, n.101.   
154
 Isaac 1986: 21. 
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land and sea, and won for Athens the entire Chersonese (Cim. 14.1).  Philaid influence 
on the Hellespont was thus restored, though Cimon ostensibly gave the land to all 
Athenians. 
Immediately following this victory, Cimon put down a revolt on Thasos.  From 
our sources, it is clear that Thasos and Athens disputed the control of the emporia on 
the mainland opposite the island, as well as the lucrative gold mines in the vicinity 
(Thuc. 1.100.2; Plut. Cim. 14.2).
155
  After a victory at sea and a successful siege of 
Thasos, Cimon acquired for Athens the disputed mainland territory along with its 
mines.
156
  His victory was so complete, in fact, that many Athenians thought he should 
capitalize on his gains by moving against Alexander of Macedon.  That Cimon failed 
to do so brought upon him the charge of taking bribes from Alexander, for which his 
enemies prosecuted him at Athens.  Cimon‟s defense consisted of insisting that he was 
not a proxenos of wealthy Thessalians or Ionians, as some other Athenians were, but 
rather of the frugal Spartans.  All the riches gained by his campaigns were funneled 
directly into the city of Athens.  By implication, he would never be swayed by a bribe 
(Plut. Cim. 14.2-3).  In reality, though, Cimon was greatly enriched by his activities in 
the northern Aegean, in no small part from the very mines he had wrested from 
Thasos. 
Cimon made great gains for Athens in the north Aegean, reestablishing 
Athenian control on the Chersonese, making the first major inroads up the Strymon 
                                                 
155
 Meiggs (1972: 79-82) discusses the date of the Eurymedon and Cimon‟s subsequent expeditions to 
the Chersonese and Thasos.  From the evidence of a surviving casualty list (IG i² 928) which contains a 
record of the fallen from both the Chersonese and Thasos, a coherent and comprehensive campaign in 
the north Aegean led by Cimon is indicated.   
156
 Thucydides (1.100.2) tells us that at about the same time, Athens attempted to establish a colony at 
Ennea Hodoi, later Amphipolis, with 10 000 settlers, which ended in disaster at Drabeskos.  For this 
colonization attempt, see Isaac 1986: 24-30; Archibald 1998: 115.  
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valley, and securing lucrative mines and territory on the mainland opposite Thasos.  
All of these areas would figure prominently in Athenian foreign policy for over a 
century following Cimon‟s career.  It is also clear that Cimon‟s own personal fortunes 
were vastly improved by these activities, as he became one of the wealthiest men in 
Athens and a leading political actor.  His innate military talent was combined with 
extensive connections in the region to achieve his aims.  In the case of the Chersonese, 
Plutarch is explicit that the Persians disdained Cimon because of his small number of 
ships, but still Cimon was successful.  This indicates that he drew on his family ties in 
the area, probably with Greek settlers and friendly Thracians alike, to drive the 
Persians and enemy Thracians from the peninsula.  He followed in his father‟s 
footsteps by bringing the fight to Thasos in order to open up new sources of revenue 
for Athens.  Again, family connections probably played a key role.  Cimon, the 
grandson of Olorus, would have had useful friends in the area, friends who might have 
been a help in his earlier siege of Eion and colonization efforts on the Strymon.       
As the ignominious end of Cimon‟s father Miltiades reveals, the Athenians 
could be a very fickle people.  Even the hero of Marathon was not immune from 
prosecution and humiliation at the hands of a vengeful demos.  Athens‟ impatience 
with its generals and political leaders is a prominent theme of ancient history.  Pericles 
was of an exceptionally rare breed in that he managed to maintain the favor of the 
Athenians until his death, though had not the plague killed him in the early years of 
the Peloponnesian War, there is no telling how long the city would have abided his 
policies.  Many of the fallen stars of Athens turned to Thrace as a place of refuge.  The 
elder Miltiades had set out for the Chersonese because the political situation in Athens 
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was unbearable and there was no room for so prominent a rival to Pisistratus.  The 
elder Cimon was murdered precisely because he represented a challenge to Pisistratid 
power.  Once driven from Athens, the Pisistratids themselves found refuge with their 
friends at Sigeum.  Like his father, the younger Cimon too fell out of favor with the 
democracy at home.  Though his Thracian connections had led to power and prestige 
at Athens, Cimon would be overshadowed and driven from the city by his political 
rivals Ephialtes and Pericles in 461 (Plut. Cim. 17.2).  His family, by contrast, had 
managed to hold onto power in the Chersonese for half a century.  The historian 
Thucydides, a kinsman of Cimon and the Philaids, was given a prestigious command 
in the Thraceward region during the Peloponnesian War precisely because of his own 
ties in the area.  But when he seemed to fail in his duty, he remained abroad, probably 
retiring to his estates on the mainland opposite Thasos.
157
  In the case of Pisistratus, 
Thrace turned out to be a kingmaker at Athens.  But under the increasingly entrenched 
democratic constitution, the zero-sum game of Athenian politics proved too volatile 
even for men as capable as Cimon.  We are in the dark concerning Cimon‟s 
whereabouts during his period of exile.  He seems not to have returned to Thrace 
where he might have been able to reassume his family‟s tyranny free of his democratic 
rivals.
158
 
 
                                                 
157
 For Thucydides, see above, ch. 1. 
158
 He appears in Boeotia at the Battle of Tanagra in 457 and offers to fight on Athens‟ side against 
Sparta (Plut. Cim. 17.3-5).  In 451 Plutarch tells us that Cimon was recalled to Athens, on a proposal by 
Pericles no less, to negotiate a truce with Sparta (Cim. 17.6).  Gomme et al. (1945-1981: vol. 1, 325-
329), however, argues based on the testimony of Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F 88) that Cimon was 
recalled in 357 after only five years in exile.  See also the discussion in Hornblower (1991-2008: vol. 1, 
167-168) who argues that Theopompus is guilty of some telescoping.  Thucydides tells us little about 
Cimon in this period, so we are largely in the dark.   
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Conclusions 
Thrace was the ideal resource for Athenians eager to acquire power.  
Pisistratus used Thrace as a source of money and soldiers with which he dominated 
Athens.  While he had been twice ousted from power by his aristocratic rivals, the 
introduction of foreign mercenaries and large sums of foreign money into the equation 
tipped the balance decisively in Pisistratus‟ favor.  Once he was established at Athens, 
what were similarly ambitious elites to do?  The elder Miltiades removed himself to 
Thrace at the fortuitous advent of Thracian tribesmen eager for a champion.  He was 
able to take advantage of the power vacuum created by continual strife between 
competing tribes.  Unlike Pisistratus, he never returned to Athens in an attempt to 
overthrow his rivals.  In Thrace he founded colonies, fought at the head of Thracians 
and Greeks, and forged alliances with figures as powerful as Croesus.  After death, he 
was honored as divine hero.  In Thrace he lived as a king.  What need to return home?   
His successors controlled the region for a further two to three decades.  In 
addition to enjoying wealth and power, they entered into dynastic marriages with 
Thracian nobility and might have adopted certain Thracian practices themselves.  
Ostensibly working on behalf of Athens, Cimon reestablished his family‟s dominance 
in the Chersonese that had been lost to the Persians.  He also expanded his power to 
the Strymon valley, where his grandfather had reigned and where his father had set his 
sights before his ignominious death.  Like his great uncle, Cimon received 
posthumous cult honors, though at the hands of the Cypriots.  The Philaids were first 
and foremost in control of a strategic and richly resourced area; but we cannot utterly 
discount the ancillary benefits they derived from life among the Thracians.     
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The Philaids revealed how useful experience in Thrace could be for the 
military strategist.  Greek fortification techniques seem to have been greatly 
influenced by the elder Miltiades‟ barrier wall, and the successful campaigns he waged 
against his Thracian neighbors evinces both an ability to adapt to a new type of enemy 
and a level of cooperation between Greek and non-Greek soldiers.  At Marathon, the 
younger Miltiades might have made the most of a hoplite army facing Persian archers 
because of his prior experience with light-armed fighters.  That the Athenians failed to 
incorporate Thracian-style tactics before the Peloponnesian War can perhaps be 
explained by the continuing prestige of the hoplite.  Thrace was the ideal proving 
ground for innovative tactics, far away from the massed phalanxes of warring poleis.  
But, few influential Athenian leaders spent such a substantial time in Thrace until 
Hagnon founded Amphipolis in 437.  Hagnon, it turns out, probably did gain military 
experience from his time among the Thracians.   
Finally, the career of the Philaids demonstrated to any astute Athenian the 
opportunities Thrace could afford in terms of territory, material wealth, and political 
power.  Archibald contrasts the activities of Pisistratus and the Philaids – that is, the 
personal foreign ties they cultivated irrespective of any coherent Athenian policy – 
with the “civic enterprises” of the Classical Athenian state once it had developed the 
“institutional machinery” of international relations.159  Yet, as the rest of this study 
will show, personal connections, and usually by extension individual private interests, 
continued to play an integral part in Athens‟ relationship with Thrace.  Athens may 
have become more sophisticated in its use of diplomacy, and a definite foreign policy 
                                                 
159
 Archibald 1998: 112. 
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may have been advanced by the state as a whole, but prominent individuals who more 
or less conformed to the Philaid paradigm continued to drive that policy.  And they did 
not always subordinate their own aims to those of Athens. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 DIEITREPHES AND THE MYCALESSUS MASSACRE 
 
Introduction 
In 413 BC the Athenians were facing immense difficulties as the 
Peloponnesian War entered a new phase.  According to Thucydides, not only were 
they engaged in a war with Sicily, a war on the same scale as that which they had been 
waging against the Peloponnesians, they were also facing financial ruin due largely to 
the damage caused by the Spartan fortification of Decelea.  It was in this context that 
one of the most gruesome episodes of the war took place (Thuc. 7.27.1-2; 28-30).   
 A contingent of Thracian fighters from the tribe of the Dioi had arrived in 
Athens to serve with the general Demosthenes in Sicily, but had arrived too late.  The 
Athenians, not willing or able to cover the expense of keeping these soldiers on the 
payroll, sent them back to Thrace under the command of a certain Dieitrephes.  While 
sailing back to Thrace through the Euripus Strait, the Athenians had instructed 
Dieitrephes to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy.  After plundering 
Tanagra, the Thracians moved further inland and attacked the town of Mycalessus, 
catching the inhabitants entirely off guard.  Mycalessus was far enough from the sea 
so as to supposedly prevent a sea-borne attack, and the walls of the city had been 
neglected to the point of disrepair and were crumbling in several sections.  The band 
of 1300 warriors stormed into the town and systematically butchered all they 
encountered, sparing not even the livestock.  Most shockingly, they entered into the 
region‟s largest boys‟ school and slaughtered all the children found inside.  In a 
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chilling note, the entire Thracian race, like other barbarous peoples, is portrayed as at 
its most murderous (φονικώτατον) when its spirits are up (ἐν ᾥ ἄν θαρσήσῃ |), 
presumably when the killing is easy (7.29.4).
1
  Thucydides insists that this attack 
represented an utter calamity for the town of Mycalessus, a disaster as complete and 
pitiable as any which occurred during the long war (7.30.10).  Eventually, the Thebans 
sent their cavalry and hoplites to the aid of Mycalessus, and catching a sizable group 
of the Thracians still involved in looting the town, killed many of them.  The 
Thracians that managed to retreat in an orderly fashion performed well against the 
Thebans, adopting the tactics of their native land by charging at the enemy in small 
groups and subsequently falling back again.  Having lost some 250 out of 1300 men, 
the Thracians escaped to their boats and sailed north. 
 Thucydides is an author fond of paradigms.  For example, although many 
staseis occurred during the war, he chose to describe only the one at Corcyra (3.69-
85).  The brutality and horrors of the civil strife amongst the Corcyreans, so vividly 
illustrated by the historian, would serve to inform the reader‟s picture of subsequent 
revolutions which would take place in various cities throughout the course of the war, 
without the need for Thucydides to go into such detail again.  Other paradigmatic 
descriptions can be found, the famous passage concerning the plague in Athens (2.47-
55) being an example.  In the same way, the episode at Mycalessus was employed by 
Thucydides to paint a striking portrait of the levels of brutality and cruelty to which 
the war had descended.  Other terrible atrocities had been committed, but the slaughter 
                                                 
1
 Kallet (1999: 240 n. 49) thinks this statement is gnomic rather than a reflection of Thucydides‟ own 
opinion of the Thracians.  Thucydides had a high opinion of at least the martial skill of the Thracians 
involved at Mycalessus, if not fully condoning their more vicious behavior.  For more on Thucydides 
and Thrace, see above, ch. 1. 
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at Mycalessus provided a powerful enough image to serve as a paradigm.
2
   
 This episode sparks several questions.  Foremost among these, what were the 
Athenians doing with such a terrible band of killers in their employ?  Moreover, what 
was the role played by the Athenian commander Dieitrephes?  What was the character 
of his relationship with the Thracian troops under his command, and what sort of 
control did he have over them?  The bulk of the evidence indicates that Dieitrephes 
was leading a group of mercenaries that would have been familiar to several Athenian 
commanders in 413.  Dieitrephes had his own family ties to Thrace and, for at least the 
two decades preceding the attack on Mycalessus, some of Athens‟ most illustrious 
men had led the Dioi and others like them.  Athens, and especially those Athenians 
who had an interest in the Thracians, knew exactly what type of soldiers these 
mercenaries were.  Dieitrephes exploited his connection to a band of bloodthirsty 
Thracians to obtain special commands, and a segment of the Athenian elite were all 
too happy to use Dieitrephes and his Thracians to further their own interests.  All of 
this came at a terrible cost for the people of Mycalessus.  
   
The Attack 
 Dieitrephes had been instructed to inflict as much damage as he could while 
sailing up the Boeotian coast.  The use of Thracian mercenaries to ravage Boeotia may 
have been a strategy planned by the Athenians for quite some time.  In Aristophanes‟ 
Acharnians, performed in 425, the Athenian envoy to Thrace suggests that if the 
                                                 
2
 See for example Lateiner (1977), who argues that Thucydides often uses events of little significance 
(such as the massacre at Mycalessus) to serve as a paradigm for the pathos of war.  See also Quinn 
1995: 573 n. 2.  
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Athenians pay his group of Thracian soldiers two drachmas per day, they will 
“thoroughly peltast (καταπελτάσονται)” all of Boeotia (159-160).  Dieitrephes‟ 
first action was to lead his troops against the territory of Tanagra, which suffered only 
a quick raid and the loss of plunder according to Thucydides.  Plundering raids and the 
destruction of crops were common offensive operations during the Peloponnesian war, 
employed by Archidamus in the early years of the conflict and central to Athens‟ 
strategy in Messenia.
3
  The city of Tanagra itself, like Mycalessus without effective 
walls, was situated several kilometers from the sea.
4
  Between the city and the sea was 
a large flat area suited to agricultural activity and Tanagra is known to have had 
extensive extramural habitation in so-called suburbs (προάστεια).5  Presumably, the 
broad plain in Tanagra‟s territory, widely settled and lying next to the sea, afforded 
both ample material for plunder and ease of access for sea-borne invaders.  This would 
at least partially explain the sparing of the city itself.  That being said, the settlers on 
the plain would have suffered from the raid, perhaps in lives, and at least in terms of 
property and livelihood.  The city as a whole surely felt the economic sting.    
 After leisurely ravaging these lowlands on the coast, the Thracians continued 
in their ships to Chalcis on Euboea.  After nightfall (ἀφ’ ἑσπέρας), Dieitrephes led 
them across the Euripus and they spent the night about three kilometers from 
Mycalessus at a temple of Hermes.  As noted by Thucydides, the inhabitants of 
Mycalessus did not expect any attack from the sea as their city lay apparently safely 
                                                 
3
 See for example Thuc. 2.19-20; 4.41. 
4
 Tanagra‟s walls were destroyed by Athens in 457/8 (Thuc. 1. 108.2) and not rebuilt until probably 
after the Peace of Antalcidas.  See Roller 1974. 
5
 Hansen 2006: 45-46.  For a complete topographical study of the region around Tanagra, including its 
rich agricultural areas, see Fossey 1988: 43-99. 
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inland.  Though actually quite close to the Euripus, Mycalessus was separated from 
the sea by a high range of mountains which effectively formed the border between 
Boeotia and the territory of Chalcis.  The temple of Hermes was most likely situated 
on the Anephorites Pass which affords access over the mountain barrier, and may have 
demarcated the official boundary of Boeotia.
6
  The group‟s ascent to a mountain pass 
five kilometers or so from the sea after nightfall indicates both a high level of skill and 
familiarity with mountainous terrain.    
 From this elevated situation, Dieitrephes and his troops could look down on 
Mycalessus below, corresponding to the modern village of Rhitsona.  At daybreak, the 
Thracians stormed down from the heights, and quickly crossed the few kilometers to 
the unsuspecting town.  Two low knolls are visible from the pass, and the ancient 
town occupied either one, or perhaps both, of these.
7
  Mycalessus was situated in the 
midst of a fertile basin, which fits in well with Homer‟s epithet for the site in the 
Catalogue of Ships: εὐρύχορον Μυκαλησσόν (Il. 2.498).8  Although most readings 
of Thucydides imply that the town was small (οὔσῃ οὐ μεγάλῃ, 7.29.3), nearly all 
manuscripts omit the negative οὐ, and the excavated necropolis of the town extends 
for the better part of a kilometer.
9
  Ulrichs in the mid eighteenth century noted that the 
area was covered with ancient stones and tile, and today the fields are completely full 
                                                 
6
 Burrows and Ure (1907-1908: 232-242) provide a good topographical discussion of the area.  See also 
Bakhuizen 1970; Fossey 1988: 80-85. 
7
 See Burrows and Ure (1907-1908: 235) for a discussion concerning the size of the town. 
8
 Fossey 1988: 83. 
9
 Burrows and Ure 1907-1908: 235.  It is true that most editors of Thucydides follow the Vatican 
manuscript B in including the negative particle, and this would appear to fit better in the text.  Yet the 
possibility remains that the town was of a substantial size. 
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of substantial building blocks brought to the surface by modern agricultural plowing.
10
  
A sizable settlement may be indicated.   
 Ultimately, it is impossible to determine the exact number of casualties.  
According to Pausanias, although other Boeotian towns which had been destroyed in 
the past had been re-occupied by survivors, Mycalessus remained deserted, implying 
that the entire population had been wiped out (1.23.3).  That the town declined 
significantly in the years after the attack is confirmed by archaeological evidence.
11
  
As for the numbers present at the ill-fated boys‟ school, we are equally in the dark.  
Thucydides says that it was the largest in the area (αὐτόθι, 7.29.5).  This either means 
that Mycalessus itself had several schools, further indication of a settlement of 
substantial size, or that the school served children from the surrounding countryside 
and villages as well as the town proper.  We only have two figures for schools in the 
fifth century, one from Herodotus who describes 119 out of 120 boys dying in Chios 
when their school collapsed (6.27.1), and another from Pausanias who relates the story 
of an enraged Olympic boxer on the tiny island of Astypalaea slaughtering sixty 
children as they were learning letters (6.9.6-7).  Setting aside issues such as whether 
publicly funded schools existed for the majority of free-born children, or whether only 
relatively rich children could afford the requisite private tuition fees, it would be 
reasonable to guess that at least several dozen children were killed at Mycalessus.
12
         
                                                 
10
 Fossey 1988: 81-82. 
11
 Excavations have focused on graves, which mostly date to the sixth century, with a few in the fifth 
century.  Although there are Hellenistic remains in the cemetery, nothing from the intervening period 
(i.e., late fifth through fourth centuries) has been found, and the site itself was a ruin by Hellenistic and 
Roman times.  This all implies that the site lay deserted from the third quarter of the fifth century 
onward.  See Burrows and Ure 1907-1908; Bakhuizen 1970: 18-31.   
12
 For the issue of school attendance, see W. V. Harris 1989: 96-102; M. Griffith 2001: 66-68. 
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 While Thucydides says explicitly that Dieitrephes led the Thracians in the 
attack (ἤγεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Μυκαλησσόν, 7.29.2), this is the last we hear of the 
actions of the Athenian commander during the episode.  Did he intend for such a 
massacre to take place, or had he merely envisioned a repeat of the raid on Tanagra 
and was forced to watch powerlessly as the foreign soldiers under his command 
wreaked havoc?  Moreover, did the Athenians themselves countenance such an 
atrocity?  Thucydides is silent on the matter.  His history, however, coupled with other 
literary and epigraphic evidence may give us some insight into the character of 
Dieitrephes and his connections to the Thracians. 
 
Dieitrephes: The Man and his Family 
Dieitrephes‟ family was distinguished in Athens.  Ostraka from around 460 
were found in the agora depicting the name Dieitrephes son of Euthoinos.
13
  To be a 
candidate for ostracism does not necessarily imply one is an aristocrat, but it at least 
signifies political prominence to such a degree as to threaten the egalitarian 
democratic order.  The son of this elder Dieitrephes, Nicostratus, was a prominent 
general in the first half of the Peloponnesian War and was placed in command along 
with Nicias of an expeditionary force to attack the Thraceward cities Mende and 
Scione in 423 (Thuc. 4.129.2).
14
  In this force were some 1000 Thracian mercenaries 
                                                 
13
 See Vanderpool (1968), who includes a genealogical table for this family.  For an alternate 
genealogical table, see Fornara 1971a: 56-57, 64-68; Develin 1989: nos. 830, 2177.      
14
 Nicostratus, a general for at least five years during the war, is also mentioned in Thuc. 3.75, 4.53, 
4.119, and 5.61, and was killed at Mantinea in 418/7. 
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and an undisclosed number of peltasts from Athens‟ northern allies.15  This 
Nicostratus is mentioned in Aristophanes‟ Wasps as addicted to sacrifices 
(φιλοθύτης) and fond of foreigners (φιλόξενος, 81-84).16  His connection to the 
Thracians would explain the second label, and perhaps the first is a slur against the 
foolish superstition that is often attributed by the Greeks to barbarous peoples.
17
  
Aristophanes tells us that Nicostratus‟ deme was Scambonidae.  Thus, he was a both a 
co-general and fellow tribesman of Thucydides who was appointed to Thrace in 424/3, 
and in 418/17 he was co-general with his fellow demesman Alcibiades, who had 
Thracian connections of his own.
18
  By extension, Dieitrephes, who was also from 
Scambonidae, conceivably had an association with Alcibiades.  
    Nicostratus was heavily involved in trying to prevent violence between the 
democratic and oligarchic factions at Corcyra in 427 (Thuc. 3.75).  He was a mediator 
between the two sides, but it was the oligarchs who benefitted most from his 
interventions as the democrats were prevented from going on an extra-judicial killing 
spree.  Nicostratus‟ efforts in preventing a massacre contrast poignantly with the 
inaction of another Athenian general, Eurymedon, who sat idly by with his sixty ships 
while the democrats butchered their opponents (7.81).  Nicostratus may simply have 
                                                 
15
 For the phenomenon of Greek poleis in the Thraceward area adopting peltast tactics for themselves, 
see Best 1969: 12-13.  They were doubtlessly also mustering points for Thracian mercenaries entering 
Greek service.  
16
 While φιλόξενος often denotes hospitality or the entertaining of guests, Strabo at least (10.3.18) 
uses the verb φιλοξενέω to mean “fond of foreign fashions” while discussing the Athenians‟ taste for 
all things foreign, particularly Thracian and Phrygian religious practices.  For the identification of the 
comic Nicostratus with the general, see MacDowell 1965; Fornara 1970.   
17
 The scholiast to these lines says that those who are φιλοθύται are irrationally superstitious 
(δεισιδαίμονες).  For an alternate interpretation of these lines, see MacDowell (1988: 140-141), who 
argues that these words are terms of praise rather than reproach, and are brought up primarily to make 
fun of Philoxenos.   
18
 Fornara 1970: 41, n. 3; Canfora 2006: 6-7, and n. 12. 
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been a better man than Eurymedon, or he may have had more sympathy for the 
oligarchic Corcyreans who were threatened with violence from the democrats.         
Although Thucydides gives no patronymic for the Dieitrephes of 413, the 
rarity of the name strongly implies that he was a relative, if not the son, of this 
Nicostratus, and in any case the grandson of the elder Dieitrephes.
19
  By the time of 
his command in 413, men from at least two generations of this family had been put in 
charge of Thracian forces, suggesting a family connection to Thrace and the 
Thracians.
20
   
Other prominent members of this family are known to us.  Herodotus names a 
champion in the pankration, Hermolycus the son of Euthynos, as the most 
conspicuous fighter among the Greeks at the Battle of Mycale (9.105).  Euthynos is 
almost certainly the same man as Euthoinos named in the above-mentioned ostraka, 
signifying that Hermolycus and the elder Dieitrephes were brothers.
21
  Pausanias saw a 
statue of Hermolycus the pankratiast on the Acropolis (1.23.10).  Nearby, Pausanias 
also saw a statue of a Dieitrephes, whom he equates with the younger Dieitrephes that 
led the Thracians in 413 (1.23.3-4).  A statue base was found in 1839 between the 
Propylaia and the Parthenon with an inscription mentioning a Hermolycus the son of 
Dieitrephes as the dedicator (IG i³ 883).  Scholars are divided as to whether this base 
belonged to the statue of Hermolycus the pankratiast or with that of Dieitrephes.  The 
inscription on the base had been dated to around 440, but recent scholarship indicates 
                                                 
19
 Inscriptional evidence, for example, furnishes only sixteen instances of this name in Attica (twenty-
two in the entire inscriptional record).  Including the ostraka and inscriptions already mentioned, there 
are a total of only four examples from the fifth century.  By way of comparison, the name Nicostratus 
appears in Attic inscriptions 293 times. 
20
 See Andrews in Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 5: 156-157; Connor 1971: 156,  n.75. 
21
 The manuscripts of Herodotus give several variant readings for the name, Euthoinos being among 
them. 
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a date toward the end of the fifth century.
22
  In any case, a family link between the 
Hermolycus of Mycale fame, the elder Dieitrephes, and the younger Dieitrephes is 
manifest.  A red-figure vase now in the Getty Museum, dated to the first half of the 
fifth century, includes the inscription “ΕΡΜΟΛΤΚΟ΢ ΚΑΛΟ΢”.23  On the vase are 
depicted young men locked in athletic combat.  The name, date, and sport portrayed 
point to this vase representing the same Hermolycus mentioned by Herodotus.  It is 
clear that Hermolycus, a warrior and athlete, was a famous and leading figure in early 
fifth century Athens, justifiably so according to Herodotus‟ account.  All of this 
indicates a family of means and prominence both politically and militarily.
24
 
Was command over the group of Thracian mercenaries in 413 a prestigious 
appointment or a lowly task reserved for a leader of little import?  The campaign in 
Sicily was at this time the focus of Athens‟ military objectives, led by Nicias and 
newly reinforced by a group under the prominent general Demosthenes.  It is unclear 
whether or not Dieitrephes was officially a general in 413, but that he was not in Sicily 
need not imply he was somehow out of favor and relegated to minor tasks.  
Demosthenes himself, the hero of Pylos, did not go to Sicily until several months after 
the beginning of the expedition when additional forces were called for.  Command of 
Thracians was often given to Athens‟ most illustrious men.  Hagnon, the founder of 
Athens‟ vitally important former colony Amphipolis, was sent to aid Sitalces in 429/8.  
Nicostratus had shared command over his Thracian mercenaries with Nicias.  The 
                                                 
22
 Earlier date: Stevens 1936; Dinsmoor 1942: 163-164; Vanderpool 1968.  Later date: Keesling 2004.   
23
 Malibu (CA), J. Paul Getty Museum, 83.Ae.217; see Greek Vases in the J.Paul Getty Museum 4 
(1989) 66-69, figs.1A-F. 
24
 Connor (1971: 156-157) also argues for the political and military prominence of this family, in spite 
of the seeming comic slander against them as nouveau riche.  See below. 
 145 
 
group of Thracians under Dieitrephes was initially intended to serve under 
Demosthenes in Sicily, a leader who had previously sought out and employed 
Thracians and other light-armed troops to great effect.  Finally, if Dieitrephes was not 
in fact a general in 413, his command would have been a special one granted by the 
city, implying a certain amount of prestige.
25
   
Two years after the massacre at Mycalessus, in 411, Dieitrephes was appointed 
by the oligarchic regime which then held power in Athens to take overall control of 
the Thracian area, and his first action upon arriving in the region was to install 
oligarchies in various states such as Thasos (8.64).  This special command tells us 
several things.  First of all, Dieitrephes had at least a moderate degree of anti-
democratic feeling to be used as an agent of the oligarchy.  Anti-democratic 
tendencies are evinced also by his task of replacing democracies with oligarchies in 
the north Aegean.  The oligarchy had been formed in Athens in order to affect the 
recall of Dieitrephes‟ fellow demesman and Thrace-haunter Alcibiades (Thuc. 8.76.7), 
which might further suggest an association between the two.    
 Secondly, that Dieitrephes was given such a high-level post a mere two years 
after the brutal massacre over which he presided is interesting to say the least.  
Certainly his experience with Thracians would have been useful for the operations he 
carried out on behalf of the oligarchy, allowing him to rely on local connections and 
networks to support his political objectives in the Thraceward area.  The evidence 
indicates that Thasos and the other north Aegean poleis contained large numbers of 
                                                 
25
 Thucydides never calls Dieitrephes a strategos.  Jordan (1970) argues that there existed a military 
office subordinate to the strategoi called the archon.  He argues that Dieitrephes‟ official title in 411 
(see below) was archon epi Thrakes, rather than strategos (234).  In 413 he may have been in a 
similarly “subordinate”, or even unofficial, command. 
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Thracian inhabitants on whose sympathies Dieitrephes might have relied.
26
  As 
mentioned above, Thucydides is silent on Dieitrephes‟ role at Mycalessus in 413.  He 
is also silent as to the general Athenian reaction to this slaughter of a defenseless 
population.  The events of 411 would indicate that the upper echelons of Athenian 
society, those backing the oligarchy, did not condemn Dieitrephes for his role two 
years earlier.  Either Dieitrephes was powerless to stop his soldiers from committing 
the atrocity, in which case his competence to hold an effective command in the 
Thraceward area would be called into question, or he was complicit in the destruction 
of the town.  If the latter is true, his assignment in 411 would indicate that his fellow 
elites not only approved of his connection to the Thracians, even to a group as 
murderous as the Dioi, but actively rewarded it.  At the very least, they appreciated 
Dieitrephes‟ usefulness.  The leadership qualities of Dieitrephes and the sort of 
Thracians he was accustomed to commanding were embraced by a significant portion 
of the Athenian elite as a way to further their cause in the north.
27
  
 In 409/8 the Athenians passed a decree to honor one Oeniades of Sciathus for 
his service to the Athenians (IG i³ 110).  Dieitrephes is listed on the inscription as the 
proposer of the decree.  We know that Sciathus had long been an ally of Athens, in 
fact a member of the Delian league.  As a league member Sciathus was listed as part 
of the Thracian district, although fairly far south, just off the coast near Mt. Pelium 
(IG i³ 269.II.30).  Dieitrephes‟ role in the honors bestowed upon Oeniades shows that 
                                                 
26
 Isaac (1986: 289-292) discusses, among other things, the high level of religious and cultural 
assimilation between Greeks and Thracians in the poleis of the North Aegean and the need for 
cooperation between the two peoples in order for the Greek settlements to be successful.  Owen (2000) 
presents the possibility that the Greek settlers of Thasos respected and adopted pre-existing Thracian 
cult practices on the island, implying some level of assimilation and co-habitation. 
27
 On the other hand, see Thrasybulus‟ activities as an agent of the democracy in the north, particularly 
at Thasos: below, ch. 4.  
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he was still involved in the affairs of the Thraceward area in 409/8, after democracy 
had been restored in Athens.  Evidently he continued to be concerned with 
maintaining his connections in the north Aegean, and his work on behalf of Oeniades, 
securing for him proxenos status among other privileges in Athens, was conducted 
with that end in mind.
28
  Dieitrephes‟ ability to thrive in both democratic and 
oligarchic climates speaks either to his skill as a politician, to his indispensability as a 
leader, or both. 
 I should add a final note on the statue of Dieitrephes on the Acropolis seen by 
Pausanias (1.23.3-4).  There is debate among scholars as to whether this statue 
actually represented the elder Dieitrephes and Pausanias simply got it wrong because 
the younger was the more famous figure.
29
  As mentioned, recent epigraphic studies of 
the extant statue base suggest that the inscription which mentions the dedicator 
Hermolycus son of Dieitrephes, as well as the sculptor Cresilas, can be dated to the 
end of the fifth century instead of the middle of the century as had been previously 
thought.
30
  The later date could indeed correspond to the younger Dieitrephes.  The 
most interesting aspect of this statue is that we are told it depicted a man pierced by 
arrows.  Pausanias is at a loss to explain this, adding that among the Greeks only the 
Cretans are known for their use of the bow.  Pliny the Elder attributed to Cresilas a 
famous work of High Classical sculpture, called the volneratus deficiens, which 
depicted a mortally wounded man (HN 34.74).  This piece, which may be the very 
                                                 
28
 See Walbank 1978: 444-448.  For a parallel, see Axiochus, the uncle of Alcibiades, honoring the 
people of Neapolis in 407: below, ch. 4. 
29
 Stevens 1936; Dinsmoor 1942: 163-164; Vanderpool 1968. 
30
 For a thorough bibliography on the debate, see Keesling 2004.   Keesling, appealing to the difficulty 
inherent in using letter forms to accurately date dedicatory inscriptions, and examining parallel 
inscriptions mentioning Kresilas, convincingly argues for a date of 410-400. 
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sculpture of Dieitrephes seen by Pausanias, is represented by several extant Roman 
copies depicting a hoplite pierced by arrows.    
 While it is true that archers were not a particularly prominent part of Greek 
armies, they were a mainstay in the armies of other peoples, particularly the Scythians 
and also the Thracians.  Archaeological evidence attests to the bow being, along with 
the javelin, a key weapon for the Thracians as many arrowheads have been found in 
Thracian tombs.
31
  The northern Thracian tribes, such as the Getai, were armed much 
like the Scythians, that is, as mounted archers (Thuc. 2.96.1).  Thucydides‟ account of 
the battle at Pylos in 425 tells us that Cleon led a force of light armed troops that 
included peltasts from Thrace via Ainus as well as many archers from foreign lands 
(4.28.4).
32
  It is reasonable to assume that some at least of these archers were 
Thracians.  Thucydides‟ remark that the Thracian ships had been anchored out of 
bowshot (ἔξω τοξεύματος, 7.30.2) during the Mycalessus attack suggests that 
arrows were flying in the engagement, although admittedly this need only imply that 
the Thebans were using them.  It is tempting to see in this statue an image of 
Dieitrephes hoisted by his own petard, killed by the type of barbarous soldier with 
whom he habitually consorted.  One thinks of Cleon, that notorious leader of light-
armed troops who elicited so much scorn from the Spartans, killed by a Myrcinian 
peltast at the Battle of Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.10.9).  After Dieitrephes proposed the 
decree in honor of his friend in 409/8 we hear nothing more about him.  This statue 
indicates that he continued in his role as a soldier, most likely among barbarians.   
                                                 
31
 Archibald 1998: 203. 
32
 See Isaac (1986: 153) for Ainus as a mustering point for Athens‟ mercenary peltast forces. 
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Dieitrephes’ Thracians 
The specific group of Thracians over whom Dieitrephes was given command 
in 413 was made up of members of a tribe known as the Dioi.  As can be found in 
Thucydides 2.96, this was a tribe of mountain dwelling Thracians who lived mostly in 
the Rhodope range in what is today southern Bulgaria.  The Rhodope Mountains are 
extremely rugged and inaccessible, containing the highest peaks in the Balkans, 
averaging over 1800 meters and punctuated by deep valleys.  Climatically, this area is 
distinct in its harshness from the neighboring Aegean coast and Thracian plain.
33
  The 
ease with which the Dioi were able to achieve surprise at Mycalessus by ascending a 
mountain pass at night reflects their mountainous homeland.  Thucydides calls the 
Dioi “autonomous,” meaning they had no type of wider state organization or 
leadership beyond the tribal, and more particularly that they were not under the sway 
of the Odrysian kingdom which then held power over much of southern Thrace.  It is a 
prevalent trope throughout ancient (and for that matter, modern) literature that those 
dwelling in mountainous regions are often the most warlike and fearsome of all 
peoples, nearly impossible to subdue and rule over.  Countless examples suggest that 
this trope is not without merit.  The inability of the mighty Odrysian kings to extend 
their influence over those inhabiting the rugged terrain of the Rhodope range attests 
further to the wild and lawless nature of such tribes.   
While describing the huge force accompanying the Thracian king Sitalces in 
his expedition against Macedonia in 429/8, Thucydides calls the Dioi the most warlike 
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 Archibald 1998: 12. 
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(μαχιμώτατοι) of the Thracians.  By means of a μέν . . . δέ clause they are placed in 
stark contrast to the rest of the horde (ὅμιλος ξύμμεικτος) which is fearsome only 
because of sheer numbers (2.98.4).  This is a morally dubious distinction to say the 
least, but the reader is left with no doubt as to the sheer ferocity and military prowess 
of the tribe.  A further indication of this tribe‟s bellicosity is that whereas Sitalces 
needed to persuade some of them to come by offering them pay as mercenaries, others 
came of their own free will (Thuc. 96.2).
34
  Best explains this desire to join in the 
expedition as rooted in the prospect of plunder.  The Dioi, he argues, suffered in 
extreme poverty and thus jumped at the chance to enrich themselves through a military 
expedition.
35
  I would posit that a fondness for warfare and all the adventure and 
pillaging it entails should not be ruled out as a motivating factor.  Otherwise, why did 
many of the Dioi not hold out for wages as well?  Presumably those paid by Sitalces 
would have had just as much opportunity for plunder as those volunteering for service.   
 In Thucydides the Dioi are further distinguished as sword-bearers, or 
μαχαιροφόροι (2.96.2; 7.27.1).  A Thracian μάχαιρα can be best described as an 
inverted scimitar, that is, a curved sword suited for slashing and hacking, a truly 
terrible weapon of which several survive and are on display in Bulgarian museums.
36
  
The Dioi, however, were perfectly capable of fighting in the peltast manner as well.  
While retreating from Mycalessus, Thucydides describes the Thracians employing the 
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 “καὶ τοὺς μὲν μισθῴ ἐπειθεν, οἱ δ’ἐθελονταὶ ξυνηκολούθουν.” 
35
 Best 1969: 133. 
36
 Archibald (1998: 202) argues that in the Classical period, a Thracian μάχαιρα referred to the curved 
dagger native to the region, significantly smaller than a slashing sword.  I question whether such a small 
weapon could have served as the primary offensive arm, as indicated by the epithet μαχαιροφόροι, 
and whether the dagger which was common kit among many Thracian peoples would have so 
distinguished the Dioi from other Thracians.  See Best (1968: pl. 5) for a Thracian μάχαιρα. 
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tactics of their native land (ἐν ἐπιχωρίῳ τάξει) against the Theban cavalry, namely 
swarming out in detachments and then falling back into mass formation 
(προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι), presumably with javelins (7.30.2).  By 
utilizing these tactics, which are exactly those employed by peltasts, the Dioi 
performed quite well against the Thebans, losing but a few men.  It would appear that 
while rampaging through the town, encountering men, women and children helpless 
and unawares, the Dioi opted to use the weapon for which they were famed and 
undoubtedly feared, hacking and slashing their way through Mycalessus with ease, 
while ready to employ more suitable weapons and tactics against the Theban cavalry.   
 Thucydides seems impressed with the martial skill of the Dioi.  Most of the 
250 Thracians that were killed were struck down while trying to embark on their ships 
since they did not know how to swim and those manning the ships had anchored them 
out of bowshot (ἔξω τοξεύματος).  As mentioned above, others were killed due to 
their negligence while looting the town (7.30.2).  Those that did stand and fight, 
utilizing coordinated peltast tactics, lost only a few of their own men while killing 
several Theban hoplites and horsemen, including one of the Boeotarchs.  The 
expression Thucydides employs to describe the Thracians‟ performance in the orderly 
retreat is οὐκ ἀτόπως, or “not in an unaccustomed manner,” which is clarified by the 
historian‟s account of the tactics of their native land.  The translations of this passage 
typically render οὐκ ἀτόπως as “very creditably” (Warner), “a respectable defense” 
(Crawley), and “a very fair defense” (Jowett).37  The scholiast to this passage explains 
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 Warner and Finley 1972 (1954); Crawley 1903; Jowett 1900. 
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οὐκ ἀτόπως as οὐκ ἀκόσως, or “not in a disorderly way”.  
 These renderings miss Thucydides‟ intended meaning.  The LSJ, citing this 
specific passage, defines ἀτόπως as “marvelously” or “absurdly”, but I believe we 
can arrive at a more specific definition.  While this is the only adverbial use of the 
word in Thucydides, there are four instances of the adjective.  ἀτόπον is used to 
describe the strange or unnatural breath of sufferers of the plague (2.49.3).  Continuing 
the description of the plague, Thucydides says he will pass over the peculiarities, 
ἀτοπίας, of individual cases (2.51.1).  During the Mytilenian Debate τῶν ἀτόπων, 
“newfangled” or “unaccustomed” things, are contrasted with τῶν εἰωθότων, or 
“customary” and “usual” things (3.38.5).  And finally, in his horrific description of the 
stasis at Corcyra and the effect it had on the rest of the Greek world, Thucydides notes 
that people seeking revenge contrived ever more novel devises, τεχνήσει . . . 
ἀτοπίᾳ, to use against their foes (3.82.4).  Thus, Thucydides employs this word to 
denote something which is strange, unaccustomed, or unusual.   
 In the context of the Thracians‟ retreat at 7.30.2, I would render οὐκ ἀτόπως 
as follows: “In the rest of the retreat, the Thracians fought in a not unaccustomed 
manner”, in other words, they fought exactly how one would expect them to.  The way 
Thucydides would have expected them to fight is explained by the description of their 
native tactics and by the loss of only a few fighters.  It is those who were killed while 
looting the town and trying to embark on their ships that are the exception rather than 
the rule.  As in the use of the adjective μαχιμώτατοι, Thucydides is again passing 
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favorable judgment on, at the very least, the formidable martial skill of the Dioi.  That 
these were the fighters placed under Dieitrephes‟ command suggests a connection 
between his family and not merely the Thracians in general, but to this specific group 
of fearsome and talented warriors.
38
   
There are very few references in our sources to the Dioi and more field work 
needs to be done in the Rhodope range to shed light on settlements there.  Mention is 
made in several places of two other important tribes inhabiting the same area, namely 
the Satrai and Bessoi, with whom the Dioi were likely connected.
39
  In any case, the 
Dioi probably shared many characteristics with their better known mountain-dwelling 
neighbors.  The Satrai appear in Hecateaus (FGrHist 1 F 157) and also figure 
prominently in Herodotus‟ description of Xerxes‟ invasion route (7.110-113).  
Herodotus says that the Satrai were the only tribe of the Thracians that Xerxes was 
unable to subject to himself, adding that they remained to his own day the only 
Thracians that had never been subject to anyone.  The reason for this is the nature of 
their home terrain, namely thickly wooded and snow-covered mountains.  Also, they 
are said by the historian to be surpassing in the arts of war (τὰ πολέμια ἄκροι).  The 
similarity to Thucydides‟ description of the Dioi is manifest.  Seemingly at odds with 
their designation as ferocious inhabitants of the mountains, the Satrai are also said by 
Herodotus to have been the most prominent tribe in exploiting the gold and silver 
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 The name “Dieitrephes,” being quite rare, is striking in its similarity to the Greek form of the tribal 
name “Dioi.”  I asked Cornell linguistics professor Alan Nussbaum whether or not Dieitrephes could 
possibly mean “nurtured by the Dioi” rather than simply being another form of “Diotrephes,” or 
“nurtured by Zeus.”  Dr. Nussbaum is skeptical whether any connection such as the former exists here, 
and thinks the latter case is far more likely.  In any case, it is interesting to ponder whether or not 
Dieitrephes‟ contemporaries would have punned on his name and connection to the Dioi. 
39
 Archibald (1998: 109) notes the attestation of the tribal name “Diobessoi.” See Plin. NH 4.40. 
 154 
 
mines of Pangaeum.      
Herodotus says that the Bessoi, according to him a branch of Satrai, were 
responsible for an oracle of Dionysus, located on the highest of their mountains.  
Herodotus‟ description indicates that this oracle was well known to the Greeks.40  
Strabo mentions the Bessoi as an independent tribe inhabiting the region from the 
Rhodope range to the Illyrian frontier (7.5).  He says that the tribes in this region are 
of all peoples the most prone to brigandage (λῃστρικώτατα ἔθνη), but that the 
Bessoi are called brigands even by the other brigands (καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστων λῃσταὶ 
προσαγορεύονται).  Strabo rounds out his description with the detail that the Bessoi 
live in huts (καλυβῖται) and lead a wretched life (λυπρόβιοι).  Aeschylus, in the 
Persae (869-870), calls the dwellings of the Thracians ἐπαύλοι.  An ἔπαυλος 
usually describes a fold for cattle, whereas ἔπαυλις can denote a farm-building, 
crude country dwelling, an army camp, or even an open unfortified village.  A crude 
dwelling of some sort seems to be implied.  An inscription found near Vetren in 
Bulgaria, dating from the fourth century, mentions ἐπαυλισταί, a hapax that may 
either mean encamping soldiers or hut-dwellers.
41
  It is clear that the Thracians, 
especially those living in mountainous regions, lived in rough structures.  Finally, 
these rugged mountain men were said by Valerius Flaccus to be massive in stature 
(immanes…Bessi, 2.229).      
Herodotus‟ comments on the oracle of Dionysus in the Rhodope range may 
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 How and Wells 1912: vol. 2, 168. 
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 Domaradzka 2002: 341. 
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give us an idea of the religious and cultural character of the above-mentioned tribes, 
including the Dioi.  That this oracle was famous in antiquity is evinced by Suetonius, 
who says that it predicted Octavian‟s rise to power, as it had for Alexander the Great 
(Aug. 64).  Recent excavations undertaken by a Bulgarian team at a site in the eastern 
Rhodope Mountains called Perperikon suggest that the place of the oracle may have 
been found.
42
  According to the archaeologists, the site was used for cult practices as 
far back as the Neolithic period, and finds from the Late Bronze and Iron Ages are 
abundant.  Most interesting are a series of small clay altars and a large open hall with a 
round altar in its center.  The area around Perperikon is littered with troughs and 
basins, which some archaeologists have equated with wine-making facilities for ritual 
purposes.  According to the excavators, there is also evidence for the practice of 
Orphic ritual, traditionally connected to Dionysiac worship.  All of this points to a cult 
center, and the location coupled with what appears to be wine related activity evince 
Dionysiac activities.  Increasingly elaborate structures were built on the site into the 
Roman period, suggesting continuity of religious activity.   
Certainly the deities worshipped at such sites by Thracians for several 
centuries and even millennia before extensive contact with the Greeks were not the 
exact manifestations of Dionysus and Orpheus that we see in Classical sources.  But 
the nature of the cult practices resembled Orphic and Bacchic rites enough to lead the 
Greeks to postulate a connection.  It was widely held among the Greeks that Dionysus 
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 The site‟s official website, sponsored by the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture, is the only comprehensive 
source on the excavations currently available: www.perperikon.bg, accessed on July 2, 2010. 
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had Thracian origins and held a special place in Thracian religious practices.
43
  
Orpheus as well had ties to Thrace, and it was ultimately a band of frenzied Thracian 
women that killed him with an assortment of Thracian weapons.
44
  Depictions of both 
figures in Attic vase-painting nearly without exception highlight their barbarian, and 
specifically Thracian, attributes.
45
  The Dioi, therefore, may have routinely engaged in 
the cult practices that the Greeks equated with savage and barbaric religion par 
excellence, namely orgiastic frenzies and wanton sexuality.  As noted above, 
Dieitrephes‟ relative Nicostratus who led a group of Thracians was slandered as a 
superstitious lover of sacrifices.  
 
Precedents for Working with the Dioi 
 Scholars have suggested that the Dioi, along with the Satrai, Bessoi, and other 
mountain tribes, had common customs, shared the worship of Dionysus, and 
discouraged foreign influences.
46
  How did Athens come to acquire the services of 
these autonomous and lawless fighters in 413?  Who made the necessary 
arrangements?  If we trace Athenian activities in the region during the decades 
preceding Mycalessus, we see that several prominent figures, most notably Hagnon, 
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 In the ancient sources, see for example Hdt. 5.7.  Fol and Ivanova (1993) collect all the sources for 
the “Thracian Dionysus”.  See also Jeanmaire 1951: 99-100. 
44
 Guthrie 1952: 25-68.  See 64, n.6 for a comprehensive list of the visual sources depicting the death of 
Orpheus at the hands of Thracian women. 
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 See, for example, an Attic red-figure vase from the mid fifth century, now in Berlin, depicting 
Orpheus charming a group of Thracians equipped as peltasts: Guthrie 1952: pl. 6; also discussed by 
Lissarrague 1990a: 210-211.  Lissarrague (161-177) discusses the portrayal of satyrs and other elements 
linked to Bacchic cult as Thracians.  He concludes that this imagery was meant to convey the savagery 
of Thrace. 
46
 As Archibald (1998: 110) points out, the Satrai‟s dominance of the mines at Pangaeum, coupled with 
the distribution of both Greek and Thracian coins throughout the Rhodope range and beyond, suggests 
some sort of interaction with the Greeks.  The coins, of course, could be as much from raiding and theft 
as from legitimate economic contacts with the Greek world. 
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had gained experience with such troops and could have acted as liaisons between 
Athens and those providing mercenary services. 
In the sixth century, Pisistratus gained a great deal of wealth and managed to 
hire mercenaries from the Pangaeum region, with whom he took control of Athens for 
the third and final time.  The famously hardy and warlike Satrai who worked the 
mines at Pangaeum would have provided the perfect force for one wishing to strong-
arm his way into power.  The Philaids, from the elder Miltiades to the younger Cimon 
had of course numerous ties to Thrace and had experience with Thracian soldiers.  The 
younger Miltiades‟ father-in-law Olorus was probably from the region near Thasos, 
and Cimon might have encountered some of these mountain-dwellers during his 
campaign in 476 to capture Eion for the Athenians.  Eion is located at the mouth of the 
Strymon River that extends north to the interior of Thrace, just west of the Rhodope 
range.   In 465, an abortive Athenian attempt to settle upriver from Eion met with 
fierce resistance at Drabescus at the hands of local Thracians, a force that might have 
included some of these autonomous tribes.
47
   
After Cimon‟s activities on Thasos and its environs in the mid 460‟s, it is 
unclear what ties Athens continued to have with this region of Thrace.  There was 
probably a continued Athenian presence at Eion and also on the mainland opposite 
Thasos, as indicated by Thucydides‟ interests there.48  Plutarch tells us of an 
expedition of Pericles to the Chersonese in 447, in which he restored the wall of 
Miltiades and drove out the marauding Thracians (Per. 19.1-2), but we hear nothing of 
                                                 
47
 Thucydides refers to a force of combined Thracians that destroyed this Athenian colonization effort 
(4.102).  Herodotus, though, refers only to Edonians (9.75).  See Isaac 1986: 25-26. 
48
 Isaac 1986: 31-34. 
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Athenian activities in the central part of the northern Aegean for several years.
49
       
In 431, Athens resorted to the traditional instrument of proxeny to establish an 
alliance with Sitalces.  In a very detailed account, Thucydides tells us that 
Nymphodorus of Abdera, who had given his sister in marriage to Sitalces, was made 
an Athenian proxenos and acted as the negotiator between Athens and the Odrysian 
king (1.29).
50
  Through Nymphodorus‟ agency, Sitalces‟ son Sadocus was brought to 
Athens and made an Athenian citizen in order to cement the alliance.  Courting 
Sitacles‟ favor might also have been partially behind the public adoption of the cult of 
Bendis at this time.
51
  The Odrysians were persuaded to send cavalry and peltasts to 
aid Athens in the Thraceward region.  Nymphodorus also arranged an alliance 
between Athens and Perdiccas of Macedon, whereby Athens restored Therme to the 
Macedonains and the Macedonians in turn aided the admiral Phormio in an expedition 
to the Chalcidice.  Thucydides is unusually explicit in recording the Athenian motives 
in these dealings, due likely to his own interest and expertise in the region.  
Hornblower wonders whether Thucydides actually had a hand in encouraging the 
Athenians to ally with Sitacles.
52
  That Thucydides was in favor of an Odrysian 
alliance would explain his unusual polemic aimed at correcting Athenian 
misconceptions of Sitacles‟ father Teres who had been slandered as a descendant of 
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 For the date of Pericles‟ expedition, based on the evidence of tribute lists and a list of Athenian 
casualties, see Meiggs 1972: 159-161.  
50
 See also Hdt. 7.137 who says that Nymphodorus had captured Spartan envoys to Asia and sent them 
to Athens where they were executed.  This is also related by Thucydides (2.67), but with no mention of 
Nymphodorus‟ involvement.  For Nymphodorus‟ proxeny and the alliance between Athens and 
Sitalces, see Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 2, 89-90; Walbank 1978: 167-168; Isaac 1986: 99-104; 
Hornblower 1991-2008: vol.1, 284-289; Archibald 1998: 118.   
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 See above, ch. 1. 
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 Hornblower 1991-2008: vol. 1, 286. 
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the savage Tereus.
53
 
The use of Nymphodorus as an agent in Thrace appears to be the exception 
rather than the rule for Athens during this period.  In Thucydides‟ history, 
Nymphodorus is the only Athenian proxenos in Thrace of any consequence.
54
  Instead, 
much more emphasis is given to the activities of Athenians in the Thraceward region, 
men such as Alcibiades and Thucydides himself.  Proxeny is usefully defined by 
Hornblower as a consular arrangement whereby a citizen of city A looked after the 
interests of city B in city A.  It was largely a public variant of the xenia relationships 
that existed between notables throughout the Greek world.
55
  Though the institution of 
proxeny was already old and well established by the time of the Peloponnesian War, 
Athenian Thrace-haunters were responsible for a majority of Athenian diplomatic 
gains in the north.
56
  For example, though Athens had proxenoi in such northern places 
as Sciathus and Selymbria, these men seem to have been connected personally to 
Athenians with interests in the area, respectively Dieitrephes and Alcibiades.
57
  In 
spite of the role played by Nymphodorus in initiating the alliance between Athens and 
Sitalces, soon certain Athenian individuals would deal directly with the Odrysian king.   
An Athenian connection to the Dioi, perhaps even to some of those who 
accompanied Dieitrephes, was made in 429/8.  Sitalces made preparations to invade 
Macedonia at the head of a massive coalition of tribes.  Along with him, he brought 
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 Gomme et al. (1945-1981: vol. 2, 90) suggests that Thucydides aimed at correcting Hellanicus, and 
perhaps Sophocles. 
54
 As Hornblower (1991-2008: vol. 1, 285) points out, only five of the ninety-four fifth century 
Athenian proxenoi collected by Walbank (1978) are mentioned by Thucydides. 
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 Hornblower 1991-2008: vol. 1, 285. 
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 For the history and origins of proxeny, see Wallace 1970. 
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 Oeniades as Sciathus is honored as a proxenos of Athens in a decree proposed by Dieitrephes.  See 
Walbank 1978: 444-448.  Apollodorus of Selymbria is similarly honored in a decree proposed by 
Alcibiades.  See Walbank 1978: 432-444; and below, ch. 4. 
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Amyntas son of Philip, intending to put him on Perdiccas‟ throne.  He was also 
accompanied by several Athenian ambassadors who happened to be in the area, and 
the Athenian Hagnon who was to act as commander (ἡγεμών).  For their part, the 
Athenians were to send a fleet and as many troops as possible to aid Sitalces in 
subduing the Chalcideans (Thuc. 2.95).  The Athenians never made good on their 
promise of added support, but so far as we can tell the Athenian ambassadors went 
along with Sitalces and Hagnon did act as a military leader for the invasion.  The Dioi 
had come down from the Rhodope range to serve as prominent members of this army, 
comprising the most fearsome contingent in the infantry (Thuc. 2.96.2; 98.4).  In 
429/8, then, Hagnon was placed in command of a Thracian infantry force that included 
the Dioi.   
Hagnon was chosen for this task because of his own Thracian connections.  In 
437/6 he was sent out as the leader of an expedition to the Strymon River to found a 
colony where several other attempts had failed.  In 497, Aristagoras of Miletus went to 
Thrace after the Persians had recalled his uncle and father-in-law Histiaeus from the 
region.  After conquering the territory of Myrcinus on the Strymon, Aristagoras was 
killed by Edonian Thracians, probably at the site known as Ennea Hodoi, or Nine 
Ways (Hdt. 124; 126; Thuc. 4.102; Diod. 12.68.1-2).  In 465, at the time Cimon was 
putting down the revolt on Thasos and acquiring territory for Athens on the mainland 
opposite, an Athenian expedition of 10 000 settlers was sent to the site of Ennea 
Hodoi.  The leaders of this venture were the Athenians Sophanes and Leagros.  Our 
sources tell us that this group, along with its leaders, was massacred by a force of 
Thracians, mostly Edonians, at the nearby Thracian site of Drabescus (Hdt. 9.75; 
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Thuc. 4.102; Diod. 12.68; Paus. 1.29-4-5).
58
  The site of Ennea Hodoi was very 
advantageous, occupying an elevated position surrounded on three sides by the 
Strymon.
59
  But the major attempts to settle it by the mid fifth century had met with 
bloody failure at the hands of the local Thracians.  Hagnon, however, succeeded in 
founding a lasting Greek city in 437/6, which he named Amphipolis. 
After giving a brief synopsis of the history of the site, Thucydides describes 
Hagnon‟s foundation.  From their base at Eion on the coast, which had been earlier 
established by Cimon, the Athenians drove (ἐξελάσαντες) the Edonians out of the 
area.  Hagnon named the new city, three miles from the port at Eion, Amphipolis 
because it was surrounded on both sides by the river.  He built the city in such a way 
that it was conspicuous (περιφανής) from land and sea, and he planned to fortify it 
with a long wall stretching from one portion of the river to the other (τείχει μακρ῵ 
ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν, Thuc. 4.102).  Athenian citizens formed the 
backbone of the new settlement‟s garrison, but a majority of the population was non-
Athenian, mostly from the nearby city of Argilus (Thuc. 4.103.5, 106; Diod. 
12.68.3).
60
  We do not know why Hagnon was specifically chosen to lead this venture.  
He was already prominent, having been an Athenian general at Samos in 440/39 
(Thuc. 1.116-117.1), and Cratinus calls him an ἀρχαιόπλουτος (F 171 K-A), but it 
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 For this settlement attempt and the battle at Drabescus, see Isaac 1986: 24-30.  For more on Leagros, 
who may have had his own Thracian connections prior to leading this mission, see above, ch. 2. 
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is unclear whether he had prior Thracian connections.  Most scholars assume that the 
colonization of Amphipolis was part of Pericles‟ overall expansionist policy, but it is 
uncertain to what extent Hagnon and Pericles were political allies.
61
        
Why did Hagnon succeed at Amphipolis?  Archibald argues that he must have 
come to some sort of arrangement with the neighboring Edonians to prevent attacks 
against the city.  Previous ventures had been viewed by the area‟s Thracians as hostile 
incursions, and Hagnon sought to remedy that.
62
  One way this could have been 
accomplished was by seeking common cultural and religious ground with the local 
population.  Isaac and Archibald both insist that the worship of Rhesus by the Greeks 
at Amphipolis was a way to do just that.
63
  Polyaenus says that it was Hagnon who 
established the cult, bringing the bones of Rhesus to Amphipolis from the Troad 
(6.53).  Shrewd diplomacy probably played a role in cementing alliances with the 
Thracians.  Cimon had made inroads nearby, and several Athenians such as 
Thucydides had connections in the area.
64
  Many local Thracians would eventually be 
allies of Athens, such as the Edonian king in Myrcinus, Pittacus, who had to be 
murdered before his city was handed over to Brasidas (Thuc. 4.107).  Hagnon‟s 
military mettle, though, was equally important to his success.  Thucydides‟ emphasis 
is on Hagnon driving the Edonians from the region and encircling the city with 
fortifications.  In the case of the bones of Rhesus too, Polyaenus describes Hagnon as 
tricking the Thracians into a brief truce which let him cross the river with the bones 
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 Isaac (1986: 36) calls the colonization of Amphipolis Pericles‟ “most ambitious project in the north 
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1989: 198-203. 
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 Archibald 1998: 117. 
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 Isaac 1986: 55-58; Archibald 1998: 101. 
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 See Isaac (1986: 31-33) for Athens‟ influence in the area even after the defeat at Drabscus. 
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and also construct his defensive works.
65
  This hardly indicates that relations with the 
locals were always amicable. 
What of the city‟s defenses?  As Amphipolis sits upon a hill surrounded on the 
north, west, and south by a bend in the Strymon, many scholars have attempted to 
reconstruct the plan of the long wall mentioned by Thucydides as essentially forming 
a 2500 meter arc from north to south, totally closing the city off from the land to the 
east towards Pangaeum.
66
  This would seem to suit Thucydides‟ description.  Pritchett, 
investigating the remains of the wall excavated in the 1970‟s by Lazaridis and drawing 
extensively on Thucydides‟ text, suggests that Hagnon had intended to encircle the 
city and construct a long wall that extended out from the enclosure wall and down to 
the river.  But, the planned long wall was not completed when Brasidas attacked in 
424, and the city was defended only by a 2220 meter inner enclosure wall.  To be sure, 
this enclosure was rather extensive and impressive in its own right.
67
  The excavator 
Lazaridis, however, argues that the material evidence indicates the city was encircled 
on all sides by a massive set of enclosure walls even in Hagnon‟s time.  According to 
Lazaridis‟ plan, the wall circuit was about 7450 meters in length, with a smaller 
enclosure for the citadel of 2220 meters.  He compares the enclosure at Amphipolis to 
the massive areas within the fourth century fortifications at Messene and Megalopolis.  
According to Lazaridis, Amphipolis was so extensively fortified to protect the 
resources of the region, including much of the arable chora outside of the citadel 
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 See Pesely (1989: 196-197) who sees no reason to doubt the story in its essentials. 
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 For the standard reconstruction of the fortifications, see Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 3, 574 and 
map facing 654. 
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 Pritchett 1965-1992: vol. 3, 304-314. 
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proper, and to enforce a unity among the disparate inhabitants of the new colony.
68
   
In spite of the discrepancies in the various reconstructions of the Hagnonian 
fortifications, it remains clear that comprehensive fortifications were envisioned by the 
city‟s founder and that the result was impressive.  In addition to being a skilled leader 
of soldiers, evinced by his ability to expel the Thracians from the region and by his 
special appointment to lead Sitalces‟ troops in 429/8, Hagnon protected Amphipolis 
with defensive works of nearly unparalleled scale.  In doing so, he seems to have 
safeguarded not only the city itself, but much of its territory.  In this way, he kept the 
Edonians at bay, and even Brasidas was only able to take the city through the 
treachery of the non-Athenian inhabitants (4.106).  Like the elder Miltiades, who had 
protected the people and territory of the Chersonese by means of a unique barrier wall, 
Hagnon relied on extensive fortification to safeguard his gains on the Strymon from 
attacks of the Edonians and other Thracians.  His military skill, probably coupled with 
a sharp instinct for diplomacy, enabled Hagnon to deal with the Thracians dwelling 
near Amphipolis more effectively than his predecessors had.      
Hagnon remained prominent at Athens well after his success at Amphipolis.   
He was appointed to the board of probouloi in 413, a body created after the Sicilian 
Expedition meant to be a check on the excesses of democracy.  His son Theramenes 
was a key player in the oligarchic coup of 411, in which Dieitrephes seems to have 
been involved, and also the overthrow of democracy in 404 (Lys. 12.65; Xen. Hell. 
2.3.30).
69
  Theramenes, inheriting his father‟s northern connections, took part in the 
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 Lazaridis 1986.  For his plan of the walls, showing the excavated sections and his reconstructions, see 
Lazaridis 1997: 22-23. 
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 For a thorough study of Hagnon‟s life and career, see Pesely 1989.  
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Athenian campaigns in Thrace and the northern Aegean from 411-407.
70
  Because 
Hagnon had led the Dioi in 429/8, it is attractive to see him as the connection through 
which the Athenians acquired the services of these mercenaries in later years.  Hagnon 
had demonstrated an ability to command Thracian troops, and also in turn to fight 
against them and keep hostile incursions at bay.  We might conjecture that he imparted 
some of his acquired tactical sense to his fellow Athenian commanders, namely 
Demosthenes and Dieitrephes.       
Thucydides tells us that the Dioi who arrived in Athens in 413 were originally 
intended to serve with Demosthenes in Sicily.  This general had used light-armed 
troops, including Thracians, before and was keenly aware of their usefulness.  His 
tactical ingenuity is widely acknowledged by scholars.
71
  He seems to have developed 
his talents in response to a crushing defeat at the hands of light-armed Aetolians in 
427/6 (Thuc. 3.94-98).  For his renowned victory at Pylos in 425, in which he captured 
the Spartans on the island of Sphacteria, he employed hundreds of peltasts, archers, 
and slingers, troops which utterly confounded the Spartan hoplites (Thuc. 4.32-33).  It 
was Cleon that had brought these troops from Athens to reinforce Demosthenes.  
Thucydides tells us that Cleon‟s force consisted of soldiers of unspecified type from 
Imbros and Lemnos, peltasts from Aenus, and 400 archers from other locations (4.28).  
Imbros and Lemnos had been captured and granted to Athens by the younger 
Miltiades while he was in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.141), and Aenus seems to have 
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served as a mustering point for Thracian mercenaries entering the service of Athens.
72
  
Cleon deliberately selected Demosthenes as his fellow commander (4.29), and many 
scholars have conjectured that Demosthenes and Cleon were working together to 
effect a prearranged plan to use light troops in the battle against the Spartans.
73
  In the 
capable and experienced hands of Demosthenes, the fearsome Dioi could have been 
very effective in Sicily in 413.  
Cleon himself might have had Thracian ties through one Theorus.  In the 
Acharnians produced in 425, Aristophanes portrays Theorus as an Athenian envoy to 
Thrace leading a group of Odomantoi to Athens (153-156).  Theorus proudly declares 
his group of Thracians to be the most warlike of all (μαχιμώτατον).  We learn from 
Herodotus that they mined Pangaeum along with the Satrai (7.112).  Although it is 
implied in the play that the Odomantoi were subject to Sitalces, Thucydides says they 
were an independent tribe dwelling beyond the Strymon in the plains (2.101.3).
74
  
Archibald, following Hammond, locates them in the southernmost foothills of the 
Rhodope range.
75
  This places them very near the home of the Dioi and other 
mountain tribes, and their designation as independent and warlike would indicate a 
similarity in character to Dieitrephes‟ men.  Perhaps Theorus was among the Athenian 
ambassadors that took part in Sitalces‟ invasion of 429/8.   
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Aristophanes portrays Theorus in several passages, especially throughout the 
Wasps, as a close political associate of Cleon and a fellow demagogue.
76
  We know 
little about Theorus outside of these two plays, but there is no reason to suspect his 
connection to the Odomatoi or to Cleon.  In 422, Cleon, perhaps relying on his 
connection to Theorus, made a special appeal to the Odomantian king Polles for 
mercenaries to help in retaking Amphipolis from Brasidas (Thuc. 5.6.2).  
Unfortunately for Cleon, the issue was forced before these mercenary troops arrived.  
The Athenians were defeated by Brasidas, and Cleon himself was killed by one of the 
Spartan‟s mercenary peltasts (Thuc. 5.10.9).  In spite of Thucydides‟ derogatory 
portrayal of Cleon‟s activities surrounding the Pylos affair in 425 and the undignified 
manner of his death in 422, Cleon certainly seems to have had an appreciation for 
Thracian-style light troops.
77
   
The evidence, then, indicates that Hagnon, Demosthenes, Cleon, and 
Dieitrephes‟ close relative Nicostratus had all led Thracian troops during the 
Peloponnesian War before 413.  Some of these troops were Dioi, and others were very 
similar to the Dioi in fighting style and geographic origin. 
We know that there were extensive contacts between the Thracians and Greeks 
at this time, especially in the coastal Greek cities in the north Aegean and in the form 
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of official diplomatic contacts with the upper echelons of the Odrysian court of 
Sitalces and his successors.
78
  There is also evidence of contact and cultural and 
economic interchange between Greeks and Thracians deep in the interior of Thrace.  
Over the last couple of decades a site identified with the attested Greek emporion of 
Pistiros has been excavated by a joint team of Bulgarian, British, Czech, Polish and 
French archaeologists.
79
  The emporion, flourishing in the fifth and fourth centuries, 
was officially founded in the mid fifth century on the site of a pre-existing center of 
tribal trade.
80
  It is located near Vetren, on the northern foothills of the Rhodope 
Mountains and at the extreme eastern part of the Maritsa valley which was a key route 
between the Thracian plain and the Aegean.  The Rhodope range and surrounding 
areas were rich in deposits of precious metals, and the Greeks chose the site of Pistiros 
because of its proximity to the sources of metal extraction as well as to important 
transport routes.
81
  Pistiros was close to the home of the Dioi and the other 
independent mountain tribes. 
The site is unique in that it is the only inland Greek center excavated to date in 
the heart of Thrace.  As such, it affords an invaluable glimpse into the relationship 
between Greeks and Thracians.  Excavations have demonstrated the presence of both 
peoples in the town.  For example, Greek and Thracian names have been found as 
graffiti on pottery, and loom weights of a distinctly Thracian style were found.
82
  
There is evidence of religious integration among the inhabitants of Pistiros, as 
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Thracian cult objects and altars have been discovered along with the attestation of 
Greek and Thracian divinities, especially Dionysus.
83
  An inscription from the fourth 
century found nearby, likely originating from a successor to Cotys I, outlines some of 
the benefits afforded by the Odrysian king to the Greek merchants inhabiting Pistiros 
and other emporia, such as exemption from customs dues and guarantees of the 
preservation of their property.
84
  The inscription, reflecting Thracian religious 
practices in its invocation of Dionysus, also deals with issues such as territorial 
disputes between Greeks and locals.  After the founding of Pistiros, settlement in the 
area literally exploded, with several new sites emerging especially toward the 
mountains to better exploit the natural resources.
85
  This bespeaks close relations 
among the Greeks and Thracians in the area at the edge of the Rhodope range.  
There is some indication of a military relationship at Pistiros, both symbiotic 
and adversarial.  Surely the Greeks would have had some sort of armed protection for 
an economic center in the heart of foreign territory.  For one thing, the site was 
fortified in the third quarter of the fifth century with a curtain wall and tower that may 
have reached over six meters in height.
86
  These defenses were strengthened in the 
fourth century.  Although profitable contact was made with many of the Thracians in 
the area, there was still some danger of attack.  The above-mentioned inscription 
demonstrates that the Odrysian rulers protected the Greek merchants at Pistiros, but 
that would have been no guarantee against attack from the independent tribes dwelling 
in the nearby mountains.  In the town itself, some Thracian weapons including the 
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heads from a spear and several arrows have been found on the main road.
87
  Arrian, 
describing Alexander‟s campaigns in Thrace, says that the autonomous Thracians of 
Mt. Haemus banded together with many armed merchants (ἐμπόρων πολλοὶ 
ὡπλισμένοι) to oppose Alexander from the heights (1.1.6-7).  These ἐμπόροι were 
most likely Greek inhabitants of emporia like Pistiros.
88
  That the Greeks opted to 
fight along with the Thracians, and indeed to exploit the mountainous terrain to their 
advantage in a typically Thracian fashion, demonstrates that the Greeks and Thracians 
dwelling in the heart of the Balkans worked together militarily and learned from one 
another. 
Dieitrephes was not the first and certainly not the only Greek to deal with the 
Dioi and others like them.  Though our sources describing Dieitrephes‟ mission in 413 
are regrettably sparse, we can speculate about some of the aspects of his command.  
The excavations at Pistiros and the accompanying inscription show that religious 
common ground was sought in Graeco-Thracian relations.  The Greeks worshipped 
Dionysus, a god linked to Thrace and Thracian cult practices.  The Dioi may have 
been especially connected to the worship of Dionysus since an important Dionysiac 
oracle was located in or near their territory.  Dieitrephes, like Nicostratus, could have 
taken part in the religious rites of his men and have been φιλοθύτης, either because 
of his own personal disposition or to build a better rapport with his troops.   
Just as Greeks and Thracians had to find some way to communicate with one 
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another in emporia, either somebody acted as an interpreter between Dieitrephes and 
the Dioi, or Dieitrephes himself could speak their language.  Another Athenian with 
close ties to Thrace, Alcibiades, was given a Thracian tutor named Zopyrus by his 
guardian Pericles (Plut. Alc. 1.22).  Certainly this relationship paid dividends later in 
Alcibiades‟ career when he took refuge on his personal estates in Thrace and had 
under his command Thracian soldiers.
89
  Thracian slaves were prevalent at Athens and 
could presumably teach people their language.  There were several ways in which 
Dieitrephes could have learned to communicate with the Dioi.  After all, his relative 
Nicostratus was connected to the Thracians. 
From a military standpoint, Dieitrephes commanded his men in such a way as 
to complement their own style of warfare.  As Thucydides says, it was Dieitrephes 
himself who led the Dioi across the Euripus after nightfall and took them to a 
mountain pass in the dark.  Mountain warfare would have been the particular specialty 
of denizens of the Rhodope range.  Swift lightly armed troops were especially suited 
to surprise assaults, and a position on a mountain overlooking the town of Mycalessus 
would have added greatly to the element of surprise, not to mention to the horror of 
any townspeople unfortunate enough to catch a glimpse of 1300 warriors hurtling 
towards their homes.  Before 413 many Athenian generals had gained experience with 
the Dioi and other similar Thracian mercenaries.  The Dioi were probably specifically 
selected because of their fearsome reputation.  In spite of Thucydides‟ silence, it is 
difficult to believe that Dieitrephes, seemingly knowledgeable about his troops‟ 
fighting style and having spent several days with them as their commander, was 
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unaware of their propensity for rapine and slaughter and the implications this would 
have had for the town of Mycalessus.           
 
The Athenian Perception of Dieitrephes 
The evidence indicates that a large segment of the elite in Athens approved of 
Dieitrephes and his command over the Dioi.  What did the general Athenian 
population think of this friend of the Thracians?  Dieitrephes is mentioned a few times 
in Old Comedy, particularly by Aristophanes in the Birds.  In this play, Dieitrephes is 
presented as a typical swaggering soldier, rising from relative obscurity to becoming a 
φύλαρχος and ἵππαρχος, both prestigious military commands connected to the 
cavalry.  He finally ends up as a “horsecock” (ἱππαλεκτρυών), representative of a 
haughty general (798-800).
90
  Strangely, Dieitrephes is portrayed as nouveau riche, 
although the evidence regarding his family history suggests otherwise.
91
  Later in the 
play, he is again connected to horsemanship, apparently persuading the young men of 
Athens to take up horse-riding (ἱππηλατεῖν, 1442-1443).  The Birds was performed 
the year before the Mycalessus massacre, but already Dieitrephes had a reputation as 
an arrogant military man connected to the aristocratic branch of military service par 
excellence, the cavalry.  The Athenian cavalry did have a special affinity for the 
Thracians.
92
     
 The slander against Dieitrephes‟ supposedly humble origins presents a curious 
problem.  The scholiast to these lines of Aristophanes attempts to clarify the poet‟s 
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jokes, explaining Dieitrephes‟ trade as a maker of wicker jars before his lot in life 
improved.  As evidence that he was a νεόπλουτος a line from a lost play of 
Aristophanes called the Heroes is quoted: “even from Dieitrephes‟ table.”93  The 
implication appears to be that Dieitrephes is so poor that his table, a symbol of one‟s 
wealth and lifestyle, is bare.  Yet, the scholiast allows for the possibility that this line 
was meant to be ironic. If irony is intended, the line would be further confirmation of 
Dieitrephes‟ great wealth and luxurious living.  The note also includes the information 
that everywhere Dieitrephes is depicted as a thief, a lowlife, and a busybody (ἅρπαξ 
καὶ πονηρὸς καὶ πολυπράγμων).  Additionally, there is an intriguing quote from 
Plato Comicus.  According to the scholiast, Plato Comicus in his play Feasts refers to 
Dieitrephes as a madman, a Cretan, and barely Athenian (τὸν μαινόμενον, τὸν 
Κρῆτα, τὸν μόγις Ἀττικόν, F 30 K-A).  In his play Cheirones,  Cratinus, a slightly 
older contemporary of Aristophanes, has Dieitrephes hauled before the ναυτοδίκαι 
as one of three shameless brutes (κνώδαλ’ ἀναιδῆ, F 251 K-A).  The primary 
responsibility of the board of ναυτοδίκαι was to deal with cases involving foreigners, 
further evidence that Dieitrephes was labeled non-Athenian. 
 The epigraphic and literary sources confirm that Dieitrephes‟ family had been 
prominent for several generations as political and military leaders and even as athletes.  
Aristophanes‟ comments that suggest otherwise are tongue-in-cheek, a comic trope 
                                                 
93
 “κἁπὸ τῆς Διιτρέφους τραπέζης.” 
 174 
 
used throughout his plays, which the scholiast seems not to have realized.
94
  The 
fragments from Old Comedy give a glimpse into what the popular perception of this 
leader of Thracians was.  To be sure, lines from the comic playwrights, men by no 
means representative of the general populace, are to be used with caution in 
determining how Athenians viewed Dieitrephes.  But these slanders must be reflective 
to some degree of popular sentiment – albeit in the exaggerated fashion of a caricature 
– in order for them to have struck a chord with the audience.  They also may be 
indication that not all of the elite approved of Dieitrephes and his connections.  
Certainly Aristophanes himself seems to have had a low opinion of Athens‟ alliance 
with Sitalces.
95
     
 In addition to being an ostentatious and boastful soldier and cavalry 
commander, Dieitrephes is labeled a vicious thief and a raving lunatic base enough to 
be reckoned among foreigners.  Cretans were stereotypically savage and wild, which 
may go toward explaining this specific label from Plato Comicus.
96
  A scenario which 
seems likely is that before the events of 413 Dieitrephes was already well known as a 
military leader, one from a rich, powerful, and possibly less than democratic family 
that incurred the jealous ridicule of the Athenian population.  After the horrific events 
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at Mycalessus, his reputation became much more sinister.  As a leader of murderous 
brutes notorious for their savagery and greed, Dieitrephes is presented as a madman 
and plunderer in the same mold as the troops under his command.  His actions and 
character essentially disqualify him from normal Athenian society, as the remarks of 
Plato Comicus suggest.  By many he is ranked among the foreigners, just like the 
Thracian troops on the payroll of Athens.               
 
Conclusions 
It is clear from his family history and his own military commands that 
Dieitrephes was a wealthy and powerful leader.  It is also clear that he was in league 
with the non-democratic elite of the city as he was an instrument of the oligarchy of 
411.  This wealthy, powerful and elitist military commander was connected very 
closely to Thrace and the Thracians, even to one of Thrace‟s most fearsome and 
lawless tribes.  This connection had been established by at least one previous 
generation of Dieitrephes‟ family before he led the attack on Mycalessus.  His 
appearances in comedy suggest that a significant portion of the general population of 
Athens, and perhaps even some aristocrats, were resentful of his wealth and standing 
and severely critical of his connection to the Thracians.  We will never know the full 
extent to which Dieitrephes was complicit in the slaughter of 413.  We do catch 
glimpses of the Athenians holding him responsible for the massacre and connecting 
him to the baser excesses of the Dioi.  Much of the elite, on the other hand, 
appreciated the usefulness of the relationship between Dieitrephes and the Thracians.  
It was precisely this connection on which the oligarchy would rely in their attempts to 
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mould the northern Aegean poleis in their likeness.  This does not evince an image of 
Dieitrephes incompetently unable to control the troops under his command, no matter 
how savage. 
 The answer to why Dieitrephes and his relative Nicostratus were drawn to 
Thrace and the Thracians is multi-faceted.  Doubtless they were able to acquire the 
benefits in terms of wealth and influence that characterized other elite Athenians‟ 
interest in the region.  Dieitrephes was quite possibly not a general in the year 413, nor 
was he in 411.  His assumption of command over the Dioi amounts to the exploitation 
of a unique opportunity.  He was appointed to an ad hoc leadership position over a 
group with whom he probably already had connections.  The mission of 413 yielded 
fruit two years later with another special command.  Under the democracy he 
continued to hold influence and took steps to maintain his northern ties.  The evidence 
suggests that he held further military posts, which might have led to his death in a 
foreign land.  For Dieitrephes, Thracian connections provided an avenue to political 
and military influence at Athens.  We do not know how he profited from these 
opportunities in a material sense, but we cannot rule out the possibility that he took his 
share of the plunder from Boeotia and that he exploited lucrative ties in the north as 
many other Athenians, including Thucydides, had done.   
 Some of the social tensions in Athens are illustrated by the disparate views of 
Athenians concerning Dieitrephes and the Thracians.  Many Athenian authors – 
Aristophanes in the Acharnians and Euripides in the Hecuba are two examples – 
caution against such strange bedfellows.
97
  Yet, this did not prevent notables from 
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fostering close ties to even the most fearsome of Thracian tribes.  It also did not 
prevent other members of the elite from actively encouraging such ties and seeking to 
exploit them for their own purposes.  The tension between Thrace as barbarous and a 
dangerous source of allies on the one hand, and a unique source of power and 
influence on the other, was carried to its logical and terrible conclusion at Mycalessus. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ALCIBIADES AND THRASYBULUS 
 
Introduction 
 Thrasybulus was the iconic figure of Athenian democracy at the end of the 
fifth century.  After the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami and the 
subsequent subjection of the city to Lysander‟s puppet regime, the murderous Thirty 
Tyrants, it appeared as though the broadly-based democracy of Pericles had been on 
the wrong side of history.  Yet, starting out with only seventy supporters, Thrasybulus 
managed to capture the Attic stronghold of Phyle and eventually defeat the forces of 
the Thirty decisively in the Piraeus, thereby brining about a restoration of the 
democratic constitution.  As a sign of the ultimate magnanimity, he was a major 
proponent of the famous amnesty law that prevented a violent backlash against the 
oligarchs once the democrats were back in power.   
 Alcibiades had a decidedly different reputation in antiquity.  Haughty, vain, 
and ambitious, he was a talented politician and general who worked towards his own 
advancement rather than that of Athens.  Upon falling out with the Athenian demos, 
Alcibiades had no qualms about aiding the Spartans and even the Persians.  The 
duplicitous and treacherous opportunism of Alcibiades ensured his place as one of the 
arch-villains of Greek history.  At the same time, nearly all ancient authorities agree 
that his talents exceeded those of his contemporaries and that following the death of 
Pericles he alone was in a position to win the war for Athens.  After the failure of the 
Sicilian expedition, Alcibiades‟ naval commands and his alliance of sorts with 
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Tissaphernes kept Athens afloat for several years, and had the Athenians heeded his 
advice at Aegospotami, they might well have defeated the Spartans.  He captivated 
ancient writers as much as modern, his complicated story providing endless fodder for 
sophisticated historical analysis and amusing anecdotes alike. 
 Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were close political and military allies from the 
time of the Ionian War, the period of predominantly naval conflict which followed the 
Athenian disaster in Sicily.  In fact, Alcibiades owed many of his greatest successes to 
Thrasybulus, including his recall to Athens and subsequent position as supreme leader 
of the Athenian war effort.  As Nepos says, while Thrasybulus accomplished many 
things without Alcibiades, Alcibiades did nothing without him.  But, because of 
certain traits of character and the vagaries of fortune, Alcibiades managed to secure 
the credit for himself (Thras. 1).  As partners, both men were tied to Thrace.  After the 
naval battle at Abydos in 411, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus remained in the north 
Aegean, exacting financial contributions from cities in the area, putting down revolts 
against Athenian authority, and dealing individually with Thracian rulers.  They both 
also secured the services of Thracian soldiers, at times as de facto private armies.  
While Alcibiades employed his Thracian forces mainly for his own purposes as an 
exile in Thrace, Thrasybulus made use of Thracian fighters in Athens itself during the 
battle to restore democracy in 404-403. 
 The careers of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades exemplify the complexity of 
Athenian ties to Thrace.  In many ways, Alcibiades fits the paradigm established by 
the other figures examined in this study.  If there was ever an Athenian who was 
discontented with the democracy, especially its check on elite ambitions, it was 
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Alcibiades.  Moreover, throughout his life he exhibited the sort of fondness for luxury 
and proclivity for tyrannical pomp and lordly power that could find fullest expression 
among the Thracians.  Alcibiades, the would-be tyrant, alienated first the Athenians, 
then the Spartans, and finally the Persians in his unscrupulous pursuit of power, before 
finding in Thrace the ideal outlet for his autocratic designs.  At the same time, his 
activities in Thrace made important gains in Athens‟ interest, and the territory he 
managed to possess as an exile might well have provided the Athenians a stepping 
stone towards rebuilding the empire; that is, had not the Spartans destroyed Athenian 
naval power at Aegospotami.  His place in Athens as yet again the savior of the city 
would have been assured. 
 Thrasybulus strengthened Athens‟ position in the north during the Ionian War 
and again in the early years of the fourth century.  He also used his Thracian 
connections to rescue Athenian democracy from the grip of tyrants.  In contrast to 
Alcibiades, Thrasybulus consistently worked for the cause of democracy at Athens, 
though he was no radical ideologue.  At times, his activities seemed to be independent 
of Athens, and he engaged in less than savory practices, including the pillaging and 
plundering of cities in order to raise money for his cash-strapped city.  Some Athenian 
sources indicate that he was later censured for this, and it is implied that such financial 
exactions were more for his own benefit and that of his henchmen than for the state.  
He was accused by Lysias of considering taking personal possession of a force of 
Athenian triremes, occupying Byzantium, and marrying a Thracian princess, all to 
escape legal consequences back home (Lys. 28.5-6).  Such accusations need not imply 
Thrasybulus‟ guilt, but they fit in well enough with the paradigm established by other 
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Thrace-haunters as to be plausible.  In any case, Thrasybulus‟ ties to Thrace were 
extensive enough to provide fodder for forensic oratory.   
Thrasybulus‟ actions highlight a paradox of Athenian democracy, indeed of 
many democracies throughout history.  Democracy at Athens was dependent upon the 
cynical exploitation of allies and subjects abroad, often facilitated through connections 
with despotic foreigners.  Throughout the course of Classical Athenian history, 
democracy was nurtured by the undemocratic actions of often undemocratically 
minded people solidifying alliances with undemocratic foreigners.  Most scholars 
agree that the Athenian policy of maintaining an overseas empire, a source of vast 
revenue from less than enthusiastic subject states, was most ardently supported by the 
democratic masses.  The loss of the empire following the Peloponnesian War hit 
Athens hard, and it was figures like Thrasybulus and their empire-building activities in 
Thrace that renewed the hopes of the Athenian people.
1
  Thrasybulus also made 
crucial use of these undemocratic connections in his campaign against the Thirty 
Tyrants and their narrow oligarchy.  In an ironic twist, Thracian barbarians were 
instrumental in rescuing democracy for the autochthonous citizens of Athens.   
 
The Necessity of Thrace following the Sicilian Disaster 
  We catch a first glimpse of collaboration between Alcibiades and Thrasybulus 
in 411.  Thrasybulus, one of the leading Athenians at Samos during the tumultuous 
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period of the oligarchic coup at Athens, persistently advocated the recall of Alcibiades 
(Thuc. 8.81).  As such, he seemed to stake his political future on Alcibiades‟ potential 
successes in the service of Athens.
2
  Once Alcibiades had regained Athens‟ trust, the 
two men worked together in the Hellespont from 411-407, combating Sparta‟s navy 
and its Persian support, and bringing cities over to Athens.  During this period, the 
Athenian generals in the Hellespont, led primarily by Alcibiades but with Thrasybulus 
also playing a central role, worked more or less independently of the newly restored 
democracy back home.
3
  It was at this time that Alcibiades and Thrasybulus began 
making connections in the Thraceward region that would play a decisive role in the 
remainder of their respective careers. 
 The campaigns in the Hellespont were necessitated by the dire situation at 
Athens following the Sicilian Expedition, which had ended in disastrous defeat in 
September of 413.  The massive force the Athenians had sent to Sicily had been 
utterly annihilated, resulting in the loss of perhaps 3000 citizen hoplites, 9000 thetes, 
and many thousands of metics.  Of the Athenian ships, 160 had been destroyed, 
leaving only a hundred or so left in the Piraeus.
4
  The loss of so many men, which the 
Athenians saw as irreplaceable, and materiel was compounded by the paltry funds 
remaining in Athens‟ treasury.  The high cost of the war effort, exacerbated by the 
economic ruin wrought by the Spartan presence in Decelea, left no money to build 
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more ships.
5
  Even if there had been ships, there were no men to fill them.  In such 
straits, the Athenians despaired of their own survival (Thuc. 8.1.2). 
 Athens‟ principal source of revenue had been its empire, which was 
threatening to fall apart.  Thucydides says that the Athenian defeat in 413 had made all 
the states in Greece eager to turn against Athens, the subjects of the empire in 
particular, a result the Spartans and Persians were all too eager to precipitate (8.2.2; 
8.5.4-6.1).  When the Spartans sent a fleet to the Hellespont and Propontis in 411, 
eventually causing the revolt of Byzantium, Athens‟ grain supply and very survival 
came under threat (Thuc. 8.80).  In response, the Athenians sent out a fleet under the 
command of Thrasybulus, which defeated the Spartans at Cynossema, marking 
Thrasybulus‟ first significant victory (Thuc. 8.100-106).6  
 From 411-407/6, Thrasybulus was continuously active in the north, involved 
with the other generals in raising money (Xen. Hell. 1.1.8), and re-elected general 
several times, even in absentia (Xen. Hell. 1.4.10).
7
  His activities included bringing 
several cities back over to Athens, beginning in early 410 after a victory at Cyzicus 
(Diod. 13.64.3), and retaking both Thasos and Abdera with a fleet of thirty ships (Xen. 
Hell. 1.4.9; Diod. 13.72.1-2).  Diodorus says that Thrasybulus won a battle at Thasos 
and followed up with a successful siege.  Xenophon tells us that Thasos had been 
reduced to a miserable state due to continuous war, revolution, and siege-induced 
famine before submitting to Thrasybulus.  Even before Cyzicus, Thrasybulus had been 
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active at Thasos, attempting to bring the city back under Athenian control (Xen. 
1.1.12).   
Krentz suggests that sometime during this period Thrasybulus had been 
appointed by Athens as the overall commander in the Thraceward area, just as 
Dieitrephes had been shortly earlier by the oligarchy in 411.
8
  Such an appointment 
would make perfect sense, especially in light of Thrasybulus‟ focus on Thasos.  
Dieitrephes, a commander closely tied to Thrace, was chosen by the oligarchy of 411 
to establish an oligarchic government on Thasos, which promptly revolted from 
Athenian control mere weeks after Dieitrephes had left the island.  As Avery 
persuasively argues, though Thasos revolted from Athens, it maintained an oligarchic 
government of some form.  The anti-Athenian oligarchs were supported by Athens‟ 
enemies, specifically the admiral Timolaus of Corinth (Hell. Oxy. 7[2].4).
9
   
Thrasybulus, a man quickly cementing ties in Thrace, was chosen by the re-
established Athenian democracy to combat the rebellious Thasian oligarchs.  Athens 
had the greatest chance of regaining Thasian allegiance by crushing the island‟s 
oligarchs and restoring democracy.  The juxtaposition of the missions of Dieitrephes 
and Thrasybulus neatly demonstrates that both oligarchs and democrats saw the value 
in maintaining an Athenian foothold in the north Aegean and that Thracian ties could 
be as important to a democrat as they were to an oligarch, depending on the political 
situation.  Thrasybulus‟ mission also shows that a “good democrat” was not above 
breaking the will of recalcitrant allies through siege and famine. 
Alcibiades was similarly engaged during this period.  After Abydos he 
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collected money along with the other generals before he was briefly imprisoned by 
Tissaphernes (Xen. Hell. 1.8-10).  Subsequent to a period of relative inactivity 
following Cyzicus, he turned his attention to attacking the interests of Pharnabazus 
along the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont and Propontis.
10
  The literary sources agree 
that Alcibiades did great damage to the territories of the King, and Diodorus tells us 
that he secured enough goods from the Persians not only to satisfy his men, but also to 
lessen the tax burden (eisphorai) levied against Athenian citizens for the prosecution 
of the war (Diod. 13.64.4).  As Strauss points out, revenue from the empire was a main 
guarantee against excessive taxation for Athenians.
11
  Alcibiades‟ activities would 
have met with the approval of the Athenian masses.  He soon turned his attention to 
fortifying Lampsacus and made an excursion against nearby Abydos.  Spending the 
winter at Lamspacus, he conducted further raids into Persian territory.   
Following this, he set out for Chalcedon which had revolted from Athens.  The 
people of Chalcedon had gathered all their movable property (λεία) and handed it 
over to their allies, the Bithynian Thracians.  Alcibiades, through the help of his 
imposing forces, struck his own deal with the Bithynians and seized the goods of the 
Chalcedonians.  He then set about walling off Chalcedon, and in the process defeated 
both the forces of Hippocrates, the Spartan harmost of the place, and Pharnabazus who 
had come to the city‟s aid.  Alcibiades continued in this manner, heading to the 
Hellespont and Chersonese to raise money, and in the process recruited many 
Thracians and the entire population of the Chersonese to his cause.  He took Selymbria 
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by betrayal, bringing in a small force of Greeks and Thracians and having his friends 
on the inside arrange for the city‟s surrender.  Once the city was in his hands, if 
Plutarch is to be believed, Alcibiades feared that his Thracian troops, who were 
fiercely loyal to him due to goodwill and affection (χάριτι . . . εὔνοιαν), would 
plunder the city.  So, he sent the Thracians out and left the city and its territory intact, 
merely leaving a garrison and collecting a sum of money (Plut. Alc. 30.4-5).  Finally 
he besieged Byzantium and took the city, once again with the collusion of his friends 
on the inside.
12
    
As is evident from our sources, Alcibiades and his lieutenants struck their own 
agreements with the peoples in the north.  With the Bithynian Thracians, Alcibiades 
concluded a treaty of good faith or friendship (πίστεις, Xen. Hell. 1.3.4; φιλίαν, 
Plut. Alc. 29.3); with Chalcedon, his lieutenants, principally Theramenes, arranged 
that the same tribute should be paid to Athens as before (Xen. Hell. 1.3.9; Diod. 
13.66.3; Plut. Alc. 31.1); from Selymbria he exacted a sum of money after establishing 
a garrison (Diod. 13.66.4; Plut. Alc. 30.4-5); and he arranged to return the city of 
Byzantium to its own citizens after making them allies (συμμάχους, Diod. 13.67.7).  
Though Alcibiades and the other generals were at this time acting on their own 
initiative, the epigraphic record confirms that many of the arrangements made in 410-
408 were subsequently ratified at Athens once Alcibiades made his return to the city.  
During this period Alcibiades depended heavily on his friends in the north, 
principally as betrayers of cities, as he relied on local forces, both Thracian and Greek, 
                                                 
12
 For all of these events, see the accounts in Xenophon (Hell. 1,2,15-3); Diodorus (13.64.4-67); and 
Plutarch (Alc. 29-31). 
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to accomplish his ends.  While Athens reacquired many of its interests in the north and 
gained some much needed revenue, Alcibiades, raising substantial numbers of local 
troops who were loyal to him personally, consolidated his own position among the 
Thracians.  At some point between 411-407, he established several fortified 
settlements in the Hellespontine region, which would later serve as his refuge from the 
Athenians once he fell out of favor after the Battle of Notium in 407/6.  From his base 
in Thrace, Alcibiades waged campaigns with his own private Thracian armies, and 
forged alliances with several Thracian kings.
13
  By these campaigns he enriched 
himself and increased his fame.  He offered his own forces, plus those of the kings 
Medocus and Seuthes, to the Athenian generals at Aegospotami, which those generals 
refused to their own ruin (Nep. Alc. 7-8; Plut. Alc. 30.4-5; 36.3; 37.2; Diod. 13.105.3-
4).    
In 407/6, Alcibiades had left his fleet at Notium under the command of a 
subordinate, for reasons not entirely known.
14
  In his absence, the Athenians were 
defeated by the Spartans under Lysander, most likely due to the folly of the officer 
Alcibiades had left in charge (Xen. Hell. 1.5.10-15; Hell. Oxy. 8[4].1-4).  Following 
the defeat, the anger of Athenians burned against their supposed hero Alcibiades, and 
he was dismissed from command.  He then fled to his Thracian strongholds (Xen. 
Hell. 1.5.17-18).  Alcibiades perhaps had an eye to making himself indispensible to 
Athens.  As discussed throughout this study, Athens had demonstrated a keen interest 
in the Hellespont since the seventh century.  By setting up his own autonomous 
                                                 
13
 See also below, ch. 6 
14
 For this campaign and the scholarly issues surrounding it, see Buck 1998: 43-46.  It seems Alcibiades 
had left in order to lend support against oligarchic exiles at Clazomenae (Diod. 13.71.1) or to confer 
with Thrasybulus at Phocaea (Xen. Hell. 1.5.11).  
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statelet in the region, Alcibiades might have hoped to offer the Athenians the chance 
to regain their influence in a key strategic area.  As such, he once again could have 
regained Athens‟ favor.15  Even so, he was acting with his own interests, as always, in 
the forefront.  To re-emerge once again as Athens‟ savior, and to have personal control 
over a piece of territory the city so desired, would have made him more powerful still.  
After Notium, Thrasybulus also fell out of favor at Athens, it would seem due to guilt 
by association with Alcibiades.  As evidence of his political decline, he failed to be 
elected general the following year.
16
  He remained out of the spotlight until he led the 
overthrow of the Thirty in 404-403, a feat which catapulted him to unprecedented 
stardom. 
In 390-389, Thrasybulus again ventured to the Hellespont, and he is mentioned 
as the overall commander in the region (ἦρ[χεν], IG ii² 24).  Here he made great gains 
for Athens, not least of which was effecting an alliance between the quarreling 
Thracian kings Medocus and Seuthes, joining them both to Athens in the process 
(Xen. Hell. 4.8.26).  Xenophon tells us that by so doing, he figured that not only 
would he gain powerful Thracian allies for Athens, but the Greek cities in the area 
would be much more inclined towards Athens.  His campaigns continued down the 
Ionian coast, where he exacted money by any means necessary.  Eventually, he ended 
up in Aspendus, where he continued his financial exactions.  The people of Aspendus 
were so angered by the raiding and looting of Thrasybulus‟ men that some locals 
stormed into the Athenian camp at night and killed Thrasybulus in his tent (Xen. Hell. 
                                                 
15
 For these plans of Alcibiades, see Hatzfeld 1940: 321-323. 
16
 Buck 1998: 46. 
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4.8.26-30; Diod. 14.94; 99.4-5). 
During the period of the Ionian War and in the early fourth century, legitimate 
means of raising money were not sufficient to keep any sizeable military venture 
going.  Pritchett argues that the so-called condottieri of the fourth century, that is, 
Greek generals who seemed to operate independently of their home state, were forced 
to resort to brigandage in order to pay for their soldiers and supplies.  The financial 
situation in the fourth century was so poor that the states themselves, Athens included, 
sanctioned such activity.
17
  The situation was similar for Athens during the last decade 
of the fifth and first decade of the fourth centuries.  It seems that Thrasybulus, who 
had worked closely with the Thracians, famous as thieves and brigands, and with 
Alcibiades, a proven master at raising money by any means necessary, had learned 
well how to exact funds from unwilling peoples.  The Athenians demonstrated their 
implicit approval of Thrasybulus‟ activities by sending out Iphicrates as his 
replacement in the Hellespont.  Iphicrates had already shown himself to be a 
resourceful and cunning commander of irregular troops, as well as a man close to the 
Thracians.  Accordingly, he was sent out with 1200 peltasts, troops ideally suited for 
the very sort of missions for which Thrasybulus was censured by Lysias (Xen. Hell. 
4.8.34).         
Many scholars have suggested that Thrasybulus, a staunch democrat, wanted to 
restore Athens‟ former empire in the early fourth century, and his activities in the 
Hellespont were aimed at such an end.
18
  Democracy itself was arguably in much need 
                                                 
17
 Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 59-116, esp. 68-70. 
18
 Seager 1967; Cawkwell 1976; Buck 1998: 97-98, 115-118.  Cawkwell argues that the main point of 
rivalry between Thrasybulus and Conon was the extent to which the Persians should be included in the 
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of empire.  Moreno, discussing the connection between Athens and the grain-
producing states in the Crimea, remarks that the despotic governments of the northern 
Black Sea were cynically influenced and supported by Athens, a democratic state.  
Athens‟ very food supply was dependent upon overseas expansion and the contact 
established between Athenian aristocrats and the authoritarian dynasts in far-flung 
places.
19
  The situation in the Crimea is in many ways analogous to Thrace, itself 
closer to home for Athens and a source of elite interest for a much longer period.  As 
Alcibiades raised much need funds for Athens by raiding and pillaging, Thrasybulus 
employed similar methods and entered into close negotiations with Thracian kings in 
order to provide for the democracy back home.  In Xenophon‟s words, he hoped thus 
to perform some good service to Athens.
20
  While he certainly made important gains 
for Athens, in good elite fashion he also established personal ties with the Thracians 
that would work in his own interest.   
In the end, both Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were vitally important to Athens 
in the north Aegean.  They also looked to their own interests in Thrace.  Thrasybulus 
could not have failed to notice how his colleague and ally had made use of Thrace as 
insurance against the anger of the Athenians.  Iphicrates, Thrasybulus‟ replacement in 
the north, worked on Athens‟ behalf in the region and also, just like Alcibiades, took 
refuge in Thrace once the Athenians turned against him.  Thrace, duly exploited by the 
activities of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, was a possible source of salvation for an 
                                                                                                                                            
restoration of Athens‟ empire.  Thrasybulus wanted to exclude them utterly, while Conon saw them as a 
potential asset.  It seems, though, that both men were guided more by personal rivalry and a pragmatic 
desire for personal power rather than any sort of democratic or anti-Persian ideals.  See Strauss 1984. 
19
 See Moreno 2007, esp. 204. 
20
 Xen. Hell. 4.8.26: “ἐνόμισε καταπρ᾵ξαι ἄν τι τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν.” 
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embattled and impoverished Athens.  At the same time, Athens‟ generals in the north, 
knowing how fickle the Athenians could be, looked to secure in Thrace their own 
salvation against any potential threat at home.       
 
Thracians at Athens, 404-403 
In 404-403, during the fight to restore democracy, Thracians may have played 
a key role.  Middleton argues that Thrasybulus relied heavily on Thracian fighters in 
the battles against the forces of the Thirty and the Spartans which took place in the 
Piraeus.
21
  Middleton bases his argument on three things: the location of the Battle of 
Munichia, which was in the vicinity of the shrine of the Thracian goddess Bendis; the 
names of some of the foreigners involved in the struggle; and also on the fighting style 
of the troops with Thrasybulus.  Xenophon describes a large number of light-armed 
troops that fought with the democratic forces in the Piraeus.  These fighters included 
peltasts and light-armed javelin-throwers (πελτοφόροι τε καὶ ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί), 
as well as stone-throwers or slingers (πετροβόλοι, Xen. Hell. 2.4.12).  Thrace was of 
course well known for such light-armed fighters, especially peltasts and javelin-
throwers.  As Middleton suggests, Athens‟ use of Thracian troops during the course of 
the Peloponnesian War, and Thrasybulus‟ own activities in Thrace from 411-407, 
make it all but certain that a sizable number of these light troops were Thracians. 
 Why did the Thracians in the Piraeus fight for Thrasybulus on behalf of 
democracy?  Middleton argues that metics, including those of Thracian origin, were 
well treated under the democracy, and they participated in the struggle in the hope of 
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 Middleton 1982.   
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winning even more rights.
22
  Thrasybulus could have made personal appeals to the 
Thracians of the Piraeus too as he had spent a great deal of time in Thrace.  Middleton 
insists that the location of the battle was decided largely by proximity to the shrine of 
Bendis, and therefore to the local Thracian population.  This argument hinges on 
Xenophon‟s comment that the light-troops lived in that very district.  Xenophon‟s 
wording, however, need only mean that the third group of light troops, that is, the 
slingers, lived in the immediate vicinity.
23
  Instead, many of the Thracian fighters 
could have been mercenary soldiers, hired by supporters of the democracy and under 
the personal command of Thrasybulus. 
 The orator Lysias paid for at least 300 and as many as 500 mercenaries for the 
democratic forces.  He also persuaded his guest-friend Thrasydaeus of Elis to 
contribute two talents, presumably also to pay for mercenaries (Plut. Mor. 835f; Just. 
5.9.9; Oros. 2.17.9).
24
  Lysias implies that there were many others who supported the 
men from Phyle with money and materiel (Lys. 31.15), and some of this support could 
have gone to fund mercenaries as well.  As we have no explicit record of the activities 
of these troops during any part of the struggle, we ought to understand their presence 
in the Piraeus battles in which many light-armed mercenary-style fighters 
participated.
25
  Thrasybulus had many Thracian connections with which to secure 
mercenaries, enlisting the help of his contacts in the north to supply him with the 
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 Middleton 1982: 303.  
23
 Hell. 2.4.12: “ἐτάχθησαν μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς πελτοφόροι τε καὶ ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί, ἐπὶ δὲ 
τούτοις οἱ πετροβόλοι. οὗτοι μέντοι συχνοὶ ἦσαν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτόθεν προσεγένοντο.”  The 
οὗτοι of the last sentence need only refer to the latter group of the three mentioned.  
24
 See Buck (1998: 73-74) for Lysias‟ contributions.  Although the sources are late, they were probably 
relying on now lost testimony from Lysias himself. 
25
 As argued by Buck 1998: 77. 
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appropriate troops.  Circumstantial evidence, therefore, suggests the possibility that 
Thrasybulus commanded a skilled group of Thracian fighters in Athens itself, just as 
Alcibiades had mercenaries at his beck and call while he was based in Thrace.   
After democracy had been restored, Thrasybulus proposed rewards for his 
supporters which included full Athenian citizenship.  This motion was opposed by 
Archinus of Coele, who charged Thrasybulus with introducing an unlawful motion 
(graphe paranomon) on the grounds that several of those to whom he wanted to grant 
citizenship were slaves ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 40.2).  Strauss suggests that Archinus might 
have been motivated less by a principled aversion to granting citizenship to slaves and 
foreigners than by a fear that his political rival Thrasybulus would have gained more 
than 1000 new supporters.
26
  In any case, Xenophon‟s account of the democratic 
uprising and a surviving inscription indicate that many of Thrasybulus‟ troops were 
eventually granted the lesser honor of isoteleia (IG ii² 10).
27
   
While the Athenians granted citizenship to slaves and foreign allies in 
exceptional circumstances, such as after the Battle of Arginusae (Ar. Ran. 693-694 
and schol.), it was a regular practice for foreign powers to offer mercenaries lands on 
which to settle as a reward for services rendered.
28
  Many Greeks, including most 
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 Strauss 1987: 96; 116, n.26. 
27
 Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.25) records that oaths were exchanged which promised isoteleia to the non-
Athenians present.  For the numbers of foreign supporters and the decree granting isoteleia instead of 
citizenship, see Krentz 1980.  Although many of the specific honors given, including possibly isoteleia, 
are missing from the extant fragments of the inscription, leading many scholars to conclude that 
Thrasybulus‟ abortive citizenship grant is depicted, Krentz persuasively argues that a failed motion 
would not have been recorded on stone, and that the tell-tale language of citizenship is absent.     
28
 See for example Pritchett (1974 -1991: vol. 2, 67) who discusses the practice in the context of 
Ptolemaic Egypt.  See also Hdt. 2.152-154 for an account of Greek mercenaries settled by 
Psammetichus in Egypt in the seventh century.  
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notably Xenophon and Iphicrates, were offered such perks by Thracian kings.
29
  
During the Peloponnesian War, Athens had granted citizenship to influential Thracians 
in return for military alliance.  Sadocus, the son of Athens‟ Odrysian ally Sitalces, 
dwelt in Athens and was made a citizen in 431 (Thuc. 2.29.5; Ar. Ach. 145-149).  The 
Demosthenic Letter to Philip indicates that in the mid fourth century the Thracian 
rulers Teres and Cersobleptes had been made Athenian citizens ([Dem.] 12.8).  The 
mercenary captain Charidemus was granted Athenian citizenship and sundry other 
honors in 357 for helping Athens regain the Thracian Chersonese through his 
mediation with Cersobleptes (Dem. 23.23, 65, 89, 145, 185, 188).
30
  The Thracians 
were given special property rights at Athens from the time of the Peloponnesian War, 
and they evidently returned the favor.
31
  Beyond seeking to grant citizenship and other 
rewards to metics who already lived in the Piraeus, perhaps Thrasybulus intended to 
reward his Thracian mercenaries, or at least their commanders, according to the 
custom practiced by the Thracians themselves and by the Athenians in the case of 
some of their more important Thracian friends.   
Archinus‟ opposition to these rewards is especially interesting in light of a 
decree mentioned by Aeschines (3.187-190) and corroborated on stone in which 
Archinus himself honored around a hundred supporters of Thrasybulus with laurel 
crowns and a token sum of less than ten drachmas apiece.  Based on the surviving 
fragments of the decree‟s inscription, Raubitschek first proposed that, in addition to 
Athenians, many foreigners were honored in this decree, albeit in a second list of 
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 See below, chs. 5, 6. 
30
 For these honors, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 86. 
31
 See also above, ch. 1. 
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names now lost.  Recently Taylor has provided further evidence and analysis in 
support of these conclusions, particularly noting that the current list of slightly more 
than fifty names does not account for the hundred or so implied by Aeschines, and that 
the stele itself would have been large enough to list many more honorands, 
specifically foreigners.
 32
  Taylor convincingly argues that those honored, both 
Athenians and foreigners, were the earliest participants in Thrasybulus‟ rebellion 
against the Thirty, namely, the small band that withstood the Thirty‟s brief siege of 
Phyle in the opening days of the occupation of the fort (Xen. Hell. 2.4.2-3).  Krentz 
has argued that the decree honored the much larger number of those who defeated the 
Thirty and their Spartan allies in a subsequent battle in northern Attica, probably in the 
plain towards Acharnae which lies only a few miles from Phyle (Xen. Hell. 2.4.4-7; 
Diod. 14.33.1).  Accordingly, the small number of names listed in the decree denotes 
the entire Athenian contribution to the battle, leaving out what would have amounted 
to several hundred foreigners, indeed the vast majority of the fighters.
33
  Taylor, 
however, decisively refutes Krentz‟s arguments by showing that foreigners were 
probably listed in the decree and that Aeschines more accurately describes the siege of 
Phyle rather than the later battle.
34
  If this is the case, it follows that Archinus had no 
objection to honoring foreigners per se, in spite of his strident opposition to 
Thrasybulus‟ proposal.  We must ask, then, why he chose to honor only those few 
early supporters of Thrasybulus rather than the larger number of fighters who defeated 
the Thirty in later battles in northern Attica and the Piraeus. 
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 Raubitschek 1941; Taylor 2002. 
33
 Krentz 1982: 82-84. 
34
 Taylor 2002: 382-386. 
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Perhaps Archinus carefully honored only the earliest participants in the 
resistance to the Thirty because Thrasybulus‟ later force consisted not only of an 
increasingly large portion of foreign troops, but significant numbers of Thracian 
mercenaries in particular.  While our sources are not explicit about the makeup of the 
democratic forces, especially prior to the battles in the Piraeus, it is plausible that 
Thracians were involved even at Phyle.  As already mentioned, many hundreds of 
mercenaries were supplied to Thrasybulus, paid for by Lysias and other wealthy 
opponents of the Thirty.  In the battle on Munichia hill, the democrats had with them 
many peltasts and javelin-throwers, which were very effective against the Thirty.  
Following the battle, Xenophon says that members of Thrasybulus‟ growing army 
needed to equip themselves with arms by making shields out of wood or wickerwork 
(Hell. 2.4.25).  As the soldiers who fought at Munichia appear to have been fully 
equipped already, it follows that they had accompanied Thrasybulus from Phyle.  The 
Thirty had, after all, rushed out to confront Thrasybulus immediately (εὐθύς) upon 
his arrival in the Piraeus (Xen. Hell. 2.4.10).  The peltasts and javelin-throwers in 
question, then, may not only have been Thracians, but even part of the mercenary 
forces supplied by Thrasybulus‟ supporters who joined the struggle while the 
democrats were still at Phyle. 
 After the Thirty had been rebuffed by a snowstorm in their attempt to besiege 
Phyle in the very early period of the conflict, they were worried that Thrasybulus‟ men 
would be able to plunder the nearby fields (ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν λεηλατήσοιεν).  
Accordingly, they sent a large force, including nearly the entire Spartan garrison and 
two divisions of cavalry, to keep watch over the fields (Xen. Hell. 2.4.4).  Although 
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Xenophon says that they encamped only three kilometers or so from Phyle, this 
appears to denote the distance from the center of the deme itself rather than the fort.
35
  
The fort lies high on the slopes of Mount Parnes, at an elevation of over 650 meters 
and several kilometers into the mountain, whereas the forces of the Thirty were 
positioned so as to protect the lower lying fields.  Diodorus says that they were close 
to Acharnae, lying on an open plain about ten kilometers from the fort itself and at an 
elevation of approximately 150-175 meters (14.33.1).  This would have situated the 
Thirty and their Spartan allies to protect the fields in terrain ideal for their cavalry 
forces.  Both Xenophon and Diodorus say that Thrasybulus and his forces, numbered 
at 700 and 1200 respectively, descended from the fort by night and made a surprise 
attack against their enemies.
36
  Not only is the fort of Phyle at a considerable 
elevation, it is also surrounded by sheer cliffs and extremely rugged terrain, perfect for 
the fort‟s purpose as providing a strong defensive position.  As night maneuvers were 
a specialty of highly skilled Thracian fighters, evinced by Dieitrephes‟ attack on 
Mycalessus, it is attractive to conceive of this operation as spearheaded by 
Thrasybulus‟ Thracians.37  Citizen volunteers, most familiar with hoplite warfare, 
would have found a nocturnal descent over several kilometers and a 500 meter drop in 
elevation very difficult.   
 Xenophon vividly describes the attack itself (Hell. 2.4.6-7).  Shortly before 
dawn, Thrasybulus led his troops at a full run (δρόμῳ) against the unsuspecting 
oligarchs.  Thrasybulus‟ forces straightaway killed some of the enemy and put the rest 
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 The location of the deme itself is currently unknown.  For the position of the fort, see Ober 1985: 
145-147. 
36
 Xen. Hell. 2.4.5: “καταβαίνει τῆς νυκτός”; Diod. 14.33.1: “νυκτὸς ἀπροσδοκήτως”. 
37
 For Dieitrephes‟ night maneuvers, see above, ch. 3. 
 198 
 
to flight, pursuing them for the better part of a mile.  They killed more than 120 of the 
enemy hoplites, and notably three of the cavalry commanders who were caught still in 
their beds.  Xenophon‟s phrasing suggests that most of the hoplite casualties resulted 
from the lengthy chase.
38
  Thracian peltasts, relatively lightly armed, would have been 
well suited for such a pursuit, and that they were able to kill so many of the enemy 
bespeaks their deadly effectiveness at a run.  Furthermore, the verb used to describe 
the initial killing of some of the men in the camp, καταβάλλω – a compound form of 
βάλλω meaning to throw or hurl – is strongly evocative of a missile attack.  In fact, 
of the instances of this verb in Xenophon‟s corpus which denote killing, all but one 
describe killing by ranged weapons such as javelins, arrows and stones, including at 
the hands of Thracian peltasts.  In these cases, the verb is accompanied by a participle 
of either ἀκοντίζω (to hurl a javelin), τοξεύω (to shoot an arrow), or both.39  The 
one exception is used in the context of Spartans pursuing and killing Locrians, who 
incidentally had first attacked the Spartans with stones and javelins and were fleeing 
through a dense wood.
40
  Thus, Xenophon describes the forces of the Thirty as literally 
being struck down by missile weapons of the sort used by Thracians. 
 We know that by 404 Thrasybulus had spent several years in Thrace, crushing 
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 “καὶ ἔστι μὲν οὓς αὐτῶν κατέβαλον, πάντας δὲ τρεψάμενοι ἐδίωξαν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ στάδια, 
καὶ ἀπέκτειναν τῶν μὲν ὁπλιτῶν πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, τῶν δὲ ἱππέων Νικόστρατόν 
τε τὸν καλὸν ἐπικαλούμενον, καὶ ἄλλους δὲ δύο, ἔτι καταλαβόντες ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς.” Note 
the μὲν. . .δὲ clause in the first part of the sentence that contrasts the few killed initially with the many 
killed in the subsequent rout.   
39
 See Hell. 3.2.4 (Thracian peltasts killing Greeks); 4.1.19 (Persian cavalry and chariots, units which 
primarily used the bow, killing Greeks); Cyr. 1.3.14; 1.4.8; 4.6.3; 4.6.4 (all describing the hunting of 
game with ranged weapons). 
40
 See Hell. 4.3.22.  The other uses of the verb range from cutting down trees to dismounting from 
horseback. 
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revolts and exacting funds by any and every means.  It makes sense that he would 
have used the monetary support given him by his supporters to pay for Thracian 
mercenaries, supplied through his northern contacts.  He had seen firsthand the 
effectiveness of Thracian fighters, and his actions in 404 demonstrate that he knew 
how to apply their strengths, from complicated nighttime maneuvers over 
mountainous terrain, to nimble assaults with ranged weapons.  In this way, 
Thrasybulus might have prefigured the genius of Iphicrates and the innovations of 
Xenophon in the use of light troops.  Several months had probably passed between the 
initial siege of Phyle and the battle in the plain, more than enough time for soldiers to 
have arrived from the north.
41
  These mercenaries accompanied Thrasybulus to the 
Piraeus and were instrumental in defeating the Thirty and the Spartans at Munichia 
and in subsequent engagements.  Middleton is right in asserting that many Thracians 
lived in the Piraeus.  Once Thrasybulus had arrived perhaps with hundreds of 
Thracians in tow, those Thracians dwelling in the area would have been quick to take 
up arms for Thrasybulus and alongside their countrymen.  Perhaps it was the Piraeus 
Thracians who picked up sling stones with which to pelt the Thirty and later set about 
improvising light shields out of wood and wickerwork, from which peltai and other 
light shields were typically made.  
Strauss argues that Archinus proposed subtle honors to the hundred or so 
heroes of Phyle, of which he was one, in order to deemphasize their achievements and 
in turn deemphasize the villainy of their opponents, namely the Thirty.  In this way, 
Archinus played the role of a reconciler, though his sympathies were more in line with 
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 For the date, see Buck 1998: 75; Taylor 2002: 382. 
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the few than the many.
42
  On the other hand, the epigram affiliated with Archinus‟ 
decree, quoted by Aeschines and partially surviving on stone, praises those who 
placed themselves in mortal danger in order to lead the fight against “the men ruling 
the city with unjust laws.”43  This does not whitewash the reign of the Thirty, nor is it 
subtle praise of the democratic forces from Phyle.  Furthermore, Thrasybulus himself 
was instrumental in bringing about the reconciliation between the democrats and 
oligarchs, including the famous amnesty law (Xen. Hell. 2.4.40-43), and was reckoned 
by the Oxyrhynchus historian as a member of the few (1.2-3).  Strauss does allow that 
the ideological differences between Archinus and Thrasybulus were probably not great 
and the opposition to Thrasybulus‟ decree was based at least as much on political 
rivalry as principle.
44
   
Archinus‟ uneasiness with Thrasybulus‟ later supports is in line with Strauss‟ 
description of the factional opposition between the two men.  Archinus might have 
disapproved of the involvement of so many Thracian soldiers, especially if they were 
personally tied to Thrasybulus.  Striving for political power in his own right, Archinus 
would have been wary of such a powerful military force in the hands of a rival, all the 
more so if substantial civic rewards were thrown into the mix.  Also, rather than 
deemphasizing the crimes of the Thirty or the achievements of the democratic 
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opposition, Archinus wished to acknowledge the role of Athenian citizens such as 
himself and those early foreigners who lent assistance, namely, distinguished Greek 
metics and citizens of Thebes.  Thrasybulus‟ Thracians were to be excluded if at all 
possible.  In the factional competition among the elite at Athens, a private foreign 
army and a large bloc of loyal new citizens in the hands of any one politician was too 
much of a threat to the balance of power.  Perhaps Thrasybulus overplayed his hand 
and made himself vulnerable to Archinus‟ charge. 
 
Political and Family Connections 
 As in the case of Dieitrephes, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades both had 
connections to Thrace extending far beyond their official military commands in the 
area.  Alcibiades, for instance, might have acquired an interest in the Thracians and 
knowledge of their customs from an early age.  His guardian Pericles had secured the 
services of a Thracian named Zopyrus as Alcibiades‟ tutor (Plat. Alc. 1.122b; Plut. 
Alc. 1.2).  Alcibiades and Thrasybulus were also tied to other prominent Athenians 
who were active in Thrace in this period, notably Hagnon and his son Theramenes.  
Aside from the obvious political and military links that would have arisen among the 
most eminent Athenians of the fifth century, the common connection to Thrace seems 
too strong to be a mere coincidence of military assignment.  The respective 
backgrounds of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades, like their careers, provide further 
evidence that Athenian ties to Thrace were personal, were passed on within families, 
and were fostered in conjunction, and sometimes rivalry, with fellow elites. 
 Little is known about Thrasybulus‟ family other than that he was from the 
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deme of Steiria and his father was a man named Lycus.
45
  Also from the deme of 
Steiria were Hagnon and Theramenes.
46
  Hagnon was very active in Thrace, from 
successfully founding Amphipolis, to serving as a general in the service of the 
Odrysian king Sitalces and possibly acting as the vehicle through which Athens 
acquired the services of the infamous Dioi.
47
  His son Theramenes was probably born 
in the 440‟s, around the same time as Thrasybulus.  Steiria was a deme of modest size, 
sending only three quota members to the boule each year.
48
  Two such prominent land-
owning families most likely interacted a great deal.
49
  It is tempting to imagine 
Thrasybulus and Theramenes growing up together on the eastern coast of Attica, 
where their deme was located, and participating in local activities including demotic 
government.       
 Many scholars have juxtaposed Thrasybulus and his supposed uprightness and 
integrity with the opportunism and cynicism of men like Theramenes.  Against the 
“double-dealing, unscrupulous, and treacherous” Theramenes, according to Buck, the 
“honorable, honest, and sincere” Thrasybulus provides a stark contrast.50  Yet there is 
considerable evidence of cooperation between these two men.
51
  In the convoluted 
account provided by Thucydides (8.45-98) of the oligarchic coup of 411, the upshot 
seems to be that Athens needed the support of Persia and that the best way to achieve 
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this was to introduce an oligarchic form of government in Athens and also to recall 
Alcibiades, who enjoyed close ties with Tissaphernes.
52
  One of the leaders of the 
oligarchs at Athens was Theramenes, who, according to the Aristotelian Athenaion 
Politeia, desired a moderate form of oligarchy as represented by a government of 5000 
citizens rather than the narrower council of 400 (Ath. Pol. 33).   
While Thrasybulus was in Samos, he worked fervently to maintain the peace 
between partisans of the Athenian oligarchy and Samian democrats.  Although 
Thrasybulus was officially on the side of the democrats against the oligarchs, he 
prevented the democrats from going on a killing spree, and instead strove to hold 
Samos together as a crucial Athenian ally and keep the peace among the many 
Athenian troops stationed there (Thuc. 8.75).  Though at this time Theramenes and 
Thrasybulus were in different political camps, both were moderate voices arguing for 
the expedient path in their respective locations.  After democracy had been assured on 
Samos, Thrasybulus did champion the recall of Alcibiades with the express purpose of 
winning over the Persians (Thuc. 8.81).  This, after all, had been the chief motivation 
behind the formation of a moderate oligarchic government in Athens (Thuc. 8.49).
53
  
Alcibiades, like Theramenes, had declared his support for the 5000 but not the 400 
(Thuc. 8.86.6).      
 During the period between the naval battles at Abydos and Cyzicus, in 411-
410, Theramenes participated along with Thrasybulus in the campaign to exact money 
from cities in the north (Xen. Hell. 1.1.8-12).  While Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were 
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in Thrace, Theramenes was in Macedonia, giving aid to the king Archelaus.  
Eventually, Theramenes decided to leave Macedonia as Archelaus was bogged down 
in an unproductive siege of Pydna.  He chose then to join Thrasybulus in Thrace and 
aided in the money-raising campaigns in the region (Diod. 13.49.1, 3).  The son of 
Hagnon would have been a great asset in dealing with those on the mainland opposite 
Thasos where much of this campaign took place.
54
  At the very least he would have 
had knowledge of the region and probably also local contacts.  The military 
cooperation between Theramenes and Thrasybulus mere months after the political 
upheavals of the oligarchic coup provides further suggestion of political affinity 
between them. 
 During the post-war oligarchy, the Thirty sent envoys to Thrasybulus in an 
attempt to entice him to join their ranks after he had seized Phyle and enjoyed some 
successes.  They offered him the very position which had been occupied by 
Theramenes before he had been executed.  Diodorus says Thrasybulus rejected this 
offer due to a lofty dedication to liberty (14.32).  On a practical level, while 
Thrasybulus was quickly gaining ground as a democratic champion against the Thirty, 
he had no sensible political reason to join the government which had murdered his 
fellow demesman and former military colleague.  While Thrasybulus demonstrated 
himself to be a democrat, he was no mean populist or demagogue.  The Oxyrhynchus 
historian, in fact, connects Thrasybulus to the faction of the sensible men of property 
(οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες), as opposed to the democratic mob (οἱ 
πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί, 1.2-3).  Some Athenians even accused Thrasybulus of 
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contemplating oligarchy at the end of his career. At any rate, he had a great deal in 
common with Theramenes, as the Thirty recognized.
55
    
 Alcibiades, too, might have been connected to the family of Hagnon.  One of 
the generals in the early phases of the Peloponnesian War was a man named 
Cleopompus, son of Clinias.  Nothing is known about this man other than his 
patronymic.  It has been suggested that he was related to Alcibiades, whose father was 
named Clinias from the deme of Scambonidae.
56
  We do not know whether 
Cleopompus and his father were also from this deme, but a small fragmentary 
inscription tentatively dated to the fourth century connects a Cleopompus, which is a 
very rare name, to a woman related to a Diodorus of Scambonidae (IG ii² 7401).  If a 
family connection does exist between Cleopompus and Alcibiades, then Cleopompus‟ 
activities as general in 430 are of some significance.  Thucydides tells us that he was 
chosen to take command of a fleet in conjunction with Hagnon to campaign in Thrace 
against the Chalcidians and Potidaea (2.58.1).  It is clear that Hagnon was chosen to 
lead this command because he had recently founded Amphipolis and had dealt 
successfully with the local inhabitants, both militarily and diplomatically (Thuc. 
4.102).  The following year, in 429/8, Hagnon was sent by Athens to aid Sitalces in his 
campaigns against Macedonia and the Chalcidians in Thrace (Thuc. 2.95).  Perhaps 
Cleopompus too had previous connections in Thrace.  At any rate, after this expedition 
he would have gained experience in the region and a close tie to one of Athens‟ 
greatest Thracophiles, Hagnon.  Two decades later, Alcibiades led a group of Athenian 
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generals in Thrace, a group which included Hagnon‟s son Theramenes. 
 Another general appointed to lead Thracian troops and campaign in Thrace 
during the Peloponnesian war was Nicostratus, the father or uncle of Dieitrephes.  Not 
only was Nicostratus a co-general with Alcibiades in 418/17, he was also from 
Alcibiades‟ deme Scambonidae.  Also from this deme was Dieitrephes, who was an 
agent of the 411 oligarchy that had championed Alcibiades‟ recall to Athens.57 
 Is anything known about Thrasybulus‟ father Lycus?  As Thrasybulus and 
Theramenes were contemporaries, it stands to reason that their respective fathers were 
as well, born in the first third of the fifth century.  Lycus is not a common Attic name, 
and from the fifth and fourth centuries only two or perhaps three men of this name are 
known, one of whom is Thrasybulus‟ father.58  Several red-figure vases by Onesimus 
and others, and a couple of black-figure vases, all dated before the second half of the 
fifth century, bear the inscription ΛΤΚΟ΢ ΚΑΛΟ΢.59  These inscriptions represent 
the other one or possibly two instances of the name Lycus from this period.   Davies 
cautions that the majority of these vases are too early, from the first decade or so of 
the century, to represent Thrasybulus‟ father.60  Given the rarity of occurrences of this 
name, and given that Thrasybulus was quite wealthy and thus likely came from a 
prominent family, it is tempting to postulate a connection between Thrasybulus and 
the figure honored in vase-painting.  If this Lycus is not in fact Thrasybulus‟ father, he 
might still be an earlier relative. 
 Two of the red-figure vases stand out in their depiction of Thracians, or Greeks 
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clothed in Thracian apparel.  A cup by Onesimus from the Louvre, dated by Beazley 
to about 490, depicts two horses with three beardless grooms.
61
  The horse on the left 
is accompanied by a naked groom holding twin spears, much in the Thracian style, 
while the horse on the right bears a rider clad in Thracian boots and a cloak, also 
wielding two spears.  In the middle, between the two horses, a figure clad in a 
Thracian cloak, boots, and animal-skin cap holds the reigns of the left horse.  The 
interior of the cup depicts a beardless horseman with a traveler‟s cap, cloak, boots, and 
two spears, which is evocative of Thracian horsemen.  Another cup, now in Boston 
and attributed to Antiphon, depicts a beardless lightly-armed youth framed by the 
kalos inscription.
62
  The youth wears a cap and is naked except for a cloak and boots.  
He is armed with a sword and a spear.  While it has been suggested that the figure 
represents a huntsman or traveler, his cloak, boots, spear, and strange cap all suggest 
Thracian influence, perhaps a Greek emulation of Thracian style.  
 As in the case of the Philaid family and others mentioned above, these vases 
might imply a connection between this Lycus and Thrace.  Though we cannot know 
for certain, if the Lycus commemorated as kalos is related to Thrasybulus, either as his 
father or an earlier ancestor, Thrasybulus‟ family might have had links to Thrace as far 
back as the early fifth century.  Though purely speculative, Hagnon and Thrasybulus‟ 
father Lycus, contemporaries and fellow demesmen, might have had plenty to discuss 
at home on the Attic coast.  Hagnon passed his connections in Thrace to his son 
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Theramenes.  Lycus might have done the same.
63
       
Alcibiades repeatedly visited Abydos with his paternal uncle Axiochus, 
beginning as early as 435 when the former was a young man, and once again around 
411.  This further demonstrates that ties to Thrace were routinely shared within 
families.  In Abydos the two men were allegedly engaged in libertine activities such as 
siring illegitimate children and incest, and Axiochus married a local woman named 
Medontis (Lys. In Alc. F 4 Thal).  A decree passed in 407 honors the residents of the 
Thracian city Neapolis, located on the mainland opposite Thasos, for remaining loyal 
to Athens in spite of the revolt of Thasos.  The decree‟s proposer is one Axiochus, 
likely this uncle of Alcibiades (IG i² 108).
64
  Like Dieitrephes who proposed decrees 
honoring his friends in the Thraceward area, Axiochus seems to have desired to 
nourish the connections he made in the North Aegean while accompanying his 
nephew.
65
  
There is additional intriguing evidence concerning cooperation between 
Alcibiades, his uncle Axiochus, and other Athenian aristocrats.  The generals in the 
north during this period were more or less acting on their own authority, having little 
contact with the democracy back at Athens.  Two inscriptions survive, however, 
showing that the agreements made between Alcibiades and various cities in the north 
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were later officially ratified in the assembly.  The inscriptions both list Alcibiades 
himself as the proposer of the measures, accomplished after he had returned to Athens 
in 407.  IG i
3
 199 preserves only the beginning of an agreement between Athens and 
Daphnus, a city to the south of the Propontis in the vicinity of modern-day Lake 
Uluabat.  The inscription says that the demos and boule ratified the agreements made 
between the people of Daphnus and the generals, that is, those Athenian leaders with 
Alcibiades who had been acting independently of the demos.  IG i
3
 118, missing the 
preamble but preserving the body of the agreement, details the arrangements made 
between the Athenian generals, trierarchs, soldiers, and all others present, with the 
people of Selymbria (24-27).
66
  Alcibiades himself added an amendment praising the 
Selymbrian Apollodorus, son of Empedos, making him an Athenian proxenos as his 
father had been, and inviting him and the other envoys to the prytaneum for meals (27-
43).
67
   
An interesting clause in the latter inscription states that all the property of 
Athenians or their allies that had been lost in the struggle with Selymbria should not 
be recovered, except for real property in the form of arable land and private dwellings 
(γῆς καὶ οἰκίας, 14-18).  We should probably understand this clause in the missing 
second half of the former inscription as well.  This implies that before the conflict 
individual Athenians had been able to own property of all kinds in Selymbria, and 
afterwards they were still able to possess landed estates.  Thus, along with securing 
funds for the war effort and providing the Athenians relief from eisphorai, Alcibiades 
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was also safeguarding the right of Athenians to own private property abroad.  The bulk 
of the evidence suggests that in addition to overseas clerouchies, which were 
conceived of as the communal property of all Athenians, powerful and wealthy 
individuals could have their own estates abroad.
 68
  This was particularly true in the 
Thraceward region, and it was a privilege exploited most extensively by Alcibiades‟ 
closest associates. 
The famous Attic Stelai detail the property confiscated from those condemned 
for desecrating the herms in 415.
69
  Along with Alcibiades as the supposed ringleader 
of the group, the hermokopidai included notables such as Axiochus, Alcibiades‟ uncle, 
and Adeimantus, an associate of Alcibiades and fellow demesman from Scambonidae.  
From Adeimantus, the stelai record the confiscation of farmland (ἀγρός) and a house 
(οἰκία) from Thasos, and the farming rights for a plot of land (ἐπικαρπία τῆς γῆς) 
in Ophryneum, a city in the Troad not far from Abydos.
70
  Axiochus is mentioned 
several times on the stelai, but the exact location of his property is missing from the 
extant fragments.  Gauthier posits that some of it at least was near Abydos, given the 
connection Axiochus and Alcibiades had with the city.
71
  In any case, some of the 
hermokopidai had property in Abydos.
72
  Along with real property, slaves were also 
confiscated and sold, and a very high proportion of them were of Thracian origin.
73
  It 
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is reasonable to surmise that many of the hermokopidai who had property in the 
Thraceward area had an inside track to acquiring Thracian slaves close to their point 
of origin.  Upon his return to Athens, Alcibiades brought with him the massive spoils 
of his campaigns, including many prisoners (Plut. Alc. 32.1).  Perhaps among these 
were Thracian slaves taken from the Persians and Athens‟ recalcitrant allies.     
Alcibiades was not interested in crushing the cities in the north during his 
campaigns of 410-408.  Instead, he relied on his personal contacts and sympathizers to 
win over cities by betrayal if possible and by offering reasonable terms of truce if 
battle seemed imminent.  He struck his own deals and drafted his own treaties with 
cities throughout the Thraceward area, arrangements which were later ratified at 
Athens once he made his triumphant return.  First and foremost, he was concerned 
with raising money, either by plundering the lands of the King or by ensuring that 
tribute was once again collected from Athens‟ chastened allies.  The epigraphic record 
shows that he was also keen to solidify the rights of Athenians to control property in 
the north.  There are only a very few pieces of scattered evidence that attest to private 
holdings abroad as opposed to public clerouchies.  The Attic Stelai and the treaty with 
Selymbria represent a large portion of this evidence, in fact nearly the whole of the 
non-literary evidence at our disposal.
74
  At any rate, elite Athenians including 
Alcibiades and his associates could hope to own their own private estates abroad.   
As the Pisistratids and the Philiads had a foothold in Thrace, so too did 
Alcibiades and many of his friends.  Winning back allies and harming the interests of 
the Persians, all with the net result of raising money for Athens, also furthered the 
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interests of a group of Athenian elites personally linked to Alcibiades.  A segment of 
the aristocracy was therefore acutely interested in maintaining an Athenian empire and 
specifically ties to Thrace.  To this end, Axiochus proposed honors to the people of 
Neapolis.  Similarly, Alcibiades bestowed prestigious rewards upon his Selymbrian 
friend Apollodorus, whose father had been an Athenian proxenos in Selymbria.  That 
Alcibiades was able to take Selymbria by betrayal evinces the utility of such 
connections.     
 Admittedly, the nature of the evidence necessitates a great deal of speculation 
in reconstructing the connections among Athenian Thracophiles.  But enough 
circumstantial evidence has survived from antiquity to suggest that such connections 
existed and permeated every aspect of Athens‟ relationship with Thrace.  There was a 
distinct cadre of political and military leaders at Athens that saw in Thrace the key to 
their personal success.  Alcibiades and Thrasybulus reinforced one another‟s interest 
in the region, as they worked in conjunction with prominent Athenian figures such as 
Hagnon and Theramenes.  Additionally, the seeds of their interest in Thrace might 
have been sown by the ties forged by family members.  The foreign policy of the 
Athenian democracy was advanced in the north by the aristocratic bonds between not 
only leading Athenians and Thracian dynasts, but also the most elite and often 
undemocratic of Athens‟ citizens.     
 
Ambition and a Place of Refuge 
Plutarch (Alc. 23) and Nepos (Alc. 11) tell us that Alcibiades was 
extraordinarily adept at emulating whichever people among whom he happened to be 
 213 
 
living.  Among the Spartans, although he was one of the wealthiest and most decadent 
men in Athens, he lived a life of frugal hardiness.  In Thrace, he reveled among and 
out-drank even the locals.  Among the Persians, he was all-exceeding in luxurious 
living and pomp, and excelled in the hunt.  But, as Plutarch adds, he did not alter his 
inmost character in every instance (π᾵σαν . . . τ῵ ἤθει μεταβολήν).  Rather, he 
assumed an appropriate external façade (σχῆμα καὶ πλάσμα) to please those around 
him.  It would seem, though, that in Thrace there was little need for Alcibiades to alter 
his natural behavior.  He was, in fact, prone to drunken excess and lewd behavior, like 
the Thracians, and he was fond of luxury and aristocratic leisure pursuits, like the 
Persians.
75
  The Thracians as well were known to enjoy luxury and displays of 
conspicuous consumption.  Consequently, during his sojourns in both Thrace and the 
Persian Empire, he was able to freely exercise his basest and most excessive character 
traits.  Among the Athenians he tried to live as he wished while continually aiming at 
glorious conquest and the aggrandizement of personal power.  This, more than 
anything else, led the Athenians to mistrust him and so excited the righteous 
indignation of his political opponents that he was destined at one point or another to 
be driven from the city, or worse.   
Thrasybulus as well might have had his share of difficulties with the Athenian 
democracy.  In spite of the renown he enjoyed for leading the effort against the Thirty 
in 404-403, his conduct at the end of his career was called into question at Athens.  
Lysias, in his oration against Ergocles delivered after Thrasybulus‟ death, accuses one 
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of Thrasybulus‟ lieutenants of cheating the Athenians and wasting the city‟s money 
for personal gain.  Lysias implies that had Thrasybulus been alive, he too would have 
faced the same charges.  Instead, it was better for a former hero of Athenian 
democracy to have been killed abroad instead of face prosecution at home (28.8).  In 
another of Lysias‟ speeches, we are told that Thrasybulus‟ associate Ergocles had not 
only been convicted of the crimes for which he was prosecuted, namely acting as a 
rogue commander and failing to give an account to Athens of funds acquired, he was 
in fact executed.  The clear implication is that Thrasybulus too had so wronged the 
Athenian democracy that he would have deserved the death penalty had not the angry 
people of Aspendus killed him in his tent.  This, though, may be no more than slander 
on the part of Lysias trying to bolster his own case. 
 Lysias accuses Ergocles of advising Thrasybulus to take personal possession of 
the Athenian ships on the expedition of 390, occupy Byzantium, and marry the 
daughter of Seuthes, the Thracian dynast in the region.  By so doing, Thrasybulus 
could have avoided prosecution at the hands of the fickle Athenians.  Lysias says that 
by such activities, these men demonstrated that they considered themselves to be 
completely alien to their city (ἀλλοτρίους τῆς πόλεως), a stock slander leveled 
against Athenian Thrace-haunters (28.5-6).
76
  He continues by explaining that as soon 
as such men get rich, they are no longer content with being subjects but seek to be 
rulers, to occupy strongholds, to establish oligarchies, and to keep the population in 
fear so that they can freely go about their awful business (28.7).  It has long been 
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argued that the primary concern for the Athenians was that Thrasybulus and his men 
were not providing enough funds for Athens and its fleet because they were pocketing 
the money for themselves.
77
  The rest of the accusations, from trying to occupy 
Byzantium, to aiming at establishing an oligarchy, are but misleading rhetorical tricks 
with the aim of setting up a glaring contrast with Thrasybulus‟ earlier seizure of Phyle 
in the name of democracy.
78
  Seager wonders at Ergocles‟ third piece of advice, to 
marry Seuthes‟ daughter, as he can find no immediately recognizable precedent for 
it.
79
  
Despite any rhetorical exaggeration, Ergocles‟ advice was not out of keeping 
with the real actions of several Athenians.  This, though, does not prove Thrasybulus‟ 
complicity.  Alcibiades had also been accused of trying to establish his own power 
base in Thrace in case he needed a refuge from the Athenians, which in the end he did.  
According to Plutarch, Alcibiades‟ enemies had accused him of delegating command 
of the fleet to his cronies in order that he might be free to sail around and extort money 
for himself while engaging in general debauchery.  He had also constructed a private 
fortress at Bisanthe, or so the accusation went, as a place of refuge (καταφυγή) in 
case he was no longer willing or able to live at Athens (Alc. 36.2).  During the period 
of 410-407, Alcibiades seems to have been in overall command of a group of generals 
making use of an Athenian fleet in the north independent of, and perhaps in 
competition with, Athens.
80
  This would have provided a precedent for Ergocles‟ 
advice of seizing the Athenian fleet.  After the failure at Notium in 407/6, Alcibiades 
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fell out of favor with the Athenians and accordingly repaired to his estates in Thrace.  
Thrasybulus seems to have incurred the anger of the Athenians as well.
81
  Knowing 
the dangers the Athenian demos could pose for generals, and after the example set by 
Alcibiades, Thrasybulus could well have considered making his own connections in 
Thrace so as to provide a possible καταφυγή.   
Lysias had also composed a speech against Thrasybulus which is no longer 
extant.  The surviving fragments consist only of several glosses by Harpocration, and 
the general content is all but impossible to reconstruct.
82
  This speech, too, appears to 
have been a denunciation of Thrasybulus‟ activities while in command in the 
Hellespont in the early fourth century.  According to Harpocration, mention is made of 
Anaxibius, who was a Spartan admiral active in the area and who would be made 
governor in Abydos after Thrasybulus‟ death.  Seuthes is also discussed in the speech, 
as is a satrap of the Great King, Strouthes.  All of this indicates the activities in the 
Hellespont and Ionia for which Thrasybulus was censured in the oration against 
Ergocles.  A curious mention is made of a certain Polystratus, described in the speech 
as a man whom the Athenians blamed for the infamous desecration of the herms 
which preceded the Sicilian Expedition.  Though we cannot know the context in which 
Lysias mentioned Polystratus and the herm incident, it is curious that one of the most 
notorious excesses of Alcibiades, which the Athenians feared was an attack upon the 
democratic government itself, should be included in a legal speech against 
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Thrasybulus. 
There is no evidence that Thrasybulus was ever an advocate of oligarchy at 
Athens, neither in an extreme form such as the rule of the Thirty, nor even a 
government in line with the ideals of his colleague Theramenes.  He was, though, no 
champion of radical democracy.  The evidence suggests that he had a keen sense of 
the pragmatic.  He was, like Alcibiades, an ambitious man, and he was ever eager to 
lay hold of opportunities as they arose.  He staked his political future on the notorious 
Alcibiades, and largely followed his example.  At Samos, he chose the sensible and 
necessary course in supporting the democrats.  He did what he thought was needed by 
advocating Alcibiades‟ recall in order to secure the support of Tissaphernes.  He also 
knew that should Alcibiades succeed in regaining the favor of the Athenians, his own 
political star would quickly rise.   
The political opportunism of Thrasybulus can be seen in several other 
instances.  After the defeat of Athens and ascendancy of Sparta, Thrasybulus had 
vehemently opposed Athens sending any aid to the rogue general Conon who was 
serving with the Persians (Hell. Oxy. 1.1-3).  Scholars have argued that Thrasybulus 
desired Athens to increase in power without the help of the despotic Persians.  Yet, he 
had advocated Alcibiades‟ recall during the Ionian War for the express purpose of 
securing Persian support.  Perhaps his opposition to Conon arose out of political 
rivalry more than any sort of principled opposition to Persia.
83
  The scholiast to 
Aristophanes‟ Ecclesiazusae says that Thrasybulus was a rash man prone to accepting 
bribes (αὐθάδης καὶ δωροδόκος).  He was also contemptuous of the Athenian 
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demos and desired to control everything himself (ὑπερόπτης τοῦ δήμου, ἠβούλετο 
δι’ αὐτοῦ πάντα πράττεσθαι, schol. ad Eccl. 203).  Strauss, following Saur, 
suggests that the latter trait indicates neither an aspiring oligarch nor tyrant, but a man 
in the mold of Pericles, who led democratic Athens as its leading citizen.
84
  While a 
young Thrasybulus might have set out to emulate the greatest Athenian politician of 
the age, Thucydides‟ assessment of the political situation in Athens following 
Pericles‟ death indicates that few could hope to follow in Pericles‟ footsteps.  
Essentially, internal dissention and rivalries for the leading spot ensured that no 
common policy was followed and no man was able to lead Athens himself (2.65.6-
13).
85
  The ambitious Thrasybulus would have found it difficult to bear an Athenian 
demos that continually oscillated between rival politicians instead of placing him at 
the helm of the state.  The humiliation resulting from the graphe paranomon charge 
levied against Thrasybulus by Archinus is a case in point. 
 Thrasybulus‟ known activities in Thrace, from his personal dealings with 
several Thracian kings, to the strengthening of alliances and the vigorous collection of 
money from cities in the area by any and every means, all suggest he was following a 
path similar to the one traveled by Alcibiades.  The evidence from Lysias and other 
sources suggests that Thrasybulus may not have been a straightforward democrat 
always upright in the service of his city.  Given the historical parallels, such as the 
marriage alliances between Athenians and Thracian kings and the personal control 
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often assumed by ambitious generals over Athenian forces in the north, we should at 
least consider Lysias‟ charges.  At a minimum, the idea of an Athenian commander 
commandeering a fleet and marrying a Thracian princess was plausible enough to 
Lysias‟ audience.  For Thrasybulus, Thrace promised a place of political refuge, and 
also great personal power, just as it had for Alcibiades.  That Thrasybulus could have 
been the sort of man to be enticed by such things provided, if nothing else, material for 
Lysias‟ prosecutions.     
 
Conclusions 
 In the final years of the Peloponnesian War, Aegean Thrace was central to 
Athens‟ strategy.  Athens‟ hard-won foothold on the Strymon, Amphipolis, had been 
wrested away by Brasidas.  Thasos had revolted from Athenian control and many 
other states had broken away from the empire or were threatening to break away at the 
slightest opportunity.  The last straw was the revolt of Byzantium, brought about by a 
Spartan fleet.  Alcibiades, who had been in exile aiding Athens‟ enemies, was once 
again seen as a possible source of salvation.  Thrasybulus, who prior to 411 does not 
appear to have been a prominent figure, championed Alcibiades‟ recall and thus 
intertwined his own political fate with the controversial figure.  It was to Thrace that 
Thrasybulus and Alcibiades turned most of their attention, and for several years they 
enjoyed great success in sinking Sparta‟s ships and chastening rebellious allies.  After 
the crushing defeat in Sicily, the Athenians had lost all hope of surviving the war.  The 
activities of their generals in the north demonstrated that Sparta, even supported by the 
Persians, could still be defeated militarily and that Athens‟ crumbling empire could be 
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restored. 
 The situation was similar in the 390‟s.  Athens had been dealt a severe blow by 
Sparta‟s victory in the war.  Her own military might had been damaged beyond 
recognition, and she had watched helplessly as the Greek cities across the Aegean 
succumbed to the wily Lysander or were sold out to the Persians.  Confidence was 
restored somewhat after the Battle of Cnidus in 396, in which the rogue Athenian 
admiral Conon had led a Persian fleet to victory over the Spartans, effectively ending 
Sparta‟s domination of the Aegean.  But, Athens was still bereft of an empire, and 
with Persia‟s control of the sea there seemed little chance of the situation improving.  
Thrasybulus‟ success in the Hellespont in 390-389, winning over several important 
cities and securing alliances with Thracian kings, reestablished an Athenian foothold 
in a key region.   
At one time or another, both Thrasybulus and Alcibiades seemed the best hope 
for increasing Athens‟ power in the Aegean.  Thucydides says that the Athenian 
dismissal of Alcibiades and subsequent empowering of lesser figures went as far as 
anything else in bringing about the city‟s downfall (6.15-2-3).  Thrasybulus, in 
addition to being one of the ablest of Athenian commanders in Thrace, was 
instrumental in ensuring the survival of democracy itself.  His struggle in 404-403 
saved the city from the murderous Thirty Tyrants and paved the way for decades of 
unbroken democratic rule, no small feat after democracy‟s humiliation at the hands of 
Sparta.  Alcibiades could have been the savior of Athens had he not alienated himself 
from the city.  Thrasybulus actually was the city‟s savior in 404-403 and promised to 
make great gains toward restoring Athens‟ former glory abroad. 
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 Aiming at tyrannical authority, Alcibiades hit upon in Thrace a source of great 
power and wealth – as well as an outlet for his excesses – that he could not find 
elsewhere.  He wielded his own private armies and managed to make himself valuable 
to the local Thracian kings.  He also found a refuge from the angry Athenians.  By 
contrast, Thrasybulus‟ own Thracian connections paid off decidedly in democracy‟s 
favor in 404 and also in the campaign of 390-389.  It is a testament to the complexity 
of Atheno-Thracian relations that the very region which attracted Alcibiades and 
others as an alternative to democracy also provided many of the soldiers that freed 
Athens from the grip of tyrants.  Thrasybulus, though, a gifted leader who some say 
desired to control everything himself, was careful to make personal inroads in Thrace 
to increase his standing and influence, and perhaps also to guard against any threat 
back home.  Lysias‟ charges cannot be dismissed out of hand as they are corroborated 
by numerous historical parallels and various passing references in other sources.  The 
execution of his subordinate Ergocles at the hands of an irate demos indicates that 
Thrasybulus might have been well advised to remain in Thrace, as Alcibiades had 
done and Iphractes would later do.  His untimely death at Aspendus prevents us from 
ever knowing his true plans.  What is certain is that Thrasybulus was a skilled 
commander and man of nuanced political views.  Athenian democracy needed him and 
his Thracian connections, as it needed elitist leaders cooperating with Thracian 
dynasts and pillaging states across the Aegean.  For his part, Thrasybulus needed 
Thrace to secure his own political success in Athens, achieving his greatest renown in 
404-403 and 390-389 because of his ties to Thracians. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IPHICRATES AND THE ODRYSIAN COURT 
 
Introduction  
Iphicrates, an Athenian military leader of the fourth century, was credited in 
antiquity with important infantry reforms that revolutionized Greek warfare by 
regularizing light-armed peltasts.  That Iphicrates was a talented and innovative 
commander is universally declared by the ancient sources.  Much of his prestige 
derived from a stunning victory at Corinth‟s port of Lechaeum in 390 where he led a 
force of mercenary peltasts that destroyed an entire mora of Spartan hoplites.  In 
addition to serving for several years in the field with this particular group of warriors – 
a majority of whom were Thracian – Iphicrates spent at least two lengthy periods in 
Thrace itself, at the court of the Odrysian king Cotys I.  While in Thrace he married 
Cotys' daughter and fought a naval battle on behalf of his father-in-law against the 
forces of Athens.   
Iphicrates had a son by his Thracian wife, and he named this child Menestheus 
after the legendary king who led the Athenian contingent in the Trojan War.  Davies 
points out that Iphicrates‟ son is only the second attested historical Athenian to bear 
the name, the first having been born only a few years previously.  Perhaps, as Davies 
conjectures, the character of Menestheus was enjoying a literary rehabilitation at this 
time.
1
  Perhaps also Iphicrates‟ choice of name reflects the complex and ambiguous 
relationship Iphicrates had with both Thrace and Athens.  Iphicrates was a notorious 
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Thracophile: his tactical prowess derived largely from his experiences with Thracian 
soldiers; he seemed to prefer the court of a Thracian king to his own city; and he 
married a Thracian princess who would bear his children.  These activities led to a 
charge of xenia at Athens at the hands of his political rivals.  A bitter remark from his 
son, as related by Nepos (Iph. 3.4), testifies to the problematic nature of Iphicrates‟ 
ties to Thrace.  When asked whether he esteemed more his father or mother, 
Menestheus replied that he preferred his mother.  His reason was that his father, as 
much was in his power, had made Menestheus a Thracian, while his mother strove to 
make him an Athenian.  Even naming his son after the Athenian leader of an 
expedition against barbarians could not disguise Iphicrates‟ awkward position astride 
two cultures and that at times he opted for Thrace at the expense of Athens. 
Menestheus personifies the tension inherent in the Atheno-Thracian 
connection.  Half Thracian and half Athenian, his name reflects an expedition sent 
across the Aegean to combat an enemy in a foreign land and bring glory to Greece.  
This, after all, was what Iphicrates had been sent out by the Athenians to do some 800 
years after Agamemnon‟s war against Troy.  Yet no mere name could compensate for 
Menestheus being the issue of his father‟s aristocratic and dynastic marriage to the 
daughter of a non-Greek king, for which Iphicrates would be censured at Athens.  
Menestheus‟ bloodline would also forever attest to his father‟s neglect of Athens in the 
pursuit of his own interests.   
The generals of fourth century Athens have often been labeled condottieri, 
equating them with the mercenary commanders of medieval and Renaissance Italy in 
their propensity for conducting self-serving campaigns that neglect the needs of their 
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home city.  In an influential study, Pritchett objects to this characterization of 
commanders such as Chabrias, Chares, and especially Iphicrates, arguing that they 
were always loyal in their service to Athens and remained subservient to the wishes of 
the polis.  If unsavory and seemingly independent military actions were carried out – 
the plundering of sundry states around the Aegean, for example – it was due to the 
financial exigencies of impoverished post-Peloponnesian War Greece.  Generals, 
lacking the requisite funds from the state, had to resort to unorthodox methods in 
securing resources.  All activities toward these ends were implicitly sanctioned by the 
polis that had knowingly sent out under-resourced expeditions.
2
   
While Iphicrates acted more like a condottiere than Pritchett allows, he did not 
represent a new type of Athenian commander for the fourth century.  He was perfectly 
in line with the preceding century and a half of Athenian Thrace-haunters.  In general, 
Iphicrates‟ connection with Thrace – his use of Thrace as both a path to advancement 
in Athens and in turn a refuge when he fell out of favor, and even his close 
relationship with a Thracian king and marriage to a Thracian princess – had been 
prefigured in the careers of elite Athenians from Pisistratus to Thrasybulus.   
Above all, Iphicrates was a soldier.  His prodigious tactical sense was so 
famous in antiquity that Polyaenus attributes to him sixty-four stratagems, by far the 
largest number given to any man, eclipsing even Julius Caesar (Strat. 3.9).  In the field 
he was an able experimenter, unconfined by traditional Greek military practice and 
ever ready to adapt the tactics and equipment of his soldiers to suit the needs of the 
campaign and more effectively combat the enemy.  Thracian warfare provided the 
                                                 
2
 Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 59-116. 
 225 
 
inspiration for many of his innovations, and the unusual experience of almost 
continuous campaigning with unconventional auxiliary troops provided the ideal 
forum for honing his craft, leaving an indelible mark on Greek military history.  
Iphicrates‟ demonstrated facility with the staples of unconventional warfare, including 
ambush and deception, were perfectly complemented by the Thracian peltast as well 
as the Thracian habits of brigandage and raiding.  He was a true cross-cultural soldier 
in that he fought alongside Thracians, both in Thrace and in mainland Greece, and 
immersed himself in Thracian society and culture to an extent that was parodied by the 
comic poets.   
Nepos and Diodorus attribute important infantry reforms to Iphicrates, namely, 
the regularization of peltast troops in Greek armies.  This has been questioned by 
modern scholars, especially Best.  For Best, Iphicrates was a cunning strategist, but his 
reforms never actually took place.  Thracian peltasts, after all, had been fighting in 
Greek armies for decades before Iphicrates held his first command, and there is no 
indication that peltasts were in any way modified or standardized as a fixture in Greek 
armies after his supposed reforms.
3
  Best is right in that Iphicrates did not exist in a 
strategic and tactical vacuum.  He could draw upon many precedents in the use of 
Thracian mercenaries.  What Best overlooks, however, is that Iphicrates was but one 
in a long line of Athenians with ties to Thrace.  The career of this fourth century 
general demonstrates the importance of the Thracian connection as a catalyst for 
military innovation. 
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Iphicrates’ Involvement with the Thracians: An Outline 
In 393, the Persians in collaboration with Conon the Athenian funded the 
establishment of a mercenary force at Corinth in order to bolster the Corinthians, 
Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians in their struggle against Sparta.  To take charge of 
this force, Conon appointed Iphicrates, a young and valiant soldier who had most 
likely served under him at the Battle of Cnidus in 394 and during the subsequent 
campaign to liberate cities in Asia from Spartan control.  Iphicrates was a formidable 
warrior and a man of great personal courage and daring.  He first gained repute by 
boldly boarding an enemy ship, probably at Cnidus, seizing its captain, and carrying 
him off in full armor to his own ship (Plut. Mor. 187a; Justin 6.5).  Because of this 
exploit, he was given command at the age of twenty of the forces sent to relieve the 
Boeotians after the Battle of Coronea.  The age required for election to the strategia 
was thirty, so this command must have been a special appointment and quite an 
extraordinary one.
4
  Iphicrates, reputedly the son of a humble shoe-maker named 
Timotheus (Paus. 9.14.6; Suda s.v. Ἰφικράτης), was reviled by the Athenian upper-
class and self-conscious about his origins (Arist. Rhet. 1367b18; Plut. Mor. 186f-
187b).
5
  Nonetheless, his daring had impressed Conon enough to earn him two special 
commands in as many years.
6
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 Pharnabazus and Conon had raised a force of mercenaries while liberating the 
Asian cities after the Battle of Cnidus.  These mercenaries were acquired in the region 
around the Hellespont (Hell. 4.8.7).  As Parke argues, it is reasonable to assume that 
these mercenaries were those later stationed at Corinth.  This is especially likely since 
the force at Corinth consisted largely of javelin-wielding peltasts, readily available 
from the area around the Hellespont.  This implies a sizeable Thracian presence at 
Corinth.
7
  Still, there is debate among scholars as to the exact makeup and origin of 
the mercenary force.  Best argues that Greeks from the Hellespont made up most of 
the force, supplemented with peltasts from Athens‟ allies in central Greece, such as the 
Acarnanians.
8
  Pritchett supposes the force was a mixture of Greeks and Asians 
recruited by Conon and Pharnabazus.
9
  It is most likely that the mercenary force at 
Corinth, called τὸ ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ by Aristophanes (Plut. 173), consisted of 
foreign mercenaries from the Hellespont supplemented by Greek citizen fighters.  It is 
unclear the extent to which these Hellespontines were Thracians, Greeks, or a mixture 
of both.   
 It is evident that the citizens of Greek cities in the Thraceward area adopted 
Thracian military practices at an earlier date and to a greater extent than cities further 
south.
10
  The formation of citizen cavalry and peltast units by states such as Abdera 
and Aenus is hardly surprising.  Parke believes that the peltasts in the service of 
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Olynthus were citizens, as they are described as part of the regular army.
11
  Peltasts 
from Olynthus and the surrounding area had bested Athenian troops in the Chalcidice 
early in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.79).  A coin from Abdera dating to the third 
quarter of the fifth century shows a naked peltast, which Isaac takes as proof that 
Abdera had a corps of citizen peltasts.  Others, though, suggest this peltast represents a 
soldier in Sitalces‟ Thracian army.12  As we have seen, during the campaigns of 
Alexander throughout Thrace, the Greek traders living in the Haemus range banded 
together with the Thracians and opposed Alexander from the heights, drawing upon 
the particular strengths of Thracian infantry techniques (Arr. 1.1.6-7).
13
   
Regular contact with Thracians would have necessitated soldiers suited to 
dealing with the threats specific to the region.  Also, the inherent tactical effectiveness 
of these non-hoplite arms would have been readily apparent to those Greeks who had 
witnessed them in action time and again.  The innovations of Athenian commanders 
such as the elder and younger Miltiades, Hagnon, and Demosthenes were largely due 
to extended contact with lightly armed foreign fighters.  Greeks living on the edge of 
the Thracian world could hardly afford the luxury of maintaining affected hoplite 
snobbery.
14
   
Best, though, overstates his case in insisting that when peltasts are listed as 
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coming from northern allies, Greek peltasts are always meant.
15
  As Isaac argues, the 
Greek city of Aenus probably acted as a mustering point for peltasts, both native 
Thracians and Greeks, in the service of Athens.
16
  Isaac posits that Aenus was also 
likely a hub of the Thracian slave trade, collecting slaves destined to mainland Greek 
cities.  He continues this line of reasoning to assert that Pisistratus recruited his 
Thracian mercenaries in the sixth century from Aegean Greek cities.
17
  It stands to 
reason that in the fifth and fourth centuries Thracian mercenaries were recruited from 
Greek cities in the northern Aegean.  How else would a Greek commander come into 
contact with Thracian soldiers-for-hire?  Thus, when the sources tell us that a 
particular mercenary force originated in Aenus, such as that accompanying Cleon to 
Pylos in 425 (Thuc. 4.28.4), or from the Hellespont as was the case with the force 
recruited by Conon (Xen. Hell. 4.8.7), there is reason to believe that a majority of the 
fighters were Thracians that had been mustered in Greek cities.   
In the years preceding the recruitment of the force for Corinth, Thracian 
mercenaries from the Hellespont were active under Greek commanders.  While 
Alcibiades was in the area, he commanded large numbers of Thracian troops whose 
support he offered the Athenians at Aegospotami (Plut. Alc. 30.4-5, 36.3, 37.2; Diod. 
13.105.3-4).  Plutarch says that these Thracian soldiers were numerous and zealous in 
their service for Alcibiades because of the affection they had for him (Alc. 30.4-5).  
The Spartan Clearchus had recruited a large force of mercenaries in the Hellespont.  
Xenophon tells us that when he joined Cyrus for the expedition against Artaxerxes, 
                                                 
15
 See Best 1969: 13, n. 72. 
16
 Isaac 1986: 152-153. 
17
 Isaac 1986: 145-146. 
 230 
 
Clearchus brought 1000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts, and 200 Cretan bowmen (An. 
1.2.9).  Note that the while the mercenary hoplites might have been Greek, the peltasts 
were Thracian.  
 Pritchett remarks on the unique nature of the mercenary force at Corinth, that 
for nearly five years an army was maintained outside the borders of Attica under the 
control of a single commander, made possible in no small part by Persian money.
18
  In 
many ways, Iphicrates‟ position resembles Dieitrephes‟ leadership over the Dioi in 
413.  Both men seem to have exploited the opportunity of a special command over a 
group of Thracians in order to circumvent the confines of the strategia.  Iphicrates was 
appointed to positions of leadership before reaching the age traditionally required to 
be a strategos, and both men were given commands without being elected by the 
demos as strategoi.  Long ago, Rehdantz speculated that Iphicrates owed his 
appointment at Corinth to pre-existing ties to Thrace, though there is no firm evidence 
of this.
 19
  In 390, after several years of campaigning, Iphicrates and these mercenary 
peltasts put to rout an entire mora of Spartan hoplites – that is, 600 of Greece‟s most 
fearsome heavy infantrymen – near Corinth‟s port at Lechaeum (Xen. Hell. 4.5).20  
This feat brought Iphicrates nearly unparalleled renown in antiquity as it shattered the 
myth of Spartan invincibility much as Demosthenes‟ victory at Pylos had.  Good 
Greek hoplites, let alone the Spartan warrior elite, simply were not supposed to be 
bested by light-armed troops, especially ignoble Thracian soldiers-for-hire.     
                                                 
18
 Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 117, 123. 
19
 Rehdantz 1845.  This is followed by Parke (1933: 52) and Best (1969: 86). 
20
 See Konecny 2001 for a comprehensive account of the battle.  While scholars have variously 
suggested anywhere between 1200 and 4000 (!) for the size of Iphicrates‟ peltast force, Konecny 
estimates around 1500, which seems reasonable.  See also Best 1969: 87-88; Anderson (1970: 123-
126), who emphasizes the importance of the hoplite support of the peltasts in this battle; and Lendon 
2005: 93-94.    
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 Iphicrates was soon back in Athens, having relinquished command of the 
mercenaries to Chabrias.  In 389 the Spartan Anaxibius was wreaking havoc with 
Athenian and Persian interests in the Hellespont, and it was Iphicrates whom the 
Athenians sent out to counter him (Xen. Hell. 4.8.33-35).  Thrasybulus had recently 
secured several cities for the Athenians in and around the Hellespont, primarily by 
obtaining the alliance of the Thracian kings Medocus and Seuthes after arbitrating a 
dispute between the two men (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25-26).  Following Thrasybulus‟ 
assassination in Aspendus, the Athenians selected Agyrrhius to take control of all 
naval operations (Xen. Hell. 4.8.31).  Despite Agyrrhius‟ recent appointment, he was 
bypassed in favor of Iphicrates for the mission of settling the situation in the 
Hellespont. 
With Iphicrates and his eight ships sailed 1200 peltasts.  Xenophon tells us that 
most of them had been among those who had served under Iphicrates at Corinth (Hell. 
4.8.34).  It is unclear what remained of τὸ ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ after the loss of 
nearly 1200 fighters, but Chabrias evidently continued to carry on military operations 
in the Corinthia.
21
  That such a large force of peltasts was more attached to an 
individual commander than to a military posting is striking.  As Pritchett highlights, 
because of Persian money Iphicrates was able to drill and hone his soldiers‟ skill 
constantly for a period of several years.  A powerful esprit de corps resulted such that 
Iphicrates‟ incredible success at Corinth could not be duplicated until the time of 
                                                 
21
 In 389, Xenophon tells us that Chabrias sailed out with some 800 peltasts to bring aid to Evagoras on 
Cyprus, stopping first to get more ships and hoplites from Athens (Hell. 5.1.10).  Presumably, the 
hoplites already under his command were taken from the mercenary force at Corinth.  There is also 
some indication that Chabrias won victories at Phlious and Mantinea after taking control of the force at 
Corinth, though this has been called into question by Thompson (1985).   
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Alexander, when continuous military training became the norm.
22
  Several ancient 
writers, notably Nepos, remark on the military discipline and cohesion that Iphicrates 
demanded, facilitated by this special environment (Iph. 2.1-2).  For all intents and 
purposes, the force of 1200 soldiers that followed Iphicrates in 389 was a private 
army.  That it consisted largely of Thracians, or at least warriors from a region familiar 
with Thracian-style tactics, would have ensured their suitability for operations in the 
Hellespont.  Thrasybulus had made important gains for Athens because of his 
formidable blend of military skill and diplomatic savvy.  In 389 the Athenians were 
afraid that the good things they had acquired through the agency of Thrasybulus would 
be lost.
23
  Iphicrates and his peltasts were seen as the best fit to fill Thrasybulus‟ 
shoes.   
 Once in the north, Iphicrates and Anaxibius attacked one another‟s territory by 
sending out raiding parties (λῃστάς) until Iphicrates executed an ambush near 
Abydos.  In the ensuing battle, Anaxibius and twelve local Spartan governors were 
killed, along with 200 men from the Spartans‟ mercenary force and fifty hoplites from 
Abydos (Xen. Hell. 4.8.35-39).
24
  Iphicrates thereby regained control of the Hellespont 
and Chersonese for Athens, though this situation would be short-lived.  In 387, the 
new Spartan leader in the region, Antalcidas, connected to the Persian king by 
marriage and thus supported with a sizeable Persian fleet, defeated the Athenians in a 
                                                 
22
 Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 123-125.  For Iphicrates‟ care in fostering an esprit de corps, see Parke 
1933: 78. 
23
 Xen. Hell. 4.8.34: “δεδιότες μὴ φθαρείη σφίσιν ἃ κατεσκεύασεν ἐν τ῵ Ἑλλησπόντῳ 
Θρασύβουλος.” 
24
 Anderson (1970: 128-129) argues that this battle shows Iphicrates‟ worth as a commander more than 
the superiority of peltasts over hoplites, since Anaxibius‟ force probably included mercenary peltasts as 
well. 
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naval battle and set up a blockade against Athenian ships (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-29).  
Iphicrates, probably now an official strategos along with Diotimus, was still in 
command of the Athenian naval forces in the area and was engaged in a blockade 
against the Persians when Antalcidas outwitted and defeated a contingent of the 
Athenian fleet under subordinate commanders (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-27).
25
  In this way, 
the Spartans retook Abydos and control of the straits.  The King‟s Peace, or Peace of 
Antalcidas, followed shortly thereafter and brought an end to the Corinthian War.   
 This is the last we hear of Iphicrates in Xenophon‟s account until over a 
decade later.  We know from other sources, however, that Iphicrates did not return to 
Athens after the loss of the Hellespont under his watch.  Upon the conclusion of the 
peace, he remained in the north and entered into close relations with the Odrysian 
court.  Did he remain in Thrace on his own initiative, or was he acting on behalf of 
Athens in an official capacity?  Scholarship is divided on the issue.
26
  From the 
evidence available we can piece together many of the characteristics of the 
relationship between Iphicrates and the Odrysians, especially Cotys I, which may shed 
light on the reasons behind Iphicrates‟ sojourn. 
 After the largely Spartan-dictated King‟s Peace, Athens continued to have an 
interest in Thrace, and though Athenian generals could no longer operate openly in the 
Aegean, Athens tried to maintain a foothold in the north.  An inscription has been 
found, dating from 386, on which the Athenians honor Hebryzelmis, king of the 
                                                 
25
 For a discussion of this action, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 64. 
26
 See Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 64-67.  See also Kallet 1983; and E. Harris 1989.  Kallet and Harris 
differ from Pritchett in their interpretation of the chronology of Iphicrates‟ activities in Thrace, the 
former two placing certain key events in the 360‟s that Pritchett ascribes to the period immediately 
following the King‟s Peace.  All three, however, explore the nature of Iphicrates‟ relationship with the 
Thracians. 
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Odrysians.
27
  It is uncertain who exactly Hebryzelmis was – whether the son of 
Medocus I, a usurper, or otherwise – but it is clear that he was the successor to 
Medocus‟ reign.28  As such, he was the enemy of Seuthes II who was trying to 
establish himself as ruler over the Odrysians and had been doing so since at least the 
turn of the century when Xenophon and the Ten Thousand fought on his behalf.
29
  
This inscription, which appears to mention Greeks working on behalf of the Odrysians 
and what might be Athenian ships on the Thracian coast in the service of Hebryzelmis, 
has been taken by several scholars as proof of Athenian diplomatic interest in the 
region, and by extension that Iphicrates was working on behalf of Athens in Thrace.
30
 
 The reconciliation between Medocus and Seuthes brought about by 
Thrasybulus a few years earlier seems to have been short-lived.  Nepos tells us that 
Iphicrates fought against the Thracians on behalf of Seuthes II and restored him to his 
throne (Iph. 2.1).  This implies Iphicrates was fighting the forces of either Medocus or 
his successor Hebryzelmis.  Nepos calls Seuthes the ally of Athens but, by 386 at 
least, the Athenians were siding instead with Hebryzelmis.  Lines 8-9 of the honorific 
inscription state that Hebryzelmis should enjoy all of his ancestral rights (ἐναι αὐτῶι 
ἅπερ τοῖς π[ρογό] / νοι[ς] ἅπα[ν]τ[α]), in other words, the territories sought by 
Seuthes.  There is some evidence that Seuthes was actually hostile to Athens in this 
period and made attacks against its interests.
31
  While Athens had a stake in Thrace 
                                                 
27
 IG ii² 31 = Tod 1950: no. 117 = Harding 1985: no. 29. 
28
 For the range of possibilities, see Archibald 1998: 219. 
29
 For Xenophon in Thrace, see below, ch. 6. 
30
 Rehdantz 1845: 24-25; Hoeck 1891: 458; Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 64-65. 
31
 See, for example, Aristides Panath. 172.19 in which Seuthes is listed among the enemies facing 
Athens; Polyaenus (7.38) describes Seuthes attacking the Athenians in the Chersonese with a mercenary 
force of 2000 Getai. 
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and made diplomatic overtures to Hebryzelmis, it seems that Iphicrates was fighting 
on behalf of the other side.
32
  This inscription, therefore, can hardly stand as 
confirmation of Iphicrates‟ official capacity in Thrace. 
 Why, then, would Iphicrates have elected to remain in the Thraceward area?  
First of all, his long experience as commander of a group of peltasts might have given 
him a keen appreciation for the Greeks‟ neighbors to the north.  He had already grown 
proficient in peltast warfare, and spending time in Thrace would have yielded many 
opportunities to enhance further his tactical prowess and renown as a general.  It also 
would have offered a path to advancement in spite of the new environment established 
by the King‟s Peace.  The prestigious commands he had achieved during a time of war 
might no longer have been available.  Finally, as commander Iphicrates was 
responsible for the loss of Abydos to Antalcidas.  Although his subordinate 
commanders were the ones to be outmatched by the Spartan leader at sea, the official 
blame would have rested with Iphicrates and his colleague Diotimus.  A return to 
Athens to face the notoriously fickle and vengeful demos might have seemed 
imprudent.  A few years abroad could cool any public outrage against an unsuccessful 
general.  This, after all, had worked for Conon who found refuge for a time on Cyprus 
and among the Persians after being part of the disastrous Athenian defeat at 
Aegospotami.
33
             
                                                 
32
 Beloch (1893-1904: vol. 3.2, 87) first posited that Iphicrates fought on behalf of Seuthes and Cotys in 
succession against Hebryzelmis. 
33
 Pritchett (1974-1991: vol.2, 64) attempts to demonstrate that the Athenians did not find Iphicrates at 
fault for the defeat.  As evidence, he argues that Dionysius, one of the subordinate commanders, was 
named by Demosthenes as a general who was convicted of defeat in Thrace, indicating that it was the 
subordinate commanders who were held responsible.  It would not have been below the Athenian 
demos to convict all the generals involved, directly responsible or otherwise, and in any case the mere 
threat of conviction could have kept Iphicrates away from Athens.  As E. Harris (1989) argues, 
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 Seuthes died in 383 and was replaced by his son Cotys I.
34
  At some point 
Iphicrates married the daughter of Cotys.
35
  This probably took place around 386 since 
Iphicrates‟ son from this marriage, Menestheus, was a general in 356 (Isoc. 15.129; 
Nep. Tim. 3.5).
36
  Iphicrates was thus connected very closely to Cotys‟ inner court.  
Iphicrates was instrumental in securing the line of Seuthes and Cotys in the Odrysian 
kingdom and we hear no more about their rival Hebryzelmis after 386.  Cotys became 
the undisputed king of the Odrysians, bringing an end to the dynastic feud which had 
existed between Medocus and Seuthes.
37
  Demosthenes remarks upon the great things 
Iphicrates accomplished for his Thracian father-in-law, showing that Cotys was not 
without reason in honoring Iphicrates with his daughter in marriage (23.129).  
Iphicrates seems to have remained in Thrace for several years.  It is not until 
380/79 that we hear of him back in Athens, at which time he was sent to Egypt to 
serve Pharnabazus (Diod. 15.29.1-4).  While in the north, Iphicrates crafted a close 
personal relationship with another northern king, the Macedonian Amyntas.
38
  
Amyntas adopted Iphicrates as his son around 383, probably after the former had been 
restored to his throne by the help of Athens and Sparta.
39
  Xenophon tells us that the 
Spartans advised Amyntas to hire mercenaries and dispense money to the kings in the 
area in order to regain his own power (Hell. 5.2.38).  During the process of courting 
                                                                                                                                            
Iphicrates‟ second sojourn in Thrace was due to the fear of the Athenian courts after his failure to retake 
Amphipolis.  His actions in 387, therefore, might have prefigured those of the 360‟s.  For Conon, see 
below, ch. 6.            
34
 For the date, see Hoeck 1891: 89. 
35
 Dem. 23.129; Nep. Iph. 3; Anaxandrides Prot. frs. 40-41; Sen. Rhe. Contr. 6.5.  In spite of the ancient 
tradition, some scholars think Iphicrates actually married a sister of Cotys.  See Davies 1971: 249-250, 
with further bibliography.  At any rate, Iphicrates was a κηδεστής of Cotys. 
36
 See Davies 1971: 249-251.  
37
 Archibald 1998: 219.  For Cotys‟ reign, see Hoeck 1891: 89-100. 
38
 Theop. FGrHist 115 F 289; Aesch. 2.26-29; Scholia in Aesch. 2.29-32; Dem. 23.149; IG ii² 102. 
39
 See the scholia to Aesch. 2.26 for the help rendered to Amyntas by Athens and Sparta. 
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fellow northern kings in order to secure alliances and soldiers, Amyntas likely came 
into diplomatic contact with Cotys.  It is probable that Cotys sanctioned the 
relationship between Iphicrates and the Macedonian.  Both kings were at the time 
consolidating their positions and it would seem that they were seeking mutual support 
with Iphicrates as their agent.  Archibald aptly describes Iphicrates during this period 
as an “international fixer.”40   
Diplomacy among the Thracians and Macedonians often involved dynastic 
alliances sealed by marriage or adoption.  That Iphicrates was accepted into the 
families of two northern kings, and thus a member of the inner court of two different 
kingdoms, is remarkable.  These new familial connections were not made solely in the 
interests of furthering Athens‟ interests.  They did enhance Iphicrates‟ diplomatic 
clout, which would be duly exploited by Athens in later years, but the primary 
motivation of the ambitious Athenian was surely more personal.  Was Iphicrates 
simply seeking material gain, which he achieved most visibly in the form of 
settlements in Thrace, or could he have been aiming at the unthinkable, namely, the 
acquisition of genuine royal authority in Thrace or Macedon?  He is the only Athenian 
that comes to mind who was related to two foreign kings, a son-in-law to one and the 
adopted son of another, by which he was legally the elder brother of the future rulers 
Perdiccas and the great Philip of Macedon.
 41
    
 Iphicrates returned to the north Aegean around 367 when Athens sent him to 
retake Amphipolis (Diod. 15.71.1; Aesch. 2.28-29).  During this mission he provided 
                                                 
40
 Archibald 1998: 219. 
41
 The closest parallel is Nymphodorus of Abdera, who served as Athens‟ proxenos with the Odrysian 
king Sitalces in 431 and was connected by marriage to both Sitalces and Perdiccas of Macedon (Thuc. 
2.29).  See above, ch. 3. 
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support for the Macedonian royal house.  Upon Amyntas‟ death, one of his sons, 
Alexander, succeeded him to the kingship but was assassinated.  His mother Eurydice, 
the widow of Amyntas, assumed the throne with her lover Ptolemy acting as regent in 
lieu of her other two sons Perdiccas and Philip.  Under threat from a pretender named 
Pausanias, Eurydice appealed to Iphicrates for help, even placing the young Philip in 
the arms of the general.  She called upon Iphicrates as a brother to her children in his 
private capacity (ἰδίᾳ) and as a friend of the Macedonian state in his public one 
(δημοσίᾳ, Aesch. 2.28).  Accordingly, Iphicrates drove Pausanias from the kingdom.  
Eurydice‟s rhetorical distinction between Iphicrates‟ duties as an official 
representative of Athens, Amyntas‟ ally, and his personal duties as a close relative of 
the royal family is interesting.
42
  Unfortunately for Iphicrates, his ties to Eurydice were 
ultimately unfruitful as the regent Ptolemy and his successor Perdiccas both aided 
Amphipolis against Athens (Aesch. 2.29).   
 Iphicrates failed to retake Amphipolis and the Athenians relieved him of his 
command (ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε), sending Timotheus as his replacement 
(Dem. 23. 149).  As Harris convincingly argues, the Athenians forcibly removed 
Iphicrates from this post due to his failure and most likely would have formally tried 
him had he returned to Athens.  Accordingly, Iphicrates once again elected to remain 
in the north and went to the court of Cotys.
43
  It is during this second stay in Thrace, 
probably around 362, that Iphicrates had the audacity (ἐτόλμησεν) to fight a naval 
                                                 
42
 For the formal alliance between Athens and Amyntas, forged around 375, see Bengston 1962-1969: 
vol. 2, no. 264. 
43
 E. Harris 1989, especially 265, n.10.  Kallet (1983) argues that Iphicrates was always acting on behalf 
of Athens‟ interests, often in concert with Timotheus, a claim Harris rejects as unsubstantiated by the 
evidence and largely disproved by Iphicrates‟ subsequent actions.  
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action against the Athenians in defense of Cotys‟ interests (ὑπὲρ τῶν Κότυος 
πραγμάτων, Dem. 23.130).44  This action served as conclusive proof for Cotys of 
Iphicrates‟ loyalty to him (τῆς ἐκείνου φιλίας πεῖραν) and he later tried to send 
Iphicrates to lay siege to Athenian territory.  This was a step the Athenian commander 
was unwilling to take, which caused a decisive falling out between the two men.   
Unable to return to Athens after having aided a barbarous Thracian against his 
home city, and likewise fearful of remaining at the court of Cotys who by then had 
become negligent of his safety, Iphicrates withdrew to Antissa on Lesbos and then 
Drys, his own possession in Thrace (Dem. 23.131-132).  The language of 
Demosthenes is clear.
45
  Iphicrates had fought one defensive military action against 
Athens which led Cotys to assume that he could be trusted to lead an actual assault on 
Athenian possessions.  Iphicrates refused to take the offensive and effectively 
alienated both sides.  The relationship between Iphicrates and Cotys which had 
continued on good terms for over two decades was over.  The Athenians, in need of 
skilled generals, eventually welcomed Iphicrates back and chose him as one of their 
commanders in the Social War of the 350‟s.   
 
At the Court of Cotys 
Several pieces of evidence illuminate the workings of the relationship between 
Iphicrates and Cotys.  There are many references to Iphicrates‟ service in the Thracian 
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 For the date, see E. Harris 1989: 266, n.11. 
45
 As E. Harris (1989: 268) argues, Demosthenes‟ primary target in this speech is the mercenary 
commander Charidemus of Oreus; the orator is either neutral or favorably disposed towards Iphicrates.  
His testimony, therefore, is probably free of rhetorical falsification of Iphicrates‟ story.  
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court in our literary sources.  Also, Xenophon‟s firsthand account of the court of 
Cotys‟ father, Seuthes II, provides an invaluable glimpse into the aesthetics, ritual, and 
politics of a Thracian court.  Finally, some material evidence can be brought to bear, 
such as more than a few luxury goods found in Bulgaria, some of which are actually 
inscribed with Cotys‟ name, that largely corroborate the image of the Odrysian court 
provided in literature. 
 First and foremost, the relationship was based on a military alliance, either as a 
formal extension of Athenian foreign policy or, more likely, an informal cooperation 
between Iphicrates and Cotys.  While in Thrace, Iphicrates seems to have been acting 
against the general policy of Athens.  Little is known about specific campaigns, but 
Polyaenus provides six stratagems of Iphicrates that occurred while in Thrace (3.9.4, 
41, 46, 50, 60, 62).  Nepos says that he waged war against the Thracians on behalf of 
Seuthes (Iph. 2.1).  And Demosthenes provides vague references to Iphicrates‟ station 
as an agent of Cotys (Dem. 23.130-132, 135, 156).  None of these sources makes 
explicit what troops Iphicrates was using in these engagements, whether they were 
Greeks, Thracians, or a combination of both, nor whether Iphicrates brought his own 
men or merely commanded the forces of the Odrysians.
46
  With such a stellar record in 
the field, the strategic and tactical advice of Iphicrates, let alone his actual leadership 
on the battlefield, would have provided invaluable help to any ruler.  Yet it seems 
likely that he also provided men. 
 As Xenophon‟s account of Iphicrates breaks off after the King‟s Peace, we 
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 Pritchett (1974-1991: vol. 2, 66) argues that in the case of Polyaenus, Iphicrates is always 
commanding Greeks against a Thracian enemy.  While he is fighting against Thracians, there is no 
reason why his own troops must necessarily be Greek. 
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hear no more about the 1200 men, mostly from the force at Corinth, who had 
accompanied their commander to the Hellespont.  Did this force remain under 
Iphicrates‟ control?  For Iphicrates to have rendered such decisive service in restoring 
Seuthes to his throne, he probably needed substantial numbers of his own troops.  
Employment in the forces of a Thracian king would have been a lucrative prospect for 
mercenaries who otherwise might have been out of work after the imposition of the 
Peace.  And if these mercenaries were Thracians themselves, they might have had 
more at stake in Odrysian dynastic squabbles than mere pay.  At least some Greeks 
were part of the force fighting on behalf of Seuthes and Cotys.  Isaeus refers to two 
Athenian brothers who took part in Iphicrates‟ campaigns in Thrace in order to 
“achieve something of note” (2.6), a reference probably to Iphicrates‟ campaigns in 
the late 380‟s.47  Iphicrates‟ fighters had served together for many years under the 
strict and inspired leadership of a gifted commander.  1200 such hardened warriors 
would have been a force to be reckoned with. 
 During his second period at Cotys‟ court, Iphicrates again likely had a force of 
soldiers with him, perhaps some of those that had been part of his mission to take 
Amphipolis.  Charidemus of Oreus is one example.  Later to become an infamous 
mercenary leader variously working for Athens, the Thracians, and even the Persians, 
Charidemus had been a light-armed soldier under Iphicrates in the 360‟s and was part 
of the mission to Amphipolis.  He followed his commander to the Odrysian court after 
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 For the date, see Edwards 2007:31-32. 
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Timotheus had been sent to take over operations at Amphipolis (Dem. 23.149-165).
48
  
It is plausible that along with Charidemus other soldiers accompanied Iphicrates to 
Thrace to serve under Cotys.   
 Iphicrates was a close advisor to Cotys on many matters in addition to 
providing military expertise.  There are several references in our sources to Iphicrates‟ 
talent for finding money with which to pay his troops.  From Xenophon‟s account of 
his activities in the Hellespont in 388 we learn that it was the Athenian commander‟s 
customary practice to sail up and down the straits in order to exact financial 
contributions from the local people (Hell. 4.8.35-39).  It is difficult to imagine that 
such contributions were made entirely willingly.  As mentioned above, both Anaxibius 
and Iphicrates initially carried on their conflict with one another by conducting 
plundering raids (λῃστάς) against their respective holdings.  The resulting booty 
would have helped to pay the troops.  Years later, when appointed to lead an 
expedition to Corcyra, Iphicrates made many raids along the way, including capturing 
several Sicilian ships, in order to raise funds (Diod. 15.47.7; Xen. Hell. 6.2.35, 38).  
While in Corcyra, he instructed his troops to work the land in order to make money, 
and his force was also hired as mercenaries by allied mainland states (Xen. Hell. 
6.2.37).  This and other similar means of acquiring funds with which to maintain an 
army were necessitated by the difficult financial straits faced by the Greek cities in the 
fourth century.
49
  Commanders were therefore expected to conduct raids in order to 
raise their own money as the city was unable to finance sizeable military expeditions 
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 See discussion in Parke 1933: 125-126.  For more on Charidemus, who remained active in Thrace 
and was involved by turns with the Thracian king Cersobleptes and the Athenian commander Chares, 
see Kelly 1990. 
49
 As argued by Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 68-70. 
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through the regular channels.   
 Iphicrates, then, had a penchant for plundering raids and for devising novel 
ways to raise funds.  His particular military experiences would have been instrumental 
in developing these talents.  Polyaenus tells us of three episodes which demonstrate 
Iphicrates‟ financial savvy: marching his troops through poor lands when short of 
money to encourage less spending; withholding a portion of his soldiers‟ pay as a 
security against desertion; and dressing some men in Persian clothes to give the 
impression to the other troops that even larger sums were on their way from the Great 
King (3.9.35, 51, 59).  This ingenuity came in handy for his patron Cotys.  Pseudo-
Aristotle tells us of one of Iphicrates‟ schemes to raise money for his father-in-law 
(Econ. 1350a30).  Essentially, Iphicrates advised Cotys to demand a quantity of grain 
from the lands under his control, which was then sold at the local emporia for a huge 
profit, providing pay for the whole army.   
 As for what court life would have been like for a close associate of the 
Odrysian king, we are fortunate to have Xenophon‟s account of his own dealings with 
Cotys‟ father Seuthes.  In the Anabasis, Xenophon describes the march of the Ten 
Thousand through Thracian territory on their return journey from Cunaxa in 399.
50
 
Seuthes, outlining for Xenophon his situation, told how he shrewdly acquired men and 
horses from the more powerful king Medocus and that he regularly conducted raids 
against his ancestral lands (λῃζόμενος τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ πατρῴαν χώραν) in order to 
wrest control of the kingdom away from Medocus.  With Xenophon‟s help, Seuthes 
                                                 
50
 See especially Anabasis books 6-7.  See also Stronk (1995) for a comprehensive commentary on the 
Ten Thousand in Thrace.  For more on Xenophon, who had no love for Seuthes, see below, ch. 6.  In 
spite of his biases, Xenophon‟s account of Seuthes‟ court seems to be trustworthy and is corroborated 
by other sources. 
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said that his goals would be easily achievable (7.2.31-34).   
Xenophon and his men agreed to fight on behalf of Seuthes against his 
Thracian enemies, and the Greek hoplite force complemented well the light-armed 
infantry and cavalry of the Thracians.  Mercenary peltasts had been used in 
conjunction with the hoplites of the Ten Thousand at Cunaxa, so Xenophon was well 
aware of their effectiveness (Xen. An. 1.10.6).  When the Greeks had first arrived in 
Thrace, they fared poorly against the local warriors because of their lack of cavalry 
and light-armed troops (6.3.7).  But Xenophon and Seuthes eventually were able to 
work out a way to integrate their two types of soldiers to great effect, and they 
overcame the mountain-dwelling tribes that had been harassing them (7.3.37-4.24).  
The successful implementation of this combined-arms force provides an illustration of 
the trend in warfare that had begun during the Peloponnesian War under generals such 
as Demosthenes and would reach its zenith under Alexander. 
51
  Xenophon‟s account, 
therefore, is a key source for the development of Greek warfare at the turn of the 
century and provides an important description of the way in which Greek and Thracian 
tactics could be integrated to enhance the armies of both peoples.   
 Xenophon‟s remains the most complete portrait we have of the workings of a 
Thracian royal court.  Several of the Greek generals, including Xenophon himself, 
were courted by Seuthes in an attempt to secure their support against the independent 
tribes.  Seuthes tempted them with promises of lavish gifts, including horses, estates, 
and even women (7.2.2, 38; 7.5.8).  He declared that Xenophon and two of his 
comrades would be made brothers of the king, sharing in his seat of power 
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(ἐνδιφρίους) and taking a portion (κοινωνοὺς) of the kingdom‟s acquisitions.  
Xenophon himself was offered Seuthes‟ daughter in marriage as well as the port of 
Bisanthe, the most beautiful of all of the king‟s estates (κάλλιστον χωρίον, 7.2.38).  
Later on Seuthes offered Xenophon two additional estates, Ganos and Neon Teichos 
(7.5.8).  Two of these holdings, Bisanthe and Neon Teichos, were earlier offered to 
Alcibiades, who had gained influence with both Medocus and Seuthes (Xen. Hell. 
1.5.17; Diod. 13. 105. 3; Nep. Alc. 7.4).    
Iphicrates himself was offered a royal Thracian bride and estates, most notably 
Drys, in return for his service on behalf of Seuthes and Cotys, a proposition he 
accepted.  Harpocration, quoting Theopompus as his source, says that Drys was settled 
by Iphicrates (ὑπὸ Ἰφικράτους κατοικισθῆναι, s. v. Δρῦς).  As Pritchett points 
out, in Ptolemaic Egypt katoikoi were foreigners settled on the land in return for 
military service. Polybius has a similar definition (5.65.10).  Pritchett goes on to argue 
that in the case of Iphicrates, Harpcration is merely referring to a free citizen settled in 
a foreign land.
52
  If one takes into account the parallel examples of Alcibiades and 
Xenophon, however, one is left with the impression that Iphicrates owned these 
settlements outright.  Additionally, the verb κατοικίζειν implies that Iphicrates 
actively colonized the site, perhaps with his own veterans.  In any case, it was regular 
practice for Odrysian kings to reward foreign generals with valuable property that was 
sizable enough to allow for many settlers.  Such estates would generate a great amount 
of wealth.  That Iphicrates fled to Drys and remained for several years after he fell out 
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with Cotys indicates that the Athenian had considerable autonomy while on his estate.  
If Drys was settled with Iphicrates‟ own soldiers, Cotys‟ inability to threaten him there 
even though it was located in Odrysian lands would be explained.   
Seuthes himself received valuable gifts as emblems of his royal authority.  
Xenophon describes how Heraclides of Maronea made a circuit around the Greek 
camp trying to extort gifts for Seuthes, accosting Xenophon specifically and saying 
that the greater the gifts Xenophon should give, the greater would be Seuthes‟ support 
(7.3.16-20).  In the feast that followed, hosted by Seuthes, distinguished guests vied 
with one another in presenting their gifts, which included ornate vessels, horses, and 
even clothes for the king‟s wife.  Xenophon, having no material gifts to offer, instead 
presented the service of his soldiers, claiming that not only would Seuthes thus regain 
much if his ancestral land, but the Greek mercenaries would willingly offer up the 
spoils of horses, men, and beautiful women to the Odrysian king as gifts (7.3.21-33).   
Archibald discusses the phenomenon of gift exchange which occurred at all 
levels of Odrysian society.  In contrast to the Persians who gave gifts to facilitate the 
smooth running of the empire, by granting parcels of land to ensure loyalty for 
example, Archibald argues that notable Odrysians received gifts in recognition of their 
own superiority.
53
  This Odrysian custom is reminiscent of that practiced by Homer‟s 
heroes.
54
  Great warriors like Achilles could expect to be given the choicest spoils as a 
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reflection of their greatness.  Prestige objects, such as those given to Seuthes by his 
distinguished guests, were for Homeric heroes the necessary outward symbol of their 
γέρας, the prerogative conferred upon the nobility.  Thus, the exchange of gifts was 
crucial for the demarcation of social rank and prestige in Homeric society, as it 
seemed to be for the Odrysians.  For notable Greeks such as Alcibiades, Xenophon 
and Iphicrates, the similarity to the world of epic would have been obvious.  It matters 
little whether rulers such as Seuthes and Cotys were aware of Homeric precedent.   
Another ritual integral to maintaining the social order in Homer‟s world was 
the feast.  As van Wees succinctly states, Homeric feasts were key in the “creation of 
personal networks, the formation of groups, and the differentiation of social status.”55  
The host of a feast would be sure to make use of the most ornate utensils and serving 
vessels possible, while displaying his collection of valuable prestige objects in the 
dining hall.  As such, the diners would often stand in awe at the wealth of their host 
(Od. 4.75).
56
  Van Wees demonstrates that heroes would take part in a sort of cycle of 
invitations and counter-invitations to feasts.  Feasts were a way to define one‟s elite 
status, as only members of the nobility were invited and in turn invited others to their 
own homes; the masses were generally excluded.
57
   
Seuthes‟ feast falls into this rubric.  The most distinguished men in the region 
were invited to the event, including the most powerful of the Thracians, the Greek 
                                                                                                                                            
exchange, see Finley 2002 [1954]:46-70.  See also Donlan 1982; 1989; Jones 1999.  Contra, see 
Hooker (1989), who argues that there was no formal institution of gift-exchange as such.    
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generals and commanders, and the ambassadors from various communities (7.3.21).
58
  
Seuthes had tripods, traditionally the most lavish of status objects, brought out for the 
guests, and each tripod was laden with skewers of meat (κρεῶν μεστοὶ 
νενεμημένων, 7.3.21).59  Another notable parallel to Homeric dining is the 
abundance of meat, in stark contrast with the diet of Classical Greeks.  In addition to 
Xenophon‟s account, there is archaeological evidence that suggests many Thracians 
hunted big game and regularly ate meat.
60
  Throughout the course of the meal Seuthes 
was presented with valuable gifts as the various nobles competed with one another by 
giving ever more lavish things (7.3.26-29).  
A copious amount of wine was consumed at Seuthes‟ banquet, evoking further 
the imagery of heroic camaraderie as well as the elite institution of the symposium, 
prevalent at Athens at this time.
61
  Several times nobles drained entire horns (κέρας) 
of wine as they drank to Seuthes, and the king himself emptied a horn with Xenophon 
(7.3.26-32).  Xenophon notes that this ritualized drinking was an established Thracian 
custom (τὸν Θρᾴκιον νόμον).  Earlier, the negotiations between Xenophon and 
Seuthes over the employment of the Greek soldiers were inaugurated by means of this 
ritual (7.2.23).  After drinking at the feast itself, Seuthes let out a war cry and 
performed a dance emulating combat in order to show his own martial prowess 
(7.3.33).  As if this feat of dexterity was not enough, at the end of the festivities 
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Seuthes sprang up, showing no sign whatsoever of being drunk (οὐδέν τι μεθύοντι 
ἐοικώς), in spite of the large quantities of drink imbibed (7.3.35).   
The Thracians were stereotypically heavy drinkers.
62
  That Seuthes was able to 
drink so much and still appear sober suggests an affinity for alcohol.  There is ample 
material evidence to support this notion.  The Rogozen treasure, found in northern 
Bulgaria in 1985, contains a large number of ornate vessels made from precious 
metals.  The objects seem to date from the end of the fifth to the mid fourth century, 
and scholars have argued that the treasure was collected by a noble Thracian family 
over the course of several decades.
63
  The vessels, many of which are inscribed with 
the names of known Odrysian rulers, including Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, were 
most likely given to the Odrysian kings as gifts or tribute payments from subject 
cities.  The names of these cities, most of which are located in south-eastern Thrace 
near the Hellespontine region, are sometimes included on the vessels.
64
  The 
overwhelming majority of these vessels – 163 out of 165 – are drinking phialai and 
wine jugs.  Likewise, the Panagyurishte treasure from central Bulgaria at the western 
end of the Thracian plain, an astonishing find consisting of several fourth century 
drinking vessels totaling over six kilograms of pure gold, includes several phialai and 
rhyta, horn-shaped vessels equivalent to the kerata used by Seuthes and his guests.
65
  
Both of these treasures, as well as several more from Bulgaria, include objects of 
incredibly ornate workmanship and valuable materials that were certainly meant to 
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showcase their owners‟ wealth and status.  That they consist primarily of drinking 
vessels demonstrates the centrality of drink-ritual for the Thracian nobility.  Van Wees 
suspects that the profusion of precious metal at the feasts described by Homer is a 
glamorous fiction, hardly reflected in the poet‟s real world.66  It clearly was, however, 
a part of the world of the Thracian rulers of the fifth and fourth centuries. 
The comic playwright Anaxandrides presents a colorful description of the 
drink-laden wedding feast (συμπόσιον) to which Iphicrates was treated by his father-
in-law Cotys (F 42 K-A).  Purple carpets (στρώμαθ’ ἁλουργῆ) were strewn about 
for the cow-cheese-eating dirty-haired Thracians to dine in their thousands (ἄνδρας 
βουτυροφάγους, αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς).  Ornate vessels were used, 
including massive bronze cauldrons and golden pitchers, from which Cotys himself 
served the guests.  Seuthes likewise is portrayed as portioning out the food in 
Xenophon‟s account.  There was plenty of musical entertainment, as at Seuthes‟ feast.  
As a dowry Iphicrates received two herds of horses, a herd of goats, a quantity of gold, 
and other splendid treasures.  Allowing for comic exaggeration, Iphicrates‟ wedding 
feast might have looked very much like the description given by Anaxandrides.  
Nothing is out of keeping with Xenophon‟s portrayal of Seuthes‟ lavish banquet or 
with the material evidence discovered.  The valuable vessels used, the gifts presented 
and the centrality of the king as host are all entirely plausible elements.  In addition to 
such a feast, Xenophon and his generals were offered kinship with Seuthes and a share 
in the kingdom.  Iphicrates most likely obtained similar honors.  Athenaeus follows a 
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quote from this passage of Anaxandrides with a description of other sumptuous 
dinners in order to emphasize the sparseness of meals at Athens itself (4.131-137).  
Therein may lie part of the impetus for an Athenian such as Iphicrates to turn to 
Thrace.   
Iphicrates, a close advisor to Cotys in military, financial, and other important 
matters, was treated as de facto royalty.  He was given the daughter of the king in 
marriage, feted with lavish feasts and granted valuable gifts of livestock, precious 
metals and lucrative property.  He was intimately connected to a world which to an 
educated Greek would have resembled that of Homer‟s basileis.  Status was 
determined by ostentatious wealth and military prowess, both of which Iphicrates 
possessed in abundance thanks to his own surpassing talents and the favor shown by 
the Odrysian king.  For his part, Xenophon had no love for Seuthes or the Thracians, 
representing them as at once decadent and savage.  Though his account is the fullest 
one we have of Thracian royalty, it is a hostile portrayal.  Xenophon preferred instead 
to find refuge among the Spartans, the quintessential hoplite elite who by their 
conservatism and restraint served as his model.  Thus, he spurned Seuthes‟ offers in 
the end.  Iphicrates, on the other hand, had no such scruples.   
 Throughout his speech against Aristocrates, delivered in 352/1, Demosthenes 
contrasts the society of Thrace with the civilized world of the Greek polis.  For 
example, Charidemus of Oreus, Iphicrates‟ successor at the Odrysian court, did not 
dwell in any civilized state (πόλιν μὲν οὐδ’ ἡντινοῦν οἰκοῦντι), but rather fought 
on behalf of a Thracian king and exploited his patron‟s royal authority to mistreat 
many (διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου βασιλείας πολλοὺς ἀδικοῦντι, 23.138).  Earlier in the 
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speech, Demosthenes ponders what the consequences would be if Charidemus were to 
leave Thrace to settle in a civilized Greek state (εἰς πόλιν ὀικῇ που) while 
continuing to commit the many crimes which were permitted to him by the authority 
and license (ἐξουσία) available in Thrace (23.57).  Though Charidemus is 
particularly singled out, his mentor Iphicrates is also said to have fought a sea-battle 
against Athens on behalf of Cotys (23.130).  The situation of the two men was quite 
similar.  Both opted for the license of barbarous Thrace and for the royal authority of a 
powerful foreign patron, spurning the confines of the polis.  Charidemus eventually 
became connected by marriage to Cersobleptes in the same way Iphicrates had been to 
Cotys (Dem. 23. 129).  Demosthenes certainly had a motive to portray Charidemus in 
the worst possible light, as the aim of this speech was to censure Aristocrates for 
proposing that Charidemus should be inviolable.
67
  The picture of the Odrysian court 
we are given by Xenophon and Anaxandrides, however, substantiated by material 
finds, fits Demosthenes‟ characterization.  As many Athenians discovered and 
exploited to their advantage, Thrace afforded the unscrupulously ambitious ample 
opportunity for material enrichment and the exercise of regal authority.  Aside from 
the sparseness of Athenian dinners, a democratic constitution could not have furnished 
equivalent opportunities for power, wealth and influence. 
 
Ambition and Anti-Democratic Tendencies 
The sources outlining Iphicrates‟ life and career describe a talented leader 
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driven by ambition and desire for power.  The more extreme manifestations of these 
attributes did not always align well with traditional Athenian politics, according to 
which a military commander was answerable to the demos.  Thrace and the court of 
Cotys offered Iphicrates a path to influence, wealth and standing that would have been 
largely closed to him at Athens.   
 In the 380‟s, Acoris, the king of Egypt, rebelled against Persian rule and 
acquired as his general Chabrias, who left for Egypt without the permission of the 
Athenians (Diod. 15.29.1-4).
68
  In 380/79 the Persian general Pharnabazus sent envoys 
to Athens to denounce Chabrias‟ aiding of the Egyptians and to ask the Athenians to 
send Iphicrates to act as a general for the Persians.  The Athenians, anxious to gain the 
favor of the Persians, complied.  During the campaign Iphicrates and Pharnabazus 
disagreed over whether to invade an undefended Memphis immediately or to await the 
entirety of the Persian army, with Iphicrates urging the former course.  Iphicrates 
demanded that Pharnabazus give him the use of all available mercenaries to assault the 
city lest an opportunity be squandered.  According to Diodorus, Pharnabazus began to 
fear Iphicrates‟ boldness and courage and worried that the Athenian would take 
possession of Egypt for himself (15.43).  In this climate of mistrust, Iphicrates 
prudently decided to steal away at night and left the service of the Persians.  Clearly, 
the Persian satrap saw in Iphicrates the type of ability and ambition that would make 
such a power-grab plausible.  In spite of his formidable skill, Iphicrates became a 
threat to Persian interests in the region.         
 An overweening ambition was already displayed by Iphicrates as a young man 
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at Corinth.  Following the destruction of the Spartan mora at Lechaeum in 390, the 
Argives acquired power in Corinth with the help of pro-Argive Corinthians in the city.  
Diodorus says that Iphircrates conceived of seizing the city of Corinth itself, reasoning 
that its strategic position was well-suited for achieving hegemony over Greece 
(14.92.1-2).
69
  Such a plan must have seemed outrageous to many since the democratic 
faction then holding Corinth was allied with Athens in the conflict against Sparta and 
the oligarchic Corinthian exiles.  The Athenian demos opposed such a brazen move, 
and Iphicrates gave up his command to be replaced by Chabrias.  Pritchett points out 
that although this episode shows Iphicrates to be haughty and domineering, he was 
nonetheless compliant with the demos‟ wishes.70  While it is true that Iphicrates did 
not strictly act against the wishes of his polis in this instance, that he formulated such 
a plan with a mind to achieving supremacy over all of Greece, albeit on behalf of 
Athens, bespeaks a great will to power.  Diodorus‟ phrasing implies that Iphicrates 
gave up his command of his own volition (ἀπέθετο τὴν ἀρχήν) rather than having 
had it stripped from him by the Athenians.  His ambitions thwarted, it seems the hero 
of Lechaeum walked away from his post in disgust.
71
    
 Xenophon‟s account makes no mention of Iphicrates‟ desire to seize Corinth, 
but it does say that the Argives who had effected a merger between Argos and Corinth 
no longer wanted Iphicrates in their territory.  Iphicrates, according to Xenophon, had 
                                                 
69
 For a discussion of this merger, see Griffith (1950) and Whitby (1984) who argue that full unification 
occurred in 390 after a period of isopoliteia beginning in 392; Tuplin (1982) argues that full unification 
had already occurred in 392.  
70
 Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 62-63. 
71
 Tuplin (1982: 83 n.29) and Whitby (1984: 307 n.29) argue that the demos in this passage refers to 
that of the Corinthians.  Iphicrates‟ subsequent resignation and his replacement by Chabrias, who 
showed no intention of carrying through with any type of similar plan on behalf of Athens, to my mind 
indicates that it was the Athenians who opposed Iphicrates.    
 255 
 
actually put to death some of the members of the pro-Argive faction (Hell. 4.8.34).  
The Argives had supported the democratic party in Corinth, it seems, in order to 
exercise control over the city.  The boundary stones between Corinth and Argos had 
been removed and the Corinthians were given the rights of Argive citizenship.  This 
did not go over well with the pro-Spartan faction in Corinth, forced into exile by those 
loyal to the alliance with Athens, Argos and Boeotia.  As such, the exiles joined forces 
with Sparta and after a military victory occupied Lechaeum (Hell. 4.4).  It was this 
group, namely Corinthian exiles and Spartan soldiers, against whom Iphicrates was 
campaigning when he cut down the Spartan mora.   
 Throughout his account, Xenophon displays a clear bias in favor of the pro-
Spartan faction, portraying the democrats as murderous tyrants (Hell. 4.4.1-5).
72
  He 
does not, however, give any reason as to why Iphicrates had killed some of the so-
called ἀργολιζόντες.  The verb used for killing, ἀποκτείνω, often implies judicial 
execution.
73
  Xenophon perhaps wants us to see Iphicrates as an instrument of the law, 
putting to death those guilty of wrongdoing; or perhaps Iphicrates was acting like a 
tyrant, arbitrarily executing his enemies.  The historian generally thinks highly of 
Iphicrates (Hell. 6.2.39; 6.5.51) and is decidedly against the Argive-Corinthian 
alliance (4.4).  A portrayal of Iphicrates justly condemning perfidious Argives would 
be in keeping with such biases.  Yet, Iphicrates‟ campaigns around Corinth were 
specifically against the Spartans and those Corinthians with whom they were allied.  
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As such, he was fighting on the side of, in fact on behalf of, those citizens of Corinth 
who were pro-Argos and who had willingly accepted the merger.
74
  A glaring 
inconsistency is apparent.   
Perhaps motives of a more personal nature were behind Iphicrates‟ execution 
of members of the pro-Argive faction.  As Diodorus tells us, Iphicrates had formulated 
a plan to seize Corinth.  Ultimately the Argives managed to do just that, perhaps as a 
direct response to the threat that Iphicrates might anticipate them.  Iphicrates may have 
undertaken these killings in order to crush his rivals in the pursuit of control over 
Corinth.  Diodorus‟ account makes it clear that the Athenians themselves wanted no 
part in such a scheme.  There is no record of any conflict between Iphicrates‟ 
replacement Chabrias and the pro-Argive faction.  Chabrias maintained a military 
presence in the area, and may have led several raids against Spartan allies, to ensure 
the security of Argive-controlled Corinth against the Spartans and their partisans.
75
  
Thus, Iphicrates might have acted on his own, seeking to fulfill his own personal 
ambitions, when he killed these men.                                                    
 According to Polyaenus, when Iphicrates was facing a capital charge at 
Athens, rather than take his chances with the judges, he arranged for a band of his own 
                                                 
74
 Whitby (1984: 301, 307) argues that Iphicrates was acting on behalf of Athens as a check on the more 
extreme elements in the pro-Argos faction.  According to this reconstruction, Iphicrates‟ execution of 
certain pro-Argive partisans gave the Argives an opportunity to demand Iphicrates‟ withdrawal and thus 
take full control of Corinth.  In this way, Iphicrates‟ independent actions actually hurt Athens‟ cause in 
that it gave the pro-Argive party enough leverage to achieve their aim of unification without Athenian 
protest or intervention.  Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention, however, of an Athenian 
desire to check the more radical aims of Argos.  The evidence for such is based only on a few lines 
from one of Andocides‟ speeches (3.26, 32).  Yet, within this same speech (3.41), Andocides implies 
that both the Corinthians and Argives appealed for Athenian military aid, which would indicate that the 
Argives at least did not view the Athenian military presence as a threat to their aims of unification.    
75
 Scholia in Ael. Arist. Pan. 171.3; Polyaen. Strat. 3.11.6. But, see Thompson (1985) for possible 
problems with these sources.  
 257 
 
thugs to bear their swords to intimidate the court.  He also made sure the judges saw 
his own sword, which he flashed before them (3.9.15, 29).  We cannot know with 
certainty whether Iphicrates‟ unofficial bodyguard was made up of Thracians, but the 
incident is reminiscent of Pisistratus‟ seizure of power in Athens with the help of 
Thracian mercenaries.  Iphicrates, with his personal ties to Thrace and access to 
Thracian soldiers, could have relied on a group of Thracian retainers to ensure that he 
got his way in the Athenian courts.  The elder Seneca, using this incident (albeit with 
some ahistorical elements) to illustrate a legal point, does say that Iphicrates‟ 
bodyguard was made up of Thracians (Contr. 6.5).  In any case, Iphicrates was not 
above the use of violence and intimidation to subvert the democratic process. 
 Polyaenus says that the trial in question was the one resulting from the 
Athenian failure at the Battle of Embata during the Social War in 356.  Due to adverse 
weather conditions, Iphicrates, his son Menestheus, and Timotheus refused to fight 
along with Chares, leaving Chares to suffer defeat.  The latter subsequently brought a 
charge of treason against the other three generals, with his ally Aristophon leading the 
prosecution.  We know from other sources that Iphicrates and his son were acquitted, 
while Timotheus was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine of 100 talents.  In 
disgrace, Timotheus withdrew to Chalcis and died shortly afterwards.
76
  Why would 
Iphicrates and his son be acquitted while their colleague was found guilty on exactly 
the same charge?  The answer seems to lie with Iphicrates‟ intimidation of the court by 
means of his own personal retinue.
77
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 There is some indication that Iphicrates jealously guarded his special place 
among the Thracians.  A famous rivalry through much of the first half of the fourth 
century is that which existed between Iphicrates and Timotheus the son of Conon.
78
  
Interestingly enough, Iphicrates and Timotheus might have been distantly related as 
Ipihicrates‟ father was named Timotheus.79  The favor shown to Iphicrates by Conon 
and their close relationship may have been a source of tension for Conon‟s son.80  
Conon had given Iphicrates the command of the mercenaries that had been recruited 
from Thrace.  Timotheus also attempted to exploit the opportunities presented by 
Thrace throughout the course of his career, as well as serving abroad in Egypt and 
Persia.  Both were talented and ambitious generals who gained much of their power 
and prestige from campaigns abroad, particularly in the north.
81
  This is what lay 
behind much of the conflict between the two men.   
 In 373 the Athenians had appointed Timotheus to lead an expedition to 
Corcyra.  In order to bolster the force given to him, Timotheus went to Thrace to 
recruit men and ships and to entice the cities in the region to join in an alliance with 
Athens.  This side trip, though, apparently took too much time and Timotheus was put 
on trial by the Athenians for the delay and stripped of his command.
82
  To take his 
                                                                                                                                            
policies of moderation and restraint.  Isocrates claims that Timotheus failed to court the populace 
adequately, and was thus convicted (15.131).  In the main, Timotheus seems to have shied away from 
the more unscrupulous methods adopted by men like Iphicrates.  See below, ch. 6.  
78
 Kallet (1983) argues that the two actually cooperated to a greater extent than most scholars have 
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place, the Athenians chose Iphicrates who immediately made the most of the 
opportunity, employing his legendary discipline and vigorously recruiting men and 
materiel.  He even managed to secure the symbolic flagships Paralus and Salaminia as 
part of his fleet (Xen. Hell. 6.2.12-14; Diod. 15.47.2-3).  While the Athenians were 
initially outraged at Timotheus‟ delay, Diodorus says that they soon saw the benefits 
inherent in the sizeable force of thirty triremes he had been able to gain in the north, as 
well as the numerous allies he had won for the Athenian cause.  Consequently, 
Timotheus was accepted back into favor (Diod. 15.47.3).  From Pseudo-Demosthenes 
we learn that Iphicrates and his ally Callistratus had led the prosecution of Timotheus 
(49.9).  The favor that Timotheus‟ efforts would eventually gain him in Athens was 
evidently foreseen by Iphicrates who preempted it with a trial.  That Timotheus had 
made such diplomatic gains in Thrace probably intensified Iphicrates‟ desire to 
humble his rival. 
 Timotheus would later return the favor.  He brought a charge of ξενία against 
Iphicrates and pledged in the ecclesia to prosecute it with all his might (Dem. 49.66).
83
  
This was probably based on Iphicrates‟ extensive ties to Cotys and perhaps also to 
Amyntas.
84
  We do not know the date of this charge and scholars variously place it 
between 370/69 and 362.
85
  Timotheus had been chosen to replace Iphicrates around 
364 upon the latter‟s failure to take Amphipolis, and perhaps the charge played a part 
in Timotheus‟ attempt to secure his own position in the north.  A γραφὴ ξενίας 
would also be appropriate after Iphicrates had aided Cotys against Athens around 362.  
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Alternatively, if an earlier date is assumed, it may be connected to Iphicrates‟ adoption 
by Amyntas or his marriage to a Thracian princess.  The elder Seneca implies that 
Iphicrates had been chastised because of this marriage (contr. 6.5).  In any case, the 
nature of such a charge implies that Iphicrates was too intertwined with foreigners, a 
fact that Timotheus attempted to exploit.  This is reminiscent of Plato Comicus‟ 
slander directed at Dieitrephes (μόγις Ἀττικόν, F 31 K-A), and similar accusations 
were often made against Athenian Thracophiles.
86
  In the end the prosecution was 
never pursued and the two reconciled through a marriage alliance.  Timotheus gave his 
daughter to Menestheus, the son of Iphicrates and his Thracian wife ([Dem.] 49.66).
87
           
 As a final note on Iphcrates‟ ambition, let us consider what Demosthenes tells 
us about the falling out with Cotys (23.129-132).  In this speech, Against Aristocrates, 
Iphicrates is employed as a rhetorical device to emphasize the much worse behavior of 
his successor Charidemus.  As such, Demosthenes had no inherent interest in 
impugning Iphicrates through rhetorical exaggeration, let alone falsehoods.
88
  As 
outlined above, Iphicrates lost Cotys‟ favor after he refused to attack Athenian 
possessions.  Cotys had come to expect the complete loyalty of Iphicrates after the 
latter had fought a naval battle against Athenian forces.  When Iphicrates refused to 
take the offensive, Cotys reduced him to such dire straits (τοῦτο . . . ἀπορίας) that he 
left the royal court and withdrew to Antissa and Drys.  Scholarship has largely 
concluded, following Rehdantz, that while Iphicrates was willing to defend his patron 
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against Athenian attack, he was unwilling to take the offensive against Athenian 
possessions.  He thus followed a shrewd but delicate policy whereby he tried to serve 
Cotys while at the same time keeping open the possibility of some day returning to 
Athens.
89
  
 Demosthenes tells us that Iphicrates elected to serve Cotys in spite of the 
surpassing honors he had earlier received from the Athenians.  Though he had a 
bronze statue, free meals in the Prytaneum, and other conspicuous distinctions, he 
nonetheless dared to fight for Cotys against the city which had so honored him.  Could 
it be that Iphicrates acted in such a way because he expected even greater honors from 
Cotys?  He had already received Cotys‟ daughter in marriage, estates in Thrace, and 
certainly other material benefits for his prior service for the Odrysians.  After the naval 
battle, Cotys felt that he was secure (βεβαίως . . . σῶς) and began to take Iphicrates‟ 
services for granted.  Consequently, he no longer took pains to reward him (οὐχ 
ὅπως ἀποδώσει χάριν ἐσπούδασεν αὐτ῵).  Once the benefits had dried up, 
Iphicrates refused to aid Cotys any further against Athens.  In reaction to Iphicrates‟ 
new tack, Cotys reduced Iphicrates to desperation and became “negligent of his safety 
(ὀλιγωροῦνθ’ . . . τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας).”  Iphcrates‟ felt a sufficient threat of 
harm so as to despair of remaining at court.  It seems that Cotys fully expected 
Iphicrates to attack Athenian interests in the north and was enraged when he failed to 
do so.  It is odd that the Odrysian king seems to have had no notion of Iphicrates‟ 
supposedly delicate strategy of playing both sides.   
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 Iphicrates‟ own reasoning, at least according to Demosthenes‟ account, was 
that he could not well (καλῶς) return to Athens since he had slighted his home city in 
favor of a barbarous Thracian.  This does not evince a subtle policy whereby Athenian 
favor could have been maintained.  That he was able to return to Athens years later, 
probably once the Social War had broken out, bespeaks Iphicrates‟ sheer 
indispensability as a commander more than a carefully crafted scheme to remain in 
Athens‟ good graces.  It is plausible that Iphicrates threw all his cards in with Cotys as 
the source of the greatest rewards, only to be disappointed when the lavish benefits 
dried up.  In this context, perhaps the ἀπορία to which Iphicrates had been reduced 
signifies material poverty and a diminution of prestige at the Odrysian court as a 
consequence of Cotys‟ new attitude.  This would provide a neat contrast with 
Demosthenes‟ earlier description of the surpassing benefits the Athenians had 
bestowed on their commander.  It would also provide an additional motive underlying 
Iphicrates‟ retreat to his own strongholds.  
    
Iphicrates’ Style of Warfare 
Although Iphicrates has often been credited with making peltasts a prominent 
feature of Greek armies, he was not the first to realize the usefulness of light-armed 
Thracian troops and exploit them to great effect, as Best conclusively shows.
90
  The 
light infantry tactics of the Thracians certainly had a profound and lasting effect on 
Greek military practice, but peltasts had been used by the Athenians at Pylos in 425, 
by the Cyreans in 401, and during many other engagements before their famous 
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exploits during the Corinthian War.  This is not to discount Iphicrates‟ military talent.  
His victory over the Spartans at Lechaeum was a tour de force.  Although only peltasts 
were involved in the actual fighting as described by Xenophon, Callias did marshal the 
hoplites during the battle and advanced toward the Spartans once they had already 
been badly thrashed by Iphicrates‟ men.  It was this hoplite threat that finally caused 
the Spartans to withdraw (Hell. 4.5.14-17).  Again, coordination between hoplites and 
peltasts had been utilized by Xenophon and Seuthes a decade earlier.  The singular 
achievement of Iphicrates at Corinth seems to have been his use of strict discipline and 
constant drill, made possible by such an extended time in the field as financed by the 
Persians.
91
  
Iphicrates‟ skill as a commander and as an enforcer of discipline, as well as his 
prodigious resourcefulness, made him a valuable addition to the Odrysian court and 
the perfect man to make the best use of Thracian troops who were likely 
unaccustomed to such rigorous drill and maneuver.  Whether or not he had 
connections with Thrace prior to his command of τὸ ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ, he did 
demonstrate a penchant for Thracian-style warfare, including more than the use of 
peltasts.  Iphicrates was adept at plundering raids.  He probably began raiding enemy 
territory while part of Conon‟s expedition after Cnidus.  Beginning in the Hellespont, 
Conon and Pharnabazus laid waste to Spartan possessions near Sestus and Abydos and 
then ravaged Spartan territory itself, doing as much damage as possible (ἐκακούργει 
ὅ τι ἐδύνατο, Xen. Hell. 4.8.6-11).  While stationed at Corinth, Iphicrates led many 
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raids against the adjacent territories, attacking Phlius and plundering (λεηλατῶν) its 
territory (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15).  He also attacked Arcadia, assaulting walled towns and 
seizing plunder (ἐλεηλάτουν).  The Arcadian hoplites did nothing to prevent this 
since they were terrified of the peltasts (Xen. Hell. 4.4.16).   
Raiding was a particularly Thracian form of warfare.  It was the preferred 
method of attack for the Dioi of Dieitrephes (Thuc. 7. 29-30).
92
  Strabo says that the 
peoples inhabiting the Thracian lands of the Balkans are of all nations the most 
steeped in brigandage (λῃστρικώτατα ἔθνη, 7.5).  Seuthes told Xenophon that his 
mode of living consisted largely in raiding Medocus‟ territory (καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ ζῶ 
τούτους ἔχων, λῃζόμενος τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ πατρῴαν χώραν, An. 7.2.34).  
Isocrates, in the Panegyricus, suggests that peltasts could threaten to seize cities just 
as pirates (καταποντισταὶ) would take over the sea, implicitly equating peltasts with 
pirates (4.115).  Thrace, therefore, would be a natural haven for a commander prone to 
such a style of warfare. 
Iphicrates also demonstrated on several occasions an ability to attack under 
cover of darkness and to make effective use of trickery and ambush.  At Phlius he 
ambushed the men of the city when they came out to defend themselves, and killed a 
great many of them (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15).  In the Hellespont he slaughtered Anaxibius 
along with hundreds of his soldiers after springing a trap (Xen. Hell. 4.8.35-39).  
Polyaenus‟ enumeration of Iphicrates‟ stratagems includes many instances of trickery, 
ambush and night operations (3.9).  Night maneuvers, even over rough terrain, were a 
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specialty of the Dioi (Thuc. 7.29-30), and perhaps also the Thracians under 
Thrasybulus.
93
  Xenophon and Seuthes had difficulty with the Thracian mountain 
tribes who attacked them during the night (An. 7.4).  The similarity of the speed, 
mobility, and trickery inherent in Thracian warfare to the maxims prescribed by 
guerilla leaders such as Mao has been noted by Best.
94
 
 Diodorus (15.44) and Nepos (Iph. 1) detail Iphicrates‟ supposed military 
reforms by which he radically modified the standard Greek infantry soldier.  Both 
authors agree that the large and unwieldy hoplite shield, the aspis, was replaced by the 
smaller Thracian-style pelte.  Allegedly because of the adoption of the pelte, these 
soldiers became known as peltasts.  Iphicrates increased the size of the spear, 
Diodorus says by half, while Nepos says the length was doubled.  Also, the sword was 
lengthened to up to twice its original size.  The soldiers were all given boots that were 
light and easy to untie, aptly dubbed ἰφικρατίδαι.  Finally, Nepos provides the detail 
that the standard mail or brass armor was replaced by a lighter linen cuirass.  All of 
these reforms were designed to make the infantryman more maneuverable and agile, 
much like traditional Thracian soldiers.  Diodorus places these reforms after 
Iphicrates‟ experiences in Egypt in the early 370‟s. 
 Best dismisses the reforms as spurious.
95
  For a long time, the standard 
interpretation of these passages was that this new “Iphicratid” infantryman, a sort of 
hybrid soldier, became a staple throughout the fourth century and was the key military 
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development of the time.
96
  The problem with this line of argument is that there is no 
evidence in our sources for such an infantryman in the Classical period.
97
  Also, 
Diodorus and Nepos seem to imply that these reforms introduced peltasts to Greek 
warfare, but peltasts had been used by the Greeks for decades by this point.  
Additionally, the reforms in question seem to point to a modification of hoplite 
soldiers with sturdy thrusting spears rather than a creation of new light-armed 
peltasts.
98
  Yet, as Stylianou argues, it is doubtful whether both Nepos and Diodorus 
fabricated this information.  Rather, it would seem that they used Ephorus as a source 
and simply misunderstood the information he provided.  Stylianou concludes that 
Iphicrates probably equipped some of his men in Egypt in this fashion to better 
combat the unwieldy heavy infantry of the Egyptians, and that these reforms were 
only temporarily used in this specific context.
99
 
 While it is true that Diodorus places these reforms within the Egyptian 
campaign and that they applied to heavy-armed hoplite troops rather than peltasts, they 
could have been inspired by Iphicrates‟ experiences with Thracian soldiers.  The most 
effective type of army, especially for combating the tribesmen of Thrace, was a 
combined-arms force of heavy and light infantry and cavalry.  The branch of the Ten 
Thousand accompanying Xenophon fared poorly against their mobile enemy when 
they first arrived in Thrace because they lacked light troops and cavalry.  Yet, when 
they combined forces with Seuthes‟ plentiful peltasts and mounted fighters, they 
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devastated the hostile tribes and forced them to submit to Seuthes‟ authority.  A 
commander as adept as Xenophon was quick to formulate a way to integrate such 
disparate arms, staggering their march through the night to ensure that the faster units 
did not outpace the slower (An. 7.3.37-39).   
Peltasts were effective against heavy infantry unsupported by other arms but 
were vulnerable against a variegated force.  Iphicrates chose to attack the Spartan 
mora at Lechaeum because he saw that the Spartan hoplites were largely unsupported 
by either cavalry or peltasts of their own (Xen. Hell. 14.5.13).  Thus peltasts alone 
were able to cut down the more encumbered Spartans.  Callias, however, did draw up 
the Athenian hoplites in case they were needed in the battle.  The final blow was 
struck when the Athenian hoplite phalanx began to advance against the Spartans.  The 
Spartans attempted to chase down Iphicrates‟ troops with what horsemen they did 
have, but the horsemen never drove home their pursuit as they attempted to maintain a 
continuous front with the hoplites (Xen. Hell. 4.5.16).  In this way, the Spartans failed 
to use their cavalry support to its full potential.   
Some more or less effective measures were devised by the Spartans to combat 
a light-armed enemy.  Xenophon says that Iphicrates‟ peltasts were initially terrified of 
the Spartans because on one occasion, the younger and more agile of the Spartan 
hoplites had managed to capture some retreating peltasts even over a long distance 
(Hell. 4.4.16).
100
  This tactic had already been employed by Brasidas in 423 against 
lightly armed Illyrians (Thuc. 4.125).  It was indeed attempted by the Spartan mora 
against Iphicrates‟ peltasts at Lechaeum when the polemarch ordered the men in the 
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age classes of 25-30 (τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ’ ἥβης) to run out in pursuit of the 
enemy.  This time, however, they were unsuccessful, primarily because the peltasts 
exploited the gaps formed during the pursuit and cut down many men (Hell.4.5.16).  It 
would appear that Iphicrates learned from his earlier experience of this new Spartan 
tactic and found a way to turn it his own advantage.
101
   
That his peltasts worked in conjunction with hoplites and that he noticed the 
Spartans were unprotected by faster troops implies Iphicrates well understood the 
importance of diversity of arms.  He likened an army to a human body, with the 
phalanx as the breast, light-armed troops as the hands, and the cavalry as the feet 
(Polyaen. 3.9.22).  During his first stay in Thrace in the service of Seuthes and Cotys, 
he probably developed such ideas further, much as Xenophon had a decade and a half 
earlier.   It would also seem that Iphicrates grasped the potential of having more 
heavily armed soldiers able to execute speedy maneuvers as the Spartans did at 
Lechaeum, however unsuccessfully.  Polyaenus tells us that Iphicrates never allowed 
his troops to break formation during a pursuit, which suggests that he also learned 
from the Spartans‟ mistakes (3.9.2).  Perhaps his reforms, if they did take place in 
Egypt, were based on a combination of his prior experiences.  If he was leading 
primarily hoplites in Egypt, it would have been difficult to change their way of 
fighting completely, which would have resulted from a conversion to proper peltasts.  
Also, a force consisting solely of peltasts could be left vulnerable if unsupported by 
heavier arms, as Xenophon‟s mountain enemies found out.  Could, then, Iphicrates‟ 
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reforms have been an experiment in creating an ideally versatile soldier, capable of 
fighting in a dense phalanx formation with a long thrusting spear while light enough to 
harass a less mobile enemy with relative ease?  Such a soldier would also be able to 
chase after a lightly-armed foe, as the Spartans had attempted, and cut him down with 
a long slashing sword.   
We will never know why this new type of soldier is absent from our sources.
102
  
Such a novel fighting style could probably only be developed and maintained during 
continuous military service over a long period, which was the case in Egypt.  This is in 
line with Pritchett‟s explanation as to why Iphicrates‟ success at Lechaeum was not 
repeated until the professional war machine of Philip and Alexander.
103
  Once back in 
the service of Athens, Iphicrates probably had to rely on the traditional citizen-hoplite 
supplemented by specialized foreign troops.  We are not told what types of troops he 
had at his disposal while in the service of Cotys, but we can speculate that the 
impressive wealth of the Odrysians enabled continuous military exercise and perhaps 
similar experimentation.  In any case, we should accept the accounts of Iphicrates‟ 
capacity for invention and creativity presented by Nepos and Diodorus.   
Iphicrates‟ particular talents made him a natural commander of Thracian 
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troops.  The Thracians in turn helped to inspire this most gifted of tacticians to new 
heights of innovation.  More than that, since Iphicrates was unconstrained by the 
Greek hoplite ethos, he was free to innovate in ways others were not.  Thracian tactics 
were disdained by most Greeks as ungentlemanly and base.  As the Spartans would 
pour scorn upon the methods by which they were defeated at Pylos in 425 (Thuc. 
4.40.2), Thucydides would contemptuously report the death of Cleon at the hands of a 
peltast near Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.10.9).  Ferrill argues that Philip might have been 
able to fuse the phalanx with different troop types because the Macedonians were 
largely outside of the Greek hoplite ethos, a notion that has a lot of merit.
104
  Brasidas, 
who seems to have introduced novel tactics for dealing with a light-armed enemy, 
perhaps enjoyed a relatively free hand to innovate because a full 700 of his 1700 
hoplites in Illyria were helots rather than Spartiates (Thuc. 4.80.5).  The 1000 who 
were not helots were probably allied soldiers from Corinth, Sicyon and Phlius.
105
  A 
very few, then, of Brasidas‟ troops would have been proper Spartans, the archetypical 
hoplite soldiers.  By leading a force of foreign mercenaries and by serving in Thrace 
Iphicrates similarly had plenty of leeway to work out his tactics as the situation 
demanded.   
Proximity to Thracians more often than not spurred on military innovation.  
The Greeks dwelling in northern Aegean cities probably adapted Thracian tactics and 
equipment because they had to fight against Thracian enemies and because they could 
readily observe the effectiveness of new styles of fighting.  Clever Spartans like 
Brasidas, when faced with a light-armed barbarian enemy, could improvise new 
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methods to deal with them.  That two of the pioneers of peltast tactics, Demosthenes 
and Iphicrates, were Athenian suggests that the development of light-armed infantry in 
Greece was due as much to Athens‟ close ties to Thrace as it was to the tactical 
ingenuity of particular commanders.     
    
Iphicrates’ Successors in Thrace 
 Nepos concludes his biography of Iphicrates‟ contemporary Timotheus with a 
grim assessment of the Athenian strategia in the following years: “The time of 
Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus was the last age of Athenian generals.  After their 
death, there was no captain from that city worthy of remembrance (Tim. 4.4).”106  
There were, however, several generals who earned considerable notoriety.  But, were 
the careers of Charidemus and Chares really so different from those of their 
predecessors?  Athens was under increasing pressure as its allies revolted in the Social 
War of the 350‟s and as Philip began to consolidate his power over all of Thrace, 
starting in the west with Amphipolis and moving ever eastward until he threatened 
Athens‟ interests on the Hellespont.  In such a climate, the exigencies of generalship in 
the service of a cash-strapped polis might have led to ever more unseemly measures to 
finance expeditions.
107
  Decades earlier, though, even Thrasybulus had resorted to 
financial exactions and plundering, and when Athens was particularly beset by 
financial difficulties in 413, Dieitrephes had unleashed his Thracians on 
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Mycalessus.
108
  There is little to suggest that the commanders active in the north in the 
mid fourth century exceeded earlier leaders by their methods or readiness to derive 
advantage from the chaotic situation in the region.  
Iphicrates‟ immediate successor was Charidemus of Oreus.  As it happens, our 
fullest source for his career is Demosthenes‟ Against Aristocrates, a hostile account to 
say the least.
109
  Charidemus was originally from Euboea, and in the 370‟s he fought 
as a slinger and light infantryman for various states before he was hired by Iphicrates 
as a xenagos for the campaign to Amphipolis from 368-364 (Dem. 23. 148).  As Parke 
suggests, it seems likely that Charidemus left the service of Athens to work for the 
Thracians after Iphicrates had been replaced at Amphipolis by Timotheus.
110
  
Charidemus thus followed the example set by his commander.  Charidemus later 
became connected by marriage to Cotys‟ son Cersobleptes in the same way Iphicrates 
had been to Cotys (Dem. 23. 129).  He seems to have campaigned on behalf of 
Cersobleptes against Athens for a time (Dem. 23. 163-165).  Eventually, though, he 
was granted Athenian citizenship and various other honors, including the title of 
eueregtes, in 357.  These honors were principally due to his role in convincing 
Cersobleptes to cede the Chersonese to Athens.
111
  As Kelly points out, Charidemus 
and Cersobleptes must have rendered valuable services for the Athenians to account 
for so many prestigious honors, a point Demosthenes wished to downplay in his 
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oration.
112
  Later in his career Charidemus remained popular at Athens.  Plutarch says 
that many Athenians desired to have Charidemus made their general after the Battle of 
Chaeronea, but Phocion was chosen instead (Phoc. 16.3).  In 335 Alexander 
demanded that Charidemus be banished from Athens (Arr. 1.10.6).  The general then 
took up service with Darius III, who had him executed in 333 for an ill-advised 
criticism (Diod. 17.30). 
Charidemus was a commander skilled enough to be chosen to accompany 
Iphicrates to Amphipolis.  But it was after the death of Cotys that Charidemus 
revealed the extent of his talent, both military and political.  In 360/59 Cotys was 
murdered and his kingdom was divided among his three sons, Bersiades in the west, 
Medocus in the center, and Cersobleptes in the east.  Demosthenes advocated a policy 
of keeping the Odrysian kingdom divided, thus limiting a potential threat to Athenian 
interests in Thrace (23.103).  But Charidemus took advantage of the confusion and 
division, becoming essentially the court general of Cersobleptes.  Demosthenes relates 
that Charidemus fought on Cersobleptes‟ behalf against the Athenians in the 
Chersonese, and supported Cersobleptes against his two pro-Athenian brothers 
(23.163-168).  It is clear that Charidemus became an important player in Thrace at this 
time, and because of this he was positioned to help or harm Athenian interests to no 
end.  In 357, the Athenians came to an arrangement with all three kings according to 
which Cersobleptes granted Athens the Chersonese through Charidemus‟ influence 
                                                 
112
 Kelly 1990: 103-104.  See also Archibald (1998: 218-222) for Athenian relations with Cotys and 
Cersobleptes, which were not always as dire as Demosthenes contends. 
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(Dem. 23.173).
113
  In 353/2, Cersobleptes urged the Athenians to appoint Charidemus 
as their general in Thrace, as he alone could recover Amphipolis.  Despite 
Demosthenes‟ objections to Charidemus, in 351/0 the Athens sent out Charidemus 
with ten ships, mercenaries, and lots of money (Dem. 3.5).  Demosthenes‟ attempts to 
turn Athens against Charidemus had obviously failed.
114
    
It is remarkable that this lowly light-armed mercenary from Euboea rose to 
such a level of prominence.  After serving with Iphicrates he became a top advisor and 
kinsman of Cersobleptes, and in short order a citizen and prominent general of Athens.  
He died while serving as a military advisor to the Persian king.  He had three sons by 
his Thracian wife who were counted as Athenian citizens and were still present in 
Athens in 330/29 and wealthy enough to pay off their father‟s naval debt (IG ii² 
1627.205-222).
115
  Just like Iphicrates, Charidemus rose from obscurity because of his 
military skill and by making himself an indispensible agent to both Athens and a 
Thracian king.  As for many Athenians, the dynastic quarrels of Thracian rulers 
coupled with Athenian interest in the Thracian littoral provided Charidemus with an 
opportunity to obtain power and influence abroad and in Athens itself.  If Charidemus 
is a unique figure at all, it is because he achieved great success despite his foreign 
birth rather than his opportunism that dictated service for Thrace at one moment and 
service for Athens at another.  
Chares had a long and checkered career as an Athenian commander, with a 
reputation as utterly profligate with little regard for the wishes of the polis.  Yet, as 
                                                 
113
 This treaty was arranged by Chares and is preserved in an inscription: IG ii² 126 = Bengston 1962-
1969: vol. 2, no. 303; Harding 1985: no. 64. 
114
 See Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 86-87; Archibald 1998: 221. 
115
 See Davies 1971: 571-572. 
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many scholars have pointed out, the ancient sources, particularly Isocrates, were 
unduly harsh in their portrayal of Chares.
116
  Chares was consistently popular with the 
demos, elected general numerous times over several decades.
117
  He may have been 
less scrupulous than Isocrates‟ pupil Timotheus, but he was no less so than countless 
other Athenian generals who were treated positively by the sources.  As Moysey 
argues, Isocrates and Chares occupied opposite ends of the political spectrum in the 
mid fourth century, a spectrum that was much narrower than that of the fifth century.  
Isocratean rhetoric is largely responsible for the distorted picture of Chares we have 
inherited.
118
   
In 355, the last year of the Social War, Chares aided the satrap Aratabazus in 
his revolt from the Persian king Artaxerxes, a decision made apparently without any 
instruction from Athens.  This has led many scholars to suggest that Chares was the 
quintessential condottiere.
119
  We are told, however, that Chares joined in the satrap‟s 
revolt because he was desperately in need of money with which to pay his troops.  
Athens‟ did not seem to object to his actions until the Persians complained and 
threatened to bolster Athens‟ rebellious allies (Diod. 16.22).120  Chares‟ sack of Sestus 
two years later, after which he slaughtered the male inhabitants and enslaved the 
women and children, has also been censured by scholars (Diod. 16.34).
121
  Sestus‟ 
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 See Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 77-85; Moysey 1985; 1987; Salmond 1996; Bianco 2002.  
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 Moysey (1985: 225) calls him the “darling of the demos.”   
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 Moysey 1987. 
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 Parke (1974-1991: vol. 2, 77), says that Chares is generally regarded as the condottiere par 
excellence. 
120
 See Pritchett (1974-1991: vol.2,  80) for the suggestion that Athens tacitly approved of Chares‟ 
support of Artabazus until threatened by Persia.  This situation recalls Chabrias‟ service in Egypt, for 
which see below, ch. 6.   
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 Salmond (1996: 45), who largely defends Chares, nevertheless argues that the sack of Sestus reveals 
Chares‟ lack of scruples. 
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fate, however, had been inflicted by Athens on many cities before Chares‟ career.  
There is no indication in the sources that Chares violated any Athenian directives in 
this action.  Despite his service abroad and his seemingly independent and self-
interested campaigns, the Athenians esteemed him enough to select him as one of their 
two generals at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 (Diod. 16.85).   
As with other generals in Thrace, Chares was sure to secure his own interests 
while campaigning in the region.  He is listed by Theopompus as the general who 
opted to go to Sigeum instead of remaining in Athens (FGrHist 115 F 105).  Though 
we are not told when Chares first settled in the northern Troad, Arrian tells us he was 
living there in the mid 330‟s as he came from Sigeum to crown Alexander at Illium 
(An. 1.12.1).  Pritchett thinks that Chares retired to Sigeum only after the Battle of 
Chaeronea, when many prominent Athenians left the city.
122
  The political situation 
after 338 was less than favorable for generals such as Chares who had fought the 
forces of Philip.  And besides, the loss of Athens‟ autonomy in terms of foreign affairs 
meant that there would be a shortage of lucrative campaigns for Athenian soldiers.  
Iphicrates seems to have realized the same after the imposition of the King‟s Peace in 
the 380‟s.  Though we hear nothing more about his life and career after this point, 
Chares seems to have found refuge, and perhaps the prospect of military service, in the 
Thraceward parts of Asia once his position in Athens became untenable.   
Despite Nepos‟ pronouncement, the Athenian generals after Timotheus 
continued to show skill and energy, and in the case of Thrace at least, it was business 
as usual.  Thrace as always was a central concern for Athens, and generals were all too 
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happy to exploit that to their own advantage while making personal inroads among the 
Thracians and the Greek settlements in the vicinity.  It was only after Philip had 
secured his control over all of coastal Thrace and eliminated the ability of the Greek 
poleis to project power over the Aegean that the age of great Athenian campaigns 
abroad came to an end.       
   
Conclusions 
Iphicrates was a man of surpassing talent and overwhelming ambition, which, 
coupled with his diplomatic sense and extensive foreign ties, was often of great benefit 
to Athens.  Yet, he was not always subservient to the wishes of the polis.  His victory 
at Lechaeum, as many of his other campaigns in and around the Corinthia, were 
stunning successes for Athens and its allies against the Spartans.  At the same time, 
this special appointment launched Iphicrates‟ brilliant career and paved the way for 
ever increasing individual honors.  When the Athenians refused to countenance his 
desire to seize the city of Corinth, Iphicrates walked away from his post.  When he had 
achieved copious honors at Athens, such as very few had before him, he remained 
unsatisfied.  It was Thrace that promised ever more opportunities for levels of wealth 
and status that democratic Athens could not provide.  Similarly, Thrace was a proven 
refuge for unsuccessful Athenian generals.  When Iphicrates found himself faced with 
the threat of legal consequences back home, he followed the examples set by 
Thracophiles from Thucydides to Alcibiades, and also of his mentor Conon, in 
refusing to submit to the authorities.     
 Demosthenes says that Thrace provided a level of exousia that allowed 
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unscrupulous men to obtain material enrichment and regal power by the exercise of 
their grandest ambitions.  The life Iphicrates enjoyed at the court of Cotys, complete 
with heroic feasts, rowdy drinking parties, and valuable treasures, indicates that he had 
a penchant for extravagant living as well – the aselgeia and poluteleia that to 
Theopompus characterized Chabrias and others who chose to leave Athens.  Though 
he was offered similar advantages in Thrace, Xenophon spurned Seuthes and his 
enticements and was allowed to live out his exile among his friends the Spartans, on 
his own estates in the Peloponnese.  Iphicrates demonstrated little of Xenophon‟s 
high-mindedness, and instead reveled in the ostentation of the Thracian court.         
 There is every indication that Iphicrates sought military adventure.  As he 
exhibited an innate talent for leadership and innovation, two things which brought him 
power and renown, he also probably sought the camaraderie of life on campaign.  The 
great amount of time he spent with a particular group of soldiers would have led to a 
deep esprit de corps.  The temporary and sporadic nature of traditional Greek armies, 
levied for specific occasions, could not have fostered comradeship among the men in 
the same way.  Aside from special cases such as the Theban Sacred Band, the Greek 
poleis were rarely able to support the continuous military training and lengthy 
campaigns to which Iphicrates had grown accustomed.  He surely enjoyed spending 
time with what amounted to his own personal army, full of soldiers who respected and 
had affection for their commander.  Thus, while Thrace offered the perfect forum for 
honing his military ideas, it also gave Iphicrates access to a world of hardened 
warriors fond of battle, plunder and drink.   
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For many Greeks, the ideal existence was epitomized in sitting by a fire in the 
cold, drinking with one‟s companions.123  The poet Alcaeus speaks of cold rain and 
frozen rivers in the dead of winter, but life is good because there is wine and a warm 
blaze (F 338 Lobel and Page).  One can imagine Iphicrates with his Thracian troops, 
rugged soldiers from a frozen country, jovially passing the time in such a way, 
warmed by the fires of their military camp.  Such cultural factors, in addition to the 
ample material and political benefits, possibly lay in part behind the attraction 
Iphicrates felt for Thrace. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WHY THRACE?  CONTROL CASES 
 
Introduction 
 The preceding chapters have outlined the sorts of personal connections which 
lay behind the relationship between Athens and Thrace.  From the mid sixth to the mid 
fourth century, many prominent Athenian individuals and families found Thrace to be 
a useful alternative to Athens, a source of advancement both materially and politically.  
Throughout, the material, cultural and social factors which were at play have been 
highlighted, including the resources available in the north, the influence that could be 
attained abroad and at Athens, and the particular appeal of life on the rugged margins 
of the Greek world.  This all beckons the question: How was Thrace unique in the eyes 
of Athenians?  Athenians had ties in many places abroad, even outside of the Greek 
world.  Throughout the ancient world foreign relationships were cultivated and 
exploited, by states and individuals alike, in order to achieve political and material 
advantage.  The same can be said for all historical epochs, across every society.  
Thrace, however, offered distinct advantages and had a cultural and social appeal few 
other places could match.  To highlight this, this chapter will examine the experiences 
of several prominent Athenians who spent much of their careers abroad in places other 
than Thrace.  
 In the end, Thrace proved to be one of the very few places within reach of the 
Athenians that promised at once unmatched resources and relatively weak local 
governance.  Whereas Persia and Egypt could offer wealth and prestige, they could not 
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guarantee the level of autonomy a clever Athenian could enjoy in the north Aegean 
among scattered Thracian tribes and often feuding Thracian dynasts.  To account for 
why every Athenian eager for power or refuge did not turn to Thrace, we ought to 
consider a combination of factors: the geo-political realities in the Aegean at particular 
periods; rivalries among the elite for influence in Thrace; and perhaps a level of 
personal prejudice.  For example, the proximity of Thrace to Athens briefly ceased to 
ensure easy access to the north after the Battle of Aegospotami left the Spartans as 
masters of the Aegean.  During Themistocles‟ exile in Persia, his rival Cimon was 
active in Thrace; and likewise, as Chabrias was in Egypt, his longtime rival Iphicrates 
was influential at the Odrysian court.  Finally, Sparta offered a different sort of 
alternative to Athens which evidently had more appeal to a man such as Xenophon 
than did Thrace.  Though, again, Xenophon may have been effectively prevented from 
carving out his own niche in Aegean Thrace by the strong Spartan presence in the 
region in 399.    
For the Athenians, Thrace was a tantalizing frontier in a way that Sparta, 
Persia, and Egypt were not.  Until Philip of Macedon fixed his gaze on the Aegean 
littoral in the late 350‟s and consolidated his power over the region by the end of the 
340‟s, for over two centuries members of the Athenian elite had derived advantage 
from a vast and open territory lying on the fringe of the Greek world.   The Thracian 
experience could hardly be duplicated elsewhere.  
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Hippias and Themistocles 
 For the late Archaic and early Classical periods, no Athenian exiles stand out 
quite like Hippias and Themistocles.  Respectively a tyrant and savior of the freshly 
minted democracy, both turned to Persia when their fortunes at Athens waned: Hippias 
in a calculated attempt at regaining mastery of Athens; Themistocles as an accused 
traitor seeking asylum and recognizing the court of the King as the ideal forum in 
which to put his considerable talents to good use.  While both turned to Persia rather 
than Thrace at the end of their careers, they each had strong ties to Thrace stretching 
back a generation.  Why, then, did they not become Thrace-haunters? 
 Hippias‟ father Pisistratus had amassed considerable wealth in Thrace, chiefly 
from the mines of Pangaeum.  While in the north he seems to have enjoyed great 
influence.
1
  A private band of Thracian mercenaries allowed him to seize power for 
the third and final time in Athens after disarming the populace ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
15.2).  Pisistratus might have appreciated the strategic importance of the Chersonese 
and therefore have had a hand in the journey of the elder Miltiades to the region.  
Herodotus is explicit in that following Pisistratus‟ death, Hippias actively 
commissioned the younger Miltiades to take over affairs in the Chersonese (6.38.2).  
Wade-Gery has argued that Miltiades and Hippias eventually had a falling out, 
perhaps due to Miltiades divorcing a relative of Hippias in order to marry the Thracian 
princess Hegesipyle.  It was at this point that Hippias married his daughter to 
Aeantides, the son of Hippocles tyrant of Lampsacus.  As the Philaids were enemies of 
Lampsacus, a city lying on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont, Wade-Gery sees this 
                                                 
1
 See Baba (1990) for Peisistratus‟ activities and influence around Pangaeum and the Thermaic Gulf. 
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marriage alliance as the decisive break between Hippias and Miltiades.
2
  Thucydides 
tells us that Hippias made the alliance with Lampsacus after the murder of 
Hipparchus.  Fearing his position in Athens, Hippias looked to the tyrant Hippocles 
because of his strong ties to Darius, a potential guarantor of the Athenian tyranny 
(Thuc. 6.59).  Following his expulsion from Athens, Hippias and his family found 
refuge at Sigeum, a city not far from Lampsacus, where Pisistratus had earlier 
established a friendly tyranny (Hdt. 5.94).  It should be noted that Amyntas of 
Macedon offered Hippias Anthemus, located on the Thermaic gulf where Pisistratus 
had been involved, but Hippias chose rather to flee to Asia Minor.
3
          
 Hippias and the Pisistratids, then, had a longstanding connection with the 
Thraceward region and used Thrace to achieve and safeguard their power in Athens.  
Hippias, however, was in the main not interested in Thrace qua Thrace, but rather as a 
conduit to Persia and King Darius.  In the late sixth and early fifth century, the Aegean 
coast of Asia Minor was littered with Persian client tyrannies.  In the histories of 
Herodotus, one of these tyrants, Histiaeus of Miletus, is made to outline how he and 
others like him were dependent upon Persia.  In order to dissuade his fellow Greek 
rulers from betraying the Persians during Darius‟ ill-fated campaign to subdue 
Scythia, Histiaeus stressed that the Greek tyrants enjoy their positions of authority at 
the pleasure of Darius.  Should the Persians be defeated, all of the Greek subject-cities 
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 Wade-Gery 1951: 215-216. 
3
 See Thuc. 2.99 for the Macedonian annexation of this territory, which had been – and still might have 
been at the time of Hippas‟ expulsion – under the control of Edonian Thracians.  For a commentary, see 
Hammond et al. 1972-1988: vol. 1, 435-440.   See also Cole 1975: 42, n. 1. 
 284 
 
would surely throw out the tyrants and opt instead for democracy (Hdt. 4.137).
4
  The 
tyranny in Lampsacus, with which Hippias allied himself, was a client of the Persian 
king in this manner.
5
  After he was expelled from Athens, Hippias fled to his friends at 
Sigeum, and then Lampsacus, and finally to the court of Darius himself (Thuc. 6.59).  
Desirous of regaining his position in Athens, Hippias decided the best course of action 
was to emulate the model of the Greek cities in Asia, that is, to turn to the Persian king 
as his benefactor and rule a Persian-controlled Athens as Darius‟ client.    
It was with this in mind that he acted as a guide for the Persian forces at 
Marathon.  Herodotus claims that the Persians landed in the deme of Marathon in 490 
because it was the part of Attica nearest to Eretria, where they had been engaged 
previously, and because it offered the best ground for cavalry (6.102-103).  On the 
first count, Herodotus is simply wrong as other parts of Attica in fact lie closer to 
Eretria; and regarding the second we must ask why the Persians did not opt for a battle 
in the Thriasian Plain in southwestern Attica, which boasted ground much more 
suitable to the Persians‟ cavalry.  In any case, the cavalry seems not to have been used 
at Marathon, and its intended role is debated by modern scholars.
6
  Lazenby argues 
that Marathon was chosen by Hippias because of his family‟s connection to the deme.  
Pisistratus had landed there and gathered supporters when he took power decades 
earlier (Hdt. 1.62).  As Lazenby contends, Hippias could have hoped to gain Athenian 
supporters in the same way.  The anti-Persian propaganda following this battle and the 
                                                 
4
 For the historical veracity of this episode, see How and Wells 1912: vol.1, 343-344.  Interestingly 
enough, Herodotus presents the younger Miltiades as the chief advocate of betraying the Persians.  The 
Philaids had dominion over the Chersonese independent of the Persians.  
5
 See Frost 1998: 199. 
6
 For an overview, see Shrimpton 1980. 
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Xerxes‟ invasion of 480-479 has obscured the reality that many Athenians, if not 
overtly treacherous, were at least in favor of appeasement with the Persians when 
faced with their impressive invasion force in 490.
7
   
Hippias was useful to the Persians as a means of taking the city, perhaps 
without the need for a battle, as the Persians were central to Hippias‟ goal of becoming 
tyrant once again.  If his friends in Asia enjoyed enviable power at the behest of the 
Great King, why could the same model not apply to Athens?  The Athenian victory at 
Marathon and the total defeat of the Persians a decade later – not to mention the 
resultant stigma forever attached to Medism – all but removed this “Persian option” 
for ambitious Athenians attempting to gain power in their own city.  As tyrant before 
the advent of broadly based democracy, Hippias had enjoyed immense personal power 
and was able to exercise all the prerogatives of the aristocracy, such as cementing 
marriage alliances with fellow aristocrats throughout the Aegean world.  As argued 
throughout this study, it was the constraints imposed upon the elite by the democracy 
that forced aristocrats and generally power-hungry individuals to turn elsewhere, 
chiefly Thrace.  Before democracy, the Philaids ventured to Thrace because the 
Pisistratids were in power in Athens and afforded little room for rival families.  After 
his expulsion, Hippias did not seek an outlet for his ambitions in Thrace because he 
believed the Persians would be able to restore him to power in Athens, where he could 
return to fulfilling his ambitions as he saw fit.  No sixth century Thracian ruler or tribe 
could plausibly offer Hippias a similar reward.        
Like Hippias, Themistocles might have had family connections to Thrace.  It 
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was widely disseminated in antiquity that Themistocles‟ mother was not Athenian.  
Plutarch quotes various sources which claim she was either Thracian or Carian, 
perhaps from Halicarnassus (Them. 1.1-2).  Nepos says she was from Acarnania 
(Them. 1.1).  Bicknell argues, quite plausibly, that the specific origins of 
Themistocles‟ mother can in fact be discerned through a critical examination of these 
passages and the sources upon which they were derived.  “Karia” as her supposed 
place of origin is no more than a corruption of “Kardia,” a city on the Thracian 
Chersonese.  This evidence is coupled with other indicators such as an ostrakon meant 
for Themistocles bearing the name “Xanthias” – an epithet meant to convey the 
stereotype of the red-haired Thracian slave – to suggest that Themistocles was part 
Thracian through his mother.  Bicknell posits that Themistocles‟ father, Neocles, had 
accompanied the elder Miltiades on his expedition to the Chersonese and there met 
Themistocles‟ mother.8  Lewis adds a postscript to Bicknell‟s article, conjecturing that 
Plutarch in remarking that Themistocles‟ mother was married ἐξ ἀγορ᾵ς (Mor. 
753d), was actually transmitting a corruption of ἐξ Ἀγορ᾵ς, implying that she was a 
Thracian from Agora, another city in the Chersonese.
9
  While it is attractive that 
Themistocles had Thracian roots, the fragmentary state of our sources dictates that 
such ideas must remain but scholarly speculation. 
 As is well known, Themistocles was eventually ostracized from Athens in spite 
of his leading role in defeating the Persians in 480-479.  When the Spartan regent 
Pausanias was found to be a pro-Persian traitor, the Spartans presented evidence that 
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9
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Themistocles too had turned to the Persians, working in conjunction with Pausanias.  
Themistocles‟ circuitous flight from the Peloponnese following his branding as a 
traitor demonstrates that few places within the reach of the Athenians and their navy 
could offer him refuge.  He fled first to Corcyra, a state indebted to him for some prior 
service, but the Corcyreans were afraid of incurring the displeasure of Athens and 
Sparta and therefore sent him to the mainland.  Themistocles then went as a suppliant 
to Admetus, king of the Molossians, who offered him protection for a time.  Admetus 
was also beset by Themistocles‟ pursuers, so Themistocles fled by sea.  After narrowly 
avoiding capture by the Athenians at Naxos, he arrived in Ephesus where, aided by his 
contacts, he made his way deep into Persia and eventually to the court of Artaxerxes.
10
  
If his initial intention once accused of treachery had been flight to Persia, the journey 
to Corcyra and other western regions would be difficult to explain.  Clearly Persia, a 
great power centered far from Athens‟ ships, became the only viable option for 
Themistocles after several harrowing escapes from Athenian and Spartan agents in the 
Adriatic and Aegean seas.   
 Themistocles probably arrived in Asia around 465, and after over a year spent 
mastering Persian languages and customs, he took his place at the Persian court in 
463.
11
  At this same time, Cimon was active in restoring Athenian rule over the 
Thracian Chersonese, a territory formerly ruled by his family.  In 466 Cimon had led 
the Greeks to victory over the Persians at the Battle of Eurymedon, which effectively 
eliminated Persian power in the Aegean.  After regaining the Chersonese, Cimon put 
                                                 
10
 For the various ancient accounts of Themistocles‟ flight, see Thuc. 135-138; Diod. 11.54-58; Plut. 
Them. 24-29; Nep. Them. 8-10.  The evidence for Themistocles‟ exile and flight is usefully collected 
and interpreted by Keaveney 2003. 
11
 For this chronology, see Keaveney 2003: 104. 
 288 
 
down a revolt on Thasos and secured for Athens the lucrative mines on the mainland.  
A decade earlier, in 476, he had led an expedition to expel the Persians from Eion on 
the Strymon River, after which he subdued the local Thracians who had supported the 
Persians.  Cimon then encouraged the Athenians to settle the area, a precursor the 
important Athenian colony of Amphipolis.
12
  Through Cimon‟s campaigns, the 
Athenians became masters of the Aegean, including much of coastal Thrace, from 
Thasos and the Strymon to the Chersonese.  This was all achieved at the expense of 
Persia. 
 There is considerable evidence that Cimon was a personal enemy of 
Themistocles.  Plutarch says that the Spartans advocated Cimon‟s advancement in 
Athens as a pro-Spartan political counterweight to Themistocles (Them. 20.4; Cim. 
10.7, 16.2).
13
  The Philaid family may have been at odds with Themistocles for some 
time.  Gruen argues that while most scholars suggest Miltiades and Themistocles were 
allies because of their supposedly complementary anti-Persian policies, the two were 
rivals.  A fragment of Stesimbrotus, preserved by Plutarch (Them. 4.3), says that 
Miltiades publically opposed Themistocles‟ famous naval policy whereby the latter 
turned Athens into a naval power at the expense of the hoplite arm of the military.  In 
493/2, the very year in which Themistocles was archon and began turning his attention 
to fortifying the Piraeus, Miltiades returned from the Chersonese.  It was then that the 
two men clashed in the political arena.
14
  Scholars are mistaken in asserting that the 
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 For Cimon‟s activities in Thrace, see Meiggs 1972: 79-82; Isaac 1986: 19-21, 177.  See also above, 
ch. 2.  
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 See Podlecki 1975: 34-35. 
14
 It should be noted that if Bicknell‟s suggestion (1982: 168-171) that Themistocles‟ father Neocles 
accompanied the elder Miltiades to the Chersonese is correct, we would have to understand some sort of 
 289 
 
role these men had in fighting the Persians signaled a strong alliance.  As Gruen 
correctly states, in the years following the expulsion of the Pisistratids, politics was 
played out in the sphere of individual and family rivalries rather than between any 
coherent factions or ideological groups.
15
  It would seem that the Philaid family saw 
Themistocles as a threat to their own power, and vice versa.  What began with 
Miltiades continued under Cimon.  In addition to the Athenians‟ naval reach, the 
strong influence of Cimon in the Thraceward region would have been a formidable 
barrier to Themistocles becoming a player in Thrace, despite any family connection of 
his own he might have had.               
The final years of Themistocles‟ career are paradigmatic of what power Greeks 
could achieve within the Persian Empire.  Once he had arrived in Asia, he sent a letter 
to the king in advance outlining his prior services to the Persians, namely the secret 
messages he conveyed to Xerxes before and after the Battle of Salamis.  In this way, 
he hoped to gain admittance to the Persian court.
16
  Ever the shrewd manipulator, 
Themistocles had hedged his bets at Salamis by offering the Persians advice which in 
the advent of a Persian victory could have ingratiated him with Xerxes.  As it turned 
out, these messages were seen as part of a cunning stratagem that ensured the Greeks‟ 
triumph.  In Asia Themistocles presented himself as having been a friend to Persia all 
along.
17
  Before taking his place at the Persian court, Themistocles spent a year 
                                                                                                                                            
falling out between the family of Themistocles and the Philaids before the late 490‟s.  Such a change in 
political alliance among men competing for a leading position in post-Pisistratid Athens is entirely 
plausible. 
15
 Gruen 1970. 
16
 For Themistocles‟ flight, see the slightly varying accounts in Thuc. 1.135-138; Plut. Them. 23-26; 
Diod. 11.56; Nep. Them. 8.   
17
 See Strauss (2004: 112-117) for a discussion of these messages and the notion that Themistocles had 
seriously contemplated joining the Persians should the affair at Salamis have gone poorly. 
 290 
 
learning all he could about Persian customs and language in order to adopt them 
himself.  He then attained a position at the court greater than any Greek had before 
him, partly because of his reputation, and also because of a zeal for conquering Greece 
for the Persian king Artaxerxes.  As a reward for his services, Artaxerxes granted 
Themistocles power over Magnesia near the Meander, Lampsacus, and Myus, all 
materially valuable in their own ways (Thuc. 1.135-138).  Though he had attained rich 
territory over which to rule, he would have done so only at the pleasure of the Persian 
king, always remaining a vassal as Histiaeus had been in Miletus and Hippias would 
have been in Athens.  The autonomy ambitious Athenians could attain in Thrace was 
largely out of Themistocles‟ grasp.   
Themistocles, however, did manage to have cult honors paid to his 
descendents in Lampsacus similar to those given the elder Miltiades in the 
Chersonese.
18
  Lampsacus is an interesting case in that it may have already been part 
of the Delian League when Themistocles received it from Artaxerxes.  As Frost 
argues, a tyrannical government did not necessarily preclude a state from membership 
in the league.
19
  Yet, it is difficult to conceive of a tyranny of Themistocles over a 
member state of the league lying near the Hellespont and Athenian-controlled Thrace.  
In the end, we do not know to what extent Themistocles actively governed the city.  
Perhaps he merely derived revenue from it, or perhaps Artaxerxes offered the city 
merely as a token gift, as Gomme has argued.
20
  As the festival held at Lampsacus in 
honor of Themistocles‟ descendants would imply, maybe Themistocles had more 
                                                 
18
 For these cult practices as part of a Thracian, as opposed to Greek, νόμος, see above, ch. 2.    
19
 Frost 1998: 196-199. 
20
 Gomme at al. 1945-1981: vol. 1, 292.  Meiggs (1972: 53-54) shows that the connection between 
Themistocles and Lampsacus is supported by strong evidence and should not be denied.  
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influence in the Thraceward than is readily apparent.  Whatever the case may be, 
during the final years of his checkered career, Themistocles found the Persian court, 
not Thrace, to provide the greatest avenue for advancement, though he only turned to 
Persia as a last resort. 
                 
Xenophon 
 With the notable exception of Thucydides, Xenophon is unique in that he was 
both a player in Thrace and one of our chief sources for the region, especially for life 
at the court of a Thracian ruler.  Though Thucydides had property and family 
connections in the north, he tells us little about them.  Xenophon, on the other hand, in 
his Anabasis gives us a detailed firsthand narrative of the campaigns in the areas of 
Thrace to the south of the Black Sea and in the vicinity of Byzantium in which he took 
part.  He also provides an invaluable glimpse into the social life of the Thracian 
nobility by detailing his relationship with Seuthes II, including a vivid account of a 
banquet attended by the most important figures in the area.  Why, then, is Xenophon 
included in this chapter on so-called control cases?  Though he was offered valuable 
estates, a royal marriage, and other privileges by Seuthes in 399, he chose rather to 
enter the service of the Spartans.  After fighting with the Spartans in Asia Minor for 
several years, Xenophon eventually returned to mainland Greece with Agesilaus in 
394 where by every indication he remained.  Xenophon fits the profile of the other 
figures covered in this study.  He was an aristocrat alienated by the Athenian political 
system, most keenly in the climate following the overthrow of the Thirty in 403.  A 
military man, he was no stranger to thrilling and dangerous adventure, and his talent 
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for tactical innovation was not inconsiderable.  He was exiled from Athens, most 
likely because of friendship with Sparta on whose side he may have fought against 
Athens at the Battle of Coronea in 394.  Thus, while Xenophon and plenty of motive 
and opportunity, so to speak, in the end he chose to spurn Seuthes and all that Thrace 
had to offer.  
 Once he arrived in Thrace along with the Ten Thousand, Xenophon had 
aspirations to be an oikist, much like the Philaids and Hagnon before him.  He 
enumerates the many fine qualities of Calpe Harbor, located in “the part of Thrace in 
Asia,” that is, on the southern shore of the Black Sea (An. 5.6.15-16; 6.4.1-8).21  In 
Xenophon‟s view the foundation of a city in this place would have been advantageous, 
especially because of the large numbers of battle-hardened hoplites, peltasts, archers, 
slingers, and horsemen he had at his disposal, and because of the multitude of those 
peoples living in the vicinity, predominantly non-Greeks.  He was careful to state that 
this foundation would add territory and power to Greece as a whole.  The majority of 
the troops were against such a foundation, and because Xenophon performed 
sacrifices on his own initiative – without first consulting the others – to inquire 
whether such a foundation should be undertaken, many thought he was conspiring to 
found a city for his own prestige and glory.
22
  Even through Xenophon‟s biased 
account it is clear is that there were a substantial number of troops among the Ten 
Thousand who mistrusted Xenophon‟s motives.  Raw personal ambition may have 
been a significant factor in his desire to found a colony.   
A major criticism leveled against Xenophon was that the site of Calpe was 
                                                 
21
 For the situation of Calpe, see Stronk 1995: 62-64. 
22
 For the impropriety of such a unilateral sacrifice, see Parker 2004: 152. 
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located in the midst of barbarians (5.6.25).  Xenophon himself says that there were no 
Greek settlements in the immediate area, but only large numbers of Bithynians who 
terribly mistreated (δεινὰ ὑβρίζειν) any Greeks unfortunate enough to wind up on 
their shores (6.4.2).  Yet, it seems as though Xenophon wanted to dominate the local 
population inhabiting the nearby villages (κῶμαι . . . πολλαὶ καὶ οἰκούμεναι) by 
means of the forces he would have settled at Calpe (6.4.6).  Further indication of his 
desire to settle amongst and have influence over barbarians is given by the envoys 
repeatedly sent by the neighboring hostile peoples, inquiring how they might become 
friends of Xenophon since they thought he was founding a city (6.6.4).  Clearly for 
Xenophon the prospect of living among warlike non-Greeks was no deterrent.   
Xenophon describes in detail how he came to the rescue of the Arcadian 
contingent which had suffered greatly while trying to plunder the villages in the 
vicinity of Calpe.  The lightly armed Bithynians, in defense of their homes, 
slaughtered great numbers of Arcadian hoplites who were unable to defend themselves 
because of their unwieldy armament.  As the Arcadians huddled together on a hilltop 
to spend the night, the Bithynians called out to each other in the dark and skillfully 
mustered greater forces.  The next day many Greeks were again cut down.  As 
Xenophon heard of the plight of the Arcadians, he marched his own contingent to their 
position by night, shrewdly placing his light troops on the flanks and upon the heights 
to provide cover, while setting much of the area ablaze to give the impression of a 
huge army.  The plan worked as by daybreak the Bithynians had all fled (An. 6.3).  
Where the Arcadian hoplites failed, Xenophon and his competent use of a combined-
arms force succeeded.  Implicitly, Xenophon tells us that he was not only willing to 
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found a settlement in barbarian lands, but was also the perfect leader for the job.
23
            
Denied the honor of founding a city, Xenophon also never came to possess the 
Thracian estates offered by Seuthes – namely Bisanthe, Ganos, and Neonteichos (An. 
7.2.38; 7.5.8), all located on the northern shore of the Propontis and two of which 
were previously held by Alcibiades.  Various reasons are given for this, especially the 
advice of Xenophon‟s chief rival in Thrace, Heraclides of Maronea, to Seuthes that 
such valuable territory should not be given to a man with an army (An. 7.5.8).  At one 
point Xenophon indicates that he had hoped to secure from Seuthes a fair place of 
refuge (ἀποστροφή) for himself and his children, should he ever have any (An. 
7.6.34).  At the same time, he continued to insist that he wished to sail home to Athens 
(An. 7.1.4; 7.1.38-40; 7.7.57).  Later on, Seuthes offered these estates once again, but 
Xenophon declined, saying that the god told him to leave with the army and that it 
would not be possible for him to stay in Thrace (An. 7.6.43; 7.7.51-52).   
The final two books of the Anabasis show that the Spartans were the 
undisputed masters of Greece in 399, firmly in control of the Hellespont and the 
neighborhood of Byzantium.  Rather than sailing straight for home after his service in 
Thrace, Xenophon continued with the remnants of the Ten Thousand in order to hand 
them over to the Spartan Thibron in Asia (An. 7.7.57).  In effect, then, he had already 
entered Spartan service in 399, where he continued for the next several years.  
Alcibiades was forced off his Thracian estates once the Spartans had gained mastery 
                                                 
23
 Prior to the march of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon was familiar with Thracian tactics.  He probably 
fought on the side of the Thirty against Thrasybulus and his Thracian supporters in 404-403 (Anderson 
1974: 47-48); he also seems to have taken part in Thrasyllus‟ expedition to Asia in 409 (Stronk 1995: 
4), which included a sizeable contingent of peltasts.  Thrasyllus eventually joined his force to that of 
Alcibiades in the Hellespont, where the two proceeded to attack Persia‟s interests in the region.    
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of the Aegean following Aegospotami.  The new rulers of Greece would not have 
tolerated such a man having his own little niche in what they considered to be their 
sphere of influence.  The Spartan Anaxibius‟ mistrust of the Ten Thousand in the 
territory of Byzantium and desire to disperse them makes this abundantly clear.
24
  
Xenophon would have risked incurring Spartan displeasure if he had tried to forge an 
autonomous existence in Thrace.   
It has recently been suggested that the entirety of Anabasis 7 is an attempt by 
Xenophon to exonerate himself from the suspicion that he was motivated by bribes 
from Seuthes.
25
  Xenophon was already mistrusted by many of his troops because of 
hints that he wanted them to settle Calpe.  Several speeches are given to combat such 
notions, and Xenophon speaks to the troops many more times once in Seuthes‟ service 
to address allegations that he was pursuing his own advancement ahead of the needs of 
the men.  Xenophon is at pains to represent himself as motivated by the ideals of 
reciprocity and guest-friendship, rather than material gain.
26
  Here we can see some of 
the potential pitfalls of aristocratic connections to Thracian rulers.  Xenophon was 
indeed offered many good things from Seuthes, including territory, a royal marriage, 
and even to become a brother to Seuthes, a table companion, and an equal partner in 
all things acquired.
27
  Yet this threatened to arouse the jealousy of the other Greeks 
and put Xenophon‟s safety among the men in jeopardy.  The appeal of Thrace for the 
Athenian elite was that it offered room to exercise one‟s ambitions without the checks 
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 For the danger the Ten Thousand posed to Spartan interests at Byzantium, see Stronk 1995: 146. 
25
 Azoulay 2004. 
26
 Azoulay 2004: 300. 
27
 An. 7.2.38: “ἀδελφούς . . . καὶ ἐνδιφρίους καὶ κοινωνοὺς ἁπάντων ὦν ἅν δυνώμεθα 
κτ᾵σθαι.”  
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inherent in the polis.  Xenophon, however, was leading a large group of Greek 
soldiers, complete with rivals for the overall command.  Throughout the long retreat 
from Cunaxa, the army functioned largely as a true community of citizens, with 
participatory government being the norm.
28
  Xenophon was, after all, elected to his 
position by popular vote, and many of the decisions he made as to what the army 
should do next were put to a vote of the soldiers.  He had to proceed very cautiously in 
accepting anything from Seuthes while this Greek army was still in the area.   
Xenophon is careful to contrast his own uprightness and honesty with the 
unreliability and treachery of Seuthes and the Thracians.
29
  His damning portrayal of 
the scheming Heraclides of Maronea establishes a paradigm of the disloyal Greek 
eager to secure his position at a barbarian court.  Mitchell claims that Xenophon ran 
into trouble because he misunderstood the Thracian custom of gift-exchange, 
expecting the sort of reciprocity that would have been the norm among the Greeks.
30
 
Some scholars go further, arguing that Thracian gift-exchange, whereby the more 
powerful receives gifts from his subjects, is the inverse of the practice as it normally 
exists among other cultures.
31
  In Xenophon‟s account, however, Seuthes did in fact 
offer rewards to Xenophon and the other Greeks in exchange for their services, 
implying reciprocity.  It was the failure to follow through with these promises that 
Xenophon denounces.
32
  In many passages, most notably throughout his Agesilaus, 
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 See Nussbaum 1967 for the Ten Thousand as a polis. 
29
 See especially Xenophon‟s long speech covering much of An. 7.7. 
30
 Mitchell 1997: 141. 
31
 See, for example, Testard and Brunaux 2004. 
32
 Hirsch (1985: 33-38), in an attempt to show that Xenophon had favorable attitudes toward the 
barbarians, argues that the Greeks are shown throughout to be even more treacherous than non-Greeks, 
and that pistis was a much stronger value for the Persians and others than for the Greeks.  His 
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Xenophon praises the patriotic and selfless loyalty of his friend Agesilaus.  It was this 
Spartan King, rather than Seuthes, who embodied the ideals which Xenophon held 
dear.                
Xenophon seems to have been put off by how savage and cruel the Thracians 
could be.  Seuthes himself was ruthless in subduing the peoples living in his territory.  
While he was working in conjunction with the Ten Thousand, Seuthes burned the 
local villages completely (παντελῶς), leaving not a single house intact.  He did this 
in order to inspire fear in everyone of the sort of ruin they would suffer if they did not 
yield to his authority (An. 7.4.1).  He also demanded that the mountain-dwelling 
Thynians, whom Xenophon calls the most warlike of all peoples (πάντων . . . 
πολεμικώτατοι, An. 7.2.22), descend from the heights and yield to him while 
inhabiting the plains.  If they failed to do so, he threatened to burn their villages and 
destroy their crops so that they would starve.  When the men refused to descend, 
Seuthes attacked and cut down unsparingly (ἀφειδῶς) all he managed to capture (An. 
7.4.5-6).  Lane Fox argues that such indiscriminate devastation of villages whose only 
crime was to be prosperous exceeded much of the strategy of even Alexander as he 
campaigned to subdue central Asia.
33
  Seuthes so terrified the population that droves 
of people came down to join his army of their own accord, while all others urgently 
entreated him for peace.  Once in control of increasingly massive resources, Seuthes 
told Xenophon that he would be willing to forgo peace if the latter wished to punish 
the Thracians who had lately bested the Greeks in a night attack.  Xenophon highlights 
                                                                                                                                            
arguments are not entirely convincing.  Xenophon chose to spend the bulk of his career among the 
Spartans, often against the Persians as in the case of Agesilaos‟ Asian campaigns. 
33
 Lane Fox 2004: 22. 
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his own magnanimity by saying that he felt subjection to Seuthes would be 
punishment enough and there was no need for further military action (An. 7.4.24).  
The careers of Dieitrephes and others demonstrate that an Athenian had to be 
sufficiently free of scruples in order to fight alongside Thracians.  Xenophon had a 
healthy respect for the utility of light armed Thracian-style troops as a complement to 
heavy infantry, and he had no problem commanding such units within the army.  
Perhaps, though, the savagery of Seuthes was more than he could countenance.      
The pomp of the Thracian court was very attractive to men such as Alcibiades 
and Iphicrates.  Xenophon, however, is careful to present himself as above such 
things, concerned with upright character, personal loyalty, and virtuous exercise of 
command instead.  His hero Agesilaus is praised for similarly spurning the 
conspicuous consumption of the elite.  Victories in the four-horse chariot race, so 
crucial to the image of the Philaids, were mocked by Agesilaus as resulting from 
wealth rather than any innate character.  In demonstration of his point, he entered his 
sister in the chariot race at Olympia, where she won (Xen. Ages. 9.6).  We should 
always take Xenophon‟s evidence with a grain of salt.  For example, there might have 
been at least a kernel of truth behind the allegations that Xenophon wished to found a 
colony at Calpe for his own glory.  Otherwise, he probably would not have spilled so 
much ink to dispel such charges.  But in the end Xenophon condemns the behavior of 
Seuthes and those Greeks such as Heraclides who pandered to barbarians. 
Above all Xenophon was eager to gratify the Spartans.  It was the Spartans 
who would end up providing Xenophon with substantial rewards and honors, 
including an estate at Scillus in the Peloponnese.  As Azoulay argues, the Spartans in 
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the final chapters of the Anabasis honored Xenophon at an exceptional level precisely 
because he spurned mercenary pay and other base rewards such as those offered by 
Seuthes.
34
  The Anabasis ends in Asia Minor with the Laconians and the troops under 
them offering Xenophon the pick of the booty acquired during a raid.  This reward 
allowed Xenophon even to lavish gifts on others (An. 7.8.23).  Xenophon remained in 
the Spartans‟ service in Asia, eventually befriending Agesilaus and returning to 
Greece with him.  After the Battle of Coroneia, at which Xenophon was present and 
may have even fought on the Spartan side, he was granted proxenia at Sparta and later 
given the estate at Scillus, probably in the late 390‟s or early 380‟s.35  Diogenes 
Laertius says that his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, were educated and received military 
training at Sparta (2.54).  It was most likely this friendship with the Spartans, instead 
of ties to the barbarians Cyrus and Seuthes, which caused Xenophon to be exiled from 
Athens.
36
 
A combination of circumstances and a fair degree of prejudice precluded 
Xenophon from taking up residence in Thrace.  The limitations for a commander 
leading a group of independently minded Greeks were made apparent when Xenophon 
conceived of founding a settlement at Calpe Harbor.  In Xenophon‟s vision, this 
settlement would have been populated by Greek soldiers more than capable of 
bringing the surrounding Thracians under their suzerainty, and would have offered 
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 Azoulay 2004: 303. 
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 For these details of Xenophon‟s life, see above, n. 2.  Plutarch (Ages. 18.1) says that Xenophon 
fought on the side of the Spartans at Coroneia, while Xenophon himself implies that he was merely 
present out of loyalty to Agesilaos (An. 5.3.6). 
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 The date and cause of the exile is one of the most contentious issues in the life of Xenophon, with 
even our ancient sources varying in explanation from participation with the Cyreans to philo-Laconism.  
See previous note for modern scholarship.  To my mind, Rahn 1981 offers the most convincing 
arguments, proposing that Xenophon was exiled in 394 after anti-Spartan sentiment became more 
openly expressed in Athens. 
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Greeks in the area and those travelling by sea a place of refuge and commerce.  The 
remnants of the Ten Thousand did not share his enthusiasm.  Seuthes, though offering 
Xenophon tempting rewards, was not to be trusted.  Nor was the luxury of the 
Thracian nobility to be emulated.  Greek soldiers would not have stood by without 
sufficient pay while their commander was made a Thracian prince.  The Spartans 
controlled much of the region on the fringes of Seuthes‟ domain, and they would not 
have smiled upon an independent Greek controlling several fortified settlements.  
Finally, Xenophon was keen to please the Spartans and his later service in Asia under 
the Spartans and eventually Agesilaus demonstrates that he trusted in Sparta to 
provide him with suitable rewards and advancement.  Friendship with Agesilaus, 
proxenia at Sparta and later an estate at Scillus, and privileges such as having his sons 
trained at Sparta were plenty to satisfy Xenophon‟s ambitions.  Sparta was his 
preferred alternative to Athens.  
            
Conon and Timotheus 
Conon, the most famous Athenian general in the first years of the fourth 
century, served as a model for the type of military leadership exercised by the likes of 
Iphicrates, rooted in force of personality and fuelled by ambition that would not 
always be subordinated to the service of Athens.  Indeed, Iphicrates had been a 
protégé of Conon and the evidence suggests he had served under Conon‟s command.37  
While Conon would have a decisive influence on Iphicrates and other renegade fourth 
century generals who were tied to Thrace, he found his outlet and refuge not in 
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 For Conon‟s career, see Seager 1967; Hamilton 1979; Strauss 1984 and 1987, esp. 126-129; Harding 
1985: no. 12; March 1997. 
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Thrace, but in Cyprus at the court of Evagoras of Salamis, and in the service of the 
Persians.  With nine ships Conon fled the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 when it 
became apparent that the Athenian fleet would be destroyed by Lysander and the 
Spartans.  Rather than face prosecution at Athens due to his role in the defeat, he 
remained abroad.  Whereas Alcibiades and later Iphicrates turned to Thrace and the 
courts of Thracian rulers to avoid the irate Athenian people, the reality of a Spartan-
controlled Aegean limited Conon‟s options.   
Beginning around 398 Conon and Evagoras worked together to arrange 
Conon‟s appointment as commander of a new Persian fleet built to combat the 
Spartans.  We have accounts of many letters to this effect sent back and forth between 
Conon, Evagoras, the Persian king Artaxerxes, and his officer Ctesias.  The satrap 
Pharnabazus, to whom Evagoras introduced the Athenian general, also played a role in 
securing Conon‟s command.38  There has been a lot of scholarly speculation as to what 
all the parties in this arrangement hoped to gain.  Clearly the Persians wished to curtail 
the growing power of the Spartans in the Aegean, and perhaps Conon and even 
Evagoras hoped to benefit Athens.
39
  Diodorus gives us one motivation on the part of 
Conon that fits well with the general‟s character.  Namely, he wanted to win great 
personal fame by being solely responsible for humbling Sparta and regaining the 
hegemony of Greece for Athens (14.39.3).  And win fame he did.  Conon, along with 
Pharnabazus, led the Persian fleet to a decisive victory over the Spartans at Cnidus in 
                                                 
38
 Isocrates 9.54-56; Ctesias Pers. Eclog. 63; Diodoros 14.38-39; Justin 6.1.7-9; Orosius 3.1.7.  For 
these dealings, see Costa 1974: 48. 
39
 For a summary of the scholarship, see Costa 1974: 48.  See also Seager 1967, esp. 99-103. 
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394, a battle in which Iphicrates likely participated.
40
  This battle was followed up by 
the removal of Spartan harmosts from the coast of Asia.  The Spartans duly rebuked, 
Conon felt it safe to return to Athens, and he was welcomed back as a hero.  With an 
infusion of Persian money Conon rebuilt the long walls of Athens to much fanfare 
(Xen. Hell. 4.8.9-10).  As Strauss points out, this act was of great strategic and 
emotional significance to the Athenians.  As Themistocles had built the original long 
walls, Conon could be seen as a second Themistocles and a re-founder of the Athenian 
Empire.  The span of the brilliant career of Themistocles, which included both 
invaluable service to Athens and influence in the Persian court, could be seen at a 
single moment in Conon.
41
       
Even following the defeat of the Spartans and the rebuilding of the Long 
Walls, an awkward tension lingered concerning the role of the Persians in the 
restoration of Athenian fortunes.  Lewis and Stroud, in their publication of an 
Athenian inscription dating from around 392-391 honoring Evagoras, point out that 
the Cypriot king is explicitly praised as a Hellene, indicating that his ethnic identity 
was in question.  The emphasis on the role of Evagoras, carefully presented as a 
Greek, in helping Conon to defeat the Spartans is probably an attempt to minimize 
Persia‟s role.  Pharnabazus, after all, was never honored in Athens, though he was 
Conon‟s associate and likely superior.42  Isocrates later claimed, seemingly in the 
same vein, that Evagoras provided the bulk of the forces commanded by Conon (Isoc. 
9.56).  Seager stresses that the victory at Cnidus and subsequent expulsion of Spartan 
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garrisons won the Greek cities of Asia and the Aegean over to Persian control, and 
Conon was throughout the period of 397-392 an admiral in the Persian service, 
subordinate to Persian officials, and working for Persian interests.
43
  Whether or not 
Conon‟s ultimate aim was to restore Athenian hegemony in the Aegean, he worked 
hand in hand with the greatest bogeyman of Athenian history.
44
   
Ironically, the Persian role in Conon‟s campaigns hindered his goals in Thrace.  
Following Cnidus, Conon and Pharnabazus sailed around the Aegean, driving the 
Spartans out of various cities and laying waste to Spartan territory.  This was generally 
welcomed by the people in the respective cities, but at Sestus and Abydos the Spartan 
harmost Dercylidas rallied the people behind the cause of preventing Persia from 
gaining mastery of the sea.  As such, Conon and Pharnabazus were unable to take 
these two cities which remained loyal to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 4.8.1-6).  They were, 
however, able to recruit many mercenaries from the Thraceward region who would 
later play such a decisive role under the command of Iphicrates.        
While Conon‟s fame and influence at Athens were without peer following his 
return to the city around 393, his energetic activities would soon bring him down.  The 
Spartan Antalcidas complained to the Persian satrap Tiribazus, saying that Conon was 
bent on building up Athenian power at the expense of Persia.  His arguments must 
have been convincing as Tiribazus arrested Conon at Sardis (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-16).  
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Hamilton discusses Conon‟s extraordinary honors in detail and compares them to 
those received by Lysander.  Such excessive honors, according to Hamilton, 
eventually led to jealousy and the downfall of both men, including Conon‟s arrest by 
the Persians.
45
  Though Conon would escape the Persians and again find refuge with 
Evagoras (Lys. 19.39-41), he fell into political obscurity.  After his death, many 
influential Athenians tried to downplay or outright deny Conon‟s role in Athens‟ 
recent successes.
46
  
The volatile fortunes of Conon reflect the careers of many Athenian Thrace-
haunters.  Conon was at one point a traitor and fugitive, later to become a savior of the 
city, only then to fall precipitously from grace.  A commander at Aegospotami, the 
most crushing defeat in Athenian memory, he abandoned his countrymen and fled 
with Athenian ships.  He evaded certain prosecution and perhaps death at Athens by 
staying abroad, entering the service of the very Persians who had made the Spartan 
victory at Aegospotami possible.  Yet with his military skill and prodigious political 
sense, he managed within a decade to be embraced by Athens and achieve a status 
enjoyed by no one else.  All of this was accomplished because of his service for 
foreign powers, stemming from a desertion and flight that were tantamount to treason.  
The example of Alcibiades‟ return to Athens with the promise of securing Persian 
support taught Conon that brilliant service abroad, ostensibly for the benefit of Athens, 
could cover a multitude of sins.  It was merely the vagaries of the balance of power in 
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 The Lysianic funeral oration, for example, discredits ties to Persia, and even attributes the rebuilding 
of the Long Walls to the men of Phyle, rather than Conon (2.56-60, 63); see Seager 1967: 100, 108.  
Both Seager and Strauss (1984) remark upon the bitter political rivalry between Conon and 
Thrasybulus.  While Conon was ascendant, Thrasybulus was largely out of the political picture, only to 
return to prominence following Conon‟s arrest and disgrace. 
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the Greek world that prevented Conon from turning to Thrace instead of Cyprus and 
Persia.  Conon was in the end a Persian admiral, under the authority of the Persian 
king and his satraps.  When he overstepped the limits of his Persian commission, he 
came to ruin. 
Conon‟s son Timotheus was also a prominent Athenian general who had a 
checkered career.
47
  Like his father, he was a shrewd cultivator of foreign connections.  
At his trial in 373, brought about by the machinations of Iphicrates and others who 
insisted that Timotheus had delayed an expedition too long while trying to raise 
support, he was defended in person by both Alcetas king of the Molossi in Epirus and 
no less a figure than Jason of Pherae, then the leading man in Greece ([Dem.] 49.9-
10).  Timotheus was acquitted, barely, but was deposed from command in favor of 
Iphicrates.  He decided then to take up service as a mercenary for the Persians in 
Egypt, where he remained for several years ([Dem.] 49.25).
48
  He probably grew very 
rich as a result of this campaign.
49
  Once back in favor at Athens, he was sent out in 
366 with thirty triremes and 8000 peltasts to aid the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes in his 
revolt from the king (Isoc. 15.111).
50
   
Timotheus was the leading proponent of the fourth century maritime league 
dubbed by modern scholars the Second Athenian Confederacy.
51
  In his capacity as 
general, he brought many states into league membership and won a great deal of non-
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 For this service abroad, see Burich 1994: 118. 
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 As pointed out by E. Harris 1988: 51, and  n. 21 
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 See Burich 1994: 131. 
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 For this league, see Cargill 1981; for Timotheus‟ role in it, see Burich 1994: 80-177. 
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league territory for Athens.
52
  Many of the states listed on the so-called Decree of 
Aristoteles, the league‟s foremost epigraphical source, were brought into the alliance 
by Timotheus during his activities in 375 and 373.
53
  Nepos says that during his 
service for Ariobarzanes in 366, Timotheus received Sestus and Crithote for Athens 
(Tim. 1).  After he replaced Iphicrates at Amphipolis in 364, he apparently brought 
twenty cities over to his side (Din. 1.14 = 3.17; Isoc. 15. 113ff).  Though he failed to 
take Amphipolis, he carried on a war against Cotys around the Thermaic Gulf and the 
Chalcidice for several years, achieving much success (Diod. 15.81.6).
54
   
Timotheus was active against Cotys at the very time Iphicrates was at Cotys‟ 
court, working on his behalf.  It might have been against some of Timotheus‟ forces 
that Iphicrates fought a naval engagement.
55
  The two generals were fierce rivals for 
power in Athens, bringing each other to trial on different occasions, and replacing one 
another in military commands once one had fallen out of favor.  While the two were 
eventually reconciled by the marriage of Timotheus‟ daughter to Iphicrates‟ son, their 
longstanding rivalry encapsulates the volatility of Athenian democratic politics and the 
competition for military honors among members of the elite.
56
   
Timotheus, though, was no Iphicrates.  A student of Isocrates and thus a 
committed Panhellenist, Timotheus strove long and hard to maintain the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, with the acquisition of allies and a unification of purpose 
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among the Greeks his overriding goal.
57
  While he did take up mercenary service for a 
period, it was in no way opposed to Athenian interests, and he was forced into the 
position because Iphicrates had had him removed from command.  Service abroad, far 
from a hostile demos, proved necessary time and again for many prominent Athenians.  
Theopompus says that Timotheus left Athens and withdrew to Lesbos, though it is 
unclear when and for how long this occurred (FGrHist 115 F 105).  Whereas 
Iphicrates worked against the Athenian cause in Thrace on more than one occasion, 
Timotheus‟ contact with Thrace and the Greek cities on the Thracian littoral was 
geared to winning allies for Athens and checking Cotys‟ hostile actions.   
Timotheus was generally regarded as an upright figure.  Nepos, for one, 
remarks on his temperance and decency, insisting that despite his many powerful 
foreign connections he considered loyalty to his homeland greater than any principle 
of hospitality (Tim. 4).  His scruples may have been his undoing.  While Iphicrates and 
Menestheus were acquitted in the trial of 356 following the defeat at Embata in the 
Social War, Timotheus was found guilty and fined 100 talents.  He withdrew to 
Chalcis in disgrace and died soon afterwards.
58
  While Iphicrates might have secured 
his own acquittal by intimidating the court with a band of his own retainers (Polyaen. 
3.9.15, 29; Sen. Rhet. Cont. 6.5), Timotheus resorted to no such measures.  Isocrates 
attributed his legal condemnation and disgrace to a lack of courting the Athenian 
populace.  For Isocrates, Timotheus was as inept at securing public favor as he was 
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skilled at handling affairs (15.131).  While he was not totally above the use of clever 
instruments to overcome his opponents – he did threaten to bring Iphicrates up on a 
charge of xenia ([Dem.] 49.66) – Timotheus in the main looked out for the interests of 
Athens and the league rather than elevating himself at the expense of the polis.  It is 
unlikely that a student of Isocrates, the leading advocate for uniting the Greeks against 
a barbarian foe, would have spent too much time at the court of a barbarous Thracian.  
And besides, it was his arch rival Iphicrates who was influential with Cotys.          
  
Chabrias 
 Chabrias was the general who inspired Theompompus‟ list of Athenians opting 
to live abroad (FGrHist 155 F 105).  An able commander, he was from a family of 
means and prominence and had a penchant for luxury.  His profligacy, extravagance, 
and great wealth are attested in many sources outside of Theopompus, many of which 
are usefully enumerated by Davies.
59
  His military victories were numerous, the most 
famous being the naval defeat of the Spartans at Naxos in 376.  This was widely hailed 
as the first true Athenian naval victory since the Peloponnesian War, overshadowing 
Conon‟s achievement with a Persian fleet at Cnidus (Diod. 15.35).  Like Conon and 
Iphicrates, Chabrias received great personal rewards at Athens for this and other 
victories, including a bronze statue modeled to reflect his storied tactical ingenuity 
against Agesilaus in Boeotia.
60
  But, like many other talented generals, Chabrias at 
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times could not bear the Athenians, their fickle support and their disapproval of his 
more eccentric traits.  So, as Theopompus tells us, he chose to leave Athens for Egypt, 
where he acted as a mercenary general for at least two different rulers.  
 Like Iphicrates, Chabrias has been equated to a condottiere.  And, as in the 
case of Iphicrates, Pritchett objects to this characterization of Chabrias, claiming that 
aside from two brief sojourns in Egypt Chabrias remained loyal in his service to 
Athens and always acted at the behest of the Athenians.
61
  Our sources are explicit, 
however, in their description of Chabrias‟ involvement in Egypt as being a private 
enterprise lacking any formal Athenian directive or sanction.  Nepos says that 
Chabrias went to Egypt sua sponte on two separate occasions, which is in direct 
contrast to the service he rendered to Evagoras of Salamis at the head of an official 
Athenian expedition.  In the case of his second journey to Egypt, self-interested 
motives are attributed to him, namely a desire to reap material rewards equivalent to 
those given to Agesilaus who had agreed to serve Tachus as a general (Nep. Chab. 2).  
Likewise, Diodorus says that Chabrias went to aid the Egyptian king Acoris without 
first securing the approval of the demos (ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ δήμου γνώμης 
προσδεξάμενος, 15.29.2), and in the case of Tachus, Chabrias was persuaded to 
serve privately (ἰδιᾳ) instead of being sent publically by Athens (δημοσίᾳ μὲν ὑπὸ 
τῆς πατρίδος, 15.92.3).   
Prior to the King‟s Peace, Chabrias had been sent by the Athenians to aid 
                                                                                                                                            
1963; Buckler 1972.  The interpretation of Burnett and Edmonson (1961), that the statue depicted a 
kneeling hoplite, is based on a confused passage of Nepos (Chab. 1.3), but the description in Diodorus 
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Evagoras in his revolt from Persia and helped him consolidate power over all of 
Cyprus.  Xenophon says the Athenians sent Chabrias out with some 800 peltasts and a 
large number of hoplites under the control of Demaenetus, probably the same man 
who had earlier brought supplies to Conon while he was working with Evagoras (Hell. 
5.1.10).  This expedition set sail in late 388 or early 387.  A year later, Athens was 
forced to acquiesce to the terms outlined by the King‟s Peace.62  This would have 
ended the official Athenian help to Evagoras.  Chabrias, though, appears to have 
remained in Cyprus a while longer before going to Egypt and entering the service of 
Acoris sometime in 386.
63
  Pritchett disapprovingly quotes both Grote and Parke, who 
argue that after the ratification of the King‟s Peace Chabrias refused to return to 
Athens and maintained control of his forces abroad, just as Iphicrates did in Thrace.
64
  
It is unclear whether Chabrias maintained a private force which he brought to Egypt, 
but he did indeed enter the service of the Egyptian king after most likely serving 
Evagoras privately for a time.  His position in Egypt was much the same as Iphicrates‟ 
in Thrace during the same period.  Both generals had been abroad leading Athenian 
forces and both opted not to return to Athens once overseas state ventures were 
rendered impossible by the terms of the peace.   
The similarity between the careers of the two men is remarkable.  Aside from 
enjoying a reputation as great tacticians, both rendered important financial and 
governmental advice to their foreign patrons.  While in the employ of Tachus, 
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Chabrias set up an essentially Athenian-style financial system in Egypt, in spite of the 
near total lack of a money-driven economy.
65
  Pseudo-Aristotle describes Chabrias‟ 
financial savvy in relation to that of Iphicrates in Thrace (Econ. 2.1350b33-1351a32).  
As Iphicrates was granted estates in Thrace, Chabrias also seems to have been 
awarded land in Egypt.  Strabo mentions the palisaded camp (χάραξ) and the village 
(κώμη) of Chabrias in Egypt (16.2.33; 17.1.22).  While the former may denote a 
temporary military encampment, the latter was probably a more permanent settlement.  
The Elder Pliny also refers to an encampment (castra) of Chabrias (Nat. Hist. 5.25).  
In the same way that Iphicrates faced legal troubles at Athens, Chabrias was taken to 
trial in 366 due to the loss of Oropus to the Boeotians (Dem. 21.64).  And finally, 
Chabrias‟ activities abroad may have incurred the scorn of many Athenians, as a 
remark of Demosthenes concerning one of Chabrias‟ Athenian mercenaries in Egypt 
indicates (19.287).  Because of his foreign activities, Iphicrates was himself brought 
up on a charge of xenia by Timotheus.                       
While their careers were similar, Chabrias and Iphicrates may have been 
rivals.
66
  Chabrias often led mercenary troops, including peltasts (Xen. Hell. 5.1.10; 
4.14), and he was sent by the Athenians as Iphicrates‟ replacement in command of the 
mercenary corps at Corinth (Diod. 14.92.2; Harpocation, s.v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ).  
When the Persians complained to the Athenians about Chabrias‟ involvement on the 
side of the Egyptians in the 380‟s, the Athenians summoned Chabrias back to Athens 
and sent out Iphicrates to serve as a general for the Persians (Diod. 15.29-1-4).  The 
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rivalry may have gone as far back as the 390‟s when Chabrias served in the 
diplomatically successful expedition of Thrasybulus to Thrace in 390/89 (IG ii² 21; 
22).  Thrasybulus had been a longtime rival of Conon, Iphicrates‟ mentor, and it was 
Iphicrates that was sent by the Athenians to replace Thrasybulus‟ mission in the north 
once the latter had died (Xen. Hell. 4.8.33-35).  Chabrias took up service in Egypt for 
Acoris and Tachus during the late 380‟s and the late 360‟s respectively, precisely the 
two time periods in which Iphicrates was influential at the court of Cotys in Thrace.  
Though at times Chabrias had been involved in Thrace – with Thrasybulus in 390/89, 
and in the 370‟s when he saved Abdera from the marauding Triballians (Diod. 
15.36.4) and won many Thracian cities over to the Second Athenian Confederacy – 
great influence among the Odrysians was wielded by his rival Iphicrates.
67
  This might 
have effectively shut Chabrias out of the north Aegean and curtailed any influence he 
could have had in Thrace.                                   
 As Theompomus attests, Egypt was an outlet for Chabrias, much as Thrace 
was for Iphicrates and others.  How, then, was Egypt different from Thrace in terms of 
the advantages and opportunities afforded ambitious Athenians?  First of all, aside 
from the sixty-year span between 404-343, Egypt was under the control of the 
Persians for roughly the entire period covered by this study.  Essentially, then, I regard 
Egypt as a Persian context.  The experiences of Conon and Alcibiades reveal the 
pitfalls of turning to Persia for advancement and an alternative to Athenian 
democracy.  Suffice it to say that the levels of autonomy attainable for a Greek in 
Thrace could not be matched under the King and his satraps.  Even under Egyptian 
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rulers, haughty Greek commanders could be disappointed by the limitations imposed 
on them.  Agesilaus, for instance, was vexed at being given a subordinate military 
position to Tachos when he ventured to Egypt as a mercenary (Plut. Ages. 37.1-2).  At 
any rate, the volatile nature of Egypt during the period of 404-343, when there were 
several conflicts with Persia and multiple dynastic quarrels, did offer many 
opportunities for mercenary service and the acquisition of riches which Greeks like 
Chabrias exploited.  But, unlike Thrace, Egypt was a venerable and ancient society, 
civilized centuries before even the emergence of the Greek polis, with entrenched 
institutions like the priesthood and a rigorous code of laws.  Wealth and influence 
aside, perhaps Egypt simply did not offer the same cultural attractions as Thrace.  The 
exousia up for grabs in the lawless regions north of the Aegean might have been 
missing in Egypt, not to mention the chariot-racing, heroic feasting, and other 
ancillary benefits which were attractive to elite Athenians.  Egypt was not a rough-
and-tumble frontier for the Athenians in the same way as Thrace.  Finally, Egypt did 
not have the same geographic proximity nor quite so long and rich a history of 
diplomatic and military connections with Athens.
68
  Aside from Chabrias, there were 
very few Athenians whom we could legitimately call Egypt-haunters.
69
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Thrace versus Persia: The Case of Alcibiades 
 With the figure of Alcibiades we are uniquely positioned to evaluate some of 
the differences between Thrace and Persia as foci of interest for elite Athenians.  The 
most pronounced distinction between the two societies, from an Athenian perspective, 
was the level of autonomy an ambitious Greek could hope to achieve.  To be sure, 
many Greeks were able to exercise remarkable power and influence within the Persian 
Empire.  For instance, Persia had on many occasions supported Greek tyrants in Ionia 
such as Histiaeus of Milteus.  But, when Histiaeus and his nephew Aristagoras tried to 
establish their own niche in Thrace centered around a fortified settlement at Myrcinus 
on the Strymon, and started to accumulate their own private resources in terms of men 
and materiel, they began to pose a threat to Darius.  Accordingly, on the advice of 
Megabazus who warned against such men being given power in advantageous 
territory, Histiaeus was recalled to Susa (Hdt. 5.23).  Aristagoras probably would have 
been too, had he not been killed by local Thracians during an attempt at expanding his 
territory (Hdt. 5.124-126).
70
    
Alcibiades had extensive dealings with the Persians.  After he fled the Spartans 
who had grown to distrust him, he became an advisor to Tissaphernes, the Persian 
satrap in Sardis.  Alcibiades, a haughty, talented, and urbane figure, thoroughly 
charmed Tissaphernes.  The satrap was so enamored with the great Hellene, that he 
named the most luxurious park in his dominion “The Alcibiades” (Plut. Alc. 24.4.-5).  
Meiggs has argued that it was Tissaphernes‟ own sophisticated attraction to 
                                                 
70
 For more on Histiaeus and Aristagoras in Thrace, see Isaac 1986: 15-17. 
 315 
 
Hellenism, in stark contrast to the boorishness of the uncultured Spartans, that ensured 
Alcibiades a privileged position in his court.
71
  Perhaps Alcibiades was himself 
attracted to the lifestyle and power available among the Persians.  Alcibiades advised 
his Persian host against hastily bringing defeat against either the Athenians or 
Spartans.  Rather, it would be in the Persians‟ interest to prolong the war between the 
Greeks until all players were rendered weak.  Accordingly, Tissaphernes decided to 
play both sides, promising, for example, to send money and ships to the Spartans, but 
delaying at every opportunity.  While at the court of Tissaphernes, Alcibiades 
achieved so great a level of influence that he was able to conduct business personally 
in the satrap‟s name (αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Σισσαφέρνους, Thuc. 8.45-46).  
Eventually, the double-dealing which Alcibiades had encouraged Tissaphernes to 
adopt backfired.  The satrap was forced to arrest Alcibiades after the latter had been 
denounced by the Spartans to the Great King.  Alcibiades eventually escaped this 
imprisonment (Plut. Alc. 27.5).             
 A few years later, in 409/8, Alcibiades managed to convince Pharnabazus, the 
energetic satrap of Phrygia, to swear a personal oath to him.  The other Greek generals 
had sworn oaths to the Persians regarding their treatment of the city of Chalcedon.  
Though Alcibiades was absent at the time, Pharnabazus thought it appropriate that he 
also be made to give an oath.  Alcibiades, however, refused to swear anything unless 
Pharnabazus in turn swore an oath to him personally.  Thus, in addition to making 
pledges about Chalcedon, both leaders gave private assurances to each other (Xen. 
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Hell. 1.3.11-12).
72
   
Alcibiades time and again showed himself a master at entering into profitable 
relationships with the most powerful men in the Persian Empire.  The ties he forged 
with Pharnabazus seemed on the cusp of bearing fruit once Alcibiades was forced to 
leave his possessions in Thrace following Aegospotami in 405.  According to 
Plutarch, Alcibiades entered the Persian Empire at this time determined to make 
himself as useful to the Great King as Themistocles had been (Alc. 37.4).  While in 
Phrygia, his ally Pharnabazus gave him the town of Grunium, from which he was able 
to derive fifty talents in revenue annually, a situation analogous to that of 
Themistocles under Artaxerxes (Nep. Alc. 9).  Before he was able to gain a position at 
the court of the king, however, Alcibiades was killed at the request of Lysander by 
Pharnabazus‟ agents (Plut. Alc. 39).       
Powerful as he was, Alcibiades was always subservient to the Persians while in 
their empire.  In Thrace things were a different matter.  Militarily active in the north 
Aegean, especially around the Hellespont, since at least 411, at some point he 
established settlements in the area.  Xenophon only mentions unspecified fortified 
settlements (τείχη), while other sources name perhaps three places in the vicinity of 
Bisanthe and Pactye (Xen. Hell. 1.5.17; 2.1.15; Lys. 14.26-27; Plut. Alc. 36.3; Nep. 
Alc. 7).
73
  It seems that he had secured these fortified places in case he needed a refuge 
from the Athenians, which in fact he did after the defeat at Notium in 407/6.  His 
settlements were near the territory controlled by the Philaids in the late sixth and early 
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fifth century, and a conscious emulation of their hereditary dominion might have been 
intended.
74
  After Notium, he remained in Thrace until the Athenian defeat at 
Aegospotami left the Spartans as masters of the Aegean.  Remaining in coastal 
settlements, no matter how well fortified, was rendered imprudent in such a climate.  
Accordingly, Alcibiades fled across the Hellespont to the court of Pharnabazus.
75
  
Alcibiades seemed to enjoy a great deal of autonomy while in Thrace, and was 
even able to raise sizeable armies of Thracians for his own use.  In 409, while he was 
campaigning in the north more or less independently of the official directives of 
Athens, he seized the city of Selymbria with the forces of the Chersonese and a large 
number of Thracian troops (Xen. Hell. 1.3.10).
76
  Plutarch says that the Thracians 
under his command at this time served Alcibiades zealously because of the goodwill 
and affection they had for him (Alc. 30.4-5).  Nepos tells us that when he withdrew to 
his fortresses after Notium, he raised a force of locals and became the first Greek to 
penetrate into the interior parts of Thrace.  By this action, his fame greatly increased 
and he was able to secure alliances with some of the kings of Thrace (Alc. 7).  Plutarch 
clarifies that Alcibiades at this time withdrew from the Athenians, gathered a force of 
foreign fighters, and on his own initiative (ἰδίᾳ) attacked some kingless Thracians 
(ἀβασιλεύτοι), and also protected the Greeks living on the frontier from Thracian 
incursions (Alc. 36.3).       
These actions appear to have been undertaken by Alcibiades on his own, 
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without the direction of the Athenians or any local Thracian ruler.  He did manage to 
ally himself with Thracian leaders, notably Medocus and Seuthes II.  Nepos implies 
that these alliances were made because of the military success he enjoyed in Thrace.  
Scholars have surmised that Alcibiades at some point gave aid to these rulers against 
rebel Thracians.  The kingless Thracians mentioned by Plutarch might have been 
rebelling against the authority of Seuthes.  That Alcibiades was able to offer the 
support of both Medocus and Seuthes to the Athenians at Aigospotamoi suggests that 
he had rendered both kings valuable services (Diod. 13.105.3).  This is especially 
interesting given that Medocus and Seuthes were often fierce rivals for power, as both 
claimed legitimate descent from the Odrysian king Seuthes I.
77
  Alcibiades was a 
master at playing both sides, and he appears to have done so in Thrace to his own 
advantage.  He also seems to have had his own force of peltasts and horsemen at 
Aegospotami (Plut. Alc. 37.2).   
There is no indication that he was under the authority of any Thracian ruler.  
Two of the territories offered to Xenophon by Seuthes had been controlled by 
Alcibiades.  Heraclides of Maronea persuaded Seuthes that it was dangerous to give 
these fortified places to Xenophon, a man with an army (An. 7.5.8).  This was most 
likely a thinly veiled reference to Alcibiades‟ own fortresses.78  Heraclides‟ remark 
implies that Alcibiades had been a threatening presence in Thrace, as he had owned 
several fortresses and commanded private armies independent of a Thracian authority.  
Because of their fortified position at Myrcinus, Histiaeus and Aristagoras had 
threatened to acquire more power than the Persians could tolerate.  Seuthes heeded the 
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 Hatzfeld 1940: 319-320; Archibald 1998: 122-123. 
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 Archibald 1998: 123. 
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advice of Heraclides and ceased mentioning the territories to Xenophon, fearful that 
with these fortresses the Athenian general would be too powerful and autonomous a 
force in the area.  A few decades later, Cotys granted Iphicrates territory of his own on 
which to settle in Thrace.  Even after he fell out with Cotys and began to fear for his 
life, Iphicrates was able to remain on his holdings in Thrace.  This suggests that, 
because of his control of fortified settlements, he too enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy independent of the local ruler.
79
 
 Few places could rival Thrace for sheer opportunity.  Alcibiades, like the 
Philaids before him, was able to sow the seeds of his own statelet near the Hellespont, 
where he commanded great material resources and his own private armies.  While he 
at times worked on behalf of the Thracian kings in the area, he did so to increase his 
own power and influence, not because of any compulsion from a higher authority.  He 
had enjoyed tremendous, albeit fleeting, influence among the Persians.  Yet, he was 
never able to take charge of his own private forces to do with as he pleased.  He could 
influence and manipulate powerful men like Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, but he 
was always under their direct authority and ultimately under the power of the Great 
King.  Estates in the Persian Empire, such as Grunium in Phrygia, were a source of 
vast revenue for Alcibiades, but they were not his to do with as he wished as his 
fortresses in Thrace seem to have been. 
 Conon had achieved perhaps the greatest level of military authority of any 
Greek among the Persians.  While he was given a startling amount of power, it was 
always at the behest of the Persians.  When he tried to use this money and influence to 
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reestablish Athenian power in the Aegean, decidedly against Persia‟s interest, he was 
arrested by the satrap Tiribazus, effectively ending his career (Xen. 4.8.12-16).  Other 
Athenians, like Conon, were able to rise to positions of prominence at the courts of 
foreign kingdoms, from Persia to Egypt.  As the career of elder Miltiades and his 
successors, as well as the attempts of men such as Histiaeus, have demonstrated, the 
territories of Aegean Thrace were best placed to offer ambitious Greeks their own 
autonomous niche.  Were it not for the destruction of Athenian naval power in 405, 
Alcibiades might have been able to achieve lasting power on the Hellespont.   
As in the famous formulation of Herodotus (5.3), the Thracians were numerous 
and potentially very powerful, yet they were never able to unite under a single 
authority or behind a common purpose.  Accordingly, they remained fragmented and 
weak.  For brief periods, the Odrysian kingdom under leaders such as Sitalces 
approached the sort of unity and central authority that positioned it as a potentially 
significant Mediterranean power.  But, more often than not, internal divisions and 
dynastic squabbles within the kingdom threatened to tear it apart.
80
  Alcibiades was 
able to exploit this situation to his own benefit by rendering influential Thracian rulers 
military aid against their rivals.  Xenophon was offered territory and other benefits in 
return for aiding Seuthes II against rival Thracians.  One of Thrasybulus‟ most 
pronounced diplomatic successes was engineering a rapprochement between 
competing Thracian kings.  Thrace presented a tantalizing power vacuum for 
ambitious Athenians.  Its natural resources and hordes of fierce warriors, eager to 
serve the highest bidder, were there for the taking.   
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 See Archibald (1998: 122-123) for an example of the rival powers within the Odrysian kingdom 
during this period. 
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Conclusions 
 There were many places in which an Athenian could seek personal power as 
well as refuge from his native city.  Thrace, though, was different.  No other locale 
held the interest of so many great Athenians and great Athenian families.  Sparta may 
be the sole exception to this, attracting men such as Cimon and Xenophon, but 
certainly such a claim can be made for no other non-Greek power, including Persia.  
This study has examined in detail several distinct cases of Athenians turning to 
Thrace, and usually ties were established between Thrace and several generations of a 
particular family rather than one individual.  Dieitrephes probably inherited his 
interest in Thrace from his older relatives, and the Philaids were active in the 
Chersonese for at least three generations.  Other great families, only briefly touched 
upon in this study, had connections in the north, such as Hagnon and his son 
Theramenes.  The list goes on and on.  The same cannot be said for Persia, Egypt, or 
even Sparta.  
 Many things led to Athenian interest in the north, from metal and timber, to 
mercenary soldiers and military alliances, to vitally important shipping lanes.  Thrace 
was also in close proximity to the Greek mainland in a way places such as Egypt were 
not.  Unlike other locales, the vast resources of Thrace, lying within easy reach for the 
Greeks, were largely up for grabs.  Though from time to time powerful kings did rule 
over large parts of the region, there were always internal divisions that could be 
exploited by a savvy leader.  Where Alcibiades wielded his own private army in the 
service of rival kings, Conon led Persian forces and was subordinate to the Persian 
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satrap, a hierarchy he would ignore at his own peril.  Hippias attempted to use the 
Persians as a means of regaining power in Athens in the model of the Greek tyrants of 
Asia.  For a Pisistratid in the period before the Persian Wars this was a reasonable 
goal; but, after the Greek victories in 490 and 480-479, Hippias‟ attempt could never 
reasonably be emulated.  In the north, however, a place of refuge complete with 
fortified settlements and private armies of local warriors was still available to exiled 
and dissatisfied Athenians. 
Thrace also had certain cultural draws that appealed to men of a particular 
stripe.  Where Iphicrates was attracted to life among foreign mercenaries and the 
horse-racing Philaids sought the prestige commensurate with their rank, Xenophon 
turned up his nose at the decadence of Seuthes‟ court, looking instead to the Spartans 
as military and moral exemplars.  Though Themistocles found refuge in Persia, it was 
in Lampsacus, a city lying opposite the Thracian Chersonese, that he received cult 
honors.  Chabrias, perhaps shut out of Thrace by his rival Iphicrates, found an outlet in 
Egypt, though few others did likewise.  Egypt was often under Persian domination and 
did not offer the same sort of frontier existence as Thrace.  As by turns a source of 
wealth, a place of refuge, and fount of great political and military power, Thrace 
provided the Athenians with a unique and oft-exploited alternative to their home city.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The relationship between Athens and Thrace was complex, as were the 
motives and experiences of the various figures examined in this study.  Nonetheless, 
some clear and important trends can be discerned throughout the two centuries in 
which Athens and Thrace were connected.  As in the introductory chapter, the 
following concluding remarks have been grouped into three broad categories: 
Political, Military, and Cultural.      
  
Political 
 So far as we know, Pisistratus was the first Athenian who found in Thrace the 
resources that could tip the balance of power in Athens.  For Pisistratus in the mid 
sixth century, these resources were large sums of money and mercenary soldiers.  He 
had tried to secure autocratic power in Athens on two occasions prior to turning to 
Thrace, and both times he was eventually overcome by his aristocratic rivals.  After 
his second expulsion from the city, he turned to the Thermaic gulf where he 
established a settlement and evidently made connections with the local ruling elite.  
He also went to the region surrounding Mt. Pangaeum, recruiting soldiers and growing 
wealthy from the area‟s mines.  Only then did he move south and amass his Greek 
allies from various states to help overwhelm his rivals at Pallene.  Once back in power, 
Herodotus says he maintained his position by means of revenue from Thrace and by 
retaining a force of mercenaries, presumably those he recruited from Thrace (1.64).  
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Pisistratus‟ enemies at Athens were utterly bested, unable to challenge the tyrant‟s 
authority again.  A new element had been introduced into Athenian politics that would 
be of central importance for the next two hundred years.          
In his stimulating reassessment of the Athenian grain supply, Moreno 
concludes that the entire system of overseas clerouchies in the fifth century and trade 
in the fourth century with the Bosporan kingdom in the Black Sea was guided and 
driven by elites in order to cement their control of the Athenian grain trade.  Control of 
the grain trade translated into entrenched control over politics.
1
  Thus, we can observe 
a phenomenon in democratic Athens similar to that which occurred under Pisistratus, 
namely, that the securing of resources abroad led to political dominance at home.  
Moreno himself contends that it was the adventurism of Pisistratus, the Philaids, and 
others that established the trend of Athenian overseas acquisitions which led to this 
particular mechanism of elite control of the polis.
2
    
 Beyond grain supply, many examples of Thrace-haunter control over foreign 
resources in general can be brought to bear to enhance Moreno‟s premise.  Dieitrephes 
and Thrasybulus, for instance, made use of their foreign connections and access to the 
resource of foreign soldiers to bolster their own positions at Athens.  Under the 
democracy, Dieitrephes was appointed to what appears to have been a special 
command over a group of mercenaries in 413.  Two years later, under an oligarchic 
government, he was made commander of the entire Thraceward region because of his 
preexisting ties to the area.  In 404-403, Thrasybulus probably used Thracian 
mercenaries, and almost certainly Thracian metics at Athens, to defeat the Thirty 
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 Moreno 2007, esp. 322-323. 
2
 Moreno 2007: 140-141. 
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Tyrants and restore democracy to the city.  As the hero of the democracy, Thrasybulus 
would enjoy lasting fame and no shortage of political prominence.  Though he was 
eclipsed for a time by Conon, he eventually regained his position and won further 
renown by negotiating an alliance with two Thracian kings in 389.  Likewise, 
Iphicrates achieved his greatest successes and was appointed to many of his 
commands because of his ties to foreign mercenary troops, many of whom were 
Thracian.  Though a foreigner himself, Charidemus was elected to generalships and 
otherwise honored by Athens because of his ties to Thracian rulers and the influence 
he could wield for or against Athenian interests.   
This was not a phenomenon unique to Thracian connections.  Mitchell usefully 
gathers the examples of appointments made on the basis of personal foreign 
connections from the time of the Peloponnesian War through the fourth century, and at 
Athens it is apparent that leaders were selected based on ties to many foreign powers.
3
  
But the importance of Thrace in terms of strategic location and abundance of 
resources, coupled with the sheer number of leading Athenians that had connections in 
the region, meant that Thrace did play a larger role in this aspect of Athenian politics 
than did other locales.  
 Advancement at home, however, is not the whole story.  Despite Moreno‟s 
insistence that the Athenian democracy was vulnerable to elite capture, several 
Athenian elites could not achieve the desired level of power and influence, either 
because they were outdone by their rivals, or because the democracy was too 
                                                 
3
 Mitchell 1997.  See 90-110 for Athenian appointments to various offices, including the generalship, 
based on foreign ties.  Of the twenty-three Athenian generals listed (105), six were connected to Thrace.  
So, for the period covered by her study (435-323), over a quarter of the generals selected directly 
because of their foreign connections were tied to Thrace.   
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constraining.  In such cases, Thrace provided a refuge and a power base where an 
ambitious Athenian could grow rich, acquire substantial tracts of territory, command 
private armies, and rule over subject populations.  This exploitation of Thrace as an 
outlet from or an alternative to Athens was first ventured directly following 
Pisistratus‟ third and final seizure of power in Athens.  Pisistratus‟ position was so 
unassailable that Miltiades the Elder jumped at the chance to leave Athens for the 
Thracian Chersonese, where he was made a tyrant in his own right and came to 
possess an area of vital strategic and economic importance.  Though Moreno contends 
that such overseas ventures were always made with power at Athens being the primary 
goal, Miltiades made no attempt to emulate Pisistratus‟ triumphant return at the head 
of Greek allies and Thracian retainers.
4
  Instead, he remained in the Chersonese and 
passed on his rule to two successors from the Philaid family, his nephews Stesagoras 
and Miltiades the Younger.   
 Alcibiades had made himself sufficiently valuable to the Athenians to be 
recalled from exile and reestablished as a leading general despite the affair of the 
herms and his defection to Sparta; his failure at Notium in 406, though, was the last 
straw for this would-be tyrant.  He had also burned his bridges at Sparta and had faced 
arrest in the Persian Empire.  But he had established ties in Thrace, where he turned as 
his last option.  For Alcibiades, Thrace was much more than a refuge from the angry 
Athenians and the other peoples he had alienated.  He came to possess valuable estates 
and led his own forces of Thracian soldiers, providing services for several Thracian 
rulers and even offering to supplement the Athenian force at Aegospotami.  Once 
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 Moreno 2007: 141. 
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power in Athens was no longer an option, Alcibiades found substantial power abroad 
in Thrace.  Iphicrates too, though he had been responsible for important Athenian 
victories in the past, lost the control of the Hellespont in the 380‟s, and failed to retake 
Amphipolis in the 360‟s.  On both occasions he likely faced prosecution at home or at 
the very least a loss of status and deprivation of command.  Furthermore, Iphicrates 
had little time for the political arena, and with the imposition of the King‟s Peace the 
prospect of lucrative and prestigious military expeditions at the behest of Athens was 
greatly diminished.  Thrace and the court of the Odrysian kings provided Iphicrates 
with a forum for military service, as well as an avenue to influence and wealth.    
 Many leading Athenians saw in Thrace a refuge that could spare them from the 
vicissitudes of Athenian public life.  Lysias accused Thrasybulus of pondering to 
abandon Athens in favor of a freelance career in Thracian lands (28.5-6).  There is no 
hard evidence that Lysias‟ charges were true, but members of the audience were 
probably inclined to believe them based on the precedent set by other generals, 
notably Thrasybulus‟ associate Alcibiades.  Athenian politics were volatile and the 
demos was notoriously fickle.  Despite his prestige and prior service for the polis, 
Thrasybulus did experience varying political fortunes at Athens.  While Pisistratus 
was able for a time to end the cycle of aristocrats forcing one another out of power and 
even out of Athens itself, few other elites managed to do the same.  The younger 
Miltiades returned to Athens from the Chersonese in 493 and enjoyed a position of 
considerable influence in the city, but not without facing a charge of tyranny at the 
hands of his rivals.  Even though he was credited with the victory at Marathon, shortly 
afterwards he fell into disgrace after an unsuccessful expedition to Paros.  His son 
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Cimon recouped his family‟s political and monetary fortunes through campaigns 
abroad, largely in Thrace, but Cimon too was eventually ousted by his rivals.  The 
same pattern is true for countless other elite Athenians and their families.  Ties abroad 
were often an avenue to power in Athens, but they were also utilized as insurance 
against a loss of power.  This aspect of foreign connections is not fully addressed in 
Moreno‟s study. 
 Chapter 6 provides several control cases involving Athenians such as Conon 
and Chabrias who served abroad and had ties to places other than Thrace.  Though it is 
beyond the scope of this study, perhaps another appropriate set of controls would be 
those Athenians who did not need to rely on foreign connections to achieve positions 
of power in Athens, especially those who enjoyed lasting power without the specter of 
political eclipse or worse.  Pericles provides a stark exception to the normal patterns of 
Athenian public life.  Though he spearheaded many expeditions abroad, he did not 
rely on foreign ties to solidify his place at Athens.  Once in power, he remained there 
as a virtual autocrat until his death, though we can never know what would have 
become of his political career had he survived to see the war take a turn for the worse.  
For those unable to achieve what Pericles did, Thrace promised an alternative venue 
for power, wealth, and prestige removed from the rivalries and constraints of 
democratic politics.  Because Thrace was materially rich and strategically situated 
while being weakly governed, and because it was located just across the Aegean 
within easy reach of Athens, it beckoned ambitious Athenians in ways other locales 
could not.  As an outlet for the power-hungry, Thrace saved Athens from a great deal 
of political strife. 
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Military 
 Thracian soldiers, especially light-armed peltasts, had a great impact on the 
development of Greek tactics, a point which has been made by many scholars and 
refined substantially by Best.  As Best has shown, peltasts became a regular presence 
in Greek infantries from the last quarter of the fifth century on, though they never 
replaced the hoplite phalanx as the primary military arm of virtually every Greek state.  
Greeks themselves were often prized as mercenaries in the fourth century precisely 
because they were heavy infantrymen, a type of soldier underrepresented in the armies 
of the Persians and other non-Greek powers.
5
  Several factors prevented the Greeks 
from realizing a lasting combined-arms force.  Greek poleis could not maintain 
professional armies for extended periods, which was essential for the intensive 
training and expertise required for an effective variegated force.  On those occasions 
when Greek soldiers did take the field for years at a time, such as the March of the Ten 
Thousand, effective ways of integrating heavy and light infantry were developed and 
utilized, often to great effect.  The Greeks were also constrained by their own military 
conventions, the predominance of the hoplite ethos in particular.  As the Spartan 
hoplites at Sphacteria displayed contempt for the missile troops that forced them to 
surrender, good Athenian hoplites disdained the “naval mob” that had been 
empowered by their role as rowers in the fleet (Thuc. 8.72.2).
6
  The level of prejudice 
was often so great that commanders strove to fight de facto hoplite battles even at sea, 
                                                 
5
 See Best 1969: 110-119. 
6
 These sentiments are also expressed in the so-called Old Oligarch‟s essay on Athenian government.  
For a synopsis of this text, including its treatment of the naval mob, see Cartledge 2009: 140-142. 
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privileging the hoplite soldier over the lowly rower.
7
        
 But Greek tactics did evolve nonetheless, however delayed by the dogged 
persistence of the hoplite phalanx.  Contacts with Thrace played no small part in this, 
starting well before the career of Iphicrates.  Beyond the incorporation of the peltast, 
the evidence indicates that Thracians had a broader military influence than scholars 
have recognized.  In the Chersonese, the Philaids had to come to terms with a different 
type of enemy, one making use of non-phalanx tactics and also one prone to raiding 
and the avoidance of pitched battle.  Miltiades the Elder put a stop to enemy attacks on 
his territory by building a wall across the entire peninsula and leading raiding parties 
of his own which probably included both Greeks and Thracian Dolonci.  The strategy 
of the barrier wall was repeated many times throughout antiquity, and its effectiveness 
in the Chersonese is demonstrated by the several occasions on which Miltiades‟ wall 
was rebuilt and strengthened.  On a vase from the late sixth century the younger 
Miltiades is praised as “kalos” to accompany an image of a mounted archer dressed in 
barbarian fashion.  Perhaps the horse-loving Philaids and their fellow Greek settlers in 
the north worked alongside native mounted troops or even adopted such tactics 
themselves.  Back in mainland Greece, Miltiades might have applied the lessons 
learned from experience in Thrace.  At Marathon, a battle led by Miltiades only three 
years after his return from the Chersonese, Greek hoplites charged at a run and slaves 
fought along with their masters, both for the first time.  The famous charge might 
                                                 
7
 Strauss (2000) argues that at the Battle of Eurymedon, Cimon modified his triremes to hold more 
hoplites for the political purpose of undercutting the importance of the thetic rowers.  Fornara (1966) 
plausibly argued that the hoplite victory on the small island of Psyttaleia during the Battle of Salamis 
was exaggerated by Herodotus‟ sources in order to highlight the hoplite achievement at the expense of 
the navy.  
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reflect Miltiades‟ experience with enemy archers, and the slaves might have acted as 
light troops on the flanks, a tactic often employed by Thracian troops.  A prejudice 
against slaves and the elevation of Marathon as the quintessential hoplite moment 
explain our sources‟ reluctance to expound upon the role of the slaves and other novel 
tactics employed in the battle. 
In the fifth century several Athenian military leaders continued the Thracian 
connection.  Hagnon successfully founded a colony in the midst of Thracian tribes and 
led the Thracian infantry of the Odrysian king Sitalces.  Hagnon appears to have 
alerted his fellow Athenian generals to the usefulness of Thracian troops, and also how 
best to employ them.  He had led the fearsome Dioi in 429/8, a group slated to serve 
with Demosthenes in Sicily in 413.  Demosthenes himself was a pioneer in light-
armed tactics, and had used Thracians and other mercenaries at Pylos in 425 to defeat 
the Spartans.  At Pylos, Demosthenes worked in conjunction with Cleon, a man with 
some Thracian ties of his own.  It was Cleon that had arranged for the contingent of 
light troops to be sent to Pylos.  While Cleon tried to make use of Thracian 
mercenaries in the struggle to retake Amphipolis a few years later, he was defeated by 
Brasidas before his Thracian help arrived.  In 413 the Dioi had arrived too late to serve 
with Demosthenes.  Instead, the Athenians sent them back to Thrace under the 
command of Dieitrephes, another figure with an awareness of how these Thracian 
soldiers could be effectively utilized.  Dieitrephes and the Dioi ravaged the territory of 
Tanagra and then carried out a surprise attack on Mycalessus after ascending to a 
mountain pass in the dark.   
 After the defeat in Sicily, the main theatre of the Peloponnesian War was the 
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Aegean, especially along the coast of Ionia and the Thraceward region to the north.  
Two leading players in this phase of the war were Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, and 
both conducted numerous campaigns in Thrace and led Thracian soldiers.  Alcibiades 
had Thracian horsemen and peltasts at his beck and call, which he offered to the 
Athenians at Aegospotami.  Thrasybulus used Thracians in the struggle against the 
Thirty Tyrants at Athens, and the evidence indicates that he well understood the 
proper tactical use of Thracian troops.  He attacked the forces of the Thirty at dawn 
after descending from the lofty mountain fort of Phyle by night, and his troops cut 
down hundreds of their enemies with missile weapons.  In the Piraeus, Thrasybulus 
arranged his Thracian and other light-armed soldiers on the high ground behind his 
own phalanx from where they could rain down missiles on the Thirty‟s hoplites.  
These and other ingenious deployments of Thracian and Thracian-style soldiers 
occurred well before Iphicrates‟ destruction of the Spartan mora at Corinth and before 
his famous infantry reforms.   
Iphicrates himself learned much from his experiences with Thracians.  He was 
indeed a skilled captain of peltasts, but he seems also to have taken steps to create the 
ideally versatile infantry soldier.  During his campaign in Egypt, he was unable to 
marshal complementary contingents of hoplites and peltasts, so he improvised by 
equipping his troops such that they could fight in close order or dash out to harass and 
pursue the enemy as the situation demanded.  Best rightly asserts that Nepos and 
Diodorus erred in ascribing to Iphicrates the introduction or regularization of peltasts 
through these novel measures.  But Iphicrates did show an ability to innovate based on 
his experiences with Thracian troops.  It seems more likely that his new type of 
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versatile soldier did not become a regular feature of fourth century Greek armies 
because of the constraints placed on Greek militaries – especially a lack of continuous 
training – rather than because he made no such innovations.  
The prominent Athenians with connections to Thrace were likely instrumental 
in bringing Thracian troops into Athenian service.  A man like Hagnon, politically and 
militarily eminent in Athens prior to and during the Peloponnesian War, would have 
told figures such as Demosthenes and Cleon how valuable Thracian fighters could be, 
and he would have drawn upon his ties to Sitalces and other leading Thracians to 
procure the services of the Dioi and those like them.  As the Greek poleis lining the 
northern Aegean coast developed Thracian tactics due to their proximity to and 
experience with Thracian tribes, so too would Athens, with many of its renowned 
citizens intimately tied to Thrace, have appreciated the utility of Thracian tactics from 
sheer exposure to them.  Simply put, Athens played a leading role in the incorporation 
of Thracian elements into Greek warfare because many Athenian military leaders 
spent time in Thrace and were connected to the Thracians.  Those who study Greek 
military developments, including Best, have not taken this relationship into account.  
 The tacticians who introduced new methods of warfare had to be open to 
experimentation outside the bounds of traditional military practice.  Vidal-Naquet has 
plausibly argued that the Athenian navy was able to experiment with novel ways of 
fighting because it was a relatively new arm of the military and was manned by lower 
classes of Athenians.  The ideology of the hoplite phalanx could thus be circumvented.  
In the fourth century, Plato disparaged naval victories as due to techne rather than any 
innate virtue on the part of the combatants.  By implication, the ritualized nature of 
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phalanx battle ensured that battles were won by the moral qualities of the victors 
instead of clever trickery or cunning maneuver.
8
  What led Athenian commanders to 
embrace new ways of fighting that were so often disdained by the hoplite classes and 
the cultural elite alike?  
Iphicrates and other influential leaders of peltasts cared little whether their 
soldiers were seen as legitimate according to the prevailing ethos.  Throughout their 
careers, Thrace-haunters demonstrated that they were not tied down by civic ideology 
or obeisance before the ethics embraced by the demos.  They turned to Thrace in the 
first place largely because they were out of step with Athenian ideals and constraints.  
They did not strive for a reputation as model citizens in the eyes of their fellow 
Athenians, but rather they sought the aggrandizement of power, wealth, and prestige.  
In the same way, they saw that unconventional tactics could be very effective in 
achieving their military ends.  It was to Iphicrates‟ advantage that the Spartans at 
Lechaeum stuck to more or less regular hoplite tactics and made themselves 
vulnerable when they attempted to modify these tactics by breaking formation to 
pursue the peltasts.  The Spartans might have disdained the ranged troops arrayed 
against them at Sphacteria, but there too unconventional tactics, noble or otherwise, 
carried the day.  Leading barbarian troops, marrying barbarian princess, and courting 
the favor of barbarian kings were activities often reviled at Athens, and more than 
once led to prosecution in the courts.  But such methods could achieve the desired 
outcomes for those who practiced them.  In Thrace-haunters, experience with the 
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 Vidal-Naquet 1999 [1968]: 228-234.  See especially Plat. Laws 706b-c, where naval crews are 
compared unfavorably to hoplites.  Whereas hoplites courageously stand their ground, naval tactics 
often dictate tactical retreats.   
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Thracians and an awareness of the military value of Thracian troops was coupled with 
a willingness to employ new and “ungentlemanly” tactics regardless of social and 
cultural stigma. 
The figures examined in this study were ready to take unprecedented military 
measures well beyond battlefield tactics.  Miltiades the Younger freed large numbers 
of slaves to fight at Marathon, and those slaves that fell in the battle were buried on 
the plain itself, just as the Athenian citizens were.  This remarkable emancipation and 
enfranchisement was not repeated until after the Battle of Arginusae eight and a half 
decades later.  Thrasybulus tried to reward his supporters, which included Greek and 
non-Greek metics resident at Athens and probably also Thracian mercenaries, with full 
citizenship rights.  These non-Athenians played a crucial part in restoring the Athenian 
democracy, but Thrasybulus‟ attempts at honoring them were quashed in the face of 
opposition, and he himself was brought up on a charge of introducing an unlawful 
motion.
9
  Freeing slaves and enfranchising foreigners were sometimes useful and even 
necessary measures, but they were few and far between.  Athenian attitudes persisted 
towards slaves and foreigners, and also towards non-hoplite troops in general.   
In the fourth century the most important land battles were fought between 
opposing phalanxes, which is perhaps the greatest testimony to Greek reluctance to 
adopt the new tactics and embrace the measures pioneered in large part by Thrace-
haunters.  In Herodotus, the Persian general Mardonius mocks the Greek style of 
battle, namely finding a level plain and fighting it out on even terms without either 
side attempting to employ strategic devices or make use of advantageous terrain 
                                                 
9
 Hunt (2001) argues that part of the reason the generals of Arginusae were brought up on trial was that 
they advocated a policy of freeing and enfranchising the slaves who rowed in the fleet. 
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(7.9b).  This is an exaggeration to be sure, but, so far as we can tell, even at Chaeronea 
in 338 the Greek forces consisted overwhelmingly of traditional citizen hoplites.  They 
were crushed by Philip‟s variegated and professionally trained army.10 
 
Cultural 
 When it comes to the cultural attractions Thrace held for certain Athenians, we 
can engage only in plausible speculation.  Did the horse-loving Philaids feel at home 
among the people of the Chersonese, who were themselves fond of horse-racing and 
skilled at mounted warfare?  Did the vain and pompous Alcibiades fit in well with the 
Thracians who expected their leaders to be ostentatious; and did Iphicrates appreciate 
the feasts to which he was treated by the Odrysians, especially in contrast to the 
apparent sparseness of dinners at Athens?  In short, did Athenian leaders who were 
prone to what the Athenians might have viewed as personal excess find a cultural 
outlet in Thrace?  I think the answer is yes, though it is impossible to say to what 
extent such cultural factors were involved in attracting these Athenians to Thrace.   
Many Athenians, especially members of the hippeis, found Thracian attributes 
to be an appropriate expression of their social status.  From black and red-figure vase-
painting to the sculptural reliefs on the Parthenon, Athenian horsemen were regularly 
portrayed with Thracian clothing and equipment.  To be sure, the peltast was often 
                                                 
10
 This battle has been notoriously difficult to reconstruct.  Our principal source is Diod. 16.85-86, 
supplemented with Polyaen. 4.2.2, 7.  For a good reconstruction, see Hammond et al. 1972-1988: vol.2, 
596-603.  Diodorus says that Philip had in addition to his infantry no less than 2000 cavalry.  The role 
of the cavalry in the battle is disputed.  See, for example, Gaebel (2002: 154-157) who argues that, 
despite most scholarly reconstructions of the battle, the Macedonian cavalry could not have broken the 
densely packed phalanx of the Theban Sacred Band.  In any case, Philip‟s own phalanx was expertly 
trained and had the advantage in technology with the longer sarissa that replaced the conventional 
hoplite spear.  As the mainland Greeks developed no arm that could contend with heavy cavalry, so too 
did they fail to adapt to the threat posed by the Macedonian phalanx.      
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depicted as the antithesis of the heroic hoplite, and Thracians were associated with 
emblems of the barbarian other and foreign excess.  But there is no mistaking that the 
Athenians had a fascination for the Thracians, one which seems to have been exploited 
by some members of the upper classes.   
Maybe some truly did find Thracian culture to be a better expression of their 
aristocratic ideals, ideals that were out of fashion within the Athenian democracy.  
Also, many aspects of traditional elite training and education were out of step with the 
assembly-driven polis.  Horsemanship, athletic prowess, and even martial skill and 
courage did not guarantee that political power would be granted by the demos.  
Alcibiades felt entitled to rule partly because he had won resplendent victories at 
Olympia.  Other aristocrats probably felt the same.  To Athenian eyes at least, the 
Thracians continued to revere brave warriors, whom they sometimes buried with their 
beloved horses.  The Thracian ruler derived legitimacy from his martial prowess, his 
wealth, and his ability to reward his friends.  He could also expect to be honored by 
his subjects with lavish gifts reminiscent of the symbols of geras so coveted by 
Homer‟s basileis.    
 In the end, Thrace made many Athenians rich and powerful.  Part of this power 
certainly derived from their ability to appropriate Thracian cultural practices.  Among 
Thracian dynasts the custom was to feast and exchange valuable gifts.  Iphicrates, 
therefore, would have happily accepted the gifts given to him by his father-in-law 
along with lavish feasts and the other trappings of Thracian power.  The Philaids 
would hardly have discouraged the honoring of the elder Miltiades with a cult, as this 
cult would only have enhanced their own claims to power.  And so forth.  Sensible 
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political actors are able to work within the prevailing ethos, regardless of their own 
beliefs.     
 The question of the divinity of Alexander the Great may provide a useful 
parallel.  Throughout the course of his conquest of Asia, Alexander appropriated 
elements of the god-king model typical of the Persian rulers that preceded him.  For 
example, he encouraged his Iranian subjects to honor him by proskynesis, the kneeling 
homage traditionally paid to the Persian king (Arr. An. 4.10; Curt. 8.5).  As his reign 
progressed, he promoted the idea of his divinity ever more explicitly, establishing the 
model for the cults of Hellenistic monarchs.
11
  Was his assumption of divine honors 
simply a means to win over his new subjects?  Or did he actually believe he was 
divine?  Both were probably true to a certain extent.  Alexander could have been an 
insightful political and cultural manipulator while at the same time gratifying his own 
predispositions.
12
  The analogy can be stretched further if we consider that while these 
activities might have appealed to Alexander‟s Iranian subjects, they incensed the 
Macedonians.  In the same way, Thrace-haunters were routinely subjected to censure 
and even prosecution at home because of their affinity for barbarians.    
With the Thrace-haunters, careful political calculation need not have been 
divorced from an attraction to Thracian cultural practices.  Demosthenes‟ suggestion 
that a desire for exousia was a prime motivation in turning to Thrace rings true 
                                                 
11
 See Bosworth (2006 [1988]: 278-290) for a full treatment of Alexander‟s divinity. 
12
 See, for example, Edmunds (1971) who argues that Alexander‟s religiosity went well beyond the 
requirements of his office or the purposes of propaganda.  There is considerable debate concerning the 
extent to which Alexander pursued a deliberate policy of cultural and political fusion between 
Macedonians and Asians, of which his adoption of Persian customs might have been part.  Long ago 
Berve (1938) suggested that Alexander followed a careful, predetermined policy, while more recently 
Bosworth (1980) has argued that Alexander reacted as necessary to the various challenges of governing 
an empire filled with disparate peoples, making up policy decisions such as integration of Iranian troops 
and adoption of foreign customs as he went along.    
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(23.57).  At the same time, we should not dismiss out of hand Theopompus‟ charge 
that Chabrias and other generals were too profligate and ostentatious for Athenian 
society (FGrHist 115 F 105).  Such sentiment had indeed become a well-worn topos in 
the fourth century, but many of those Athenians that turned to Thrace seemed 
genuinely dissatisfied with the restraints of Athenian society.  In Thrace power and 
wealth could be coupled with a pseudo-heroic lifestyle.  This might have added to the 
appeal.      
 
The exact relationship between what Athens as a polis tried to accomplish 
overseas in Thrace and what were the personal ventures of individual Athenians is 
often unclear.  What is clear, however, is that for two centuries Athens and Thrace 
were intimately linked.  These ties were forged and maintained by a set of individuals 
and families that Aristophanes aptly described as Thrace-haunters.  Many of these 
Thrace-haunters were the most distinguished figures in the polis and were often those 
who shaped and effected Athenian policy at home and abroad.  At the same time, they 
were frequently denied the power they sought at Athens and were forced to look 
elsewhere.  From Pisistratus‟ seizure of power with the help of Thracian mercenaries 
and Pangaeum gold, to Athens‟ preoccupation with Amphipolis, the colony founded 
by Hagnon; and from the light-armed troops arrayed against the Spartans at Pylos, to 
the extreme measures aimed at safeguarding the Chersonese in the face of Philip‟s 
expanding empire, Thrace and the Thrace-haunters had a profound influence on the 
course of Athenian history.  
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